JUSTICE FREEMAN
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Kilbride and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Karmeier dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Garman.
Justice Thomas took no part in the decision.
OPINION
Plaintiffs, Cook County Circuit Court Judge William D. Maddux and five Cook County voters eligible to vote in judicial elections, sought a declaration from the circuit court of Cook County that the Compulsory Retirement of Judges Act (Retirement Act or Act) (705 ILCS 55/1 et seq. (West 2006)) is unconstitutional. The circuit court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the appellate court, and then filed a motion to transfer to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(b). See 210 Ill. 2d R. 302(b) (requiring, if in the public interest, prompt adjudication by the Illinois Supreme Court). We allowed the motion and ordered that the appeal be taken directly to this court. 210 Ill. 2d R. 302(b). For reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs’ complaint challenged the constitutionality of the Retirement Act on a number of grounds, including that it impermissibly imposes limitations on the judicial retention process in violation of article VI, section 12(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §12(d)). Plaintiffs named as defendants the Governor of Illinois,1 the members of the Illinois State Board of Elections and the Cook County clerk. The defendant Governor moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2 — 619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 — 619(a)(1) (West 2006)), claiming that there was no actual controversy between himself and the plaintiffs. The Board defendants moved to dismiss under section 2 — 615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 2006)), on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim that the Act is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, relying solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and claiming they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Judge Maddux is currently the presiding judge of the law division of the Cook County circuit court. He was first appointed a circuit judge in 1991 and was subsequently elected as a circuit judge in 1992. He was later retained by the voters as a circuit judge in the 1996 and 2002 elections. His current term expires in 2010. Judge Maddux will be 75 years old by the date his term expires and will, at that time, be subject to the Retirement Act’s provisions. In an amendment to their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Judge Maddux intends to run for retention should the Act be invalidated, but will not run in a contested election should the Act be upheld.
The circuit court filed a memorandum opinion and order, granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss and denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed the case in its entirety with regard to all defendants.2 In so doing, the circuit court determined that it was bound to accept the “judicial gloss” placed on the Retirement Act by the First District’s decision in Anagnost v. Layhe, 230 Ill. App. 3d 540 (1992). The circuit court noted that Anagnost had construed the Act as preventing a judge from running in a retention election after the expiration of the term in which the judge attains the age of 75, but allowing a judge to run for judicial office in a contested election, regardless of any age limitation. The circuit court concluded that there was no basis to conclude that the Retirement Act amounted to a constitutionally unauthorized modification of the retention process, as the text and history of the judicial article of the Illinois Constitution support the constitutionality of the Act as interpreted by Anagnost.
ANALYSIS
The dismissal of a complaint is reviewed de novo. People ex rel. Ryan v. World Church of the Creator, 198 Ill. 2d 115, 120 (2001).
This case turns on the meaning of the Retirement Act and whether its operation is consistent with our state constitution.
The Retirement Act provides:
“A judge is automatically retired at the expiration of the term in which the judge attains the age of 75. Such judge shall conclude all matters pending before him unless the Supreme Court makes other provisions for the disposition of such matters. This Section shall apply to all Supreme Court, appellate, circuit and associate judges.” 705 ILCS 55/1 (West 2006).
As in all cases of statutory construction, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly in passing the Act, and the enacted language is generally the best evidence of that. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006). We may also consider the purpose behind the Act and the evils sought to be remedied, as well as the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other, a critical consideration for this case. County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill. 2d 593, 604 (2008).
The Act states that a judge is “automatically retired” at the expiration of the term in which he attains the age of 75. The word “retired” is modified by the adverb “automatically.” Thus, the Act makes clear that, once a judge reaches the age of 75 while still serving a judicial term of office, the termination of work is not left to choice. Giving the language its plain and ordinary meaning, as we must (People v. Roos, 118 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (1987)), the Act dictates that a judge who turns 75 at any point during his term must cease to be employed as a judge at the conclusion of that term. The verb “retired” in this context means permanent termination of employment as a judge. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1939 (1986) (defining “retire” as to withdraw from “active duty”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1317 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “retirement” as the termination of one’s “employment or career”). We therefore conclude that, under the Act’s plain language, mandatory, permanent retirement is required for all judges at the expiration of the term in which they reach age 75.
