[289]*289BROWN, Justice.
This case involves two separate actions which were consolidated for review. Appellants filed suit against the appellees seeking damages resulting from unsuccessful tubal ligations. There are several categories of appellants here.
Eighteen appellants had tubal ligations so that they would become sterile, but instead became pregnant. They were plaintiffs below. At the time of the suits eleven of these appellants had given birth to healthy, normal children; three of the appellants were pregnant; and four of the appellants had terminated their pregnancies.
The husbands of the female appellants were also plaintiffs below and are appellants here. The women who did not terminate their pregnancies, together with their husbands, brought a cause of action which is styled as a “wrongful birth” action, although it is' sometimes denominated a “wrongful pregnancy” action. It is essentially a medical malpractice action. The husbands and wives who became parents or were to become parents were also plaintiffs below on behalf of the children in another action which is denominated a “wrongful life” action.
Appellees here are Dr. Weirdsma, who performed the tubal ligations; Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County, where the operations were performed; and Davol, Inc., which manufactured the cauterization instrument used in the surgery.
In their complaints, appellants alleged various acts of negligence against the three appellees. They also alleged breach of warranty against Davol, Inc. Intermingled in the appellants’ tort claims are allegations that apparently were designed to state a cause of action for breach of contract. The trial judge granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of all appellees.
Appellants stated the issues as follows:
“1. Was it error for the trial court to grant judgment on the pleadings when the Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Defendants’ medical negligence caused Plaintiffs to become pregnant and thereafter to sustain emotional distress, medical expenses, alteration of lifestyle and other damages?
“2. Can the Defendants exempt themselves from the application of traditional tort law doctrines by arguing that the pregnancies, children and abortions caused by their conduct created a ‘benefit’ to Plaintiffs which, as a matter of law, outweighs the detrimental results of their negligence?
“3. Are the Plaintiffs, who sustained medical expenses, pain, emotional trauma, changes in lifestyle and additional costs which are attributable to the Defendants’ negligence, entitled to have those damages determined by a jury and not upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings?”
We will affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
I
The “wrongful life” action asserted by the parents on behalf of their children is an action for damages based on appellees’ negligence which caused a particular child to be born. We hold that a cause of action for “wrongful life” under the circumstances here does not exist.
The vast majority of cases have refused to recognize a cause of action for “wrongful life” on behalf of a child based on the rationale that there is no legal right not to be born.1
The Alabama Supreme Court in Elliott v. Brown, Ala., 361 So.2d 546, 548 (1978) stated:
“ * * * Fundamental to the recognition of such a cause of action [wrongful life] is the notion that the defendant has violat[290]*290ed some legal right of plaintiff’s and as a result she has suffered injury. * * *
“We hold that there is no legal right not to be born and the plaintiff has no cause of action for ‘wrongful life.’ ”
The few courts which have acknowledged a cause of action for wrongful life have done so only for impaired children, and then usually because there was a causal connection between the alleged negligence and the impairment. See Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified to allow a cause of action only for “wrongful birth” in 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). In Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.3d 220, 182 Cal.Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954 (1982), the question was whether a child born with a hereditary affliction could maintain a tort action against a physician who negligently failed to advise the child’s parents before the child’s conception of the possibility of the hereditary condition, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to choose not to conceive the child.
The California Supreme Court stated: “In sum, we conclude that while a plaintiff-child in a wrongful life action may not recover general damages for being born impaired as opposed to not being born at all, the child — like his or her parents — may recover special damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary to treat the hereditary ailment.”
We know of no cases recognizing a “wrongful life” cause of action under the circumstances of this case. The district judge was correct in dismissing the wrongful life claims.
II
The principal issue in this case is whether the parents have a cause of action in their own right for “wrongful birth” against ap-pellees, assuming that fault on appellees’ part led to the birth of an unplanned, yet normal and healthy child.
Appellants seek damages against appel-lees as follows:
“1. For actual expenses to be incurred in the future which have been occasioned by the birth of minor children in question including medical and hospital care during delivery, actual costs of raising such children including medical expenses, expenses for general care and maintenance and other similar expenses.
“2. For the reasonable value of the mental anguish sustained by appellants by reason of wrongful conduct of appellees including interference with the lifestyle decisions made by appellants and for the emotional distress occasioned by changes in the future plans of the appellants and in the case of the appellants who have had abortions the reasonable value of such emotional distress.
