Weaver, J.
The question presented is whether the plaintiffs wrongful death medical malpractice claim is barred despite the statute of limitations saving pro[59]*59vision of MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852. Specifically, we must decide whether the statute of limitations saving provision began to run when the probate court issued plaintiff letters of authority as temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990, or when the probate court issued plaintiff letters of authority as personal representative on October 9, 1990. We hold that MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 began to run when plaintiff was appointed temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990, and, therefore, her claim is barred. Further, we hold that this decision is not limited to prospective application, but rather applies to this case, pending cases, and future cases interpreting MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
i
The estate of the decedent Carolyn Lindsey filed this wrongful death medical malpractice action in the Wayne Circuit Court. The action alleged that defendant Harper Hospital and other named defendants failed to diagnose or to appreciate a postsurgicai infection that occurred between October 1, 1987, and December 17, 1987. These complications led to the amputation above the knee of the decedent’s right leg. Mrs. Lindsey died on January 7, 1988, allegedly as a result of the complications.
Plaintiff, decedent’s daughter, Lanya Lindsey, petitioned the Wayne Probate Court to be appointed temporary personal representative. The probate court approved the appointment and issued plaintiff letters of authority as temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990. On October 4, 1990, the probate [60]*60court appointed plaintiff personal representative of decedent’s estate, and issued plaintiff letters of authority as personal representative on October 9, 1990. On October 1, 1992, over two years after the issuance of the September 14, 1990, letters of authority, but within two years of the October 9, 1990, letters of authority, plaintiff initiated this wrongful death medical malpractice action against defendants.
Defendant Harper Hospital moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Defendant asserted that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations saving provision, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852, because the claim was filed more than two years after plaintiff’s appointment as temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990. Plaintiff responded that the claim was timely because it was filed within two years of the probate court’s issuance of the October 9, 1990, letters of authority as personal representative.
The circuit court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that plaintiff’s claim was barred.1 This Court granted leave to appeal on October 9, 1996.2 We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
n
The period of limitation for a medical malpractice action is two years from the time a claim first accrues. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). However, where a potential claimant dies within thirty days after the statute of limitations has run or within [61]*61the two-year period of limitation, the statute of limitations saving provision operates to suspend the running of the statute until a personal representative is appointed to represent the interests of the estate. MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852. The question presented in this case is whether the statute of limitations saving provision began to run when the court issued plaintiff letters of authority as temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990, or when the court issued plaintiff letters of authority as personal representative on October 9, 1990.
A
In arguing that the statute of limitations did not begin running until the letters of authority for the personal representative were issued, plaintiff relies on Szydelko v Smith’s Estate, 259 Mich 519; 244 NW 148 (1932).3 Szydelko interpreted the predecessor statutory provisions to the statute of limitations saving provision and Probate Code provisions at issue in the present case.
The statute of limitations saving provision at issue in Szydelko stated in pertinent part that the cause of
action may be commenced by or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person or the claim may be proved as a debt against the estate of the deceased person, as the case may be, at any time within two years after granting letters testamentary or of administration .... [1929 CL 13981.]
[62]*62To determine whether the Legislature intended that the words “letters testamentary or of administration” to include appointments of special administrators or only appointments of general administrators, Szydelko considered the use of the same words in the probate statute.
Szydelko found that “the appointment of a special administrator was a matter quite apart from the issuing of ‘letters testamentary or of administration.’ ” Szydelko, supra at 522. The Court noted that, unlike the general administrator, the special administrator had no powers of general administration and served solely to conserve the estate until the executor or general administrator was appointed. Id. More importantly, a special administrator could not be sued in personal actions accruing before the death of the decedent. Id. at 523. Szydelko thus concluded that the two-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the issuance of letters of general administration. Id.
We find Szydelko’s consideration of Probate Code provisions instructive. However, we also find Szydelko not controlling for two reasons. First, the case at bar is distinguishable from Szydelko because the instant case involves claims by, rather than against, an estate. Second, there have been significant changes to both the Judicature Act and the Probate Code since Szydelko that limit Szydelko’s precedential value.