The circuit court, following the construction of the Act offered in Anagnost v. Layhe, 230 Ill. App. 3d 540 (1992), interpreted the Act in a manner that departs considerably from its plain language. As we explain, however, that construction does not effectuate the purpose behind it and cannot stand.
In Anagnost, the appellate court construed the Act to bar sitting judges from seeking retention of their seats once they reach the age of 75 within a term, but not from seeking election. The case involved a 75-year-old licensed attorney who sought the nomination for the office of supreme court justice. The defendants challenged his nominating petitions on the basis that he was ineligible for office under the Act because he was too old. The attorney challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that the legislature lacked authority to prohibit persons 75 years old or older from running for judicial office. The appellate court recognized the difficult constitutional question that the case presented. Anagnost, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 542-43. On the one hand, the court acknowledged the long line of authority which prevents the legislature from adding to the qualifications for judicial office, as specified in section 11 of the judicial article.3 Anagnost, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 542. On the other hand, the court observed that section 15(a) of that article4 expressly authorized the legislature to fix a mandatory retirement age for judges. Anagnost, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 542.
Ultimately, the appellate court did - not reach the constitutional question. Anagnost, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 542-43. Instead, it resolved the case by construing the Act as not barring a “person over the age of 75[,] and otherwise qualified to serve as a judge from running in a judicial election.” Anagnost, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 544. The court noted that the “language of the Judges Act leaves little room for an interpretation that it is applicable to any one [sic] other than sitting judges.” Anagnost, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 544. It also noted the difference between an adversarial election and the retention process. Anagnost, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 543-44. Although the court held that a citizen 75 years or older was eligible to run for judicial office, the effect of its holding on sitting judges was that a judge retired under the Act could yet run for election.
Justice Jiganti, in dissent, correctly recognized that the majority’s holding was that “a judge may seek election beyond retirement age but not retention.” Anagnost, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 546 (Jiganti, J., dissenting). He noted that while there arguably may be a difference between seeking election and seeking retention, holding that a judge beyond retirement age may seek election but not retention brought about an absurd result. Anagnost, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 546 (Jiganti, J., dissenting).
In this case, both parties see in Anagnost reason to consider whether legislative acquiescence, a canon of statutory construction, controls the question of the Act’s interpretation. They acknowledge that in the time since Anagnost was decided, the General Assembly has taken no action to amend the Act. We need not, however, belabor these arguments. Legislative acquiescence is a “jurisprudential principle; it is not a rule of law.” People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 331 (2007). More importantly, the General Assembly cannot acquiesce to a construction that is at odds with the constitution, and the construction that finds support in Anagnost cannot be harmonized with the constitutional mandate of section 15(a).
The Attorney General, recognizing that this case differs factually from Anagnost, nevertheless argues that the circuit court correctly applied Anagnost's construction in this case. The Attorney General reasons as follows. If a judge turns 75 during his term in office, then his seat becomes vacant automatically at the conclusion of that term. The seat being vacant, it cannot be retained because the judge would be ineligible to run for retention. The judge would thus be effectively retired. The Attorney General sees nothing in the Act, however, that would preclude that same judge, so “retired” by the Act’s operation, from running for a judicial seat in an open5 election, including the very one that the judge was “retired” from.
This interpretation, referred to by both parties as the “Anagnost gloss,”6 departs in no small way from the Act’s plain language. Specifically, the Act draws no distinction between retention elections and open elections. It is, of course, “never proper for a court to depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions.” County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 556 (1999). Yet, adding language is exactly what the Attorney General’s construction does. The Act says nothing about retention or about the ability to avoid permanent retirement by simply running in an open election. It provides only that a judge is automatically retired at the end of the term in which he turns 75.
