Grand Voiture d'Ohio Societe des 40 et 8 v. Montgomery Cty. Voiture No. 34 la Societe 40 et 8

2024 Ohio 5410

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 15, 2024
• Docket: 30056
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Grand Voiture d'Ohio Societe des 40 et 8 v. Montgomery Cty. Voiture No. 34 la Societe 40 et 8, 2024-Ohio- 5410.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

GRAND VOITURE D'OHIO SOCIETE : DES 40 ET 8 : : C.A. No. 30056 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2018 CV 01457 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas MONTGOMERY COUNTY VOITURE : Court) NO. 34 la SOCIETE 40 ET 8, et al. : : Appellants

...........

OPINION

Rendered on November 15, 2024

CHARLES J. SIMPSON, Attorney for Appellant

KEVIN A. BOWMAN, Attorney for Appellee

.............

LEWIS, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Charles J. Simpson appeals from judgments of the -2-

Montgomery County Common Pleas Court finding him in contempt of court and imposing

sanctions. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} This is the most recent appeal in a protracted series of state and federal

cases involving Simpson, Montgomery County Voiture No. 34 la Societe des 40 Hommes

et 8 Chevaux (“Voiture Locale”), Grande Voiture D’Ohio la Societe des 40 Hommes et 8

Chevaux (“Grande Voiture”), and various factions of the charitable organization La

Societe des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux, commonly known as “The Forty and Eight.”

Because the procedural history is lengthy and complex, we will repeat a brief summary

of the background of these cases for purposes of clarity. In Huber Hts. Veterans Club,

Inc. v. Grande Voiture d'Ohio La Societe des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux, 2021-Ohio-2784,

¶ 3-10 (2d Dist.), we stated as follows:

The Forty and Eight has a hierarchical structure consisting of a

national organization and associated state and local organizations.

Voiture Nationale is the national organization, and Grande Voiture is the

Ohio state-level organization. [Voiture Locale] is the county-level

organization in Montgomery County. [Huber Heights Veterans Club

(“HHVC”)] purports to be a successor organization to Voiture Locale that is

no longer associated with The Forty and Eight.

At some point, Voiture Locale began engaging in conduct that was

contrary to the constitution, bylaws, and other governing documents of the

national and state-level organizations. Among other things, Voiture Locale -3-

adopted an amended constitution, elected a new board of governors under

that amended constitution, created an auxiliary membership, and failed to

pay national dues.

In 2017, Grande Voiture initiated internal disciplinary proceedings

against Charles Simpson, one of the local organization's officers under the

new constitution, and permanently expelled him from membership for life.

Following that determination, Voiture Locale resolved to prohibit Grande

Voiture officials from entering Voiture Locale's premises, located at 4214

Powell Road in Huber Heights. Another member of Voiture Locale,

however, filed a criminal trespass complaint against Simpson with the

Huber Heights police.

In 2018, Grande Voiture brought an action against Voiture Locale

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and an accounting. Montgomery

C.P. No. 2018-CV-1457. Voiture Locale filed a counterclaim against

Grande Voiture and a third-party complaint against Voiture Nationale,

alleging that Grande Voiture and Voiture Nationale engaged in actions to

wrongfully take possession and control of its property, as well as extortion,

coercion, libel, slander and defamation.

On April 28, 2019, the trial court in Case No. 2018-CV-1457 granted

summary judgment to Grande Voiture and Voiture Nationale. The court

noted: “The evidence in the record is undisputed that Montgomery Voiture

Locale No. 34 has violated numerous provisions of the state and national -4-

constitutions and is now being run by nonmembers of the 40 and 8, such as

Defendant Simpson, who was expelled permanently from membership.”

The trial court held that Voiture Locale was bound by the constitutions of

the organization at the national, state, and local levels, as well as the other

rules promulgated by the national and state-level organizations.

The court voided all actions taken by Voiture Locale that were in

violation of those constitutions, invalidated Voiture Locale's amended

constitution, and dissolved the purported board of directors appointed under

that constitution. The court further granted an injunction, which, among

other things, barred Simpson from participating in or interfering with the

affairs of Voiture Locale. . . . We affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Grande Voiture D'Ohio La Societe des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux v.

Montgomery Cty. Voiture No. 34 La Societe des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28388, 2020-Ohio-3821 [(“Grande Voiture I”)].

Despite the trial court's rulings, Simpson (a licensed attorney) has

continued to act ostensibly on behalf of Voiture Locale, either as a purported

officer or as an attorney retained by the now-dissolved board of directors.

These actions have included filing a forcible entry and detainer action in

municipal court . . ., a bankruptcy petition for Voiture Locale in bankruptcy

court . . ., and additional litigation in common pleas court . . . . Several of

the lawsuits challenged conduct by Grande Voiture officials with respect to

the local organization's property. In addition, based on Simpson's belief -5-

that Voiture Locale was a non-profit corporation under Ohio law that was

separate and apart from The Forty and Eight, Simpson filed paperwork to

change the name of Voiture Locale to the Huber Heights Veterans Club

(HHVC) and to have the Powell Road property retitled in that name. . . .

To date, Simpson has been unsuccessful at every turn. The

municipal court, bankruptcy court, and common pleas court actions were

resolved based on res judicata and/or due to Simpson's lack of authority to

act on behalf of Voiture Locale. . . .

{¶ 3} In this case, Case No. 2018-CV-1457, the trial court granted summary

judgment to Grande Voiture and issued an injunction on April 28, 2019. The injunction

barred Simpson from participating in or interfering with the affairs of Voiture Locale. The

judgment also ordered Simpson, among other things, to provide an accounting of assets

and debts. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment in Grande Voiture I.

{¶ 4} Less than two weeks after the trial court rendered summary judgment,

Simpson filed a bankruptcy action on behalf of Voiture Locale while purporting to act as

one of its officers. Therefore, Grande Voiture filed a May 9, 2019 motion for contempt

against Simpson for violations of the injunctions and later supplemented that motion with

additional alleged violations of the injunction. On March 4, 2020, the trial court issued a

finding of contempt against Simpson for repeated violations of the injunction, including,

but not limited to, filing documents with the Ohio Secretary of State and renaming the

local level of the organization from Voiture Locale to HHVC. As a result of the contempt

finding, on June 29, 2020, the court ordered sanctions against Simpson in the sum of -6-

$39,767.22 for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Grande Voiture.

Simpson appealed.

{¶ 5} Meanwhile, Grande Voiture had filed a motion in the trial court seeking to

correct the record title to the property conveyed by Simpson, because he had failed to

comply with the March 4, 2020 contempt order. The motion was granted on September

17, 2020, and the trial court ordered the County Recorder to: (1) record the order granting

the motion, (2) remove HHVC from the record chain of title, and (3) return title to Voiture

Locale. Simpson filed an appeal of that order. The contempt judgment and sanctions

and the title correction order were consolidated on appeal. We affirmed both the trial

court's orders. See Grande Voiture d'Ohio La Societe des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux v.