“3. For punitive damages against Dr. Wierdsma in a reasonable sum.
“4. For such other and further relief as the court deems proper in the premises together with appellants’ costs incurred herein.”
Courts which have considered “wrongful birth” cases have reached four different positions concerning damages when a normal, healthy child is born. Because this is a relatively new area of medical malpractice law, we will discuss each of these four positions on damages.
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[289]*289BROWN, Justice.
This case involves two separate actions which were consolidated for review. Appellants filed suit against the appellees seeking damages resulting from unsuccessful tubal ligations. There are several categories of appellants here.
Eighteen appellants had tubal ligations so that they would become sterile, but instead became pregnant. They were plaintiffs below. At the time of the suits eleven of these appellants had given birth to healthy, normal children; three of the appellants were pregnant; and four of the appellants had terminated their pregnancies.
The husbands of the female appellants were also plaintiffs below and are appellants here. The women who did not terminate their pregnancies, together with their husbands, brought a cause of action which is styled as a “wrongful birth” action, although it is' sometimes denominated a “wrongful pregnancy” action. It is essentially a medical malpractice action. The husbands and wives who became parents or were to become parents were also plaintiffs below on behalf of the children in another action which is denominated a “wrongful life” action.
Appellees here are Dr. Weirdsma, who performed the tubal ligations; Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County, where the operations were performed; and Davol, Inc., which manufactured the cauterization instrument used in the surgery.
In their complaints, appellants alleged various acts of negligence against the three appellees. They also alleged breach of warranty against Davol, Inc. Intermingled in the appellants’ tort claims are allegations that apparently were designed to state a cause of action for breach of contract. The trial judge granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of all appellees.
Appellants stated the issues as follows:
“1. Was it error for the trial court to grant judgment on the pleadings when the Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Defendants’ medical negligence caused Plaintiffs to become pregnant and thereafter to sustain emotional distress, medical expenses, alteration of lifestyle and other damages?
“2. Can the Defendants exempt themselves from the application of traditional tort law doctrines by arguing that the pregnancies, children and abortions caused by their conduct created a ‘benefit’ to Plaintiffs which, as a matter of law, outweighs the detrimental results of their negligence?
“3. Are the Plaintiffs, who sustained medical expenses, pain, emotional trauma, changes in lifestyle and additional costs which are attributable to the Defendants’ negligence, entitled to have those damages determined by a jury and not upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings?”
We will affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
I
The “wrongful life” action asserted by the parents on behalf of their children is an action for damages based on appellees’ negligence which caused a particular child to be born. We hold that a cause of action for “wrongful life” under the circumstances here does not exist.
The vast majority of cases have refused to recognize a cause of action for “wrongful life” on behalf of a child based on the rationale that there is no legal right not to be born.1
The Alabama Supreme Court in Elliott v. Brown, Ala., 361 So.2d 546, 548 (1978) stated:
“ * * * Fundamental to the recognition of such a cause of action [wrongful life] is the notion that the defendant has violat[290]*290ed some legal right of plaintiff’s and as a result she has suffered injury. * * *
“We hold that there is no legal right not to be born and the plaintiff has no cause of action for ‘wrongful life.’ ”
The few courts which have acknowledged a cause of action for wrongful life have done so only for impaired children, and then usually because there was a causal connection between the alleged negligence and the impairment. See Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified to allow a cause of action only for “wrongful birth” in 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). In Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.3d 220, 182 Cal.Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954 (1982), the question was whether a child born with a hereditary affliction could maintain a tort action against a physician who negligently failed to advise the child’s parents before the child’s conception of the possibility of the hereditary condition, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to choose not to conceive the child.
The California Supreme Court stated: “In sum, we conclude that while a plaintiff-child in a wrongful life action may not recover general damages for being born impaired as opposed to not being born at all, the child — like his or her parents — may recover special damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary to treat the hereditary ailment.”
We know of no cases recognizing a “wrongful life” cause of action under the circumstances of this case. The district judge was correct in dismissing the wrongful life claims.
II
The principal issue in this case is whether the parents have a cause of action in their own right for “wrongful birth” against ap-pellees, assuming that fault on appellees’ part led to the birth of an unplanned, yet normal and healthy child.