This construction, moreover, would disqualify by age sitting judges who would seek retention, but not those sitting judges retired by the Act’s operation who would seek election. Such a construction is not supported by the actual language of the Act, which purports to retire all judges. And, it is critical to point out that providing for the mandatory retirement of judges was the only thing that the General Assembly may do under section 15(a). We have long acknowledged that the intent of the drafters in section 15(a) was to have the legislature designate an age beyond which a judge could no longer hold office. Cusack v. Howlett, 44 Ill. 2d 233, 244 (1969) (construing 1964 amendment to the judicial article of the Constitution of 1870, the precursor to the current judicial article, as granting to the General Assembly the authority to fix a “mandatory” retirement age for judges); see also 2 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1089 (Delegate Rachunas noting that the proposal for the 1970 Constitution deals with the “automatic retirement for age *** of judges). See also G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated & Comparative Analysis 375 (1969) (noting that drafters of section 15(a) sought to establish an age at which a judge could no longer hold office).
More importantly, and as Justice Jiganti recognized in his dissent in Anagnost, under this construction, mandatory retirement is easily avoided by running in an open election for a judicial seat, including the one made vacant by the Act’s operation. Thus, under this construction, the Act does not provide for mandatory retirement at all. The only judges retired under this construction would be those who choose to be. This entirely undermines the notion of a mandatory retirement based on age. Consider, for example, a 76-year judge, who is “retired” by virtue of attaining the age of 75 during his term. That person could still run for, and be elected to, the same seat he vacated by operation of the Act. Moreover, if elected, that judge, beginning his term at an age older than 75 would thus be immune from the Act altogether. That judge would never “attain” 75 within a judicial term. 705 ILCS 55/1 (West 2006). The Act could not prevent the judge from seeking retention in six years (as a circuit court judge) or ten years (as an appellate or supreme court justice).7 The not unlikely possibility of a person older than 75 running for judicial office8 defeats the intent of section 15(a) of the judicial article, which purports to provide for mandatory judicial retirement based on age.
Thus, under the Anagnost construction, the Act does not achieve mandatory retirement at all. It is, in effect, nothing but an anti-retention provision.9 A judge disqualified by age from running for retention, yet able to hold a judicial seat, even the one he was retired from, via an open election is, in no sense of the word, “retired.” As such, the Act, so construed, fails to fulfill the constitutional mandate of compulsory retirement.
The appellate court in Anagnost, and the circuit court here, stated that their interpretation of the Act was reasonable given that the distinction between retention elections and open elections provides a means for voters to assess the fitness of 75-year “retired” judges to again hold office. The point is not relevant for constitutional analysis, but the logic is nevertheless flawed, as we explain below.
Nothing in section 15(a) expressly links age-based mandatory retirement to fitness. While infirmities of age might have been the concern of the drafters of section 15(a), it is also possible that they sought to preclude life tenure for judges, which, at the time, some viewed as having been made possible through the retention process.10 As we have pointed out, under the interpretation in Anagnost, a judge can avoid the effect of being retired simply by running again, even for the same seat made vacant by his “retirement.” This obviously thwarts the intent to keep someone from sitting on the bench for life.
The concern with limiting judicial tenure through retirement by age might explain why, in sections 15(c) and (e), the judicial article provides an explicit procedure for the removal of a judge for reasons of unfitness. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §§15(b), (c), (e). Section 15(c) creates a Judicial Inquiry Board empowered to charge a judge or associate judge with being “physically or mentally unable to perform his [or her] duties.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §15(c). Section 15(e) creates a Courts Commission empowered to “retire” a judge who is “physically or mentally unable to perform his or her duties.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §15(e).
Nevertheless, there is some evidence to support the appellate court’s conclusion that fitness was the concern behind the mandatory retirement provision contained in section 15(a). The legislative history of the Act, whose original passage predated section 15(a) of the 1970 Constitution,11 shows that some legislators believed that age-based mandatory retirement “will tend to insure a more vigorous judiciary to which the public is entitled.” Report of the Judicial Advisory Council of Illinois 9-10 (June 1963) (submitted to the Governor and the Seventy-Third General Assembly of the State of Illinois).12 The drafters of the 1970 Constitution knew of this legislative history and retained the concept of mandatory age-based retirement in the judicial article. G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated & Comparative Analysis 375 (1969).