Montgomery Cty. Voiture No. 34 La Societe Des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux, 2021-Ohio-

1430 (2d Dist.) (“Grande Voiture II”).

{¶ 6} On March 9, 2021, Grande Voiture filed a Civ.R. 70 motion to authorize the

filing of a name change with the Secretary of State due to Simpson's continued failure to

comply with the court's order. Simpson filed a motion to strike Grande Voiture's motion

as frivolous and to impose sanctions. On March 13, 2021, the trial court granted Grande

Voiture's motion and overruled Simpson's motion. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

See Grande Voiture D'Ohio La Societe Des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux v. Montgomery

Cty. Voiture No. 34 La Societe Des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux, 2021-Ohio-2429 (2d Dist.)

(“Grande Voiture III”).

{¶ 7} On May 26, 2022, Grande Voiture filed another motion for contempt against

Simpson for failing to do the specific things the trial court had ordered him to do in its -7-

March 4, 2020 contempt order. The March 4, 2020 order had specifically directed

Simpson to comply with five mandates: (1) pay all reasonable attorney’s fees, litigation

expenses, and other costs that Grande Voiture incurred as a result of Simpon’s failure to

abide by the injunction; (2) take all necessary actions and pay all reasonable costs to

restore the name of Voiture Locale with the Ohio Secretary of State; (3) take all necessary

actions and pay all necessary costs to restore title of the Powell Road property in the

name of Voiture Locale; (4) pay all outstanding invoices from the U.S. Trustee Payment

Center for fees related to the bankruptcy case; and (5) provide Grande Voiture with

information on every bank account held, or previously held, in the name of Voiture Locale

or HHVC, and provide all financial information within his possession, including all

documents provided to or produced by CC One of Clark County, an accounting service

owned and operated by Simpson’s relative. Grande Voiture’s motion alleged that

Simpson had failed to do any of these five things and, as a sanction, Grande Voiture

requested attorney’s fees in excess of $78,000.

{¶ 8} Simpson filed a response to Grande Voiture’s motion for contempt.

Simpson also filed an answer and counterclaim with a jury demand. Simpson then filed

a motion requesting a voluntary order of disqualification of the trial court judge, primarily

on the basis that the trial court judge had not agreed with Simpson’s previous arguments

to the court. The trial court denied any partiality, but because the court had “openly

expressed concerns with [Simpson’s] fitness to practice law,” the trial court agreed to

transfer the case to another judge.

{¶ 9} Following the transfer, the trial court granted Grande Voiture’s motion to -8-

strike Simpson’s answer and counterclaim. The trial court explained that Simpson was

not permitted to file an answer or counterclaim after the pleadings had closed and a final

judgment had been rendered.

{¶ 10} Simpson then filed another series of motions. He filed a motion to

reconsider the trial court’s decision to strike his answer and counterclaim, which the trial

court overruled. He filed a “Jury Demand Repeated and Confirmed” along with a request

for leave to file a motion for summary judgment on the stricken answer and counterclaim.

These also were overruled by the trial court. Simpson filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, which was stricken. Simpson then filed a motion to vacate the order striking

his motion for judgment on the pleadings. Additionally, Simpson filed a motion

requesting that the trial court judge disqualify herself primarily because the judge

“refuse[d] to consider the merits of Defendant’s Answer and Counterclaim and motions

and refuse[d] Defendant’s request for a trial by jury.” This request was also denied.

{¶ 11} The trial court set a hearing on Grande Voiture’s May 26, 2022 contempt

motion for October 21, 2022. Simpson filed a motion in limine and reasserted his request

for a jury trial. The trial court overruled Simpson’s motion in limine and jury demand.

Simpson filed a motion to reconsider and another answer and counterclaim with an

additional jury demand. The trial court denied these filings. In response to his motions

being denied, Simpson filed an affidavit of disqualification with the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Ohio Supreme Court denied Simpson’s request for disqualification on October 6,

2022. In re Disqualification of Melnick, 2022-Ohio-4431, ¶ 7.

{¶ 12} On October 7, 2022, Simpson filed a motion to continue the October 21, -9-

2022 hearing, due to Simpson’s having filed an original action with this court and the need

to schedule a jury trial. The next day, Simpson filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion requesting

relief from the April 28, 2019 and June 29, 2020 judgments and requesting sanctions

against Grande Voiture and their counsel of $126,000. The trial court denied these

motions and denied Simpson’s motion to reconsider the denials. Simpson’s original

action was eventually dismissed. See State ex rel. Simpson v. Melnick, 2023-Ohio-1236

(2d Dist.).

{¶ 13} A hearing on Grande Voiture’s motion for contempt was held on October

21, 2022, at which Frank Kronen, Ronald Kozar, and Charles Simpson testified. Prior to

the hearing, it was stated on the record that Simpson had paid the nearly $40,000 in

attorney’s fees, Grande Voiture had reacquired the property on Powell Road, and Grande

Voiture had reversed Simpson’s action of changing the name of Voiture Locale to the

HHVC. Accordingly, the remaining issues for the contempt hearing were: 1) Simpson’s

failure to turn over the financial documents; 2) Simpson’s failure to pay the outstanding

invoices from the U.S. Trustee Payment Center related to the bankruptcy case; and 3)

Simpson’s continued participation in filing lawsuits, which resulted in Grande Voiture’s

incurring additional attorney’s fees and expenses.

{¶ 14} Frank Kronen, the National Commander and Chef de Chemin de Fer in the

Forty and Eight organization, testified on behalf of Grande Voiture. He testified that

Grande Voiture is an Honor Society of American veterans that operates as a charitable

organization. Kronen, in his prior capacity as Grand Avocat for Grande Voiture, initiated

the lawsuit against Simpson and Voiture Locale. Following the grant of the permanent -10-

injunction, Simpson repeatedly sued Grande Voiture and its members in local, state, and

federal courts. According to Kronen, the attorney’s fees incurred in response to

Simpson’s filings had negatively affected all members of the organization in the State of

Ohio. In order to cover its attorney’s fees in the previous litigation, the organization had

to sell off its Huber Heights property.

