307 Ga. 696 FINAL COPY S19A1256. MANN v. THE STATE.
BENHAM, Justice.
David Mann, Jr., was convicted of malice murder and two
counts of first degree cruelty to children in connection with the death
of seven-year-old Ethan Martinez.1 Following the trial court’s denial
of his motion for new trial, Mann appeals, arguing that the evidence
1 The crimes occurred on September 18, 2012, and Ethan died as a result
of his injuries on September 21, 2012. On December 7, 2012, a Newton County grand jury indicted Mann for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated battery — family violence (Count 2), felony murder predicated on cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 3), aggravated battery — family violence (rendering Ethan’s brain useless by throwing his body to the ground) (Count 4), cruelty to children in the first degree (throwing Ethan to the ground) (Count 5), cruelty to children in the first degree (grabbing and squeezing Ethan’s penis) (Count 6), and cruelty to children in the first degree (hitting Ethan on his back and buttocks) (Count 7). At a trial held from September 29 to October 2, 2014, a jury found Mann guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Mann as follows: life in prison on Count 1; 20 years on Count 6 (to be served consecutively to the life sentence); and 20 years on Count 7 (to be served consecutively to the other sentences). The remaining counts were vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes. On March 22, 2018, Mann moved the trial court for leave to file an out-of-time motion for new trial; the trial court granted the motion on that same day. Also on March 22, 2018, Mann filed a motion for new trial, which he amended twice. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Mann’s motion for new trial (as amended) on February 19, 2019. Mann filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and this case was docketed to the August 2019 term and thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs. was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court
committed reversible error in multiple instances; and that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel. Because we conclude that
his claims are meritless, we affirm.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
presented below established as follows. In September 2012, Mann
lived in a Newton County home with his fiancée, Dora Martinez, and
her son, Ethan. On the morning of September 18, Dora woke early
to dress Ethan, who was well and behaving normally when she left
the house for work around 6:30 a.m. Shortly after 7:00 a.m., Mann
placed a 911 call and reported that Ethan was unresponsive and
vomiting and had soiled himself.
When first responders arrived, they found Ethan surrounded
by a pool of vomit and unconscious but breathing. Ethan had signs
of a head injury and had urinated and defecated on himself. Mann
indicated to first responders that, two days earlier, Ethan had fallen
from a playset and hit his head. Ethan was transported to the
Newton County Medical Center, where a nurse observed a large
2 hematoma on the back of his head, bruising to his buttocks, and
abrasions on his arms. A CT scan showed bleeding along the side of
Ethan’s brain, as well as brain swelling. Ethan was then transported
to Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta, where he was admitted with a
traumatic brain injury. His other injuries included a circumferential
bruise to his penis and scrotum, a bruised back, elevated liver
enzymes, and retinal hemorrhaging in both eyes. Doctors eventually
confirmed brain death, and Ethan was taken off life support on
September 21.
Before Ethan was declared brain dead, Mann was driven by a
relative to the Newton County Sheriff’s Office for an interview. After
ending the initial interview by requesting counsel, Mann was taken
into custody on charges of cruelty to children and aggravated
battery. During the booking process, Mann completed an inmate
request form, indicating that he wanted to speak with officers again.
During the second interview, Mann admitted to officers that he had
“whooped” Ethan after learning that Ethan had not completed his
homework. Using a doll, Mann demonstrated how he had “scooped
3 up” and held Ethan over his shoulder while spanking him; Mann
also indicated that he may have inadvertently hit Ethan on the back
during the spanking. According to Mann, he spanked Ethan “less
than ten times” but admitted that he was “very strong and . . . didn’t
hit [Ethan] soft.” Mann also admitted that, after he finished
spanking Ethan, he “squeezed” Ethan between the legs because he
“was mad”; he assumed that this squeezing caused the penile
bruising. Mann said that he then “picked [Ethan] up in the air . . .
[and] tried to throw him on the bed” but missed the bed and Ethan
hit the ground. Mann reported that the back of Ethan’s head hit the
ground and then “his body like lifted up. Like he lifted his stomach
up, like he was having a seizure or something.”
