Life Partners Creditors' Trust v. Cowley (In Re Life Partners Holdings, Inc.)

926 F.3d 103
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMay 31, 2019
Docket17-11477
StatusPublished
Cited by234 cases

This text of 926 F.3d 103 (Life Partners Creditors' Trust v. Cowley (In Re Life Partners Holdings, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Life Partners Creditors' Trust v. Cowley (In Re Life Partners Holdings, Inc.), 926 F.3d 103 (5th Cir. 2019).

Opinion

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

This case arises out of the Chapter 11 bankruptcies of three related entities: Life *112 Partners Holdings, Inc.; Life Partners, Inc. (LPI); and LPI Financial Services (collectively, the "LP Entities"). The LP Entities operated an investment business focused on the sale of interests in life insurance policies, through which they defrauded investors and violated securities laws. See Moran v. Pardo , No. 4:15-cv-00905, Dkt. No. 359 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 2017); see also SEC v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc. , 854 F.3d 765 , 789 (5th Cir. 2017). The LP Entities used a multi-level marketing structure to sell their life insurance investments, contracting with individuals and entities they called "Licensees" to refer potential investors in exchange for sales commissions. The bankruptcy trustee filed five adversary proceedings 1 against various groups of these Licensees, asserting claims under the Bankruptcy Code and on behalf of individual investors. Life Partners Creditors' Trust (Creditors' Trust)-an entity created by the Chapter 11 plan-was later substituted as plaintiff in these proceedings.

The district court granted the Licensees' motions to dismiss all of Creditors' Trust's claims and declined to allow repleading. The district court also denied Creditors' Trust's motion for reconsideration. We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE and REMAND in part.

I.

A.

In 1991, Brian Pardo founded LPI for the purpose of selling "viaticals"-investments in life insurance policies that the insureds had sold to third parties. 2 LPI's parent company, Life Partners Holdings, and a related entity, LPI Financial Services, were also engaged in this business. The LP Entities used a multi-level marketing structure to promote their investment offerings to investors. First, the LP Entities contracted with "Master Licensees" to (1) refer potential investors to the LP Entities and (2) recruit additional licensees. The licensees recruited by Master Licensees-called "Referring Licensees"-would in turn enter into two contracts: one with the LP Entities to refer potential investors, and another with the Master Licensee to facilitate their sharing of the commissions received from the LP Entities' sales. The LP Entities produced offering materials for both types of Licensees to distribute to potential investors.

Through their Licensees, the LP Entities sold life insurance policies in shares referred to as "fractional interests." Under their investment contracts with the LP Entities, the investors funded an escrow account with sufficient funds to keep the policies in effect during the life expectancies of the insureds as estimated by the LP Entities on their offering materials. If the insureds survived beyond the LP Entities' estimate, the investors also agreed to contribute additional funds for premiums until the policies reached maturity.

Initially, the LP Entities focused on policies in which the insureds had been diagnosed *113 with AIDS because the disease shortened the insureds' life expectancies in comparison to the actuarial life expectancies used by insurance companies. However, shortly after the LP Entities entered the viaticals market, medical advances significantly increased life expectancies for AIDS patients. As a result, by 2004, the LP Entities had pivoted their business model to focus on elderly insureds who were terminally ill-individuals whose life expectancies would presumably also be shorter than the actuarial estimates. The LP Entities hired Dr. Donald Cassidy to identify appropriate insureds and estimate their life expectancies.

However, it soon became apparent that Dr. Cassidy did not have the ability to perform either task with any accuracy. Of the 302 policies that the LP Entities originated between 2004 and 2007, Dr. Cassidy predicted that 157 would mature by the end of 2007. Only seven matured during that time. Undeterred, the LP Entities continued to use the inaccurate life expectancies to set the purchase price of the fractional interests, which resulted in the LP Entities overcharging investors. In addition, the offering materials distributed by the Licensees continued to represent that the insureds had short life expectancies when their life expectancies were likely no shorter than the actuarial estimates.

According to Creditors' Trust, the LP Entities' offering materials also contained numerous other misrepresentations regarding the life insurance industry and the LP Entities' investment offerings. Most of these misrepresentations were related to Dr. Cassidy's flawed life expectancy estimates, which the LP Entities used to support their claims that the fractional interests were sound investments with a "superior yield potential," that the policies would mature relatively quickly, that the investments were low-risk even if the LP Entities' life expectancy predictions were incorrect, that the LP Entities' prices were appropriate, and that the LP Entities had a positive track record with past life insurance investments. These misrepresentations form the basis of several of Creditors' Trust's claims against the Licensees.

Over a twelve-year period, the LP Entities raised more than $ 1.8 billion from the sale of more than 100,000 fractional interests to investors. Even when investors began expressing doubts because policy maturities were long overdue and media coverage suggested Dr. Cassidy's predictions were inaccurate, Pardo and other LP Entities insiders continued to represent that Dr. Cassidy's predictions were accurate and that the policies would mature imminently. The Licensees disseminated these representations to the investors.

Throughout this time, the Licensees received commissions and fees under their contracts with the LP Entities. Between 2008 and 2015, these commissions and fees totaled more than $ 27.6 million. While investors knew that a portion of their investment funds would be used to pay fees, they were not given specifics as to how that money was distributed. On average, the Licensees received 12% of the money an investor provided in exchange for a fractional interest, which was well above the industry standard for a commission in a securities transaction.

Due to the large commissions paid to the Licensees-as well as large distributions made to Pardo and other LP Entities executives-Creditors' Trust alleges that the LP Entities were insolvent for much of their existence prior to filing for bankruptcy. Because the life settlements were bad investments, each new purchase of a fractional interest created a liability to the investor. And because the LP Entities were depleting all their resources on commissions *114 and distributions, they did not have sufficient funds to cover those liabilities. Instead, the LP Entities-through the Licensees-continued to recruit new investors to keep the business funded. Eventually, however, the LP Entities no longer had enough capital to conduct their business operations or continue maintaining the policies that had not yet matured.

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Bluebook (online)
926 F.3d 103, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/life-partners-creditors-trust-v-cowley-in-re-life-partners-holdings-ca5-2019.