{¶ 15} During the hearing, Simpson testified that he had not turned over any

financial documents since the March 4, 2020 order. According to Simpson, who had

been the financial officer of Voiture Locale, Grande Voiture gained access to all of the

financial information when it reclaimed the Voiture Locale and, therefore, he did not need

to turn over anything. Oct. 21, 2022 Tr. 62-63. He also testified that he had not turned

over any money to Grande Voiture from the closure of the bank accounts or any

information regarding those bank accounts. Simpson acknowledged that CC One of

Clark County was in possession of financial documents, but he did not provide those to

Grande Voiture. Id. at 64-65. Simpson further admitted he had not paid any

outstanding invoices from the bankruptcy case; Simpson claimed that “the Court ordered

Mr. Kronen to pay it,” not him. Id. at 63. He also admitted to filing 23 different local,

state, and federal lawsuits since the March 4, 2020 order, either on his own behalf or on

behalf of the HHVC board of directors, of which he was a board member.

{¶ 16} Ronald Kozar, a licensed attorney in Dayton, Ohio, who had practiced in

civil litigation for over 30 years, testified as an expert as to the reasonableness of Grande

Voiture’s requested attorney’s fees. According to Kozar, who had reviewed the 23

various lawsuits initiated by Simpson, both the hourly fee and the amount of work incurred -11-

by Grande Voiture were reasonable. The total amount of attorney’s fees incurred

between July 10, 2020, and October 3, 2022, was $95,312.50.

{¶ 17} On October 22, 2022, Simpson filed a motion for sanctions requesting an

award of attorney’s fees against Grande Voiture and its attorneys “on account of their

frivolous and harassing conduct.” Grande Voiture opposed Simpson’s motion and his

supplemental motion for attorney’s fees. Simpson requested $250,353.00 in attorney’s

fees and expenses. Grande Voiture supplemented their attorney’s fees statement to

include fees and expenses incurred during October 2022, increasing the requested total

amount to $102,612.50.

{¶ 18} On December 7, 2022, the trial court issued a decision holding Simpson in

contempt. The trial court issued the following orders in its decision:

1. Simpson shall pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in the amount $102,612.50

to compensate Plaintiff for the attorney’s fees accrued as a result of

Simpson’s unlawful filing of twenty-three lawsuits in violation of the April 28,

2019 Order and the contempt proceedings within 6 months from the date

of this Order.

2. Simpson shall personally provide all financial documents and account

information, including tax and accounting information held with CC-1 of

Clark County to Plaintiff’s attorney, Kevin Bowman, within 30 days of this

Order. This Order shall not be construed in any manner to require [Plaintiff]

to take any action to procure these documents or information.

3. Simpson shall pay the U.S. Trustee Invoices as represented in Exhibit 7 -12-

within 30 days from the date of this Order.

4. Simpson shall file certification of compliances within 10 days after the

expiration of each deadline specified above. Simpson’s certification of

compliance shall include the signature of Plaintiff’s attorney that compliance

has been met. For clarification, the deadline for final certification of

compliance of the three cortication’s [sic] shall be filed ten days after the

six-month deadline for attorney’s fees.

5. Compliance with the requirements listed above shall operate as the purge

for contempt sanctions.

(Emphasis in original.) Decision Sustaining Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt (Dec. 7, 2022),

p. 11-12.

{¶ 19} On December 8, 2022, Simpson filed a motion requesting findings of fact

and conclusions of law and a motion to vacate the trial court’s December 7, 2022 order.

The trial court overruled Simpson’s request for findings of facts and conclusions of law

and his motion to vacate the December 7, 2022 order.

{¶ 20} On March 17, 2023, Grande Voiture filed a notice of non-compliance by

Simpson with the second, third, and fourth mandates of the December 7, 2022 decision.

A subsequent motion requested sanctions against Simpson for failing to comply with all

five of the trial court’s December 7, 2022 mandates.

{¶ 21} On March 29, 2023, the trial court judge voluntarily recused herself and a

visiting judge was appointed by the Ohio Supreme Court.

{¶ 22} On June 20, 2023, Simpson filed a motion to strike and deny Grande -13-

Voiture’s notice of noncompliance and motion for further contempt sanctions because the

cause had been removed to the federal United States District Court for the Southern

District of Ohio in Case No. 3:23-cv-155. On September 28, 2023, Grande Voiture filed

a notice of remand stating that the federal court had dismissed the federal case and

remanded the cause to the Common Pleas Court. See Grande Voiture D’Ohio La

Societe des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux v. Montgomery Cty. Voiture No. 34 La Societe des

40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux, No. 3:23-cv-155, 2023 WL 6554068 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27,

2023). Grande Voiture reasserted that Simpson had failed to comply with the trial court’s

December 7, 2022 mandates and requested the court to impose sanctions.

{¶ 23} Following the remand, the trial court scheduled a hearing for October 17,

2023, on the motion to enforce sanctions. On October 4, 2023, Simpson filed a motion

to continue the hearing on the motion to enforce sanctions, because Simpson wanted all

the pending issues to be resolved by a jury. The trial court denied his motion. However,

the hearing on the motion to enforce sanctions was eventually reset to December 14,

2023.

{¶ 24} On October 11, 2023, Simpson filed a motion to dismiss Grande Voiture’s

motion to enforce sanctions. Simpson also filed a motion asking the court to take judicial

notice of the following actions pending between the parties and certain filings in those

cases: Huber Hts. Veterans Club v. Bowman, No. 3:22-cv-159 (S.D. Ohio); Huber Hts.

Veterans Club, Inc., v. VFW Post 9966, No. 3:23-cv-121 (S.D. Ohio); Huber Hts. Veterans

Club v. Webb, Montgomery C.P. No. 2021 CV 4538; and Huber Hts. Veterans Club Inc.,

v. VFW Post 9966, Clark C.P. No. 2021 CV 277. The trial court overruled Simpson’s -14-

motion to dismiss. The court further indicated it would take judicial notice of the court

proceedings between the parties and that certain documents had been submitted, but it

would not accept the documents submitted in other cases for the truth of the matters

asserted therein.

{¶ 25} A purge hearing was held on December 14, 2023. When asked if Simpson

had furnished all the financial records regarding the income, assets, or debts of Voiture

Locale within 60 days of the trial court’s December 7, 2022 order, Simpson responded

“There is no requirement directed to me to furnish a financial statement or any kind of

accounting.” Dec. 14, 2023 Tr. 18-19. When asked if Simpson had provided the

information on every bank account as previously ordered on April 28, 2019, Simpson

responded in the negative. Id. at 19. When asked if Simpson had paid the outstanding

invoices from the U.S. Trustee Payment Center, Simpson denied that he had. Id. at 20.

{¶ 26} When the trial court asked Grande Voiture if it had received the financial

records that had been required by the court’s April 28, 2019 order, Grande Voiture

responded in the negative. Grande Voiture also denied having received information on

the bank accounts as previously ordered. Grande Voiture further indicated that the

invoices from the U.S. Trustee Payment Center had not been paid.

