UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RAHUL DEV MANCHANDA, Plaintiff, -against- 25-CV-3935 (LTS) ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE 1ST ORDER DEPARTMENT; NYS SUPREME COURT; APPELLATE DIVISION 1ST DEPARTMENT, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff filed this action pro se. On May 16, 2025, the Court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, without prejudice, for failure to comply with the injunction issued in Manchanda v. Walsh, ECF 1:23-CV-7637, 56 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2024). On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “notice of motion for contempt of court against Judge T Swain and Assistant Attorney General Anjali Bhat.” (ECF 15.) Plaintiff asks that the Court issue sanctions against the undersigned and to “restore” the matter. (Id.) The Court liberally construes this submission as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).1 See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010)
1 Plaintiff is an attorney who is not entitled to the special solicitude usually granted to pro se litigants. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]here, as here, the plaintiff is an attorney representing himself, he ordinarily “receives no such solicitude at all.”); see also Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 82 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) (pro se attorneys “cannot claim the special consideration which the courts customarily grant to pro se parties”). Although Plaintiff did not label this document as a motion for reconsideration, because he seeks to “restore” the matter to the court’s docket, it appears he seeks reconsideration of the Court’s May 16, 2025 order of dismissal. (the solicitude afforded to pro se litigants takes a variety of forms, including liberal construction of papers, “relaxation of the limitations on the amendment of pleadings,” leniency in the enforcement of other procedural rules, and “deliberate, continuing efforts to ensure that a pro se litigant understands what is required of him”) (citations omitted).
After reviewing Plaintiff’s submission, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration. DISCUSSION A. Recusal of the Undersigned Because Plaintiff seeks sanctions against the undersigned, the Court first addresses whether recusal is warranted in this matter. For the following reasons, the Court finds that recusal is not warranted. A judge is required to recuse herself from “any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). When a judge’s impartiality is questioned on bias or prejudice grounds, “what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). That is, recusal is warranted if “an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts . . . entertain
significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal.” United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 169 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The showing of personal bias to warrant recusal must ordinarily be based on “extrajudicial conduct . . . not conduct which arises in a judicial context.” Lewis v. Tuscan Dairy Farms, Inc., 25 F.3d 1138, 1141 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted); see Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 199 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of recusal motion filed in case by plaintiff where judge had ruled against him on all his motions and where plaintiff had “speculated that the judge may have been acquainted with [him]”). In rare circumstances, judicial “opinions formed by [a] judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the [court] proceedings, or of prior proceedings,”
may be the basis of a recusal motion, but only if those opinions “display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff states no facts suggesting that the undersigned “displayed a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. Any reasonable and objective observer would perceive Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction only with the Court’s rulings. If Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the Court’s rulings, he is free to appeal them to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. (noting that [a]lmost invariably, [judicial rulings] are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal”). As there is no need for the undersigned to recuse herself from this action, the Court now addresses Plaintiff’s motion.
B. Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) A party who moves to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) must demonstrate that the Court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had been previously put before it. R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “Such motions must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly considered by the court.” Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A motion for reconsideration is not an invitation to parties to ‘treat the court’s initial decision as the opening of a dialogue in which that party may then use such a motion to advance new theories or adduce new evidence in response to the court’s ruling.’”) (internal quotation and citations omitted). A motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Id.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RAHUL DEV MANCHANDA, Plaintiff, -against- 25-CV-3935 (LTS) ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE 1ST ORDER DEPARTMENT; NYS SUPREME COURT; APPELLATE DIVISION 1ST DEPARTMENT, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff filed this action pro se. On May 16, 2025, the Court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, without prejudice, for failure to comply with the injunction issued in Manchanda v. Walsh, ECF 1:23-CV-7637, 56 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2024). On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “notice of motion for contempt of court against Judge T Swain and Assistant Attorney General Anjali Bhat.” (ECF 15.) Plaintiff asks that the Court issue sanctions against the undersigned and to “restore” the matter. (Id.) The Court liberally construes this submission as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).1 See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010)
1 Plaintiff is an attorney who is not entitled to the special solicitude usually granted to pro se litigants. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]here, as here, the plaintiff is an attorney representing himself, he ordinarily “receives no such solicitude at all.”); see also Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 82 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) (pro se attorneys “cannot claim the special consideration which the courts customarily grant to pro se parties”). Although Plaintiff did not label this document as a motion for reconsideration, because he seeks to “restore” the matter to the court’s docket, it appears he seeks reconsideration of the Court’s May 16, 2025 order of dismissal. (the solicitude afforded to pro se litigants takes a variety of forms, including liberal construction of papers, “relaxation of the limitations on the amendment of pleadings,” leniency in the enforcement of other procedural rules, and “deliberate, continuing efforts to ensure that a pro se litigant understands what is required of him”) (citations omitted).
