Maria Felipe Suchite, an individual on behalf of herself and others v. ABM Aviation, Inc., a Georgia corporation, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: July 22, 2024
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00003
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIA FELIPE SUCHITE, an individual Case No.: 24cv3-LL-SBC on behalf of herself and others, 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Plaintiffs, 13 COMPEL ARBITRATION AND v. STRIKING CLASS CLAIMS AND 14 STAYING THE ACTION PENDING ABM AVIATION, INC., a Georgia 15 PLAINTIFF SUCHITE’S corporation, et al. ARBITRATION 16 Defendants. 17 [ECF No. 8]

19 Plaintiff Maria Felipe Suchite (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant 20 ABM Aviation, Inc. and ABM Industries Incorporated (“Defendants”) asserting ten causes 21 of action arising from her employment with Defendants. ECF No. 1 at 33-66 (hereinafter 22 “Complaint”). Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims 23 pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. ECF No. 8. Defendants also move to strike class 24 allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss or stay the action. Id. Plaintiff filed an 25 Opposition to Defendants’ Motion (“Oppo.”), and Defendants filed a Reply. ECF Nos. 11, 26 13. The Court finds this matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral 27 1 argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1. Upon review of the parties’ submissions and 2 the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration. The 3 Court also GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Class Allegations in the Complaint 4 and STAYS the action pending the completion of Plaintiff’s individual arbitration. 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 In or around August 2023, Plaintiff began working as a cleaner in the Southwest 7 Airline terminal at the San Diego International Airport for Defendants. Complaint ¶ 21; 8 see also ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 5 (hereinafter “Tamada Decl.”). Plaintiff alleges that she worked 9 there until she was “involuntarily terminated” by Defendants on October 6, 2023. 10 Complaint ¶ 21. As part of her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff entered into a written 11 “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” (hereinafter “Agreement”). Tamada Decl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff’s 12 Job Offer Letter, which includes the Agreement, was signed by Plaintiff on July 26, 2023. 13 ECF No. 8-1 at 7-21 (“Exhibit 1 to the Tamada Decl.”). The Agreement provides in 14 relevant part: 15 [T]he Company and I agree as follows . . . . Final and binding arbitration before a single, neutral arbitrator, instead of a judge and jury in court, shall be 16 the exclusive remedy for any ‘Covered Claim’ . . . . ‘Covered Claims’ include, 17 but are not limited to. . . any provision of federal or state labor code or a Wage Order, for unpaid fees, expenses, wages, or overtime, for unpaid 18 compensation or penalties for missed meal or rest breaks, for wrongful 19 termination, for unfair competition. . . or any federal, state, or local laws to the full extent permitted by applicable federal law after the application of 20 Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) preemption principles . . . . As to any 21 Covered Claim, each party waives to the maximum extent permitted by federal law, the right to bring, maintain, or participate in any class, collective, 22 or representative proceeding….Further, Covered Claims must be brought in 23 the individual capacity of the party asserting the claim, and cannot be maintained on a class, collective, or representative basis, to the full extent 24 permitted by applicable federal law after the application of federal preemption 25 principles.”

26 27 1 Tamada Decl., Exhibit 1 at 8-9. Since 2014, Defendants have required all newly-hired 2 employees, including Plaintiff, to execute the Agreement. Tamada Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff 3 accessed the Agreement via a web portal maintained by a third-party Oracle Corporation 4 and her electronic signature is on the Agreement Tamada Decl. ¶¶ 6-14. Defendants state 5 that they “do[] not limit the amount of time that employees have to review or ask questions 6 about their job offer and Agreement.” Id. ¶ 15. 7 According to Plaintiff, she did not understand that she was signing an Arbitration 8 Agreement, because she only understands Spanish. Oppo. at 7, 11. Plaintiff argues that 9 “[s]omeone else [her bookkeeper], not the Plaintiff logged in and completed the onboarding 10 paperwork for the Plaintiff because Plaintiff does not read English.” Id. at 10. In sum, 11 Plaintiff argues that “the Agreement is unenforceable under California law because it is 12 procedurally and substantively unconscionable.” Id. at 9. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs motions to compel arbitration. 9 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. In deciding whether to compel arbitration, the court must consider two 16 “gateway issues”: (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties, 17 and if so (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute. See Brennan v. Opus Bank, 18 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “In determining whether a valid 19 arbitration agreement exists, federal courts apply ordinary state-law principles that govern 20 the formation of contracts.” Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 21 2014) (citation and quotations omitted). If the court is “satisfied that the making of the 22 agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall 23 make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms 24 of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. There is an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral 25 dispute resolution.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 26 631 (1985). As such, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 27 resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 1 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); see also Tomkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th 2 Cir. 2016). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 A. Evidentiary Objections 5 The Court first addresses Defendants’ Objection to evidence submitted in support of 6 Plaintiff’s Opposition, including the Declarations of Maria Felipe Suchite and Laurie 7 Davila-Felix. See ECF No. 14. Defendants object to the Declaration of Maria Felipe 8 Suchite in its entirety, and move to strike it on the basis that it “is inadmissible because it 9 is an improperly authenticated translation of testimony given in a foreign language and 10 therefore lacks foundation.” Id. at 2. Written translations must be properly authenticated. 11 See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). As such “[w]itness testimony translated from a foreign language 12 must be properly authenticated and any interpretation must be shown to be an accurate 13 translation done by a competent translator.” Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. 14 Supp. 654, 659 (N.D. Cal. April 25, 1994) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 604 & 901). Although 15 Plaintiff’s Declaration has a “translation authentication” submitted by Laurie Davila, the 16 authentication does not indicate that she is a qualified translator or certified interpreter. See 17 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 659. Also, there is no indication that the English version of the 18 Declaration is a true and correct translation as it appears to have been done via 19 “teleconference.” See generally Sunrider Corp. v. Bountiful Biotech Corp., 2010 WL 20 4590766 at *16 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010); see also Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de 21 Mexicali, AC v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1226 (D. Nev. July 3, 2006) (vacated 22 and remanded on other grounds) (sustaining objection to declarations that appeared to have 23 been written originally in Spanish and later translated into English, absent any indication 24 that the English versions of the declarations were true and correct translations). 25 Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ Objection to Plaintiff’s Declaration. 26 27 1 Defendants also object to the Declaration of Laurie Davila in its entirety on the 2 grounds that it is irrelevant. ECF No. 14 at 7. The Court ultimately did not rely on Ms. 3 Davila’s Declaration. As such, this objection is MOOT. 4 Plaintiff objects to a portion of the Declaration submitted by Lorraine Bettencourt in 5 support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel on the grounds that it lacks foundation and is 6 prejudicial hearsay. ECF No. 11-3. The Court ultimately did not rely on Ms. Bettencourt’s 7 Declaration. As such, this objection is MOOT. 8 Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff requests that the Court hold an evidentiary 9 hearing “to the extent the Court deems necessary.” Oppo. at 18. The Court declines to hold 10 an evidentiary hearing as it does not find it necessary in this case. 11 B. Defendants’ Motion to Compel 12 Defendants argue that Plaintiff must arbitrate her claims because she signed a valid 13 arbitration agreement as part of her employment contract. Plaintiff opposes on the grounds 14 that the Agreement is unenforceable because it is procedurally and substantively 15 unconscionable. The Court addresses the parties’ agreements in turn. 16 1. Whether a Valid Arbitration Agreement Exists 17 Defendants bear the burden of establishing that a valid arbitration agreement exists 18 between them and plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence. See Knutson v. Sirius XM 19 Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014). In deciding whether parties have agreed to 20 arbitrate, courts “should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of 21 contracts.” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see 22 also Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1175. “It is undisputed that under California law, mutual assent 23 is a required element of contract formation.” Knutson, 771 F.3d at 565. “‘Mutual assent 24 may be manifested by written or spoken words, or by conduct,’ and acceptance of contract 25 terms may be implied through action or inaction.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “Thus, 26 ‘an offeree, knowing that an offer has been made to him but not knowing all of its terms, 27 may be held to have accepted, by his conduct, whatever terms the offer 1 contains.’” Id. (quoting Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 2 987, 991 (1972)). “Courts must determine whether the outward manifestations of consent 3 would lead a reasonable person to believe the offeree has assented to the 4 agreement.” Id. However, “[a]n offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his 5 consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he was unaware, 6 contained in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.” Id. at 7 566 (quoting Windsor Mills, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 993). 