At trial, Ethan’s pediatrician testified that she saw Ethan for
a regularly scheduled check-up on September 17, the day before the
incident. She conducted a head-to-toe exam and observed no injuries
anywhere on Ethan’s head or body. Ethan’s school principal testified
that no incident reports were on file indicating that Ethan had fallen
on the school playground. Other school officials testified that Ethan
4 told them he was afraid to go home because Mann would get mad,
yell at him, hit and choke him, and “make him run.” Ethan had
explained to them that Mann’s rage stemmed from Ethan’s inability
to do his homework on his own.
The State also presented the testimony of four of Ethan’s
treating physicians, including a pediatric intensive care unit
physician, a pediatric neurosurgeon, and a child-abuse pediatrician.
These physicians all testified that Ethan’s brain injury was not
consistent with a fall from either a playset or a bed and that his
injuries were more consistent with, in the words of one physician,
“something that would allow more high energy, such as car accidents
or some severe trauma.” The physicians also agreed that Ethan’s
injuries would have been inflicted within hours, not days, of the
onset of his symptoms. As to the penile bruising, the child-abuse
pediatrician testified that, because the bruising circled the entire
base of the penis, it resulted from the penis being squeezed; the
medical examiner’s testimony echoed this conclusion. Both the child-
abuse pediatrician and the medical examiner testified that the
5 bruising on Ethan’s buttocks was clearly a hand-slap mark. The
medical examiner testified that Ethan’s cause of death was blunt-
force head trauma.
1. Mann asserts that the evidence presented against him at
trial was insufficient to support his convictions.2 He also claims that
the trial court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict. We
apply the same standard of review to both claims: “whether the
evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdicts, was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which
he was convicted.” Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 286 (2) (824 SE2d
346) (2019). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). The evidence recounted above, including
Mann’s inculpatory statements in which he admitted to causing
2 Mann also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for felony murder
predicated on aggravated battery — family violence (Count 2), felony murder predicated on cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 3), aggravated battery — family violence (rendering Ethan’s brain useless by throwing his body to the ground) (Count 4), and cruelty to children in the first degree (throwing Ethan to the ground) (Count 5). However, Mann was not sentenced on any of these counts, and, accordingly, these claims are moot. See, e.g., Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828, 830 (2) (700 SE2d 544) (2010). 6 Ethan’s injuries, to squeezing Ethan between the legs, and to hitting
Ethan on his back and buttocks, was clearly sufficient to support
Mann’s convictions. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying
Mann’s motion for a directed verdict
2. Mann contends that the trial court committed reversible
error in five respects. We address each in turn.
(a) Mann first argues that the trial court erred by refusing to
give his requested charge on the affirmative defense of accident
because, he says, he indicated during his interrogation that he
intended to throw Ethan on the bed rather than on the ground.
According to Mann, that statement constitutes the slight evidence
necessary to authorize a jury instruction on accident. See
Wainwright v. State, 305 Ga. 63, 70 (5) (823 SE2d 749) (2019) (“[T]o
authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be slight
evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). As an initial matter, “[c]laims by a defendant
that he ‘didn’t mean to do it’ and ‘it was an accident’ are insufficient
without more to authorize a charge on accident.” (Citation and
7 punctuation omitted.) Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828, 832 (4) (700 SE2d
544) (2010). However, “[e]ven if the evidence presented authorized
the requested charge, the failure to give a requested charge which is
authorized by the evidence can be harmless error. The inquiry is
whether it is highly probable that the error contributed to the
verdict.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Reddick v. State, 301
Ga. 90, 92 (1) (799 SE2d 754) (2017).
