[Cite as Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2021-Ohio-2060.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY
CHRISTINE LINDSEY, CASE NO. 2020-G-0275
Plaintiff-Appellant, Civil Appeal from the -v- Court of Common Pleas
DANIEL LINDSEY, Trial Court No. 2016 DC 000693 Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION
Decided: June 21, 2021 Judgment: Affirmed
R. Russell Kubyn, Kubyn & Ghaster, 8373 Mentor Avenue, Mentor, OH 44060 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Carol A. Szczepanik, The Law Office of Carol A. Szczepanik, LLC, P.O. Box 214, 10808 Kinsman Road, Newbury, OH 44065 (For Defendant-Appellee).
Denise Cook, 154 East Aurora Road, PMB #231, Northfield, OH 44067 (Guardian ad Litem).
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Christine Lindsey (“mother”), appeals from the judgment of the
Geauga County Court of Common Pleas holding her in contempt of court upon the
emergency motion of appellee, Daniel Lindsey (“father”). At issue is whether the trial
court erred in finding her in contempt; if not, whether the conditions for purging the contempt were unreasonable or impossible to meet; and, whether ordering her to pay
father’s attorney fees and costs was an abuse of discretion.
{¶2} We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Mother’s unilateral action in withholding
parenting time using COIVD-19 pandemic restrictions as a basis without seeking court
intervention until months after father filed to gain parenting time is contemptuous. While
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic caused much consternation about contact between
those living in different households, the directives issued by the state of Ohio anticipated
the need for travel and contact between different households in order to facilitate
parenting time.
{¶3} Mother was given the opportunity to purge the jail time and have the fine
suspended by obeying the court’s previous orders. Given the conditional nature of these
sanctions, the trial court properly found that father met his burden of proving mother was
in civil, not criminal, contempt, and mother failed in her burden to establish impossibility
of compliance or a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the parenting time order.
We also find these conditions are neither impossible to comply with nor impractical or
unreasonable.
{¶4} Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding reasonable
attorney fees and costs that would not have been incurred but for mother’s unilateral
conduct.
Substantive Facts and Procedural History
{¶5} The parties were married in 2011 and divorced in 2019. They had one child
as issue of their marriage, C.L. Ultimately, the trial court adopted a 50/50 shared-
parenting plan, which was submitted by father. Mother appealed that order, inter alia,
Case No. 2020-G-0275 and in Lindsey v. Lindsey, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2019-G-0201, 2019-Ohio-4923, this
court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Mother subsequently filed an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Ohio, but the high court declined to accept the matter for review. See
Lindsey v. Lindsey, 158 Ohio St.3d 1505, 2020-Ohio-2819.
{¶6} Meanwhile, during the pendency of the appeals, father did not seek to
specifically enforce the 50/50 shared-parenting order. He maintained that he did not wish
to disrupt C.L.’s routine in the event the parenting plan were to change by virtue of
mother’s appeals. As such, he continued to exercise the more limited parenting time
afforded in prior court orders; namely, one overnight during the week and alternating
weekends from Friday to Sunday. The parties adhered to this schedule, without issue,
until March 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. At that time, mother
unilaterally determined father could not physically visit C.L. due to concerns relating to
the virus and its potential transmission. As a result, on March 19, 2020, father filed an
emergency motion to show cause and motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses.
Mother opposed the motion, and father duly replied to the opposition. The matter was
set for hearing on April 15, 2020.
{¶7} At the outset of the hearing, counsel for mother made an oral objection to
the magistrate hearing the case, alleging a conflict that required her to recuse herself.
Ultimately, after various pleadings were filed on the conflict issue, the motion to remove
the magistrate was denied. Mother appealed this judgment but, on June 30, 2020, this
court dismissed the matter for lack of a final, appealable order. See Lindsey v. Lindsey,
11th Dist. Geauga No. 2020-G-0250, 2020-Ohio-3567. Finally, a hearing on the show-
cause motion was held on July 31, 2020. After receiving testimony from father, mother,
Case No. 2020-G-0275 and mother’s mother, as well as father’s attorney (regarding the fee issue), the magistrate
concluded mother refused to comply with the court’s parenting-time order. The
magistrate therefore recommended mother be held in contempt. The magistrate further
decided mother should serve 10 days in jail and be fined $250. The magistrate also
recommended father receive 13 consecutive days’ visitation for the actual time father lost
due to mother’s actions. The magistrate recommended the jail time and fine be
suspended pending mother’s compliance with court orders. The magistrate additionally
concluded father should be awarded $1,275 in attorney fees and that mother pay costs.
