M. Warshawsky, J.
Plaintiff suffered the near [723]*723total loss of vision in one eye when a capped beer bottle exploded close to his face. At a bench trial in Wayne County Circuit Court, plaintiff sought to show negligence and breach of implied warranty on the part of defendant brewery. The trial judge granted defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal under GCR 1963, 504.2.
Plaintiff worked as a busboy at a restaurant and bar in April, 1973. At this bench trial in May, 1978, plaintiff described the careful manner with which he removed several cases of beer from a locked and dry storage room and placed them next to coolers behind the bar. After about a 15-minute break, plaintiff returned to remove the bottles from their cases to stock the coolers. Plaintiff testified that, while carefully removing and not bumping bottles of Stroh’s beer, one bottle exploded in his hand about six to nine inches from his head, causing lacerations to his nose and right eye. The top portion of the bottle with the cap still on it, which had been saved, disappeared from plaintiff’s attorney’s office, apparently through the diligent efforts of a custodian. The bottle was never produced at trial.
Plaintiff’s proofs concerning the condition of the bottle when it arrived at the restaurant were vague. Plaintiff and the kitchen manager were uncertain whether an agent of defendant or an independent distributor delivered the beer to the restaurant. Plaintiff testified that the beer could have been delivered by a salesman, a Stroh’s truck, or another beer truck. The kitchen manager testified he believed the beer had been delivered by a distributor named Powell.
At the close of plaintiff’s proofs, defendant moved for involuntary dismissal. In granting the motion, the trial court ruled that, where there are [724]*724intervening handlers of the bottle from the time it leaves the bottler until it reaches its destination, plaintiff must make some showing that the bottle was not mishandled in the interim.
Plaintiff contends on appeal that he need only show that the bottle exploded and that it was not mishandled by him. The burden of showing the absence of mishandling, plaintiff argues, should lie with the defendant, especially where, as here, it was asserted as an affirmative defense.
A trial court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss in a bench trial under GCR 1963, 504.2, will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Warren v June’s Mobile Home Village & Sales, Inc, 66 Mich App 386, 389; 239 NW2d 380 (1976). Unlike the motion for directed verdict, GCR 1963, 515.1, a motion for involuntary dismissal calls upon the trial judge to exercise his function as trier of fact, weigh the evidence, pass upon the credibility of witnesses and select between conflicting inferences. Plaintiff is not given the advantage of the most favorable interpretation of the evidence. 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), pp 332-333.
To recover under either theory asserted in the present case, breach of implied warranty or negligence, plaintiff must trace the defect into the hands of the defendant. Caldwell v Fox, 394 Mich 401, 410; 231 NW2d 46 (1975). As between negligence and breach of implied warranty, the former theory calls for proof that the defect was caused by defendant’s negligence, while the latter requires showing that the defect was attributable to the defendant. Smith v E R Squibb & Sons, Inc, 405 Mich 79, 89; 273 NW2d 476 (1979); Caldwell, supra, 410; Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich 85, 98-99; 133 NW2d 129 (1965). [725]*725"[P]laintiff has the burden of establishing that when the product left the manufacturer it was defective.” Holloway v General Motors Corp (On Rehearing), 403 Mich 614, 621; 271 NW2d 777 (1978).
The evidence need not be conclusive; it is enough if plaintiff "produces sufficient evidence of careful handling in general, and of the absence of unusual incidents, to permit reasonable men to conclude that, more likely than not, the event was due to the defendant’s negligence”. Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 39, p 219. See 63 Am Jur 2d, Products Liability, § 10, p 20.
"[Plaintiff] is not, however, obliged to eliminate all possible causes of the accident consistent with the view that there was no manufacturing defect. He sustains his burden when he establishes with direct or circumstantial evidence a reasonable probability that the defect is attributable to the manufacturer.” Holloway, supra, p 621 (footnotes omitted).
In the present case, plaintiff needed to connect the alleged defect with the defendant. In order to do that, plaintiff had to overcome testimony in the case that it might have been a third party who delivered the bottle or show that the third party did not mishandle the bottle.
Plaintiff produced some evidence of a defect in the bottle leading to the explosion; however, there was inadequate proof to connect the defect with the defendant. Plaintiff’s showing of careful handling of the bottle after its arrival at the restaurant and his own care in removing the bottle from its case does not extend far enough to trace the defect to the defendant. The alleged defect could easily have been caused by someone handling the bottles after they left defendant’s custody and [726]*726control. The bottle or the case containing the bottle could have been dropped or kicked by the distributor before delivery to the restaurant. Had plaintiff established that the bottle was delivered by an agent of defendant, a different question would be presented. At this point, however, it is a mystery who delivered the bottle to the restaurant. Under these circumstances and under the scope of review afforded by an order for involuntary dismissal by the trial judge sitting as trier of fact, we are not persuaded that the trial judge’s finding was clearly erroneous.
