Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America v. National Labor Relations Board

275 F.2d 646, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 188, 45 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2752, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5347

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: February 18, 1960
• Docket: 14794
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

Local 357 of the Teamsters union asks us to review and set aside, and the National Labor Relations Board asks us to enforce, an order of the latter which held an exclusive hiring hall agreement constitutes discrimination which encourages union membership within the meaning of Sections 8(a) (3) and (1) and 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 65 Stat. 601, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158. The order directed the respondent employer, Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, and the union to cease and desist from performing, maintaining or otherwise giving effect to the condemned hiring hall agreement and to take certain affirmative action which the Board found would effectuate the purposes of the Act.

Among the affirmative acts which the order required of the union and employer jointly was to make whole one Lester II. Slater for any loss he may have suffered from the discrimination which the Board held had been practiced against him under the hiring hall agreement; and to reimburse all casual employees for the initiation fees and dues which, the Board said, had been “exacted from them as the price of their employment.”

We think the Board’s order is correct except that it goes too far in directing reimbursement of the dues and fees paid to the union by all casual employees. National Labor Relations Board v. American Dredging Co., 3 Cir., 1960, 276 F.2d 286.¹ The order should be modified to confine the reimbursement feature to Slater alone. As so modified, the Board’s order will be enforced.

It is so ordered.

1 . We have considered the opinion of the Seventh Circuit in National Labor Relations Board v. Local 60, 1960, 273 F.2d 699, but are constrained to the view that the Third Circuit opinion more aptly applies to the problem presented on the record before us.