The evidence demonstrated that Ethan suffered devastating
injuries, including bruising to his genitals, bruising to his body,
retinal hemorrhaging in both eyes, bleeding and swelling in the
brain, and ultimately brain death as a result of Mann’s intentional
acts of beating, squeezing, and throwing Ethan. Given this
evidence, the jury likely would have discounted any reliance on
accident. Indeed, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury’s
finding that Mann acted with malice, which is inconsistent with the
defense of accident and his claim that he acted without criminal
intent. See Thomas v. State, 297 Ga. 750, 753 (2) (778 SE2d 168)
(2015). Accordingly, any error by the trial court in failing to instruct
8 the jury on the law of accident was harmless.
(b) Mann also asserts that the trial court erred by denying his
requested jury charge on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser
included offense of both malice murder and felony murder. Georgia
law provides that “[a] person commits the offense of involuntary
manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes
the death of another human being without any intention to do so by
the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.” (Emphasis
supplied.) OCGA § 16-5-3 (a).
Mann asserts that, because he told investigators that he did
not intend for Ethan to hit the floor, his act of throwing Ethan could
constitute either simple battery, see OCGA § 16-5-23 (a) (2), or
reckless conduct, see OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), both misdemeanors. Mann
again contends that this statement was sufficient to require the trial
court to give his requested jury charge on involuntary
manslaughter. See Wainwright, supra.
Again, assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court
erred, we conclude that any error was harmless. Because the State
9 played the admitted portions of Mann’s custodial statements for the
jury, the jury was aware of Mann’s claims that he intended only to
throw Ethan on the bed and that Ethan’s injuries were inflicted
unintentionally. However, Mann’s admissions reflect that he threw
Ethan in the course of an angry encounter, that he beat the child,
and that he squeezed Ethan’s penis. The jury also heard testimony
from multiple medical experts that Ethan’s injuries could only have
been inflicted by “significant tremendous forces that were applied to
[his] head” and were consistent with Ethan’s being picked up and
slammed to the ground. There was extensive evidence before the
jury that Ethan’s injuries were inflicted intentionally and that his
death was intentional. Indeed, the jury found as much because it
returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of malice murder. See
Bonman v. State, 298 Ga. 839, 840-841 (2) (785 SE2d 288) (2016)
(holding that trial court’s refusal to charge involuntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense was harmless error where
the jury, by finding appellant guilty of malice murder, necessarily
found that he intended to kill the victim). Accordingly, it is highly
10 probable that any error in refusing Mann’s requested charge on
involuntary manslaughter did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.
See Rogers v. State, 289 Ga. 675, 677-678 (2) (715 SE2d 68) (2011)
(“[T]he jury, by also finding appellant guilty of malice murder, made
an additional, specific finding that [a]ppellant intended the victim’s
killing. In light of these circumstances, it is highly probable that the
trial court’s refusal to give a charge on involuntary manslaughter
did not contribute to the verdict.” (punctuation omitted) (quoting
Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 382 (10) (c) (552 SE2d 855) (2001))).
(c) Mann also contends that the trial court erred when it did
not suppress incriminating custodial statements that he made to
law enforcement. Specifically, Mann contends that his statements
were involuntary and inadmissible under OCGA § 24-8-824 because
they were induced by a “hope of benefit.”
Under Georgia law, a confession is admissible where it was
“made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the
slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” OCGA § 24-8-
824. “This Court has consistently interpreted the phrase ‘slightest
11 hope of benefit’ not in the colloquial sense, but as it is understood in
the context within the statute, focusing on promises related to
reduced criminal punishment — a shorter sentence, lesser charges,
or no charges at all.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Price v.
State, 305 Ga. 608, 610 (2) (825 SE2d 178) (2019). The trial court
concluded that the video-recorded statements were voluntarily
made and, thus, were admissible; we review that decision de novo.
See Benton v. State, 302 Ga. 570, 572 (2) (807 SE2d 450) (2017)
(recognizing that “where controlling facts are not in dispute, such as
those facts discernible from a videotape, our review [of a trial court’s
decision on a motion to suppress evidence of a defendant’s custodial
statement to investigators] is de novo” (citation and punctuation)).