{¶ 27} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it was going to

grant Grande Voiture’s motion to impose contempt sanctions. The court instructed the

parties to submit an entry reflecting that $102,612.50 be ordered plus statutory interest

from the date it was ordered. The court also instructed the parties to include in the entry

the orders of the court with respect to the documents that had not yet been turned over -15-

as previously instructed and the payment of the trustee amount still due. The trial court

indicated that it wished to impose a $100 weekly penalty as initially described by the prior

trial court judge but requested that the parties brief whether the court had any authority

to do that within five days of the hearing. Although the court permitted both parties to

submit an entry, the court indicated it would only sign an entry that reflected its orders as

stated on the record.

{¶ 28} Following the hearing, Simpson filed a motion to dismiss the motion for

contempt and submitted a proposed entry. The trial court did not sign the proposed

entry.

{¶ 29} Grande Voiture prepared an entry that the trial court signed. On December

27, 2023, the trial court issued a decision holding Simpson in contempt of the trial court’s

April 28, 2019 judgment and finding that Simpson had failed to comply with the court’s

December 7, 2022 order. Grande Voiture was awarded $102,612.50 in attorney’s fees

with statutory interest and the trial court ordered Simpson to pay a weekly fine of $100

until Simpson paid the attorney’s fees due and the U.S. Trustee Invoices and provided

the financial documents and accounting information to Grande Voiture’s attorney.

Simpson’s motion to dismiss was overruled, and Simpson was ordered to pay the costs.

{¶ 30} Following the December 27, 2023 decision, Simpson filed a motion

requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law, a motion to strike the court’s order, a

motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for a new trial. The trial court

overruled all of Simpson’s motions. Simpson also requested reconsideration of the trial

court’s denial of his motions, which likewise was denied. Simpson appeals. -16-

{¶ 31} As a preliminary matter, the notice of appeal filed in this case purports to

appeal on behalf of “Montgomery County Voiture No. 34 [etc.] and Charles J. Simpson.”

The trial court has ordered that Simpson may no longer act as an officer of the

organization, and we affirmed that order in a prior appeal. See Grande Voiture I, 2020-

Ohio-3821 (2d Dist.). The case now before us, Montgomery C.A. No. 30056, deals

exclusively with the finding of contempt and sanctions imposed against Simpson

personally, and we will proceed accordingly.

II. December 27, 2023 Order

{¶ 32} In his first assignment of error, Simpson alleges the following:

The Court erred in filing the order of Dec. 27, 2023 without the

presiding judge’s signature or determination of facts by the presiding judge.

Said order is null and void.

{¶ 33} On December 7, 2022, the trial court issued an order sustaining Grande

Voiture’s motion for contempt against Simpson. In March 2023, the trial court judge who

issued the December 7, 2022 order recused herself, and a visiting judge was assigned

by the Supreme Court of Ohio on May 10, 2023. The December 27, 2023 order imposing

sanctions against Simpson was issued by the visiting judge. Simpson alleges that the

trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the December 27, 2023 order because the visiting

judge did not sign the entry and failed to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law

upon Simpson’s timely request. We disagree.

a. Electronic Signature

{¶ 34} “Advancements in computer technology have allowed for the -17-

implementation of an electronic signature that may be used in place of a judge's physical

signature. The Supreme Court of Ohio, through Sup.R. [5], has promulgated minimum

standards allowing for a court to adopt a local rule that authorizes the use of an electronic

signature to authenticate an electronic judgment entry.” State ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo,

2011-Ohio-2410, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), rev’d in part on other grounds, State ex rel. Engelhart

v. Russo, 2012-Ohio-47, ¶ 25. Likewise, R.C. 1306.22 provides that courts “may adopt

rules pertaining to the use of electronic records and electronic signatures.” R.C.

1306.22(B).

{¶ 35} The Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Local Rule (Mont. Co.

C.P.R.) 1.15 previously stated that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . ., all civil and

criminal cases, including all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda of law, deposition

transcripts, transcripts of proceedings, orders or other documents, shall be filed

electronically through the Court's authorized electronic filing system (‘eFile system’).” 1

This rule included a requirement that the court electronically file all court-initiated filings.

Mont. Co. C.P.R. 1.15(B). Although attorneys could electronically sign an e-filed

document by typing “/s/ [name],” Mont. Co. C.P.R. 1.15(F)(4)(e) addressed signatures of

a judge or judicial officer. It stated that “eFiled documents may be signed by a Judge or

judicial officer via a digitized image of his or her signature combined with a digital

signature. All orders, decrees, judgments and other documents signed in this manner

shall have the same force and effect as if the Judge had affixed his or her signature to a

1 The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas Local Rules were amended on July

1, 2024. We cite to the version of the local rules that was in effect at the time this action was pending in the lower court. -18-

paper copy of the order and journalized it.”

{¶ 36} In this case, the visiting judge typed his name electronically with “/s/” before

his name. It did not strictly comply with the local rules because his signature was not a

digitized image of his signature. Nevertheless, it still qualified as an electronic signature

since it had an otherwise recognized digital/electronic signature.

{¶ 37} R.C. 1306.01(H) defines "Electronic signature" as “an electronic sound,

symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or

adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record. A signature that is secured

through blockchain technology is considered to be in an electronic form and to be an

electronic signature.” “Electronic signatures require the use of a personal password or

code or unique identifier entrusted to the person whose signature in an electronic form

ultimately appears on the document.” State v. Anderson, 2010-Ohio-2085, ¶ 55 (8th

Dist.) (Gallagher, A.J., concurring). “If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature

satisfies the law.” R.C. 1306.06(D).

{¶ 38} Because approving the proposed order (and the electronic signature within

it) was an act of the judge, it is attributable to the judge and must be given full legal effect.

See R.C. 1306.08(A) (“An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a

person if it was the act of the person”); R.C. 1306.08(B) (“The effect of an electronic record

or electronic signature attributed to a person under division (A) of this section shall be

determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation,

execution, or adoption, including the parties' agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided

by law.”); R.C. 1306.06(A) (“A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or -19-

enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.”). Here, the visiting judge indicated

precisely what he wanted in the entry at the time of the December 13, 2023 hearing and

instructed the parties to submit proposed entries reflecting his decision. Mont. Co.

C.P.R. 2.17(C) provided that a judge “may approve or disapprove any proposed judgment

entry,” and a judgment becomes effective “upon the filing and journalization of a judgment

entry with the [c]lerk.” The rule required only that “a” judgment entry be filed, making no

distinction between an entry prepared by a judge and a proposed entry submitted by a

party and ratified by a judge as the judgment of the court. The December 27, 2023 entry

was a proposed entry by Grande Voiture that was adopted by the trial court. It reflected

the same orders the judge imposed at the December 13, 2023 hearing, bore his electronic

signature, and was journalized.