Appellants seek damages against appel-lees as follows:
“1. For actual expenses to be incurred in the future which have been occasioned by the birth of minor children in question including medical and hospital care during delivery, actual costs of raising such children including medical expenses, expenses for general care and maintenance and other similar expenses.
“2. For the reasonable value of the mental anguish sustained by appellants by reason of wrongful conduct of appellees including interference with the lifestyle decisions made by appellants and for the emotional distress occasioned by changes in the future plans of the appellants and in the case of the appellants who have had abortions the reasonable value of such emotional distress.
“3. For punitive damages against Dr. Wierdsma in a reasonable sum.
“4. For such other and further relief as the court deems proper in the premises together with appellants’ costs incurred herein.”
Courts which have considered “wrongful birth” cases have reached four different positions concerning damages when a normal, healthy child is born. Because this is a relatively new area of medical malpractice law, we will discuss each of these four positions on damages.
The first view is that the parents have no right to recover any damages or expenses for the performance of unsuccessful sterilization operations. Some earlier cases held that despite any finding of negligence, breach of contract, or misrepresentation on the part of a physician or surgeon, no damages resulted from the birth of a normal child through normal delivery with no permanent harm to the mother. One case was based on the grounds that the gift of a normal child could not be considered an injury to the parents and that in any event, the granting of damages on such grounds would be against public policy. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa.D. & C. 41, 6 Lycoming R. 19 (1957). In Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash.2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964), the court decided that the jury, as reasonable persons, might well have concluded that the parents suffered no [291]*291damage in the birth of a healthy child and that the costs incidental to the birth were far outweighed by the blessing of a child. The court did not, however, go so far as to state that damages would be against public policy as a matter of law.
We are not aware of any recent cases that deny all damages to parents; provided, of course, that negligence, causation and damages are properly proved.
The second view is that the parents have a right to recover all damages and expenses, including the cost of rearing the child. Some courts which have allowed damages for the cost of rearing a healthy child seem to have based their decisions on the fact that the right to limit procreation through contraception and through a limited right to abortion is within a constitutionally protected “zone of privacy.” In Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968, 970 (1981), two cases involving unsuccessful sterilization attempts were consolidated on appeal. The court in allowing damages, including rearing and education expenses, said:
“ * * * That right is legally protectible and need not be justified or explained. The allowance of rearing costs is not an aspersion upon the value of the child’s life. It is instead a recognition of the importance of the parent’s fundamental right to control their reproductivity. [Citation.] We cannot endorse a view that effectively nullifies this right by providing that its violation results in no injury. * * * »
The third view is that parents have a right to recover all expenses and damages incurred or to be incurred resulting from the birth of an unplanned child, subject to an offset for the benefits that will be enjoyed by the parents. This concept is sometimes called the “benefit-rule.” In adopting the “benefit-rule,” some courts have applied Restatement, Second, Torts, § 920, p. 509 (1979).
“When the defendant’s tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.”
In applying the “benefit-rule,” if fault is found, the trier of fact determines all expenses and damages incurred and to be incurred by the parents, including costs of rearing the child, and then makes a deduction for benefits the child brings to the parents. Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982).
The fourth view is that parents have a right to recover all damages and expenses occurring because of the pregnancy and birth, but that they have no right to recover the costs of rearing the child. The courts which do not allow recovery for the expense of rearing an unplanned child do so for a number of policy reasons, any one of which is sufficient to deny recovery: 1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or 2) the injury is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the tortfeasor; or 3) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no just or sensible stopping point; or 4) that the benefits of having a child outweigh any economic loss which parents might incur in rearing and educating a healthy child. Rieck v. Medical Protective Company of Fort Wayne, Indiana, 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
A summary of the development and state of the law was made in Phillips v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 544, 549 (D.S.C.1980).