The language addressed in Szydelko is inapplicable because MCL 700.175; MSA 27.5175 expressly provides that “[t]he temporary personal representative may commence and maintain actions as personal representative . . . .” The problem addressed in Szy[63]*63delko, as stated above, was that the estate could not be sued in actions not already pending while under the administration of a special administrator. The Legislature, therefore, left a vacuum of authority, and the Szydelko Court was faced with the possibility that an estate could delay the appointment of the general administrator until the two-year period of limitation had run on an unfiled claim. However, we are not faced with a similar problem because the Legislature in the Revised Probate Code expressly authorizes the temporary personal representative to commence and maintain actions on behalf of the estate. MCL 700.175; MSA 27.5175.
Furthermore, in 1988 the statute of limitations saving provision of the Revised Judicature Act was amended to no longer address actions against estates, so Szydelko no longer controls the interpretation of the saving provision. Other substantive changes were also made to the probate law that limit Szydelko’s applicability.
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Weaver, J.
The question presented is whether the plaintiffs wrongful death medical malpractice claim is barred despite the statute of limitations saving pro[59]*59vision of MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852. Specifically, we must decide whether the statute of limitations saving provision began to run when the probate court issued plaintiff letters of authority as temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990, or when the probate court issued plaintiff letters of authority as personal representative on October 9, 1990. We hold that MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 began to run when plaintiff was appointed temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990, and, therefore, her claim is barred. Further, we hold that this decision is not limited to prospective application, but rather applies to this case, pending cases, and future cases interpreting MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
i
The estate of the decedent Carolyn Lindsey filed this wrongful death medical malpractice action in the Wayne Circuit Court. The action alleged that defendant Harper Hospital and other named defendants failed to diagnose or to appreciate a postsurgicai infection that occurred between October 1, 1987, and December 17, 1987. These complications led to the amputation above the knee of the decedent’s right leg. Mrs. Lindsey died on January 7, 1988, allegedly as a result of the complications.
Plaintiff, decedent’s daughter, Lanya Lindsey, petitioned the Wayne Probate Court to be appointed temporary personal representative. The probate court approved the appointment and issued plaintiff letters of authority as temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990. On October 4, 1990, the probate [60]*60court appointed plaintiff personal representative of decedent’s estate, and issued plaintiff letters of authority as personal representative on October 9, 1990. On October 1, 1992, over two years after the issuance of the September 14, 1990, letters of authority, but within two years of the October 9, 1990, letters of authority, plaintiff initiated this wrongful death medical malpractice action against defendants.
Defendant Harper Hospital moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Defendant asserted that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations saving provision, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852, because the claim was filed more than two years after plaintiff’s appointment as temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990. Plaintiff responded that the claim was timely because it was filed within two years of the probate court’s issuance of the October 9, 1990, letters of authority as personal representative.
The circuit court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that plaintiff’s claim was barred.1 This Court granted leave to appeal on October 9, 1996.2 We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
n
The period of limitation for a medical malpractice action is two years from the time a claim first accrues. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). However, where a potential claimant dies within thirty days after the statute of limitations has run or within [61]*61the two-year period of limitation, the statute of limitations saving provision operates to suspend the running of the statute until a personal representative is appointed to represent the interests of the estate. MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852. The question presented in this case is whether the statute of limitations saving provision began to run when the court issued plaintiff letters of authority as temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990, or when the court issued plaintiff letters of authority as personal representative on October 9, 1990.
A
In arguing that the statute of limitations did not begin running until the letters of authority for the personal representative were issued, plaintiff relies on Szydelko v Smith’s Estate, 259 Mich 519; 244 NW 148 (1932).3 Szydelko interpreted the predecessor statutory provisions to the statute of limitations saving provision and Probate Code provisions at issue in the present case.
The statute of limitations saving provision at issue in Szydelko stated in pertinent part that the cause of
action may be commenced by or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person or the claim may be proved as a debt against the estate of the deceased person, as the case may be, at any time within two years after granting letters testamentary or of administration .... [1929 CL 13981.]
[62]*62To determine whether the Legislature intended that the words “letters testamentary or of administration” to include appointments of special administrators or only appointments of general administrators, Szydelko considered the use of the same words in the probate statute.
Szydelko found that “the appointment of a special administrator was a matter quite apart from the issuing of ‘letters testamentary or of administration.’ ” Szydelko, supra at 522. The Court noted that, unlike the general administrator, the special administrator had no powers of general administration and served solely to conserve the estate until the executor or general administrator was appointed. Id. More importantly, a special administrator could not be sued in personal actions accruing before the death of the decedent. Id. at 523. Szydelko thus concluded that the two-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the issuance of letters of general administration. Id.