{¶ 39} Although the trial court did not strictly comply with Mont. Co. C.P.R.

1.15(F)(4)(e), the rule is procedural and designed to facilitate case management. “Local

rules of court are promulgated by and applied by local courts for the convenience of the

local bench and bar. They do not implicate constitutional rights.” Smith v. Conley,

2006-Ohio-2035, ¶ 9. While visiting judges should be aware of and comply with the local

rules of the court in which they are presiding, we see nothing under these circumstances

that renders the decision void or necessitates reversal.

b. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law

{¶ 40} Simpson also argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred

by not including findings of fact and conclusions of law in its December 7, 2022, and -20-

December 27, 2023 orders. Simpson relies on Civ.R. 52, which states that a party may

request findings of fact and conclusions of law under certain circumstances. However,

if Civ.R. 52 does not require the court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law,

then the court has no duty to issue them, even upon a timely request of a party. Savage

v. Cody-Ziegler, Inc., 2006-Ohio-2760, ¶ 13-18 (4th Dist.). The Ohio Supreme Court has

explicitly held that “Civ.R. 52 findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary in a

contempt proceeding.” State ex rel. Ventrone v. Birkel, 65 Ohio St.2d 10, 12 (1981).

Proceedings held to determine whether an individual has complied with certain purge

conditions also do not require findings of fact and conclusions of law. Machnics v. Sloe,

2008-Ohio-1133, ¶ 65 (11th Dist.). Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court

erred in denying Simpson’s repeated requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law,

and the absence of such findings and conclusions did it render the trial court’s December

7, 2022, and December 27, 2023 orders void.

c. Civil Rule 63(B)

{¶ 41} Simpson relies on Civ.R. 63(B) in support of his contention that the visiting

judge lacked the authority to issue the December 23, 2023 order. We do not agree.

{¶ 42} “Civ.R. 63(A) governs jury trials and Civ.R. 63(B) comes into effect after the

verdict or findings are made.” Vergon v. Vergon, 87 Ohio App.3d 639, 643 (8th Dist.

1993). The rule provides as follows:

If for any reason the judge before whom an action has been tried is

unable to perform the duties to be performed by the court after a verdict is

returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, another judge -21-

designated by the administrative judge . . . may perform those duties; but if

such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those duties, he may in

his discretion grant a new trial.

Civ.R. 63(B).

{¶ 43} Simpson cites no authority, and this court's research has revealed none, to

indicate that this rule is applicable to the situation at bar. See Hertel v. Houbler, 1988

WL 84235, *3 (5th Dist. Aug. 5, 1988) (Civ.R. 63 “expressly refers to changes of judges

that occurred during a jury trial, or after judgment but before entry. We are unwilling to

extend the rule beyond that particular scope.”) In the instant case, there was no trial,

and the trial court’s December 7, 2022 order adequately set forth the court’s decision on

the merits of the contempt proceedings. The visiting judge, on the other hand, presided

over the purge hearing and was tasked with determining whether Simpson had purged

the contempt orders. “[A]t a purge hearing, ‘the propriety of the contempt finding or the

purge conditions is not in question,’ and the hearing is limited to determining whether the

contemnor complied with conditions imposed for purging contempt.” Docks Venture,

L.L.C. v. Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd., 2014-Ohio-4254, ¶ 20, quoting Liming v. Damos,

2012-Ohio-4783, ¶ 30. This merely required the visiting judge to review the trial court’s

December 7, 2022 order and determine whether Simpson had complied with that order.

Accordingly, Civ.R. 63(B) did not apply.

{¶ 44} Simpson’s first assignment of error is overruled.

III. Trial Court’s Jurisdiction and Authority -22-

{¶ 45} Simpson’s second and third assignments of error relate to the trial court’s

contempt and sanction orders. The two assignments of error are as follows:

The Court erred and exceeded its jurisdiction and authority by

proceeding, conducting and allowing the proceedings in this matter.

The Court erred in denying to Defendants their right to a trial by jury

and denying to Defendants their right to answer defend and counterclaim

Plaintiff’s claims.

{¶ 46} According to Simpson, Grande Voiture’s motion for contempt was an

attempt to institute a new civil action, which entitled him to a jury trial. Simpson contends

that, because Grande Voiture failed to comply with the Civil Rules when initiating a new

cause of action, the trial court could not issue the December 27, 2023 decision. As part

of this argument, Simpson claims he was denied his right to a jury trial and that the trial

court refused to consider his answer and counterclaim. Finally, Simpson challenges the

trial court’s finding of contempt and sanctions. All of Simpson’s arguments are meritless.

a. The Trial Court’s Jurisdiction

{¶ 47} On May 26, 2022, Grande Voiture filed a motion asking the trial court to

“order Simpson to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for violation of the

permanent injunction, and award reasonable attorney’s fees as a sanction.” Grande

Voiture’s Motion for Contempt, p. 7. Specifically, Grande Voiture alleged that Simpson

had violated the Court’s April 28, 2019 injunction and had failed to comply with the court’s

March 4, 2020 order.

{¶ 48} According to Simpson, the trial court’s jurisdiction of the parties ended when -23-

the April 28, 2019 final judgment was entered. Therefore, “[t]he court has no jurisdiction

or authority over any post-judgment matter.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 13. We disagree.

{¶ 49} In Hosta v. Chrysler, 2007-Ohio-4205, ¶ 32 (2d Dist.), we explained that:

When a permanent injunction has been issued by the trial court on

the merits of a claim, the court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce the

injunction. A permanent injunction may be enforced as an act of the court

and disobedience of the order may be punished as contempt. The

permanent injunction may be enforced by motion without the necessity of

an independent action.

(Citations omitted.)

{¶ 50} “An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, involving process,

pleadings, and ending in a judgment or decree, by which a party prosecutes another for

the redress of a legal wrong, enforcement of a legal right, or the punishment of a public

offense.” R.C. 2307.01. A contempt proceeding, however, is not an “action.”

Champaign Cty. Court of Common Pleas v. Fansler, 2016-Ohio-228, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).

Rather, a contempt proceeding is a “special proceeding” the purpose of which “ ‘is to

secure the dignity of the courts and the uninterrupted and unimpeded administration of

justice.’ ” Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 16 (1988),

quoting Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio St.2d 55 (1971), paragraph two of the

syllabus. The common pleas court “has both the statutory authority under R.C.

2705.02(A) and the inherent power to punish the disobedience of its orders in contempt

proceedings.” Melnick, 2023-Ohio-3864, at ¶ 6, citing Zakany v. Zakany, 9 Ohio St.3d -24-

192 (1984), syllabus.