“ * * * [S]ix jurisdictions have considered ‘wrongful birth’ claims in approximately fifteen reported decisions, with numerous other jurisdictions having considered ‘wrongful pregnancy’ claims. The majority of those cases — indeed, the overwhelming majority of the more recent cases — have recognized the validity of ‘wrongful birth’ claims; this trend is implicitly conceded by the defendants. Although some of the earlier decisions denied recovery, [Citations.] the jurisdictions that have reached the merits of the controversy are currently unanimous in their recognition of the cause of action. [Citations.] A similar trend is apparent [292]*292with ‘wrongful pregnancy’ claims. [Citation.] Despite a few recent cases to the contrary, [Citations.] ‘wrongful pregnancy’ actions ‘have ... met with considerable success since 1967 [when the leading case of Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303, 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967) was decided]. Although the courts have not been in agreement on how to assess damages, the majority now allow recovery of some sort to the parents.’ * * * ”
Consistent with the majority of recent cases, we hold that parents who find themselves in the situation that appellants do here are entitled to recover some items of damages, provided they are able to prove negligence, causation, and damages. Our problem is in determining what items of damages are proper. A ruling denying any damages to appellants would render the medical profession immune from liability for negligent treatment of patients seeking to limit the size of their families.
“ * * * Non-recognition of any cause of action for wrongful conception leaves a void in the area of recovery for medical malpractice and dilutes the standard of professional conduct and expertise in the area of family planning, which has been clothed with constitutional protection. * * * ” Kingsbury v. Smith, N.H., 442 A.2d 1003, 1005 (1982).
Coleman v. Garrison, Del.Super., 327 A.2d 757 (1974) addresses the problem of com-pensible damages.2 In that case the issue was whether a cause of action existed against defendants, assuming that fault on their part led to the birth of an unplanned, yet normal and healthy child. The Delaware Superior Court denied damages for the emotional, as well as for the pecuniary cost, of rearing an unplanned child, saying:
“Limitation of the cause of action in such a manner is valid since to do otherwise, would be to invite unduly speculative and ethically questionable assessments of such matters as the emotional effect of a birth on siblings as well as parents, and the emotional as well as pecuniary costs of raising an unplanned and, perhaps, an unwanted child in varying family environments. Speculative damages are, quite simply, not recoverable in this State. [Citations.]”
We hold that provided appellants prove fault, they are entitled to submit to the trier of fact expenses and damages for 1) recovery of any medical expenses associated with the unsuccessful ligation, such as surgical expense, hospital expense, physicians’ fees, and expense of medication, 2) medical and hospital expenses for the birth of the unplanned child, 3) wages necessarily lost by the woman because of pregnancy and childbirth or because of an abortion, 4) pain and suffering of the mother in connection with pregnancy, and 5) cost of abortion, together with pain and suffering of the women who elected to have their pregnancies terminated.
We reject any claim for damages or expenses after the birth of the child. We believe that these latter expenses and damages are too speculative; that the injury is too remote from the negligence; that the injury is out of proportion to the culpability of the tortfeasors; and that the allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on appellees, since it would likely open the way for fraudulent claims, and since it would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
We specifically reject the “benefit-rule” or offset concept.
“ * * * The preciousness of human life should not be held to vary with the circumstances surrounding birth. To make such a determination would, indeed, raise the unfortunate prospect of ruling, as a matter of law, that under certain circumstances a child would not be worth the trouble and expense necessary to bring him into the world. * * * ” Coleman v. Garrison, supra, at 761.
[293]*293We believe that the benefits of the birth of a healthy, normal child outweigh the expense of rearing a child. The bond of affection between child and parent, the pride in a child’s achievement, and the comfort, counsel and society of a child are incalculable benefits, which should not be measured by some misplaced attempt to put a specific dollar value on a child’s life.
The benefit or offset concept smacks of condemnation law, where the trier of fact determines the value of the land taken by the condemnor. The trier of fact then determines the benefit that results to the land owner, which benefit is deducted from the original value to determine the proper award. If the concept of benefit or offset were applied to “wrongful birth” actions, we can conceive of the ridiculous result that benefits could be greater than damages, in which event someone could argue that the parents would owe something to the tort-feasors. We think that a child should not be viewed as a piece of property, with fact finders first assessing the expense and damage incurred because of a child’s life, then deducting the value of that child’s life. For that reason, we think Restatement, Second, Torts § 920, supra, has no application to “wrongful birth” actions.
We have said some things that were not necessary to this opinion. However, the apparent unnecessary matters are intertwined with necessary matters. “It is proper for the Supreme Court to decide incidental questions which are bound to arise again in the case.” Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. State, 645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo., 1982).
We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the “wrongful life” action. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the “wrongful birth” or “wrongful pregnancy” action, and remand the cases to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.