We find Szydelko’s consideration of Probate Code provisions instructive. However, we also find Szydelko not controlling for two reasons. First, the case at bar is distinguishable from Szydelko because the instant case involves claims by, rather than against, an estate. Second, there have been significant changes to both the Judicature Act and the Probate Code since Szydelko that limit Szydelko’s precedential value.
The language addressed in Szydelko is inapplicable because MCL 700.175; MSA 27.5175 expressly provides that “[t]he temporary personal representative may commence and maintain actions as personal representative . . . .” The problem addressed in Szy[63]*63delko, as stated above, was that the estate could not be sued in actions not already pending while under the administration of a special administrator. The Legislature, therefore, left a vacuum of authority, and the Szydelko Court was faced with the possibility that an estate could delay the appointment of the general administrator until the two-year period of limitation had run on an unfiled claim. However, we are not faced with a similar problem because the Legislature in the Revised Probate Code expressly authorizes the temporary personal representative to commence and maintain actions on behalf of the estate. MCL 700.175; MSA 27.5175.
Furthermore, in 1988 the statute of limitations saving provision of the Revised Judicature Act was amended to no longer address actions against estates, so Szydelko no longer controls the interpretation of the saving provision. Other substantive changes were also made to the probate law that limit Szydelko’s applicability. In fact, this Court recognized this limited applicability in Rhule v Armstrong, 384 Mich 709, 717; 187 NW2d 223 (1971) (overruled on other grounds). Rhule stated:
All language of the Court in the Szydelko case had to do with the filing and disposition of claims in probate against the estates of decedents, and the statutes pertaining thereto, as same stood when the Szydelko claim was filed in 1928 and was disposed of by the Court in 1932.
The Legislature has made significant changes to the authority and responsibility of the temporary personal representative. As addressed in part n(B), temporary personal representatives are by definition personal [64]*64representatives,4 and when a temporary personal representative becomes a personal representative, he is liable as a personal representative from the date of appointment as temporary personal representative.5 Further, unlike the special administrator under the old probate law, the temporary personal representative may now commence and maintain actions unrelated to the collection of goods, chattels, and debts of the decedent.6 Thus, we hold Szydelko does not control our interpretation of the modem statutes.
B
Because Szydelko’s interpretation of the predecessor of the statute of limitations saving provision is not controlling, we are again faced with a question of statutory interpretation regarding when the statute of limitations saving provision began to run in this case. As amended in 1988, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 provides in pertinent part:
If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action which survives by law may be commenced by the personal representative of the deceased person at any time within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run.
The statute has the effect of extending the period of limitation set forth in MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805 where a death occurs either before the period of limitation has run or within thirty days after the period [65]*65has run. As an exception to the statute of limitations, the saving provision should be strictly construed. Mair v Consumers Power Co, 419 Mich 74, 80; 348 NW2d 256 (1984).
Because the term personal representative is not defined in the statute, we examine the Revised Probate Code for a definition. The saving provision of the statute of limitations and the Probate Code are intended to work together to preserve legal actions that survive death and to define the running of the statute of limitations where a person dies before or within thirty days of the running of the period of limitation. Under the rule of construction of statutes in pari materia, it is appropriate to harmonize statutory provisions that serve a common purpose when attempting to discern the intent of the Legislature. Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 136-137; 521 NW2d 230 (1994); Wayne Co v Auditor General, 250 Mich 227, 232-233; 229 NW 911 (1930).
The statute of limitations saving provision of the Revised Judicature Act was amended by 1988 PA 221 to be consistent with the streamlined language of the 1978 Revised Probate Code. Turner v Mercy Hosps & Health Services of Detroit, 210 Mich App 345, 351, n 1; 533 NW2d 365 (1995). The Revised Probate Code abandoned “executor and administrator” in favor of the more encompassing title “personal representative.” MCL 700.9(3); MSA 27.5009(3). It also replaced the title “special administrator” with “temporary personal representative.” MCL 700.174-700.179; MSA 27.5174-27.5179.
This streamlining of the probate nomenclature also reflected substantive changes in the responsibility and authority of temporary personal representatives. [66]*66The Revised Probate Code defines “personal representative” to include:
executor, administrator, administrator with will annexed, administrator de bonis non, a temporary or successor personal representative, and a person who performs substantially the same functions in respect to the estate of a decedent under the law governing their status. [MCL 700.9(3); MSA 27.5009(3).]