{¶8} Mother filed objections and supplemental objections to the magistrate’s
decision. Father opposed the objections, and, on November 25, 2020, the trial court
adopted the magistrate’s recommendations. Mother appeals that judgment and assigns
two errors for our review. The first alleges:
{¶9} “The trial court erred and committed an abuse of discretion, including
adopting the magistrate’s decision, finding the appellant in contempt of court, whether by
clear and convincing evidence that the appellant failed to comply with parenting time
orders therein in civil contempt and/or beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal contempt,
due to the nature of the allegation by the appellee and the finding and penalties and fine
imposed by the trial court.”
Purported Inconsistency in Trial Court’s Judgment
{¶10} Mother first contends the trial court erred in finding mother should have
moved the court to challenge the previous order rather than resorting to a unilateral
remedy of halting father’s visitation. She asserts she indeed filed an emergency motion
to maintain status quo and a motion to terminate shared parenting. Accordingly, she
Case No. 2020-G-0275 argues the court overlooked and/or ignored these filings and, in light of its adoption of the
magistrate’s decision in the underlying matter, improperly denied the motions without a
meaningful hearing.
{¶11} We acknowledge mother filed the above-stated motions. They were filed,
however, on August 3 and August 4, 2020, respectively, months after father filed his
emergency motion to show cause. The hearing on the motion for contempt occurred on
July 31, 2020. The motions, therefore, were filed well after the alleged contemptable
conduct. As a result, the trial court did not make a problematic finding inasmuch as the
trial court’s statement is valid; it related to the conduct for which the show cause motion
was filed. If mother had a problem with the visitation order vis-à-vis the COVID-19
pandemic in March 2020, she should have filed the motions at that point rather than
preventing father from exercising his rights without judicial intervention.
Civil versus Criminal Contempt
{¶12} Contempt of court has been variously defined as “disobedience of an order
of a court” and “conduct which brings the administration of justice into disrespect, or which
tends to embarrass, impede or obstruct a court in the performance of its functions.”
Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15 (1988). Contempt
powers are considered inherent in the court and considered necessary to the proper
exercise of judicial functions. Id. Because the primary purpose of a contempt proceeding
is to preserve the authority and proper functioning of the court, we review the trial court’s
decisions in contempt proceedings for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 16.
{¶13} “Proceedings in contempt are sui generis in the law. They bear some
resemblance to suits in equity, to criminal proceedings and to ordinary civil actions; but
Case No. 2020-G-0275 they are none of these.” Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, Am. Fedn. of State,
Cty. and Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO, 35 Ohio St.2d 197, 201-202 (1973). Although the
distinction between civil and criminal contempt is sometimes less than clear, it is
important. See Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-4783, ¶ 11, citing
Internatl. Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994).
Because all contempt involves some type of sanction or punishment, the distinction
between civil and criminal contempt is usually based on the purpose served by imposing
the sanction. State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554 (2001).
{¶14} If the sanction is remedial or coercive and for the benefit of the complainant,
the contempt proceeding is usually classified as civil. Brown v. Executive 200, Inc., 64
Ohio St.2d 250, 253 (1980). Often, civil contempt is characterized by conditional
sanctions, i.e., “[t]he contemnor is said to carry the keys of his prison in his own pocket”
and may be jailed until he or she complies with the court order. Id. On the other hand,
criminal contempt is usually characterized by unconditional prison terms or fines. Id. at
253-254. The purposes behind the sanction in criminal contempt are primarily to punish
the contemnor and to vindicate the authority of the court. Id. Thus, to determine if the
sanctions in the instant cause were criminal or civil in nature, it is necessary to determine
the purpose behind the sanction: was it to coerce mother to obey the court’s judgment,
or was it to punish her for past violations?
{¶15} Mother contends the trial court’s order finding her in contempt was criminal
in nature and, as a result, the court was required to make a determination that father
established proof of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Mother further contends father
Case No. 2020-G-0275 failed to meet this heightened burden. Thus, she concludes the trial court erred when it
found her in contempt. We do not agree.
{¶16} Initially, the sanctions imposed by the court included a fine of $250; 10 days
in jail; and the payment of attorney fees as well as court costs. Mother was given the
opportunity to purge the jail time and have the fine suspended by obeying the court’s
previous orders. Given their conditional nature, the purpose of these sanctions is civil in
nature, and, accordingly, we conclude mother was found in civil contempt.
Did Father Establish Mother was in Civil Contempt of the Visitation Order?
{¶17} The shared parenting decree at issue provides, in relevant part:
{¶18} “Father and Mother shall comply with the following Plan for Shared
Parenting regarding the custody, care and control of the minor child pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code Section 3109.04.
{¶19} “* * *
{¶20} “Both Father and Mother shall be the legal custodians and residential
parents of the minor child when he or she has parenting time.
{¶21} “* * *
{¶22} “The Mother shall have parenting time each Monday beginning when the
minor child is returned to school, child care, or the Mother’s residence, as appropriate,
but in no event later than 9:00 a.m. and ending on Wednesday when the minor child is
returned to school, child care, or Father’s residence, as appropriate, but in no event later
than 9:00 a.m.