But the legitimate interest in “a more vigorous judiciary” is not realized under the construction of the Act advanced by the appellate court in Anagnost. Once again, under that construction, a judge precluded from retaining his seat may nevertheless hold judicial office via an open election, including the very seat he was “retired” from. If the drafters of the constitution were concerned about the infirmities of age, that concern would exist for any person 75 and older. Logically, the same disqualification based on the infirmities of age could logically apply to both those who would seek either retention or election.13 Such inconsistent treatment cannot rationally be tied to the method of election; either age determines the ability to hold judicial office or it does not.
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the circuit court in this case and the appellate court in Anagnost erred in construing the Act as they did. The Anagnost interpretation is not supported by the plain language of the Act and, more problematically, does not achieve the constitutional mandate of compulsory judicial retirement contemplated by section 15(a). Accordingly, Anagnost is overruled.
Having overruled Anagnost, we return to the plain language of the Act for purposes of assessing plaintiffs’ arguments. As we have noted, that language compels mandatory retirement for all judges at the expiration of the term in which they attain the age of 75.
Plaintiffs contend that section 15(a) does not authorize the General Assembly to enact mandatory judicial retirement legislation, but the argument lacks merit. The constitution operates as a limitation upon the General Assembly’s sweeping authority, not as any grant of power (see City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d 480, 489 (2003)); thus the General Assembly is free to enact any legislation that the constitution does not expressly prohibit (Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman, 181 Ill. 2d 65, 78 (1998)). Nevertheless, where the constitution specifically addresses the power of the General Assembly to enact particular legislation, basic principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation still apply. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d at 489. The court must ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions in the constitutional and legislative contexts in which they appear. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d at 489. The constitution must be read and understood according to the most natural and obvious meaning of the language in order to avoid eliminating or extending its operation. Austin v. Healy, 376 Ill. 633, 636 (1941). Where the words of the constitution are clear, explicit, and unambiguous, there is no need for a court to engage in construction. City of Beardstown v. City of Virginia, 76 Ill. 34, 40 (1875).
Section 15(a) of the 1970 Constitution states that the General Assembly “may provide by law for the retirement of Judges and Associate Judges at a prescribed age.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 15(a). The use of “may” indicates that the drafters intended to allow the General Assembly permissive power, which it may choose to exercise or not, to enact mandatory retirement legislation. See In re Marriage of Freeman, 106 Ill. 2d 290, 298 (1985) (stating that, except in unusual circumstances, the use of “may” connotes permissiveness); People v. Siler, 85 Ill. App. 3d 304, 310 (1980) (noting use of “may” in the constitution denotes discretion).14 The word “prescribe” means “to order” or “direct.” The provision thus plainly allows the General Assembly to enact legislation regarding mandatory retirement of judges based on age if it so chooses. Moreover, as we have explained, the conclusion that section 15(a) intended for any such legislation to be mandatory is consistent with both case law and the constitutional debates. See Cusack, 44 Ill. 2d at 244; 5 Proceedings 3958.
In acting pursuant to section 15(a) of the judicial article, the General Assembly created in the Act a scheme that declares a vacancy in the office of a judge at the expiration of the term in which that judge reaches the age of 75. See Tully v. State of Illinois, 143 Ill. 2d 425 (1991) (noting, in passing, that a seat becomes vacant upon compulsory retirement under the Act). That the Act renders the seat “vacant” is consistent with section 12(b) of the judicial article, which provides that a judicial office “shall be vacant upon [the judge’s] death, resignation, retirement, removal, or upon the conclusion of [the judge’s] term without retention in office.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §12(b). Thus, plaintiffs’ contention that the General Assembly lacks authority to enact legislation such as the Act is without merit. The question that remains is whether this particular legislative scheme conflicts, as plaintiffs also maintain, with other provisions of the constitution.
