Marlin Gougher v. Gelene

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedSeptember 27, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-07978
StatusUnknown

This text of Marlin Gougher v. Gelene (Marlin Gougher v. Gelene) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marlin Gougher v. Gelene, (C.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARLIN GOUGHER, Case No. 2:23-cv-07978-FMO-PD

12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING 13 v. PETITION WITHOUT 14 GELENE, et al., PREJUDICE 15 Respondents. 16

17 On September 22, 2023, Marlin Gougher (“Petitioner”), a federal 18 prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an “Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas 19 Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody under 28 U. S. C. § 2241” (“Petition”). 20 [Dkt. No. 1.] For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be 21 dismissed. 22 23 I. Background and Petitioner’s Contentions 24 Petitioner is presently housed at the Federal Correctional Institution at 25 Lompoc (“FCI Lompoc”), which is within the Central District of California. 26 [Dkt. No. 1.]1 He brings his Petition on behalf of himself and other similarly 27 28 1 Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court takes judicial 1 situated and formerly situated inmates against B. Unit Manager Gelene, B. 2 Unit Counselor Macias, and Maintenance Supervisor Keneon (collectively, 3 (“Respondents”)). [Id.] Petitioner alleges a violation of the Eighth 4 Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. [Id. at 3.] 5 Petitioner is housed in Building “B” at FCI Lompoc and alleges that the 6 ventilation and heating systems in his Building, and Buildings “A”, “J”, and 7 “K”, are inadequate. [Id. at 2-4.] Petitioner and other inmates are forced to 8 hang blankets or sheets around their beds in order to protect themselves from 9 the cold air. [Id.] Petitioner alleges that correctional officers at FCI Lompoc 10 are instructed to take down or confiscate blankets and sheets in the “name of 11 appearance, when in reality it is to inflict physical and psychological torture” 12 on inmates. [Id. at 3.] Petitioner also alleges that the lack of proper 13 ventilation and heating could be viewed as elder abuse as well as violating the 14 Americans with Disabilities Act. [Id.] Petitioner suggests that the situation 15 could be remedied by ordering the Bureau of Prisons to weld or replace the windows in the housing units, install a duct system with a filter, or add 16 heaters. [Id. at 5-6.] 17 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 A. Duty to Screen the Petition 20 A habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is subject to the same 21 screening requirements that apply to habeas petitions brought under 28 22 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States 23 District Courts (“Habeas Rules”), Rule 1(b) (providing that district courts may 24

25 also Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F. 3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that a court may take judicial notice of court records). Petitioner was convicted in the 26 United States District Court for the Southern District of California of distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography and sentenced in December 2017 to 200 27 months in custody. United States v. Martin Lee Gougher, 3:14-cr00635-WQH-1. 28 1 apply the Habeas Rules to habeas petitions that are not brought under 28 2 U.S.C. § 2254). Accordingly, a district court “must promptly examine” the 3 petition and, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached 4 exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief,” the “judge must dismiss 5 the petition.” Habeas Rule 4; Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005); Lane v. 6 Feather, 584 F. App’x 843, 843 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s 7 application of Habeas Rule 4 to dismiss Section 2241 petition). The Court has 8 reviewed the Petition under Rule 4 of the Habeas Rules and finds the Petition 9 is subject to dismissal for the reasons explained below. 10 B. To the Extent Petitioner Seeks to Bring his Petition on Behalf of Other Inmates, He May Not Do So 11 It is well-established that pro se litigants have no authority to represent 12 anyone other than themselves. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 13 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (non-attorney may not attempt to pursue claim on behalf 14 of others in a representative capacity); Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 15 79 (9th Cir. 1962) (“A litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority 16 to represent anyone other than himself.”); see also McShane v. United States, 17 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966). “Although a non-attorney may appear in 18 propria persona in his own behalf, that privilege is personal to him. He has 19 no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.” C.E. Pope 20 Equity Trust v. U.S., 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). As 21 such, Petitioner cannot pursue this case on behalf of similarly situated or 22 formerly situated inmates. 23 C. Petitioner’s Claims Are Not Cognizable on Habeas Review 24 “Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to 25 imprisonment”— a petition for habeas corpus and a civil rights complaint. 26 Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam). Relief in the 27 form of a writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a person in custody under 28 the authority of the United States if the petitioner can show that he is “in 1 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 2 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1), (3). In general, habeas proceedings provide a 3 forum in which to challenge the “legality or duration” of a prisoner’s 4 confinement. Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 1979) (as 5 amended); see also Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927, 934 (9th Cir. 2016) 6 (en banc) (habeas is “the exclusive vehicle” for claims that fall within “the core 7 of habeas corpus,” that is, claims challenging “the fact or duration of the 8 conviction or sentence”). By contrast, a civil rights action is the “proper 9 remedy” for a petitioner asserting “a constitutional challenge to the conditions 10 of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.” Preiser v. 11 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 12 (2004) (“[C]onstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a 13 prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive 14 relief, fall outside of [the] core” of habeas corpus and instead, should be 15 brought as a civil rights action “in the first instance”); Greenhill v. Lappin, 376 F. App’x 757 (9th Cir.

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Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Muhammad v. Close
540 U.S. 749 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Nelson v. Campbell
541 U.S. 637 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Mayle v. Felix
545 U.S. 644 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Harris v. County of Orange
682 F.3d 1126 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc.
546 F.3d 661 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Anthony Greenhill v. Harley Lappin
376 F. App'x 757 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Damous Nettles v. Randy Grounds
830 F.3d 922 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Ramirez v. Galaza
334 F.3d 850 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
United States v. Davis
584 F. App'x 843 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)

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Marlin Gougher v. Gelene, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marlin-gougher-v-gelene-cacd-2023.