{¶ 51} On April 28, 2019, the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of

Grande Voiture and granted injunctive relief barring Simpson “from further participation in

the affairs of [Voiture Locale]” and “from further action as [an] officer[ ] of the organization.”

The judgment also ordered Simpson to provide an accounting of assets and debts and

prohibited both Simpson and Voiture Locale “from selling, transferring, or otherwise

alienating the real property of [Voiture Locale].” We affirmed that decision on direct

appeal. See Grande Voiture I, 2020-Ohio-3821. It is undisputed that the April 28, 2019

injunction was permanent in nature. Notably, we affirmed on direct appeal a prior

judgment in which Simpson had been found in contempt of the April 28, 2019 injunction.

See Grande Voiture II, 2021-Ohio-1430. Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction to

resolve Grande Voiture’s post-judgment contempt motion.

{¶ 52} Because no complaint was required to enforce the permanent injunction or

to file a motion for contempt, Simpson was not entitled to file an answer or counterclaim

to Grande Voiture’s motion for contempt. See, e.g., Civ.R. 12(A) (providing for service

of an answer after a complaint is served, not in any other context); Civ.R. 7 (distinguishing

between pleadings and motions); Civ.R. 6(C) (setting forth time in which to respond to

motions as distinct from pleadings). Nor was Simpson entitled to a jury trial on the

contempt motion. “Generally, there is no right to a jury trial in contempt proceedings

unless ‘a long term of imprisonment is involved.’ ” Melnick at ¶ 9, quoting Cincinnati v.

Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, Am. Fedn. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO, 35 Ohio

St.2d 197, 202 (1973). Grande Voiture’s May 26, 2022 motion for contempt only -25-

requested attorney’s fees. Nothing in the record supports a determination that

imprisonment, much less a long term of imprisonment, was a possible contempt sanction

in this case. Indeed, the record before us reveals that Grande Voiture sought only

monetary contempt sanctions and the trial court only imposed monetary contempt

sanctions. Accordingly, Simpson was not entitled to a jury trial.

b. Contempt Proceedings

{¶ 53} As to the merits of the trial court’s finding of contempt, Simpson argues that

the April 28, 2019 injunction merely restrained him from participating as a member or

officer in the Forty and Eight organization and that he did nothing to violate that restriction.

He provides no argument for his failure to comply with the trial court’s March 4, 2020

order.

{¶ 54} “A prima facie case of civil contempt is made when the moving party proves

both the existence of a court order and the nonmoving party's noncompliance with the

terms of that order.” Wolf v. Wolf, 2010-Ohio-2762, ¶ 4 (1st Dist.). “A finding of civil

contempt requires clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor has failed

to comply with the court's prior orders.” Moraine v. Steger Motors, Inc., 111 Ohio App.3d

265, 268 (2d Dist. 1996), citing ConTex, Inc. v. Consol. Technologies, Inc., 40 Ohio

App.3d 94 (1st Dist. 1988). Clear and convincing evidence is the level of proof that would

“produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought

to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus. “Once the movant establishes a prima facie case of contempt, the burden

shifts to the nonmoving party to establish a defense by the preponderance of the -26-

evidence.” (Citations omitted.) Lelak v. Lelak, 2021-Ohio-519, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 55} We review the trial court's decision in a civil-contempt proceeding for an

abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter, 2013-Ohio-5614, ¶ 21,

citing Birkel, 65 Ohio St.2d at 11. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court's

attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc.,

19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87 (1985).

{¶ 56} Simpson has repeatedly argued that the April 28, 2019 injunction did not

apply to him. His argument is premised on the theory that Voiture Locale is both an

organization that is part of the national organization and a corporation that is a separate

and distinct entity from the national organization. According to Simpson, it was the

organization that was subject to the trial court's injunction, not the corporation, and he

simply acted for the corporation, of which he remains an officer and member. We

rejected this contention in Grande Voiture II. There, we affirmed the trial court’s order

finding him in contempt and explained:

As the trial court found, Simpson did much more than act as counsel

for Voiture [Locale]. He signed a bankruptcy petition saying that he had

records of the corporation (claiming that he was its treasurer). He knew

that the former directors were prohibited from taking any actions for the

corporation, so he had to know his litigation filings were enjoined by the trial

court. He put up a mailbox and apparently diverted some mail. He failed

to turn over the financial records. He filed a replevin action against a

[Voiture Locale] member who had retrieved a parade vehicle from the club -27-

property for safekeeping, and, while that action was filed before the

injunction, Simpson continued to argue after the injunction that the vehicle

belonged to the corporation, despite knowing that the corporation could no

longer act on behalf of the ousted board. Simpson formally changed the

name of the organization, and he prepared and recorded a deed transferring

title of real property to the new name, despite knowing that the corporation

had been enjoined from transferring or alienating any property.

Simpson's arguments in these assignments of error rest on the

premise that the corporation is a separate entity from the organization and

is not bound by the injunction. That premise has been repeatedly rejected,

and the issue is res judicata.

Grande Voiture II, 2021-Ohio-1430, at ¶ 12-13 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 57} We again reject his contention in this case. Furthermore, the original

action was filed against both Voiture Locale and Simpson as named defendants. The

trial court’s injunction specifically provided that “Defendant Charles Simpson . . . [is]

hereby barred from further participation in the affairs of [Voiture Locale],” Simpson is

“hereby barred from further action as [an officer] of the organization,” and “Defendants

are prohibited from selling, transferring, or otherwise alienating the real property of

[Voiture Locale] or using it in any way other than its dedicated, exempt purpose.” April

28, 2019 Judgment. The injunction further ordered “all financial records or other

information regarding the income, assets, or debts, of [Voiture Locale]” be provided within

60 days from the order. The injunction applied directly to all defendants, including -28-

Simpson.

{¶ 58} Further, the trial court’s March 4, 2020 order was clear and definite. The

trial court directed Simpson to: (1) pay all reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs that

Grande Voiture had incurred as a result of Simpson’s failure to abide by the April 28, 2019

injunction, including the fees “incurred in the bankruptcy case, the forcible entry and

detainer case, and in the Pellicer case, and for the fees incurred in this case in litigating

the motion for contempt and the enforcement of the injunction; (2) take all necessary

actions and pay all necessary costs to restore the original name of the corporation from

HHVC; (3) “take all necessary actions and pay all necessary costs to restore title to the

property in the name of” Voiture Locale; (4) pay all outstanding invoices from the U.S.

Trustee Payment Center for fees related to his unauthorized filing of the bankruptcy; and

(5) provide to Grande Voiture information on every bank account currently or previously

held in the name of Voiture Locale or the HHVC and all financial information regarding

Voiture Locale in his possession or control.