8 In their pending Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is required to arbitrate her 9 claims pursuant to the Agreement that she signed. Defendants include the Agreement as an 10 exhibit to the Declaration of Paige Tamada, a senior director of human resources 11 compliance and policies, for Defendant ABM Industries Incorporated. Tamada Decl., 12 Exhibits 1, 2. In her Declaration, Ms. Tamada states that Defendants provided the Mutual 13 Arbitration Agreement to Ms. Suchite, and that Plaintiff accessed and reviewed the 14 Agreement through a third-party web portal maintained by Oracle Corporation. Tamada 15 Decl. ¶¶ 5-14. Ms. Tamada states that Plaintiff electronically signed the Agreement through 16 Defendants’ hiring portal on July 26, 2023. Id.; see also Tamada Decl., Exhibits 1, 2. Ms. 17 Tamada also explains that for Plaintiff to have viewed and signed the Agreement, she was 18 required to log in using a one-time password and scroll to the bottom of the Agreement 19 which clearly stated in bold that all covered matters “be submitted to arbitration rather than 20 to a judge and jury in court,” and that “by my signature or electronic signature, I knowingly 21 and voluntarily agree to this mutual arbitration agreement.” Id. at Exhibit 1. Indeed, a 22 review of the Agreement reveals that it bears Plaintiff's name, her electronic signature, and 23 the date July 26, 2023. Tamada Decl., Exhibits 1 and 2. 24 In her Opposition to the pending Motion, Plaintiff challenges the validity of the 25 Agreement, stating that “[n]o one explained to Plaintiff what she was signing” and that 26 “Plaintiff learned for the first time that there is an arbitration agreement after [her counsel] 27 1 obtained her personnel file.” ECF No. 11 at 7. Plaintiff argues that in reviewing her 2 onboarding paperwork: 3 Plaintiff Suchite visited the website address ABM provided and saw it was only in English. To help with her with the application, Plaintiff met with her 4 multilingual bookkeeper, who delegated the job to her assistant, who logged 5 into the website ABM provided and completed Plaintiff’s onboarding paperwork. . . . Given these facts, Plaintiff very respectfully requests the Court 6 to find that Defendants fail[ed] to meet [their] burden to show the existence 7 of an agreement to arbitrate because there was no mutual assent, as required to prove a contract. 8

9 Id. at 11 (internal citations omitted). 10 However, an “employer [is not] required to explain the details of the contract to 11 Plaintiff or to force him to read it.” Pinto v. Squaw Valley Resort, LLC, No. 17-cv-02281- 12 MCE-CKD, 2018 WL 5630702, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2018). Plaintiff admits that she 13 authorized her multilingual bookkeeper to help her with her paperwork, and the fact that 14 Plaintiff failed to do her due diligence in reviewing the Agreement is not sufficient to 15 challenge the existence of an agreement. See generally Trevino v. Acosta, Inc., No. 17-cv- 16 06529-NC, 2018 WL 3537885, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2018) (“[T]he Court cannot 17 invalidate the terms of the signed arbitration agreement merely because Trevino did not 18 understand the agreement or chose not to read it.”). 19 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of establishing 20 that a valid, written agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties. 21 2. Whether The Agreement Encompasses the Dispute 22 The Court must now determine whether the Agreement encompasses the dispute at 23 issue. The Agreement states that “ABM Industries Incorporated and its subsidiary 24 companies (collectively, the ‘Company’) and I desire to resolve fairly and quickly, all 25 disputes between us . . . . including but not limited to those arising from and/or relating in 26 any way to any aspect of my hiring, my employment, my compensation, and/or the end of 27 my employment, with the Company.” Tamada Decl., Exhibit 1 at 8. Thus, the Agreement 1 is between Plaintiff and Defendants. All of Plaintiff’s claims asserted in this action relate 2 to her employment with Defendants and are thus encompassed by the Agreement. 3 Because there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties and the claims 4 raised in Plaintiff’s Complaint fall within the scope of the parties’ Agreement, the 5 Court must compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims, unless the Agreement is unenforceable. 6 3. Whether the Agreement is Enforceable 7 Next, the Court will analyze whether the Agreement is valid and enforceable under 8 9 U.S.C. § 2. Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is procedurally and substantively 9 unconscionable. Oppo. at 9-18. 10 i. Procedural Unconscionability 11 “Unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one 12 of adhesion.” Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 113 13 (2000). “The term contract of adhesion signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed 14 and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party 15 only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.” Id. “The procedural element of 16 unconscionability focuses on ‘oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining 17 power.’” Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1260 (9th Cir. 18 2017) (quoting Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 55 Cal. 19 4th 223, 246 (2012)); see also Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 922 (9th 20 Cir. 2013) (“Procedural unconscionability concerns the manner in which the contract was 21 negotiated and the respective circumstances of the parties at that time, focusing on the level 22 of oppression and surprise involved in the agreement.”). “Oppression addresses the weaker 23 party’s absence of choice and unequal bargaining power that results in ‘no real 24 negotiation,’” while “[s]urprise involves the extent to which the contract clearly discloses 25 its terms as well as the reasonable expectations of the weaker party.” Chavarria, 733 F.3d 26 at 922 (citations omitted). 27 1 Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is unenforceable because it is an unconscionable 2 adhesion contract. The Court finds that the Agreement is a contract of adhesion. There was 3 a significant imbalance in bargaining power between Plaintiff and Defendants as 4 Defendants are a large company with locations throughout the nation. The Agreement was 5 required as part of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants, did not contain an opt-out 6 provision, and Plaintiff signed it in connection with her offer letter. Thus, based on the 7 standardized, take-it-or-leave it nature of the agreement, the Court finds that the Agreement 8 is a contract of adhesion. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has established some 9 degree of procedural unconscionability. 10 In assessing the degree of procedural unconscionability, the Court finds it minimal 11 in light of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the contract. Several courts have 12 found that “mandatory arbitration agreements offered as a precondition to employment are 13 enforceable provided there is no indication that applicants signed the agreement under 14 duress, were lied to, or otherwise manipulated into signing the agreement.” See, 15 e.g., Snipes v. Dollar Tree Distribution, Inc., No. 15-CV-00878-MCE-DB, 2019 WL 16 5830052, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2019) (citing Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal. 4th 17 1237, 1245 (2016)); Hermosillo v. Davey Tree Surgery Co., No. 18-CV-00393-LHK, 2018 18 WL 3417505 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2018). “The adhesive nature of a contract, without more, 19 would give rise to a low degree of procedural unconscionability at most.” Poublon, 846 20 F.3d at 1261-62 (citing Baltazar, 62 Cal. 4th at 1245). 21 Plaintiff claims that Defendants provided the Agreement only in English knowing 22 she had limited English capability, but this adds “only a minimal degree of procedural 23 unconscionability” when there is an opportunity to seek help. See Chico v. Hilton 24 Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 14-5750-JFW SSX, 2014 WL 5088240 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 25 2014) (compelling arbitration where the company provided only an English-language 26 arbitration agreement to a Spanish-speaking employee). Plaintiff had an unlimited amount 27 of time to review or ask questions about her job offer and Agreement. Tamada Decl. ¶ 15. 1 In other words, Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to ask questions or request a 2 translation, but she did not do so. See Chico, 2014 WL 5088240, at *15 (finding that “if 3 [the company] did not give [employee] an opportunity to ask questions, consult with an 4 attorney, take the arbitration agreements home, or obtain a Spanish translation of the 5 [arbitration agreement], it would support [employee’s] claim of procedural 6 unconscionability”). By having time to seek assistance or inquire further about the 7 arbitration agreement, Plaintiff faced a lessened degree of oppression and surprise. 8 The Court concludes that the arbitration agreement is an adhesion contract with 9 minimal procedural unconscionability. Thus, enforceability turns on whether the 10 arbitration agreement has a high degree of substantive unconscionability. 11 ii. Substantive Unconscionability 12 Having found that the Agreement is only minimally procedurally unconscionable, 13 the Court must find that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable to a much greater 14 degree to conclude that it, as a whole, is unconscionable. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114. 15 Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because: (1) it 16 disallows Berman proceedings1; (2) it unlawfully bars claims via the Private Attorney 17 General Act (“PAGA”); (3) it unlawfully requires the parties to bear their own attorneys’ 18 fees and costs; and (4) the unconscionable provisions may not be severed. Oppo. at 12-18. 19 The Court will address each argument in turn. 20 Plaintiff’s claim that the Agreement does not allow for Berman proceedings is 21 unfounded. Upon the Court’s own review of the Agreement, it explicitly states: 22 Nothing in this Agreement precludes me from filing a charge or from participating in an administrative investigation of a charge before an 23

24 25 26 1 A Berman hearing is conducted by a deputy commissioner, and the procedure is “designed to provide a speedy, informal, and affordable method of resolving wage claims.” Cal. Code 27 1 appropriate government commission, body, or agency, be it federal, state or local. Similarly, this agreement does not preclude the parties from conciliating 2 any charge pending before an appropriate government commission, body or 3 agency.