{¶23} “The Father shall have parenting time each Wednesday beginning when the
minor child is returned to school, child care, day care, or Father’s residence, as
Case No. 2020-G-0275 appropriate, but in no event later than 9:00 a.m. and ending on Friday when the minor
child is returned to school, child care, or the other parent’s residence, as appropriate, but
in no event later than 9:00 a.m.
{¶24} “The Mother and Father shall have parenting time with the minor child on
alternating weekends beginning Friday when the minor child is returned to school, child
care, or the other parent’s residence, as appropriate, but in no event later than 9:00 a.m.
and ending the following Monday when the minor child is returned to school, child care,
or Mother’s residence, as appropriate, but in no event later than 9:00 a.m.
{¶25} “This allocation of parenting time is flexible and may be modified by mutual
agreement of the Father and Mother as warranted.”
{¶26} We initially point out that, although evidence indicated mother provided
father with “face-time” visitation, the decree contemplates residential parenting; thus,
face-time cannot be considered parenting time. Further, despite the built-in flexibility of
the decree, father did not agree to the modification mother imposed. As such, the
evidence established mother violated the specific terms of the decree.
{¶27} Notwithstanding these pivotal points, mother argues father failed to meet
his burden of proof by establishing she, by clear and convincing evidence, committed civil
contempt. She initially claims that, regardless of her prima facie violation of the prior
visitation order, compliance with the order was impossible, owing to the COVID-19
pandemic. She asserts that, in light of the pandemic, compliance with the order was
unreasonable and thus she established, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
affirmative defense of impossibility. We do not agree.
Case No. 2020-G-0275 {¶28} As discussed above, mother could have sought a modification of the
visitation order by moving the court and arguing the pandemic justified a modification of
the visitation arrangements. She did not do so. We recognize that courts of law
implemented social distancing rules and policies restricting in-person interaction due to
the pandemic. Still, they remained open, and thus mother was not precluded from
seeking relief; hence, because it was neither impossible nor impracticable for her to move
the court in March to modify visitation, she failed to demonstrate her lack of compliance
was a function of impossibility.
{¶29} Next, mother contends compliance with the visitation order would have
been unreasonable due to her legitimate concerns relating to the pandemic. She
additionally asserts that even if she technically violated the order, she did so based upon
a good-faith belief that her violation would protect the safety of C.L. Consequently, she
maintains, the trial court should have concluded any violation was excusable. We do not
agree.
{¶30} The Ohio Department of Health’s March 22, 2020 stay-at-home order
included various exceptions for essential activities and travel. One exception to the stay-
at-home order was traveling for transport of children pursuant to a custody order. If travel
for such a purpose is essential, it would reasonably follow that visitation and custody
transfers are equally essential. A copy of the Department’s order was submitted into
evidence and admitted over objection. Thus, even though mother asserted her decision
to withhold father’s physical visitation rights was due to a legitimate concern for C.L.’s
safety, pursuant to the state’s stay-at-home directives, her ultra vires actions were
Case No. 2020-G-0275 actually inconsistent with the Department’s order. Mother’s claim that compliance was
unreasonable is therefore without merit.
{¶31} Furthermore, the evidence showed that mother and C.L. lived with her
parents and adult brother. In addition, mother’s young nephew was in the house regularly
because her mother babysat the child. Even though mother testified each resident of the
household took strict precautions regarding outside contact with others, it is not entirely
clear whether the same could be said of the nephew or the members of his household.
Alternatively, father lived alone, worked remotely, and for the most part, had little outside
contact with third parties. In light of these points, we cannot conclude mother’s unilateral
decision to withhold visitation was the only reasonable means of protecting C.L. Indeed,
even though testimony reflected mother’s household took certain precautions to protect
the members from significant exposure to strangers, it would not appear adhering to the
visitation schedule, given father’s lifestyle, would have placed C.L. in the path of imminent
harm. Regardless of mother’s belief that her actions were necessary, the court did not
err in concluding her violation of the visitation order was inexcusable.
{¶32} The evidence demonstrated mother was aware of the court-ordered
visitation schedule. Mother, in a text message to father, stated that, irrespective of the
order, she would be “drawing a hard line and visitation will not happen until things settle
down.” She additionally stated: “[u]nless the courts force me to remove her from being
contained. I will continue to keep her quarantined.” As noted above, the court found
mother in civil contempt, which required father to establish the violation by clear and
convincing evidence. This quantum of proof is more than a mere preponderance of the
Case No. 2020-G-0275 evidence but is not that required beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold father met his
burden and therefore the trial court did not err in finding mother in civil contempt.
{¶33} Mother’s first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶34} Mother’s second assignment of error provides:
{¶35} “The trial court erred and committed an abuse of discretion, including
adopting the magistrate’s decision, by ordering the appellant to pay a fine of $250.00,
awarding attorneys’ fees, and ordering other improper purge conditions.”