Mann was interviewed on September 20, 2012, beginning at
2:56 p.m., by Investigator Sharon Stewart and Lieutenant Tyrone
Oliver. Before beginning the interview, Investigator Stewart read
Mann the Miranda3 warnings; Mann thereafter signed a “Miranda
3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)
(1966). 12 Rights - Waiver Form” and agreed to speak with the investigators.
After approximately 20 minutes, Mann invoked his right to counsel;
Investigator Stewart and Lieutenant Oliver told Mann that Ethan
had woken up and had told investigators that Mann was responsible
for his injuries. The interview concluded, and Mann was taken to be
booked.
Approximately 40 minutes after the first interview ended,
Mann reinitiated contact with Investigator Stewart and Lieutenant
Oliver via an inmate request form. Mann was returned to the
interview room, and Investigator Stewart again advised Mann of his
Miranda rights. Mann signed a second waiver form and again
expressed his desire to speak with the investigators. After being
asked by the investigators to “walk [them] through . . . what
happened,” Mann made his inculpatory statements but maintained
that Ethan’s injuries were unintentional: he confessed that he
“whooped” Ethan and then “threw him on the ground” but claimed
that his “intentions was [sic] to throw [Ethan] on the bed.” Later in
the interview, Mann asked the investigators whether they had lied
13 to him during the first interview when they told him Ethan had
woken up. Both Investigator Stewart and Lieutenant Oliver denied
lying to Mann but refused to give him any further information about
Ethan’s state.
On appeal, Mann argues only that the investigator’s
representations about Ethan’s medical condition and availability to
give a statement to law enforcement amounted to a hope of benefit,
in that Mann believed, based on those representations, that he
would not be charged with murder. To support his position, Mann
relies solely upon this Court’s decision in State v. Ritter, 268 Ga. 108
(1) (485 SE2d 492) (1997). In Ritter, the interrogating officer told the
defendant that the victim would “be okay” except for “a bad
headache.” Id. at 109 (punctuation omitted). The investigator failed
to inform the defendant that the victim had, in fact, died and that
the interrogating officer had obtained a warrant for the defendant’s
arrest on charges of murder and armed robbery. And perhaps most
importantly, we concluded that the investigator’s “representation
regarding the victim’s state of health constituted an implied promise
14 that Ritter could not be charged with murder if he gave a statement
to the police, but could only be charged with aggravated assault.” Id.
at 110 (1).
The facts of Mann’s case, however, are distinguishable from
those in Ritter.4 Here, though the interrogating officers falsely told
Mann that Ethan had woken up and told them that Mann caused
his injuries, the statement that Ethan was still alive was truthful;
indeed, Ethan was not declared dead until the day after Mann’s
confession, and investigators did not obtain a warrant for Mann’s
arrest on charges of murder until September 24. “It is well
established that artifice and deception do not render a statement
involuntary so long as they are not calculated to procure an untrue
statement.” Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 290-291 (3) (766 SE2d 447)
(2014) (no hope of benefit when officers represented to the defendant
that the deceased victim had survived the shooting). Throughout
the interview, the officers exhorted Mann to be honest with them
4 We have serious doubts as to whether Ritter was rightly decided; however, because there are sufficient distinctions between Ritter and this case, we are not concerned that Ritter controls here. 15 and to tell them the truth about what happened on the morning
Ethan sustained his injuries. See Reed v. State, 307 Ga. ___, ___ (2)
(a) (___ SE2d ___) (2019) (“[E]xhortations or encouragement to tell
the truth and comments conveying the seriousness of a suspect’s
situation do not render his subsequent statements involuntary.”).
Additionally, unlike the defendant in Ritter, Mann seemed to
place little, if any, reliance on the statements regarding Ethan’s
health and simply wanted to explain that Ethan’s death was an
accident. Mann continued to express his disbelief of their earlier
statements regarding Ethan’s improvement and asked the
investigators numerous times whether they were being truthful
with him. He also stated that he did not “want [Ethan] laying [in the
hospital] about to die” and that he had administered CPR on Ethan
to “try to save his life,” indicating that he was aware of the severity
of Ethan’s injuries, regardless of what the investigators told him.