4 Agreement, p. 4, ¶ E. Thus, based on the plain reading of the Agreement, there is 5 nothing that prohibits Plaintiff from having chosen to file an administrative claim with the 6 Labor Commissioner to seek a Berman-hearing. Additionally, Plaintiff’s reliance on OTO, 7 L.L.C. v. Kho is misplaced. 8 Cal. 5th 111 (2019). The plaintiff in OTO was given an 8 arbitration agreement without an opportunity to read it. Id. at 118. Ms. Suchite was 9 undeniably given an opportunity to read and understand the Agreement at issue in her case, 10 but she chose not to. Additionally, unlike the OTO case, here, Plaintiff has failed to allege 11 any facts indicating that she signed the Agreement under a “coercive setting.” Id. at 137. 12 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on substantive unconscionability on this ground fails. 13 Regarding the PAGA claims, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is substantively 14 unconscionable because it prohibits the prosecution of a representative PAGA action in 15 violation of California’ rule prohibiting wholesale waivers of PAGA claims. Oppo. at 15 16 (internal citations omitted). Notably, Plaintiff does not even bring a PAGA claim in her 17 Complaint. Accordingly, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s argument that the 18 Agreement is substantively unconscionable on this basis. Plaintiff argues more generally 19 that the Agreement is unconscionable because it “mandates that all claims in arbitration to 20 be pursued ‘in the individual capacity of the party asserting the claim.’” Oppo. at 15 (citing 21 Tamada Decl., Exhibit 1 ¶ B). Plaintiff’s argument on this ground also fails because the 22 Court is bound to “enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms – including 23 terms providing for individualized proceedings.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 24 502 (2018); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) 25 (“Requiring the availability of classwide arbitrations . . . creates a scheme inconsistent with 26 the [Federal Arbitration Act].”); Carter v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 718 F. App’x 502, 504 (9th 27 1 Cir. 2017) (explaining that Concepion “foreclos[es] any argument” that “an arbitration 2 agreement is unconscionable solely because it contains a class action waiver”). 3 Plaintiff’s argument that the parties are required to bear their own attorneys’ fees 4 and costs does not make the Agreement substantively unconscionable. The Agreement 5 clearly provides that ABM agreed “that it will pay all fees and costs of AAA and the 6 arbitrator,” including “the initial filing fee associated with filing the demand.” Agreement 7 ¶ C. See Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 110-11 (“[W]hen an employer imposes mandatory 8 arbitration as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or arbitration process 9 cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would 10 not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court.”). The Agreement 11 also allows for the arbitrator to exercise his or her discretion to award attorneys’ fees and 12 costs associated with the arbitration. Agreement ¶ C. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument 13 about attorneys’ fees and costs is unfounded. 14 Having found that there are no substantively unconscionable provisions in the 15 Agreement, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s argument about severing the 16 unconscionable provisions. In sum, Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. The Court finds 17 that Plaintiff fails to show that the Mutual Arbitration Agreement is substantively 18 unconscionable. Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s individual claims are subject to arbitration. 19 4. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Class Claims and to Dismiss or Stay the Action Pending the Outcome of Arbitration 20

21 Defendants request that the Court strike Plaintiff’s class claims. The Court has 22 already found that Plaintiff’s individual claims are subject to arbitration. That leaves open 23 the question of how to handle Plaintiff’s class allegations and claims. As set forth above, 24 the Agreement does not permit arbitration of the class or representative claims but instead 25 includes an enforceable waiver of those claims. 26 The Agreement states in relevant part: 27 As to any Covered Claim, each party waives to the maximum extent permitted 1 by federal law, the right to bring, maintain, or participate in any class, collective, or representative proceeding . . . Further, Covered claims must be 2 brought in the individual capacity of the party asserting the claim, and cannot 3 be maintained on a class, collective or representative basis, to the full extent permitted by applicable federal law after the application of federal preemption 4 principles. 5 Agreement ¶ C. The Agreement has clear language that it does not permit arbitration of 6 class, collective, or representative actions. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 7 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 (2019) (“Neither silence nor ambiguity provides a sufficient basis 8 for concluding that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to undermine the central 9 benefits of arbitration itself.”). Additionally, California and U.S. Supreme Courts have 10 recognized, class action or representative action waivers like the one above are enforceable. 11 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351; Carter v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 718 F. App’x at 504 (9th 12 Cir. 2017). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike class claims 13 because of the valid waiver in the Agreement. 14 Thus, Plaintiff’s only remaining claims are the individual claims that are subject to 15 arbitration. The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court has the discretion to stay or 16 dismiss a plaintiff’s claims where all of the relevant claims are subject to arbitration. See 17 Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Martin Marietta 18 Aluminum, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 586 F.2d 143, 147-48 (9th Cir. 1978)). The Court finds 19 it appropriate to ORDER Plaintiff Suchite and Defendants to arbitration and STAY the 20 action pending completion of those proceedings. The Parties are directed to file a joint 21 status update within seven days of completing arbitration. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 In accordance with the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 24 1. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Plaintiff Suchite to arbitration is GRANTED; 25 2. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Class Allegations is GRANTED; 26 3. The Court STAYS this action pending the outcome of Plaintiff Suchite’s 27 1 4. The parties are ORDERED to file a joint status update within seven days of 2 || completing the arbitration proceedings. 3 || IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: July 22, 2024 NO 5 Je J 6 Honorable Linda Lopez United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28