{¶ 59} On June 29, 2020, Simpson was found in contempt of the above orders and

sanctioned. Simpson was ordered to pay $39,767.22 in attorney’s fees. Notably, the

trial court stated:

Defendant is cautioned that this Court retains jurisdiction to enforce

the permanent injunction and that further violations may result in additional

monetary or other sanctions. Defendant Simpson remains in specific

violation of this Court’s March 4, 2020 Order with respect [to] his filings with

the Secretary of State in connection with the name Montgomery County -29-

Voiture No. 34, the deed to the chateau, and the financial documents of

Montgomery County No. 34. Defendants’ failure to remedy these

continuing violations may also result in additional monetary or other

sanctions.

Decision Awarding Contempt Sanctions Against Simpson (June 29, 2020), p. 3.

{¶ 60} On May 26, 2022, Grande Voiture alleged that Simpson had continued to

violate the permanent injunction and Simpson had yet to comply with any of the mandates

in the court’s March 4, 2020 order. A hearing on that motion was held on October 21,

2022. Prior to the hearing, it was stated on the record that Simpson had paid the

attorney’s fees covered by the June 29, 2020 order, Grande Voiture had reacquired the

property on Powell Road, and Grande Voiture had reversed Simpson’s actions of

changing the name of Voiture Locale to the HHVC. Accordingly, the remaining issues

for the contempt hearing were: 1) Simpson’s failure to turn over the financial documents;

2) Simpson’s failure to pay the outstanding invoices from the U.S. Trustee Payment

Center related to the bankruptcy case; and 3) Simpson’s continued participation in filing

lawsuits in contravention of the permanent injunction.

{¶ 61} During the hearing, Grande Voiture submitted evidence of the 23 lawsuits

initiated by Simpson since the last contempt finding and testimony that Simpson had not

complied with the trial court’s prior orders. Notably, Simpson admitted that he had not

turned over any financial documents since the March 4, 2020 order, he had not paid any

outstanding invoices from the bankruptcy case, and he had filed 23 different local, state,

and federal lawsuits since the March 4, 2020 order, either on his own behalf or on behalf -30-

of the HHVC board of directors, of which he was a board member.

{¶ 62} Grande Voiture needed only to prove the existence of a court order and

Simpson’s noncompliance with the order by clear and convincing evidence. Grande

Voiture met its burden. None of Simpson’s alleged defenses were reasonable or

sufficient to justify his non-compliance. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by issuing its December 7, 2022 decision finding Simpson in contempt of court.

c. Sanctions

{¶ 63} The trial court’s December 7, 2022 decision provided Simpson with the

opportunity to purge his contempt by complying with the court’s orders. He failed to do

so. Accordingly, on December 27, 2023, the trial court awarded Grande Voiture

$102,612.50 in attorney’s fees, ordered Simpson to pay costs, and imposed a sanction

of $100 per week until Simpson complied with the court’s orders. Simpson does not

challenge the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees or the $100 per week fine imposed;

rather, he challenges the trial court’s authority to impose any sanction other than a fine of

$200 pursuant to R.C. 2727.12. Simpson’s argument is not persuasive.

{¶ 64} R.C. 2727.11 provides that “[a]n injunction or restraining order granted by a

judge may be enforced as the act of the court, and disobedience thereof may be punished

by the court, or by a judge who granted it in vacation, as a contempt.” R.C. 2727.12

provides that:

Upon being satisfied, by affidavit, of the breach of an injunction or

restraining order, the court or judge who issued such injunction or order may -31-

issue an attachment against the guilty party who shall pay a fine of not more

than two hundred dollars, for the use of the county, make immediate

restitution to the party injured, and give further security to obey the

injunction or restraining order. In default thereof, said party may be

committed to close custody until he complies with such requirement, or is

otherwise discharged.

{¶ 65} While a permanent injunction was issued in this case, the motion filed by

Grande Voiture asked the trial court to find Simpson in contempt of both the court’s

injunction and subsequent March 4, 2020 order. Relevant here, any person who is guilty

of “[d]isobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment, or

command of a court or officer” may be punished as for a contempt. R.C. 2705.02(A)(1).

If the accused is found guilty of the contempt charge, R.C. 2705.05 provides that the court

may impose any of the following penalties:

(1) For a first offense, a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars, a

definite term of imprisonment of not more than thirty days in jail, or both;

(2) For a second offense, a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, a

definite term of imprisonment of not more than sixty days in jail, or both;

(3) For a third or subsequent offense, a fine of not more than one thousand

dollars, a definite term of imprisonment of not more than ninety days in jail,

or both.

{¶ 66} The penalties prescribed in R.C. 2727.12 are cumulative to the penalties

that may be imposed under R.C. 2705.05. Citicasters Co. v. Stop 26-Riverbend, Inc., -32-

2002-Ohio-2286, ¶ 59 (7th Dist.), citing Pilliod v. Searles, 115 Ohio St. 694 (1927). We

have previously said that R.C. 2705.05 does not limit courts from imposing other

sanctions based on their inherent power to punish contempt. In re S.M.J., 2024-Ohio-

1495, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.), citing Johnson v. Johnson, 2020-Ohio-1644, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).

“Although it is conceded that the General Assembly may prescribe procedure in indirect

contempt cases, the power to punish for contempt has traditionally been regarded as

inherent in the courts and not subject to legislative control.” Cincinnati Dist. Council 51,

35 Ohio St.2d at 207. Though the Revised Code provides statutory authority, “[t]he

power of contempt is inherent in a court, such power being necessary to the exercise of

judicial functions.” Denovchek, 36 Ohio St.3d at 15. “Implicit in the exercise of that

power is the authority to fashion a punishment that will induce the contemnor to remedy

the contempt involved.” Steger Motors, Inc., 111 Ohio App.3d at 269. “Consequently,

while the trial court needed to follow the procedures in R.C. 2705.05(A), it was not

restricted to the punishments in the statute.” In re S.M.J. at ¶ 39. Simpson’s argument

that R.C. 2727.11 and R.C. 2727.12 provided no authority for the trial court's issuance of

sanctions is of no consequence, because the trial court had inherent authority

independent of those statutes. Boston Hts. v. Cerny, 2007-Ohio-2886, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.).

{¶ 67} “[C]ivil contempts are characterized as violations against the party for

whose benefit the order was made, whereas criminal contempts are most often described

as offenses against the dignity or process of the court.” State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90

Ohio St.3d 551, 555 (2001), citing State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 204-205 (1980).

“Civil contempt sanctions involve a conditional penalty . . . ‘designed for remedial or -33-

coercive purposes and are often employed to compel obedience to a court order.”

(Citation omitted.) Docks Venture, L.L.C. 2014-Ohio-4254, at ¶ 15, quoting Corn at 555.