Although giving effect to the Act’s plain language obviously fulfills the constitutional goal of mandatory retirement, it raises other constitutional problems that cannot be remedied simply by statutory construction or constitutional interpretation. As already pointed out, section 11 of the judicial article establishes only three criteria for eligibility to be a judge. These do not include either a minimum or maximum age.15 As a result, all citizens who meet these criteria are eligible to be a candidate for judicial office. The Act would preclude a class of people, former judges who become 75 within their term, from running for vacant judicial seats in open elections. This causes constitutional concerns because other citizens, not in that class, can run in open elections for judicial office.
Consider the situation of a 76-year-old citizen who has never held judicial office. If that person runs for judicial office and wins, he would never face the prospect of compulsory retirement because, under the Act’s operation, automatic retirement occurs “at the expiration of the term in which the judge attains the age of 75.” 705 ILCS 55/1 (West 2006). There would never be a “term in which” such a judge would “attaint ] the age of 75.” 705 ILCS 55/1 (West 2006). (The same would, of course, be true for a judge who left judicial office before turning 75, who then ran for election after turning 76.) The successful candidate in this scenario would fall outside the statute’s language and would be eligible for retention at the conclusion of the term. Mandatory retirement would exist for some, but not all, judges because there would exist a class of judges who would be immune from the mandatory retirement envisioned under section 15(a).
The Act, therefore, does nothing to advance the goal of insuring a “more vigorous judiciary” since it would allow for people older than 75 years to serve terms of 6 and possibly 10 years. More importantly, the Act creates an irrational classification that could not, in terms of equal protection, withstand scrutiny under our state constitution. Equal protection requires that similarly situated individuals will be treated similarly unless the government can demonstrate an appropriate reason to do otherwise. City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B., 211 Ill. 2d 456, 466 (2004); People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 176-77 (2003). In cases like this one, where the statutory classification at issue does not involve fundamental rights, courts employ “rational basis scrutiny” to determine whether the classification bears a rational relation to a legitimate purpose. In re Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548, 562 (2000).
There is no rational basis upon which the legislature can prevent 75-year-old or older former judges from running in an election, but not citizens 75 years old or older who were never judges when the disqualifying characteristic is age. If the legitimate state interest is to insure a “vigorous judiciary,” the classification we describe above cannot be deemed rationally related to that purpose. We stress again that if age defines ability (and both the constitutional and legislative history indicate that it was believed that it does), either all those 75 years of age or older are unfit or they are not. No presumption of constitutionality could save legislation like this that so blatantly violates equal protection. See People v. Nastasio, 19 Ill. 2d 524, 529 (1960) (explaining courts’ duty to avoid interpretations that raise constitutional questions and cast doubt on validity).
The Attorney General, perhaps anticipating the constitutional problems arising from the Act’s plain language, suggests that sections 11, 12, and 15 of the judicial article can be read together as an implicit grant of authority to the legislature to create additional eligibility factors pertaining to age for judges.16 In other words, because section 15(a) mandates retirement at a certain age, the constitution implicitly authorizes that age to be considered as a kind of de facto eligibility criterion with respect to sections 11 and 12. This argument is rooted in the notion that if such implicit authorization is not read into the judicial article, this court would, in effect, be reading out of the constitution section 15 (a)’s allowance for mandatory retirement.
Such an analysis, however, departs from the text of the constitution. Statutory constructions based on looking beyond the text of a statute are disfavored since a court has no authority to depart from the law’s plain meaning or alter its language in a “way that constitutes a change in the plain meaning of the words actually adopted by the legislature.” U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Clark, 216 Ill. 2d 334, 346 (2005). The same is true in construing constitutional provisions, perhaps even more so given that the language in question was what was presented to the citizens who voted to approve it.