After reviewing Plaintiff’s submission, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration. DISCUSSION A. Recusal of the Undersigned Because Plaintiff seeks sanctions against the undersigned, the Court first addresses whether recusal is warranted in this matter. For the following reasons, the Court finds that recusal is not warranted. A judge is required to recuse herself from “any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). When a judge’s impartiality is questioned on bias or prejudice grounds, “what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). That is, recusal is warranted if “an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts . . . entertain
significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal.” United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 169 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The showing of personal bias to warrant recusal must ordinarily be based on “extrajudicial conduct . . . not conduct which arises in a judicial context.” Lewis v. Tuscan Dairy Farms, Inc., 25 F.3d 1138, 1141 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted); see Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 199 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of recusal motion filed in case by plaintiff where judge had ruled against him on all his motions and where plaintiff had “speculated that the judge may have been acquainted with [him]”). In rare circumstances, judicial “opinions formed by [a] judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the [court] proceedings, or of prior proceedings,”
may be the basis of a recusal motion, but only if those opinions “display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff states no facts suggesting that the undersigned “displayed a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. Any reasonable and objective observer would perceive Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction only with the Court’s rulings. If Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the Court’s rulings, he is free to appeal them to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. (noting that [a]lmost invariably, [judicial rulings] are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal”). As there is no need for the undersigned to recuse herself from this action, the Court now addresses Plaintiff’s motion.
B. Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) A party who moves to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) must demonstrate that the Court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had been previously put before it. R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “Such motions must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly considered by the court.” Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A motion for reconsideration is not an invitation to parties to ‘treat the court’s initial decision as the opening of a dialogue in which that party may then use such a motion to advance new theories or adduce new evidence in response to the court’s ruling.’”) (internal quotation and citations omitted). A motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Id.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Court overlooked any controlling decisions or factual matters with respect to the dismissed action. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). C. Motion for Reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3 The standards governing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 are the same. R.F.M.A.S., Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (discussion in the context of both Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). Thus, a party seeking reconsideration of any order under Local Civil Rule 6.3 must demonstrate that the Court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had been previously put before it. R.F.M.A.S., Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 509. A motion brought under Local Civil Rule 6.3 must be filed within 14 days “after the entry of the Court’s determination of the original motion, or in the case of a court order resulting in
a judgment, within . . . (14) days after the entry of the judgment.” Id. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Court overlooked any controlling decisions or factual matters with respect to the dismissed action. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion under Local Civil Rule 6.3. D. Motion for Reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), a party may seek relief from a district court’s order or judgment for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A motion based on reasons (1), (2), or (3) must be filed “no more than one year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The Court has considered Plaintiff’s arguments, and even under a liberal interpretation of his motion, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of the grounds listed in the first five clauses of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) apply. Therefore, the motion under any of these clauses is denied. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), the motion is also denied. “[A] Rule 60(b)(6) motion must be based upon some reason other than those stated in clauses (1)-(5).” United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Smith v. Sec’y of HHS, 776 F.2d 1330, 1333 (6th Cir. 1985)). A party moving under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot circumvent the one-year limitation applicable to claims under clauses (1)-(3) by invoking the residual clause (6) of Rule 60(b). Id. A Rule 60(b)(6) motion must show both that the motion was filed within a “reasonable time” and that “‘extraordinary circumstances’ [exist] to warrant relief.” Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Pac. Fin. Servs. of America, Inc., 301 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199-202 (1950). The Court dismissed this action because Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements imposed in Manchanda, No. 23-CV-7637. In his motion, Plaintiff does not state any facts suggesting that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting reconsideration of the Court’s order of dismissal. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s motion (ECF 15), construed as a motion for reconsideration, is denied. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all motions in this action. This case remains closed. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an
appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: May 21, 2025 New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge