Marion W. Jackson v. Elliott L. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare

449 F.2d 1326, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7425
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedOctober 26, 1971
Docket71-2107
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 449 F.2d 1326 (Marion W. Jackson v. Elliott L. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marion W. Jackson v. Elliott L. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 449 F.2d 1326, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7425 (5th Cir. 1971).

Opinion

GEWIN, Circuit Judge:

Marion W. Jackson appeals from the judgment of the district court affirming upon review under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act 1 the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, holding that he is not entitled to a period of disability or to disability insurance benefits under §§ 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act. 2 After a careful review of the record and briefs in this case we find ourselves compelled to disagree with the court’s finding that the Secretary’s determination is supported by substantial evidence, and therefore vacate and remand.

This court is fully cognizant of the narrow scope of judicial review of the Secretary’s decision which is permitted by the Act 3 and the presumptive weight which attaches to the Secretary’s findings. 4 In cases of this type courts are limited to considering whether the decision of the Secretary is supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Blanks v. Richardson, 439 F.2d 1158, 1159 (5th Cir. 1971). The court is not to retry the case de novo and may not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary, Alsobrooks v. Gardner, 357 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1966); Bridges v. Gardner, 368 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1966). Nevertheless, substantial evidence required to uphold the Secretary’s findings and decision is more than a mere scintilla, and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Williams v. Finch, 440 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1971); Bridges v. Gardner, supra; Merrell v. Gardner, 397 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1968).

In order to qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must have impairments which deprive him of his capacity to work to the extent that he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity. 5

The Hearing Examiner recognized in his findings that Jackson suffers from a respiratory problem, an epigastric condition, and the surgical absence of his right arm [amputated 6 inches below the shoulder as a result of an injury while in the armed forces during World War II]. In his analysis, the Hearing Examiner considered the evidence tending to show that Jackson was afflicted to a degree with arthritis. However, he concluded that in’ the absence of films confirming the condition, the arthritis does not constitute a significant impairment of Jackson’s ability to function.

*1328 The Hearing Examiner concluded that these physical impairments, considered singly or in combination with each other, were not sufficiently severe to entitle Jackson to disability benefits. Additionally he found that Jackson’s impairments do not prevent him from engaging in substantial gainful activity in either his usual occupation in a gas station or as an operator of a retail store, or in some other light to sedentary work areas described in the testimony of the vocational expert.

Our review of the record convinces us that there is little dispute with respect to Jackson’s physical impairments. The central issue for the Hearing Examiner and the Secretary was whether those impairments result in such disability as would prevent Jackson from engaging in substantial gainful activity within the terms of the statute. After a careful examination of the entire record we are convinced that the Secretary’s conclusion that Jackson’s impairments nevertheless permit him to engage in substantial gainful activity is not supported by substantial evidence.

The first part of the Hearing Examiner’s conclusion was that Jackson has the functional capacity to resume his usual occupation in a gas station or as an operator of a retail store. The record is devoid of any support for this conclusion. The uncontroverted medical evidence established that Jackson suffered from chronic bronchitis, with probable emphysema; 6 chronic gastritis ; 7 and the surgical absence of his right arm. The undisputed medical evidence also established that Jackson is unable to participate in activities which require physical exertion. 8

The vocational expert summoned by the Hearing Examiner was asked by the Examiner how he would characterize Jackson’s work prior to his work in the gas station or in the retail store; he answered :

“Well, from a worker trait characteristic point of view, I would say that it would range from light to heavy jobs that would require stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, reaching, lifting, standing, walking, talking, hearing.”

The vocational expert was then asked how he would classify Jackson’s work in the gas station and in the grocery store and again responded, from light to heavy. Significantly, the vocational expert did not at any time suggest that a man with Jackson’s impairments could perform either as a gas station or retail store operator. In fact the vocational expert observed that all of the jobs which he had suggested for a man in Jackson’s position were less demanding physically than running a grocery store [Jackson’s last employment]. In view of the clear evidence establishing the disability we conclude that there is no con *1329 trary evidence in the record to support the Hearing Examiner’s conclusion that Jackson could return to his former occupation.

But the Hearing Examiner also found that even if it be concluded that Jackson could not return to his former work, “the testimony of the vocational expert makes clear that there are a number of jobs in the regional and national economy, although perhaps not all the jobs mentioned, for which the claimant is qualified by age, education and experience.”

In order to place the vocational expert's testimony into proper perspective, it is necessary to review the conclusions of the expert in the context of his examination by the examiner. The Hearing Examiner posed a hypothetical question in the following terms:

Q. * * * I am going to ask you that taking into consideration what you have heard here today and from examination of the exhibits, can you suggest any work in the national economy that you think this claimant can do, taking into account his testimony today?
A.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
449 F.2d 1326, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7425, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marion-w-jackson-v-elliott-l-richardson-secretary-of-health-education-ca5-1971.