The trial judge correctly ruled in the present case that plaintiff needed to show the absence of mishandling by others after the bottle left the defendant’s brewery. Because we agree with the trial judge that plaintiff failed to connect the alleged defect in the bottle to the defendant, we need not decide whether the trial judge’s additional finding that an independent distributor delivered the bottle was clearly erroneous. In addition, defendant’s assertion of negligence by others as an affirmative defense could not change the burden of proof.
The cases cited by plaintiff either do not discuss the present question, Pattinson v Coca-Cola Bottling Co of Port Huron, 333 Mich 253; 52 NW2d 688 (1952), or noted that the evidence showed the defendant delivered the bottle, Cusumano v The Stroh Brewery Co, 26 Mich App 549; 182 NW2d 787 (1970), lv den 384 Mich 795 (1971). Plaintiff’s reliance on the rule of circumstantial evidence of negligence, Burghardt v Detroit United Railway, 206 Mich 545; 173 NW 360; 5 ALR 1333 (1919), is misplaced because, "[ejven though there is beyond all probable doubt negligence in the air, it is still necessary to bring it home to the defendant”. [727]*727Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 39, p 218. The mere naming of a party defendant and proof of someone’s negligence or breach of implied warranty is insufficient, without more, to trace the defect to the named defendant.
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M. Warshawsky, J.
Plaintiff suffered the near [723]*723total loss of vision in one eye when a capped beer bottle exploded close to his face. At a bench trial in Wayne County Circuit Court, plaintiff sought to show negligence and breach of implied warranty on the part of defendant brewery. The trial judge granted defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal under GCR 1963, 504.2.
Plaintiff worked as a busboy at a restaurant and bar in April, 1973. At this bench trial in May, 1978, plaintiff described the careful manner with which he removed several cases of beer from a locked and dry storage room and placed them next to coolers behind the bar. After about a 15-minute break, plaintiff returned to remove the bottles from their cases to stock the coolers. Plaintiff testified that, while carefully removing and not bumping bottles of Stroh’s beer, one bottle exploded in his hand about six to nine inches from his head, causing lacerations to his nose and right eye. The top portion of the bottle with the cap still on it, which had been saved, disappeared from plaintiff’s attorney’s office, apparently through the diligent efforts of a custodian. The bottle was never produced at trial.
Plaintiff’s proofs concerning the condition of the bottle when it arrived at the restaurant were vague. Plaintiff and the kitchen manager were uncertain whether an agent of defendant or an independent distributor delivered the beer to the restaurant. Plaintiff testified that the beer could have been delivered by a salesman, a Stroh’s truck, or another beer truck. The kitchen manager testified he believed the beer had been delivered by a distributor named Powell.
At the close of plaintiff’s proofs, defendant moved for involuntary dismissal. In granting the motion, the trial court ruled that, where there are [724]*724intervening handlers of the bottle from the time it leaves the bottler until it reaches its destination, plaintiff must make some showing that the bottle was not mishandled in the interim.
Plaintiff contends on appeal that he need only show that the bottle exploded and that it was not mishandled by him. The burden of showing the absence of mishandling, plaintiff argues, should lie with the defendant, especially where, as here, it was asserted as an affirmative defense.
A trial court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss in a bench trial under GCR 1963, 504.2, will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Warren v June’s Mobile Home Village & Sales, Inc, 66 Mich App 386, 389; 239 NW2d 380 (1976). Unlike the motion for directed verdict, GCR 1963, 515.1, a motion for involuntary dismissal calls upon the trial judge to exercise his function as trier of fact, weigh the evidence, pass upon the credibility of witnesses and select between conflicting inferences. Plaintiff is not given the advantage of the most favorable interpretation of the evidence. 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), pp 332-333.
To recover under either theory asserted in the present case, breach of implied warranty or negligence, plaintiff must trace the defect into the hands of the defendant. Caldwell v Fox, 394 Mich 401, 410; 231 NW2d 46 (1975). As between negligence and breach of implied warranty, the former theory calls for proof that the defect was caused by defendant’s negligence, while the latter requires showing that the defect was attributable to the defendant. Smith v E R Squibb & Sons, Inc, 405 Mich 79, 89; 273 NW2d 476 (1979); Caldwell, supra, 410; Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich 85, 98-99; 133 NW2d 129 (1965). [725]*725"[P]laintiff has the burden of establishing that when the product left the manufacturer it was defective.” Holloway v General Motors Corp (On Rehearing), 403 Mich 614, 621; 271 NW2d 777 (1978).