{¶36} Mother argues the trial court erred in adopting the magistrate’s
recommendations relating to the purge conditions attached to the court’s civil contempt
finding. She claims the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the conditions because
they are both unreasonable and compliance is either impossible or impractical. We do
not agree.
Propriety of Penalties and Purge Conditions
{¶37} R.C. 2705.05 prescribes the penalties for contempt and states that “[f]or a
first offense, [the trial court may impose] a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars,
a definite term of imprisonment of not more than thirty days in jail, or both.” R.C.
2705.05(A)(1). The trial court may also require the contemnor to pay costs and the
moving party’s attorney fees. See Spicker v. Spicker, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 01 CO
52, 2003-Ohio 3553, ¶ 48. In the exercise of its discretion in a civil contempt proceeding,
a court has the ability to exercise its equitable powers in fashioning a coercive remedy
designed to achieve compliance with its orders. Winebrenner v. Winebrenner, 11th Dist.
Lake No. 96-L-033, 1996 WL 761996, *3 (Dec. 6, 1996). “It is well to remember that in a
contempt situation, it is the court who is the offended party even though the issue may
Case No. 2020-G-0275 have been raised by one of the litigants.” Id. In effect, therefore, a court may fashion
remedies authorized by statute as well as those it deems equitably suitable to require
compliance.
{¶38} Here, the trial court ordered appellant to serve 10 days in jail and pay a fine
of $250. This order was suspended pending compliance with its order. As we have
already concluded the trial court’s contempt finding was proper, and the punitive terms
are within statutory parameters, we discern no error in the court’s imposition of these
penalties.
{¶39} The court also adopted the magistrate’s recommendation that father should
receive, in addition to his regular parenting time, 13 consecutive days of make-up
parenting time. This time represents the period mother withheld father’s visitation. The
record supports the court’s finding that father lost 13 days of visitation due to mother’s
unilateral decision to withhold visitation. One can reasonably conclude that this order
was designed to urge, if not coerce, mother to obey the court’s visitation order. That is,
if she does not, she will face the possibility of losing her scheduled visitation with C.L. for
an equal period of time that she withholds visitation from father. We conclude this remedy
is both reasonable and equitable.
{¶40} Mother maintains, however, the purge conditions are impossible or
impractical. It appears her position is based upon her belief that the purge conditions, in
essence, function to regulate her future conduct, which is an impossible or unreasonable
effort to punish a future violation which has not occurred. We do not agree.
{¶41} The trial court rightfully determined appellant violated the previous order
and further concluded father should be entitled to the make-up parenting time he lost due
Case No. 2020-G-0275 to mother’s violation. These conditions are purely remedial. To the extent the conditions,
in fact, dissuade mother from violating an order in the future is coincidental: The
conditions do not control or function to regulate or punish mother’s future conduct; rather,
they are simply examples of what might occur if mother, in the exercise of her private
discretion and autonomy, decides, again, to violate the court’s order(s). Mother is
required to comply with existing orders and afford father the visitation of which she
previously deprived him. These conditions are neither impossible to comply with nor
impractical or unreasonably. Mother’s argument therefore is without merit.
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs
{¶42} Post-decree attorney fees and expenses are governed by R.C. 3105.73(B),
which states:
{¶43} “In any post-decree motion or proceeding that arises out of an action for
divorce, * * * the court may award all or part of reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses to either party if the court finds the award equitable. In determining whether an
award is equitable, the court may consider the parties’ income, the conduct of the parties,
and any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate, but it may not consider the
parties’ assets.”
{¶44} The statute gives a trial court wide latitude to award attorney fees and
litigation expenses if it finds the award equitable. Cutter v. Cutter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 96375, 2012-Ohio-358, ¶ 26. On appeal, the trial court’s decision is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Gibbs, 60 Ohio St.3d 69
(1991). The reviewing court places great reliance upon the discretion of the trial court,
Case No. 2020-G-0275 both in the finding of contempt and the penalty imposed. Radford v. Radford, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga Nos. 96267 and 96445, 2011-Ohio-6263, ¶ 36.
{¶45} The record includes testimony from father’s attorney regarding her hourly
rate and fees related to the filing of the motion to show cause and prosecuting the same.
Mother offers nothing to undermine the credibility of this testimony. Moreover, mother’s
conduct triggered the filing of the motion. Mother was unable to show cause regarding
why she should not be held in contempt, and, as discussed throughout this opinion, we
find no error in the trial court’s determination. Given mother’s conduct in relation to the
trial court’s previous order, we conclude the underlying judgment requiring mother to pay
costs and attorney fees is equitable.
{¶46} Mother’s second assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶47} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Geauga
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
Case No. 2020-G-0275