Accordingly, there is no merit to Mann’s contention that his second
statement was involuntary as being induced by a hope of benefit.
(d) Mann contends that the trial court erred by denying his
16 motion for a continuance. Again, his claim is without merit.
In June 2014, Mann retained new trial counsel and was
granted a continuance to afford his new counsel time to prepare for
trial. Mann filed a second motion to continue in September 2014.
The trial court held a hearing on this motion on September 24, 2014,
during which trial counsel argued that he required another
continuance to secure an expert to rebut the testimony of the State’s
medical witnesses in support of Mann’s accident defense. Trial
counsel also noted that he, counsel, had been retained in June 2014
and had only recently obtained Mann’s file from prior counsel. The
trial court indicated that, because the trial would not start for
several days and because the State would not rest for several days
longer, Mann had time to secure a witness. The State indicated that,
so long as it had the expert’s opinion 24 hours before the expert
would testify, it would not object to the expert’s testifying. The trial
did not begin until September 29, and the State did not rest until
October 2.
“In considering a motion for continuance, the trial court enjoys
17 broad discretion and may grant or refuse the motion as the ends of
justice may require.” (Punctuation omitted.) Phoenix v. State, 304
Ga. 785, 788 (2) (822 SE2d 195) (2018) (quoting OCGA § 17-8-22).
To obtain a new trial based upon the denial of a motion for a
continuance, an appellant must show not only a clear abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion but
also that he was harmed by that denial. Id. Mann has not met this
burden.
Our review of the record shows that the trial court considered
several factors before denying Mann’s motion: that it had granted
Mann’s prior motion for a continuance, that Mann’s counsel had not
previously apprised the trial court of any difficulties he encountered
while preparing for trial, and that one of the State’s witnesses
rescheduled surgery in order to be available for the September trial
date. Given these facts, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Mann’s motion for continuance. See Phoenix,
304 Ga. at 788 (2). See also Terrell v. State, 304 Ga. 183, 185-186
(2) (815 SE2d 66) (2018) (“[T]rial judges necessarily require a great
18 deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems
is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same
time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for
compelling reasons.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
(e) In his final claim of trial court error, Mann challenges the
admission of post-autopsy photographs. The photographs at issue
depict a vertical incision extending the length of Ethan’s chest,
which was made to harvest Ethan’s organs for donation. Relying
only upon our decisions in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862 (302 SE2d
347) (1983), and McClure v. State, 278 Ga. 411 (603 SE2d 224)
(2004), Mann claims that the “gruesome” photographs were
“prejudicial and inflammatory.”
As an initial matter, we note that, although Mann objected to
some of the photographs he now challenges, he did not object to all
of them, and the basis on which he challenged the photographs at
trial is not the same basis on which he now challenges the
19 photographs on appeal.5 We therefore review his appellate claim for
plain error only. See Thompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 151 (6) (816
SE2d 646) (2018). See also OCGA § 24-1-103 (d). To establish plain
error,
[Mann] must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his substantial rights, and the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. To show that the error affected his substantial rights, [Mann] is required to show that error probably affected the outcome of his trial.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bozzie v. State, 302 Ga. 704,
707 (2) (808 SE2d 671) (2017). See also State v. Kelly, 290 Ga 29 (718
SE2d 232) (2011).
In Brown, this Court held that “[a] photograph which depicts
the victim after autopsy incisions are made or after the state of the
body is changed by authorities or the pathologist will not be
admissible unless necessary to show some material fact which
becomes apparent only because of the autopsy.” 250 Ga. at 867 (5).