The evidence need not be conclusive; it is enough if plaintiff "produces sufficient evidence of careful handling in general, and of the absence of unusual incidents, to permit reasonable men to conclude that, more likely than not, the event was due to the defendant’s negligence”. Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 39, p 219. See 63 Am Jur 2d, Products Liability, § 10, p 20.
"[Plaintiff] is not, however, obliged to eliminate all possible causes of the accident consistent with the view that there was no manufacturing defect. He sustains his burden when he establishes with direct or circumstantial evidence a reasonable probability that the defect is attributable to the manufacturer.” Holloway, supra, p 621 (footnotes omitted).
In the present case, plaintiff needed to connect the alleged defect with the defendant. In order to do that, plaintiff had to overcome testimony in the case that it might have been a third party who delivered the bottle or show that the third party did not mishandle the bottle.
Plaintiff produced some evidence of a defect in the bottle leading to the explosion; however, there was inadequate proof to connect the defect with the defendant. Plaintiff’s showing of careful handling of the bottle after its arrival at the restaurant and his own care in removing the bottle from its case does not extend far enough to trace the defect to the defendant. The alleged defect could easily have been caused by someone handling the bottles after they left defendant’s custody and [726]*726control. The bottle or the case containing the bottle could have been dropped or kicked by the distributor before delivery to the restaurant. Had plaintiff established that the bottle was delivered by an agent of defendant, a different question would be presented. At this point, however, it is a mystery who delivered the bottle to the restaurant. Under these circumstances and under the scope of review afforded by an order for involuntary dismissal by the trial judge sitting as trier of fact, we are not persuaded that the trial judge’s finding was clearly erroneous.
The trial judge correctly ruled in the present case that plaintiff needed to show the absence of mishandling by others after the bottle left the defendant’s brewery. Because we agree with the trial judge that plaintiff failed to connect the alleged defect in the bottle to the defendant, we need not decide whether the trial judge’s additional finding that an independent distributor delivered the bottle was clearly erroneous. In addition, defendant’s assertion of negligence by others as an affirmative defense could not change the burden of proof.
The cases cited by plaintiff either do not discuss the present question, Pattinson v Coca-Cola Bottling Co of Port Huron, 333 Mich 253; 52 NW2d 688 (1952), or noted that the evidence showed the defendant delivered the bottle, Cusumano v The Stroh Brewery Co, 26 Mich App 549; 182 NW2d 787 (1970), lv den 384 Mich 795 (1971). Plaintiff’s reliance on the rule of circumstantial evidence of negligence, Burghardt v Detroit United Railway, 206 Mich 545; 173 NW 360; 5 ALR 1333 (1919), is misplaced because, "[ejven though there is beyond all probable doubt negligence in the air, it is still necessary to bring it home to the defendant”. [727]*727Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 39, p 218. The mere naming of a party defendant and proof of someone’s negligence or breach of implied warranty is insufficient, without more, to trace the defect to the named defendant.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying his motion for a new trial on the grounds of manifest injustice resulting from surprise, newly discovered evidence, misconduct of the defendant, and the trial court’s failure to grant a continuance or reopening of the proofs. The grant or denial of a new trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Kailimai v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 398 Mich 230; 247 NW2d 295 (1976). The burden is on the party moving for a new trial to persuade the trial court of an error of sufficient magnitude to cause the trial court to grant a new trial in the exercise of its discretion. Lemanski v Ford Motor Co, 82 Mich App 244; 266 NW2d 775 (1978), lv den 405 Mich 811 (1979).
We are not persuaded that the trial judge abused his discretion on the grounds asserted by plaintiff. A party claiming a new trial on the ground of surprise must indicate surprise because of the testimony at the time it is given. Great American Ins Co v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 13 Mich App 410, 424; 164 NW2d 575 (1968). In the present case, plaintiff’s counsel appeared to be satisfied with the testimony as given and did not claim surprise until after defendant moved for involuntary dismissal. The claim of newly discovered evidence, GCR 1963, 527.1(6), is much like the one of surprise. Ordinarily, evidence is not newly discovered unless discovered after the verdict is rendered. 6 Callaghan’s Michigan Pleading & Practice, § 41.21, p 388. Moreover, it is difficult to [728]*728conclude that plaintiff, exercising reasonable diligence, could not have discovered who delivered the beer bottle to the restaurant. 3 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), pp 113-114. The trial judge also did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. Such a motion must be made as soon as possible after ascertaining the facts; a continuance shall be granted only if the trial court finds the evidence material and diligent efforts were made to secure the witnesses or evidence. See GCR 1963, 503.2. We find Kornicks v Lindy’s Supermarket, 24 Mich App 668; 180 NW2d 847 (1970), lv den 384 Mich 771 (1970), distinguishable. Lastly, we find no support for plaintiff’s claim that the deficiency in the proofs was due to misconduct by defendant.
Affirmed.
R. M. Maher, J., concurred.