MacOmber v. Dillman

505 A.2d 810, 1986 Me. LEXIS 659

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: February 27, 1986
• Status: Published

Opinions

GLASSMAN, Justice.

Pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 72(c), this case was reported by the Superior Court, York County, from its order denying the defendants’ motion for dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim against the defendants for which relief could be granted, and setting forth the scope of damages recoverable by the plaintiffs should they prevail in their action. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we modify the order as to damages, and, as so modified, affirm the order of the Superior Court.

I.

In April of 1984, the plaintiffs, Roxanne and Steven Macomber, filed a complaint against the defendants, Carter F. Dillman and the Webber Hospital Association. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that as a proximate result of the defendants’ negligent and careless failure to comply with the standard of care of medical practice in the performance of a tubal ligation on Roxanne for the purpose of her permanent sterilization, Roxanne was not permanently sterilized and had conceived and given birth to a child, Mazie. Although the plaintiffs did not allege in their complaint that Mazie is a healthy, normal child, they did not allege otherwise, and the parties have agreed to these facts. Plaintiffs sought damages from defendants “including, but not limited to, the cost of raising and educating Mazie May Macomber, the medical and other expenses of the pregnancy and childbirth, the medical and other expenses of a subsequent hysterectomy for purposes of sterilization, lost wages, loss of consortium, the medical and other expenses of the unsuccessful tubal ligation, permanent physical impairment to Roxanne Macomber resulting from bearing Mazie May, her sixth child, and physical and mental pain and suffering resulting [therefrom].”

Defendants filed motions for dismissal or summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs by their complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and could not recover damages for the cost of rearing and educating a healthy, normal child. After hearing, the Superior Court entered its order denying the defendants’ motions and adopting the analysis that should the plaintiffs prevail they would be entitled to recover “all reasonable, foreseeable, and proximately caused damages, including the expenses of child rearing.” The court refused to rule on whether damages so recoverable by plaintiffs “should be offset by benefits” of parenthood.

On a joint motion of the parties, the Superior Court reported the case to this court thereby posing the following questions of law: (1) Did the Superior Court by its order properly deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim against the defendants for which relief can be granted? (2) Did the Superior Court by its order properly set forth the damages that the plaintiffs could recover should they prevail in their action against the defendants?

II.

We first address the question of whether the plaintiffs have by their complaint stated a claim against the defendants. Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiffs’ action does not represent a new cause of action in the state of Maine. “Since the early days of the common law a cause of action in tort has been recognized to exist when the negligence of one person is the proximate cause of damage to another person.” MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 75 (Me.1980). “[T]o state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must aver either the necessary elements of a cause of action or facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief upon some theory.” E.N. Nason, Inc. v. Land-Ho Development, 403 A.2d 1173, 1177 (Me.1979). When a plaintiff claims he has suffered a personal injury as the result of medical mistreatment, his remedy lies in a complaint for negligence. Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me.1980). The necessary elements of a cause of action for negligence are a duty owed, a breach of that duty proximately causing the plaintiff’s injuries and resulting damages. Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491 (Me. 1973). All well-pleaded material allegations of a complaint are taken as admitted for the purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Haskell v. Phinney, 460 A.2d 1354 (Me.1983); 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 12.11 at 248 (1970). Applying these principles to the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint, it is clear that the necessary elements of a cause of action in negligence have been set forth against the defendants.

III.

We next consider whether the Superior Court correctly established the scope of recoverable damages. We are aware that the courts which have considered this type of case have not reached a consensus as to damages, if any, that may be recoverable. See Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982), for a summary of four different legal positions in the body of developing law on this issue.

We hold for reasons of public policy that a parent cannot be said to have been damaged or injured by the birth and rearing of a healthy, normal child. Accordingly, we limit the recovery of damages, where applicable, to the hospital and medical expenses incurred for the sterilization procedures and pregnancy, the pain and suffering connected with the pregnancy and the loss of earnings by the mother during that time. Our ruling today is limited to the facts of this case, involving a failed sterilization procedure resulting in the birth of a healthy, normal child.

We also must address whether the plaintiff, Steven Macomber, may recover for loss of consortium of his wife, Roxanne. For centuries courts have recognized a husband’s right to recover damages for the loss of consortium when a tortious injury to his wife detrimentally affects the spousal relationship. See Britton v. Dube, et al., 154 Me. 319, 147 A.2d 452 (1958) (under a claim for loss of consortium husband was allowed to recover damages for loss of services of wife); see also Note, Who Should Recover For Loss of Consortium, 35 Me.L.Rev. 295 (1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 905, comment f (1977). Because his wife’s cause of action is for negligence, Steven Macomber may recover proven damages for loss of consortium.

The entry is:

The order of the Superior Court is modified to limit the scope of recoverable damages, and as so modified, affirmed. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.

McKUSICK, NICHOLS, and ROBERTS, JJ., concurring.