“A contempt fine is considered civil and remedial if it coerces a party into compliance with

the court's order or compensates the complainant for losses sustained.” (Citation

omitted.) Miami Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Powlette, 2023-Ohio-2890, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). “In

the exercise of its discretion in a civil contempt proceeding, a court has the ability to

exercise its equitable powers in fashioning a coercive remedy designed to achieve

compliance with its orders.” Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2021-Ohio-2060, ¶ 37 (11th Dist.), citing

Winebrenner v. Winebrenner, 1996 WL 761996, *3 (11th Dist. Dec. 6, 1996).

{¶ 68} The trial court here found that the purge orders and potential sanctions were

reasonable in light of the fact that it was Simpson’s second contempt finding for

committing similar violations. The purpose of the fine was neither to compensate Grande

Voiture for its losses nor to punish Simpson for his conduct. Rather, it was coercive in

nature, one imposed to produce compliance by Simpson with the court's orders.

Notably, “[i]t is well settled that separate fines may be assessed for each day in which a

court's order is violated.” (Citations omitted.) Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, 35 Ohio St.2d

at 207, fn. 1. Accordingly, the $100 per week fine for each week Simpson remained in

noncompliance was reasonably designed to compel Simpson to comply with the court’s

orders, and the trial court was permitted to impose it upon Simpson to procure his

compliance.

{¶ 69} Furthermore, it is well settled that trial courts have discretion to require the

contemnor to pay the moving party's attorney’s fees. Lelak, 2021-Ohio-519, at ¶ 42. “A -34-

trial court has discretion to include reasonable attorney fees as a part of costs taxable to

a defendant found guilty of civil contempt.” State ex rel. Fraternal Ord. of Police Captain

John C. Post Lodge No. 44 v. Dayton, 49 Ohio St.2d 219 (1977), syllabus. Thus, the

trial court was authorized to order Simpson to pay reasonable attorney’s fees.

{¶ 70} Simpson’s second and third assignments of error are overruled.

IV. Simpson’s Request for Sanctions

{¶ 71} In his final assignment of error, Simpson claims that because he filed

motions for sanctions against Grande Voiture, the trial court was required to hold a

hearing pursuant to R.C. 2323.51. We do not agree.

{¶ 72} On October 22, 2022, Simpson filed a motion requesting that the court find

Grande Voiture’s May 26, 2022 motion for contempt sanctions and the prosecution of

such motion frivolous. Simpson supplemented his motion to include Grande Voiture’s

conduct prior to the filing of the contempt motion in his allegations of frivolity. Simpson

requested $250,353 as sanctions for the frivolous conduct, which included $245,250 for

attorney’s fees and $5,103 for expenses.

{¶ 73} In its December 7, 2022 decision, the trial court denied Simpson any

sanctions. The trial court found that Grande Voiture’s contempt motion was not frivolous

because Simpson had been found to be in contempt. The trial court also struck

Simpson’s supplemental motion for sanctions because it did not comply with the local

rules and lacked merit.

{¶ 74} In Grande Voiture III, Simpson raised a similar argument that the trial court

had erred in failing to grant his motion for sanctions because Grande Voiture had filed a -35-

motion for Civ.R. 70 relief that Simpson claimed was frivolous. Grande Voiture III, 2021-

Ohio-2429, at ¶ 24. Having found that Grande Voiture’s motion for Civ.R. 70 relief was

warranted and permitted by law and the facts of the case, we concluded that Grande

Voiture necessarily did not engage in frivolous conduct in filing the motion and that it was

not subject to sanctions for such filing. Id. at ¶ 26. The same analysis applies here.

{¶ 75} Based on our disposition of the prior assignments of error, Grande Voiture’s

motion asking the trial court to hold Simpson in contempt of court was warranted and

permitted by law and the facts of the case. We must therefore conclude, as the trial court

did, that Grande Voiture did not engage in frivolous conduct in filing that motion and was

not subject to sanctions for such filing. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling

Simpson’s motion for sanctions.

{¶ 76} It was also not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to overrule Simpson’s

motion without a hearing. “R.C. 2323.51 does not mandate that an evidentiary hearing

always be conducted to determine whether a particular action involves frivolous conduct,

but it does require that if attorney fees are to be ultimately awarded, then a hearing indeed

must be held in accordance with subsections (a), (b), and (c) of R.C. 2323.51(B)(2).”

Shields v. City of Englewood, 2007-Ohio-3165, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.). “[W]here a trial court

determines there is no basis for the imposition of sanctions, the trial court has discretion

to deny the motion for sanctions without a hearing.” (Citations omitted.) Middle W.

Spirits, LLC v. Gemini Vodka, Ltd., 2021-Ohio-1503, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). In this case, there

was a hearing held on Grande Voiture’s contempt motion, which was the basis for

Simpson’s motion for sanctions. Because there was no arguable merit to Simpson’s -36-

allegation that the May 26, 2022 contempt motion was frivolous, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Simpson’s motion without a hearing.

{¶ 77} As for Simpson’s supplemental motion for sanctions, which alleged that

Grande Voiture’s conduct prior to filing the contempt motion had been frivolous, the trial

court ordered Simpson’s supplemental motion for sanctions to be stricken because

Simpson failed to comply with the Montgomery County Local Rules. The local rule

provided that after a moving party files a motion, the opposing party may file a

memorandum in opposition, and the moving party may file a reply memorandum. Mont.

Co. C.P.R. 2.05(B). However, it further provided that “[n]o other memoranda shall be

filed without leave of the Court.” Mont. Co. C.P.R. 2.05(B)(3).

{¶ 78} In this case, Simpson filed a motion for sanctions on October 22, 2022.

Grande Voiture filed a memorandum in opposition to which Simpson filed a reply on

October 31, 2022. Simpson then filed a supplemental motion for sanctions on November

14, 2022, which was intended to “add to and renew” his prior motion for sanctions.

Simpson filed the supplemental motion without first obtaining leave of court. It was within

the sound discretion of the trial court to strike his supplemental motion for failing to comply

with the local rules. In so striking, the trial court also found that the arguments provided

in Simpson’s supplemental motion had previously been raised and rejected by the trial

court on “numerous” prior occasions and lacked merit. A trial court has discretion to

manage its docket and “to strike filings that [are] ‘repetitious, unsubstantiated, frivolous,

and/or made in bad faith.’ ” White v. Dollar Tree Inc., 2024-Ohio-4511, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.),

quoting State v. Dudas, 2022-Ohio-1637, ¶ 54 (11th Dist.). Under these circumstances, -37-

we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in striking Simpson’s

supplemental motion for sanctions.

{¶ 79} Simpson’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

V. Conclusion

{¶ 80} Having overruled all of Simpson’s assignments of error, we will affirm the

judgments of the trial court.

WELBAUM, J. and TUCKER, J., concur.