5 At trial, counsel argued that the photographs were inadmissible under
OCGA §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-402, and 24-4-403. 20 We applied this rule in later cases, including McClure. However,
because Mann’s trial occurred in 2014, it was governed by the new
Evidence Code. As we recently explained, “the rule in Brown is no
doubt abrogated by the new Evidence Code.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Venturino v. State, 306 Ga. 391, 396 (2) (b)
(830 SE2d 110) (2019). We have “disavow[ed] the application of the
rule announced in Brown, and applied in its progeny, in cases
governed by the new Evidence Code.” Id. As such, Mann’s claim of
error predicated on Brown and its progeny is meritless.6
3. Finally, Mann argues that his trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance in two regards. To succeed on
these claims, Mann must demonstrate both that his trial counsel
performed deficiently and that, absent that deficient performance, a
reasonable probability exists that the outcome at trial would have
been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687, 694
6 We remind counsel that “Georgia lawyers do this Court no favors . . . when they fail to recognize that we are all living in a new evidence world and are required to analyze and apply the new law.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 192 (3) (787 SE2d 221) (2016). 21 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If a defendant fails to satisfy
one part of the Strickland test, then this Court is not required to
consider the other. See Stripling v. State, 304 Ga. 131, 138 (3) (b)
(816 SE2d 663) (2018). Mann has not met this standard in regard to
either of his claims.
(a) Mann first argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to pursue solely an accident defense. Mann
argues that trial counsel confused the jury by presenting multiple
theories, through cross-examination and argument, that someone
else had caused Ethan’s injuries or, alternatively, that the injuries
had developed over time.
“An attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a
question of trial strategy,” and trial strategy, if reasonable, does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. (Citation and
punctuationomitted.) Bryant v. State, 306 Ga. 687, 697 (2) (c) (832
SE2d 826) (2019). “A defendant who contends a strategic decision
constitutes deficient performance must show that no competent
attorney, under similar circumstances, would have made it.”
22 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 148
(3) (g) (829 SE2d 321) (2019).
At the hearing on Mann’s motion for new trial, trial counsel
testified that, before trial, he had prepared two separate defenses
for trial. The first was to be used if the trial court suppressed Mann’s
inculpatory statements and involved multiple theories of defense,
including accident, alternative perpetrator, and slow-developing
injury; the other, which focused on the sole defense of accident,
would be used if the trial court admitted the statements. Counsel
explained that he focused on the accident defense until the trial
court, at the mid-trial charge conference, declined to give Mann’s
requested charge on accident; thereafter, trial counsel chose to cross-
examine witnesses regarding an alternative perpetrator and a slow-
developing injury and to argue the same theories in closing because
he wanted to offer “other avenues where a jury could find [Mann]
not guilty.”
Mann has not articulated how this strategy fell outside the
wide range of reasonable professional conduct or, much less, shown
23 that no competent attorney under similar circumstances would have
pursued the same strategy. See Walker v. State, 294 Ga. 752, 757 (2)
(e) (755 SE2d 790) (2014) (“The fact that present counsel would
pursue a different strategy does not render trial counsel’s strategy
unreasonable.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Given the facts
of this case, we conclude that trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable
— and, thus, that trial counsel did not perform deficiently — and
that Mann is not entitled to relief on this claim.
(b) Mann also argues that trial counsel was ineffective by
failing to request a jury charge on the voluntariness of his custodial
statement. Assuming that this failure constitutes deficient
performance, Mann’s claim nevertheless fails because he cannot
demonstrate prejudice.
As discussed above, ample evidence was before the jury that
Mann’s second statement was made freely and voluntarily. After
invoking his right to counsel during the first interview, Mann
reinitiated contact with the investigating officers by signing an
inmate request form, and he affirmed his desire to speak with the
24 officers before the second interview. Both Investigator Stewart and
Lieutenant Oliver testified that the Miranda warnings were read to
Mann before the start of each interview and that Mann
acknowledged both verbally and in writing that he understood those
warnings. Mann offered no rebuttal evidence, and the jury could
readily conclude that the officers were not seeking to obtain an
untrue statement. Given these circumstances, there is no reasonable
probability that the outcome at trial would have been different
absent trial counsel’s presumed deficiency.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JANUARY 27, 2020. Murder. Newton Superior Court. Before Judge Johnson. Mark H. Yun, Anthony S. Carter, for appellant.
25 Layla H. Zon, District Attorney, Candice L. Branche, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.