To interpret the constitution in the manner suggested by the Attorney General is especially problematic because, as we have stated, the constitution acts as a limitation on the General Assembly’s authority. In section 15(a), the drafters gave the legislature the discretion to enact judicial retirement legislation. Section 11 acts as a limitation on the General Assembly to add to the eligibility of citizens to run for judicial office. We cannot, merely because of section 15(a), read into section 11 an additional eligibility criterion that would impair the rights of people who have never been judges to run for judicial office. In other words, section 15(a), which allows only for the General Assembly to exercise discretion over judicial retirement, cannot be considered a grant of authority to the legislature over matters other than judicial retirement. The constitution acknowledges that the General Assembly may provide for the retirement of judges, which it sought to do under the Act. As it turns out, in doing so, the particular statutory mechanism that the legislature enacted runs afoul of various constitutional principles. We cannot read words into our constitution in order to save problematic legislation.
Legislation is presumed constitutional and must be construed as not offending the constitution, provided, of course, that the construction is reasonable. Gill v. Miller, 94 Ill. 2d 52, 56 (1983). This presumption, however, is only the starting point in constitutional analysis; it is not outcome determinative. Thus, notwithstanding a statute’s presumption of constitutionality, this court has acknowledged its “power to strike down” legislation when it is “violative of the clear requirements of the constitution.” Donovan v. Holzman, 8 Ill. 2d 87, 93 (1956). This court has long acknowledged its “duty to interpret the law and to protect the rights of individuals against acts beyond the scope of the legislative power.” People ex rel. Huempfner v. Benson, 294 Ill. 236 (1920). If a statute is unconstitutional, courts are obligated to declare it invalid. Wilson v. Department of Revenue, 169 Ill. 2d 306, 310 (1996). This duty cannot be evaded or neglected, no matter how desirable or beneficial the legislation may appear to be. Wilson, 169 Ill. 2d at 310; Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 190 (1952).
As we have explained, the judicial article allows for the General Assembly to enact mandatory judicial retirement legislation; however, the plain language of the specific legislation that has been enacted pursuant to the constitution violates equal protection. Moreover, as it is written, it allows certain judges to avoid mandatory retirement. This court is mindful that restraint is called for when presented with challenges to the constitutionality of legislation enacted pursuant to a specific grant of constitutional authority. But we cannot be reluctant to invalidate legislation that either goes beyond the specific grant of authority or is otherwise inconsistent with our constitution, as we have demonstrated in the past. For example, our state constitution requires the legislature to provide by law for four judicial districts outside of Cook County “of substantially equal population.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §2. This court has repeatedly struck down legislative attempts to meet this constitutional mandate. See Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman, 181 Ill. 2d 65 (1998); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513 (1990). As Justice Ryan astutely noted in his special concurrence in State Board of Elections,
“[T]his court, the legislature and the executive are bound by the limitations of the constitution. No matter how politically or socially desirable a piece of legislation may be, if it is contrary to the provisions of our constitution, it cannot stand. Possibly, this court is more conscious of constitutional restrictions than are the other branches of our State government because we must constantly square our holdings with the constitution, whereas the legislative and executive branches must often measure their positions by social and political concerns. Nonetheless, the final product of those branches must stand the constitutional test.” State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d at 539 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
These observations are particularly apt in this case.
Finally, the circuit court here correctly observed that the General Assembly “must navigate” with “precision” in this area given the tensions that exist in the judicial article between having no age ceiling for eligibility in section 11 and allowing for age-based mandatory retirement in section 15(a). The court noted that “the quandary” arises not from the language of the Act, but rather “finds its source in the structure of the judicial article.”
It may well be that the route to mandatory retirement for judges lies in constitutional amendment.17 Such concerns, however, are beyond the scope of this opinion. Our duty in this case is limited to assessing the constitutionality of the Act as it currently exists, not to redraft it. We have determined that the Act as written is unconstitutional. It is, of course, the General Assembly’s prerogative, under section 15(a), to attempt to reenact mandatory judicial retirement legislation. Our holding today recognizes this authority. It is also fair to acknowledge, however, the difficulty in exercising that discretion where retirement is linked to age absent a corresponding constitutional age ceiling in section 11 which would disqualify a person from running for judicial office.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above, the Act is declared unconstitutional and the order of the circuit court is reversed.
Reversed.
JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.