Martin v. Easton Publishing Co.

85 F.R.D. 312, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10038
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 24, 1980
DocketCiv. A. No. 76-2899
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 85 F.R.D. 312 (Martin v. Easton Publishing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 85 F.R.D. 312, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10038 (E.D. Pa. 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TROUTMAN, District Judge.

Chronicled previously, the history of and asseverations in this litigation no longer require expatiation.1 The present dispute centers on a discovery order entered by the magistrate and directing plaintiff to answer certain interrogatories which defendants originally propounded in June 1978.2 Shortly thereafter plaintiff filed answers and did not object to any questions. However, defendants claimed that plaintiff’s answers were so general that they failed to identify a single fact, witness or document supporting any of plaintiff’s claims. Generally, defendants asked plaintiff to identify any experts or statisticians whom she consulted or expected to call at trial and to identify the persons, facts or documents upon which plaintiff intended to rely in proving her claims of sex discrimination. In essence, plaintiff replied that she had not decided whether to retain any experts or statisticians and that all of the other information which defendants requested could be located either in her notebooks,3 depositions, or in employment information sup[314]*314plied by defendant.4 More specifically, plaintiff argued that her deposition testimony and notebooks amply provided the requested information and that ordering plaintiff to shoulder the inevitably substantial cost of clerical and legal services in ferreting this information from the discovery material imposed an intolerable burden on plaintiff and seriously jeopardized her ability to prepare her own case. The magistrate granted defendants’ motion to compel. Plaintiff now appeals from that order.

In the first two interrogatories defendants seek to learn whom plaintiff expects to call as an expert witness at trial and whom plaintiff specially consulted or employed in preparation for trial but does not expect to call as a witness.5 Plaintiff replied that to date she has not employed or consulted any experts in preparing her case. Nor did she anticipate calling an expert to testify at trial. However, plaintiff did reserve the right to do so at some future date.

The identity of experts to be called at trial or specially employed or consulted in preparation therefor clearly lies within the scope of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4). Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D.Pa.1980). At the outset of the case plaintiff may not have decided whether to retain or consult any experts. However, almost four years have now elapsed since plaintiff filed her suit. The magistrate originally ordered completion of discovery by October 1978. The case rapidly approaches the eve of trial. To require plaintiff to commit herself now requires no more of her than any other litigant whose day in court draws nigh. Defendants need this information in order to prepare for cross-examination and to decide whether to employ their own expert.

In Interrogatory Three defendants want to know if plaintiff intends to call a statistician at trial. In Interrogatory Four defendants ask plaintiff to state the statistical bases of her claims.6 As noted above, at this stage of the litigation defendants are entitled to know whether plaintiff expects to use statistical evidence as proof of her claims. Whether defendants should prepare statistical testimony in response thereto and what kind and concerning what issues of statistical proof defendants should anticipate all depend on plaintiff’s decision to call a statistician or to use statistics as proof of discrimination. This knowledge is also essential for defendants to prepare cross-examination. Defendants cannot know what, if any, statistics plaintiff intends to offer or on what issues she will attempt to use statistics to buttress her individual case. General statistics relating to employment policies “may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized . . . decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason” for the employer’s actions. McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 n. 19, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1826, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Even more importantly,

[i]f the defendants in a Title VII suit believe there to be any reason to discredit plaintiffs’ statistics that does not appear on their face, the opportunity to challenge them is available to the defendants just as in any other lawsuit. They may endeavor to impeach the reliability of the statistical evidence, they may offer rebutting evidence, they may disparage in arguments or in briefs the probative weight which the plaintiffs’ evidence should be accorded.

Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 338, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2731, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). Once again, to require plaintiff to decide whether she will use statistical evidence at this late point in the proceedings is necessary to expedite the case to trial and to afford defendants a fair opportunity to also present their evidence.

In Interrogatories Five through Eight defendants want plaintiff to divulge [315]*315her knowledge of any individual circumstances (other than those affecting her specifically) which she contends would indicate a pattern and practice of discrimination.7 More specifically, these interrogatories require plaintiff to identify evidence which supports her claim that her treatment was typical of a pattern and practice of sex discrimination by defendants. Plaintiff referred defendants to her three notebooks, which consist of approximately 630 pages, deposition transcripts which cover almost 2000 pages of testimony, and to employment data supplied by defendants.8 Plaintiff cannot escape her responsibility of providing direct, complete and honest answers to interrogatories with the cavalier assertion that required information can be found in this massive amount of material. Rather, plaintiff must state specifically and identify precisely which documents will provide the desired information. Flour Mills of America, Inc. v. Pace, 75 F.R.D. 676 (E.D.Okl.1977), Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D.Mass.1976), Budget-Rent-A-Car of Missouri, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 55 F.R.D. 354 (W.D.Mo.1972). Defendants are entitled to know the factual content of plaintiff’s claims with a reasonable degree of precision. Harlem River Consumers Cooperative, Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 459 (S.D.N.Y.1974). Incorporation by reference to a deposition is not a responsive answer, for “[t]he fact that a witness testified on a particular subject does not necessarily mean that a party who is required to answer interrogatories adopts the substance of the testimony to support his claim or contention.” J. J. Delaney Carpet Co. v. Forrest Mills, Inc., 34 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y.1963). Plaintiff also cannot answer one interrogatory simply by referring defendants to another equally unresponsive answer. Trabon Engineering Corp. v. Easton Manufacturing Co., 37 F.R.D. 51 (N.D.Ohio 1964).

In Interrogatories Nine and Ten defendants inquire of plaintiff when an alleged conspiracy transpired, the parts played by each defendant and what acts constituted this conspiracy.9 Plaintiff’s answers parrot ones described above.

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Bluebook (online)
85 F.R.D. 312, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10038, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martin-v-easton-publishing-co-paed-1980.