Further, the Legislature added an entirely new section to the Probate Code that provides:
If the temporary personal representative becomes the personal representative, all special requirements of sections 174 to 178 shall be waived and the temporary personal representative shall be accountable as though he were the personal representative from the date of appointment as temporary personal representative. [MCL 700.179; MSA 27.5179.]
We hold that these amendments evidence an intent to allow temporary personal representatives to perform essentially the same functions and to bear the same responsibilities as personal representatives.
c
Our conclusion is consistent with the purposes of the statute of limitations saving provision, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852, which is intended to preserve actions that survive death in order that the representative of the estate may have a reasonable time to pursue such actions. Morse v Hayes, 150 Mich 597, 602; 114 NW 397 (1908). We hold this purpose was met by the appointment of plaintiff as temporary personal representative because letters of authority [67]*67issued to her as temporary personal representative stated:
full power and authority to take possession, collect, preserve, manage, and dispose of all the property of the estate according to law, and to perform all acts permitted or required by statute, court rule, and orders and decrees of this court ....
The letters of authority were identical in their delegation of powers as those issued to plaintiff as personal representative a few weeks later, the only difference being that the September 14, 1990, letters of authority included the word “temporary.”
Further, as stated above and unlike its predecessor, the Revised Probate Code does not limit the temporary personal representative to pursuit of actions involving the preservation and collection of assets of the estate. Compare 1929 CL 15589 with MCL 700.175; MSA 27.5175. Under the Revised Probate Code, a temporary personal representative is empowered to pursue and defend all claims on behalf of the estate.
Because we find no constructive difference in the Revised Probate Code regarding the authority and responsibility of temporary personal representatives and that of personal representatives, we hold that the statute of limitations saving provision ran from September 14, 1990, when plaintiff was appointed temporary personal representative. Therefore, plaintiffs claim was not timely under MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852.
[68]*68m
Plaintiff argues that even if this Court holds that the statute of limitations saving provision ran from her appointment as temporary personal representative, that holding should be applied prospectively only. The general rule is that judicial decisions are to be given full retroactive effect. Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240; 393 NW2d 847 (1986). However, where injustice might result from full retroactivity, this Court has adopted a more flexible approach, giving holdings limited retroactive or prospective effect. This flexibility is intended to accomplish the “maximum of justice” under varied circumstances. Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 360; 343 NW2d 181 (1984), citing Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 265-266; 111 NW2d 1 (1961).
Prospective application of a holding is appropriate when the holding overrules settled precedent or decides an “ ‘issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.’ ” People v Phillips, 416 Mich 63, 68; 330 NW2d 366 (1982), citing Chevron Oil Co v Huson, 404 US 97, 106; 92 S Ct 349; 30 L Ed 2d 296 (1971). Although this is the first time this Court has considered whether the 1988 revised statute of limitations saving provision begins to run at the issuance of letters of authority for the temporary personal representative or the personal representative, this is not the type of first-impression question that supports prospective application. As the Court of Appeals persuasively reasoned:
The fact that a decision may involve an issue of first impression does not in and of itself justify giving it prospective application where the decision does not announce a new rule of law or change existing law, but merely gives an [69]*69interpretation that has not previously been the subject of an appellate court decision. [Jahner v Dep’t of Corrections, 197 Mich App 111, 114; 495 NW2d 168 (1992).]
We do not find that the balance of justice demands prospective application in this case. Though plaintiffs claim may seem unfairly barred by our holding, it cannot be denied that all statutes of limitation set arbitrary time limits for legal claims. Statutes of limitation serve to protect defendants from stale claims. This purpose must be balanced with the purpose of exceptions to statutes of limitation, such as the saving provision. The saving provision preserves a plaintiffs claim, but, as an exception to a statute of limitation, must be narrowly construed. Mair, supra.
Plaintiff, by the letters of authority as temporary personal representative and by the provisions of the Revised Probate Code, had full authority to commence and maintain actions on behalf of the estate. Indeed, plaintiff immediately exercised her authority under MCL 700.703; MSA 27.57037 as temporary personal representative to limit claims against the estate when she issued notice to all creditors, giving them four months to present their claims against the estate. Given plaintiffs assumption of such control over the estate, it does not seem unfair to accord her the responsibility to pursue claims on behalf of the estate within two years of her appointment as temporary personal representative.
[70]*70IV
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and this decision is applied to this case, pending cases, and future cases interpreting MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852.
Mallett, C.J., and Brickley and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Weaver, J.