UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
HENRY L. KLEIN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER: 25-1047
JENNIFER M. MEDLEY DIVISION “5”
ORDER AND REASONS
This is a suit for damages – compensatory and punitive – against a sitting state-court judge for decisions she made in a still-pending case. It is the latest episode in a years-long crusade undertaken by Plaintiff in multiple state and federal courts seeking relief related to numerous complicated transactions resulting from the failure of First NBC Bank. The pleadings and documents filed by Plaintiff in this case are no less byzantine than the underlying transactions giving rise to this (and a lot of related) litigation. Those pleadings and their accompanying exhibits – awash in different fonts, typefaces and sizes (and even different colors) – are often quite hard to follow, as they bounce from one case to another and back again, only occasionally touching upon what appear to be Plaintiff’s complaints about what the Defendant-Judge did in this case. And no matter how these 1 documents are styled, they all are painfully repetitive and continuously argue about legal 1 Plaintiff has filed a bizarre collection of heretofore un-heard of (at least to this judge) documents in this record, including a “Request for Guidance” and “Supplemental Request for Guidance” (rec. docs. 3, 4); “Ex Parte Motion to Appoint U.S. Marshall [sic] to Serve Summons and Thereupon to Appoint Magistrate-Judge KWR to Conduct a Chambers v. NASCO Investigation of Fraud Upon the Courts” (rec. doc. 6); “Ex Parte Request for Order to Protect Records and Expedited Production” (rec. doc. 15); “Response to Correction” (rec. doc. 16); “Popsrto- asergument Observations” (rec. doc. 28); and a response to a deficiency notice entered by the Clerk’s office that runs some 480 pages with exhibits. (Rec. doc. 31). This is all too much. And while Plaintiff is proceeding and factual issues that are not part of this case, but pertain to the various injustices he and 2 his clients allegedly suffered in the underlying case(s). This case is now before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Rec. doc. 17-1). Currently pending are two motions filed by Defendant, Judge Jennifer M. Medley (“Judge Medley”). First is the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Entry of Prefiling Injunction, which seeks (1) dismissal of Plaintiff’s Henry L. Klein’s (“Klein”) claims against her, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and (2) an order that Klein be enjoined from filing pleadings in this Court unless and until he obtains leave of Court from the Chief Judge. (Rec. doc. 13). Second is a Motion to Stay Discovery. (Rec. doc. 18). Klein filed an opposition memorandum to the Motion to Dismiss (rec. doc. 22) but not 3 as to the Motion to Stay. Medley filed a reply to the Motion to Dismiss. (Rec. doc. 25). The Court held oral argument on the motions, and Klein has filed a number of post-hearing documents that will be discussed below. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the pleadings and substantial exhibits in the record and, based upon that review, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, rules as fIo. llowsB. A CKGROUND
On May 27, 2025, Klein filed his Complaint naming Judge Medley of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans (“Civil District Court”) as the sole defendant. (Rec. doc. 1).
2 A perfect exHamenpsolen –v .j uSsatn dtaanysd earg o PTlahien tSifufp frileemda ac yp lCelaaduisneg osft ythleed U “nMitoetdio Snt atote Rs eCsounmsteit uOtriaoln P. r esentation,” in which he argues that “[i]n the last few days, the Docket in 2022-03662 has been inundated with pleadings that can't survive or Resuming oral argument will allow each item of evidence (A-W) filed on August 14 to be introduced for Rule 57 purposes.” (Rec. doc. 32). This is not case number 2022-03662 and whether that case can survive Plaintiff’s arguments is Klein alleges that Judge Medley is part of a long-running conspiracy against him and his clients. He claims that Judge Medley has violated his constitutional rightsG ainrodd tLhoea nriCgoh,t Ls LoCf ov.t hHeernsr yu nLd. Kerle 4in2. U.S.C. § 1983 based on her rulings in the matter entitled
, Docket No. 2021-5090, currently pending in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans (the “Underlying Matter”). (Rec. doc. 13). Klein claims that the Underlying Matter arises out of a June 15, 2021 suit by GirodLoanCo against him “as a commercial guarantor on a Levy Gardens promissory note dated September 26, 2008.” (Rec. doc. 1). Chief Judge Vitter previously summarized the factual and procedural background of the Underlying MatterG iinro tdh eL OoarndCeor avn. dK lReienasons she issued remanding the case to state court in Case No. 25-1127, . Because the details of that case are not of great importance in deciding the jurisdictional issues raised by the pending motion to dismiss,
Chief Judge Vitter’s summary of those proceedings suffices for present purposes. It is clear that Klein wants very badly to have his various complaints adjudicated in this Court rather than state court. He twice removed the Underlying Matter to this Court: on October 1, 2024, after which the case was remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and then again on June 4, 2025, a, fter his Motion to recuse Judges eMeedley was denied in state court. (No. 24-2366, Rec. doc. 1 30; No. 25-1127, Rec. doc. 1; Id. Klein’s Exhibits H, I, J, K, and L). That case was remanded as well by Chief Judge Vitter. ( , rec. doc. 51). Klein claims that Judge Medley violated his rights as secured by the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by denying him access to courts and “threaten[ing] sanctions for free speech and expression.” (Rec. doc. 1). According to Klein, Judge Medley committed these wrongs when she “engaged in a pattern of summary subpoena to Klein’s wife as part of post-judgement discoverIyd .regarding Klein’s assets, and threatened sanctions against him if he violated her orders. ( ). As his remedy, Klein requests that Judge Medley be fouIdn.d liable and that she be
ordered to pay him damages, both compensatory and punitive. ( ). It is worth noting that Klein’s license to practice law in Louisiana was suspended in 2023, largelyp froor hseis actions in the litigation underlying this case. He has elected to represent himself asId a. litigant in the current matter rather than seek reinstatement of his law license. ( ). On August 27, 2025, Judge Medley filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against her under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Rec. doc. 13). Judge Medley asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Kleins’ claims based on the following legal defenses:
(1) she is entitled to ElevenRtho oAkmere-nFdelmdmenatn immunity and is not a “person” for purposes of a Section 1983 claim; (2) the Younger doctrine applies; (3) the Court may abstain from hearing the claims based on the Id.)a. b stention doctrine; and (4) that Judge Medley is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. ( These are the jurisdictional arguments currently before LthEeG CAoLu SrtT. ANDARDS II. A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
Federal RuleP roifc eC viv. iIlr oPnrsocedure 12(b)(1) governs challenges to a court's subject
matter jurisdiction. , No. CV 19-11451, 2020 WL 1638376, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2020). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdHiocmtioen B wuihldeenr tsh Aes sc'onu ortf lMaicskss., tIhnec .s tva. tuCtitoyr yo fo rM caodnisstointutional power to adjudicate the case.” Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund , 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). Because a 12(b)(1) motion is jurisdictional, a court considers such a motion “before addressing any attack on the merits” in order to “ pInr ervee FnEt[M ]A a Tcroauirlet rw Fiothrmouatl djuerhiysddeic Ptiroond f. rLoimab p. Lreitmiga.turely dismissing
a case with prejudice.” Ramming v. United States (Miss. Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286-87 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)). Nevertheless, a court uses “the saSmeee D sotoalnedya vr. dP”r iwnchiepni analyzing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion as it would a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. , 250 F. App'x 114, 115-16 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Unlike in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, though, “[c]ourts may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the Ccloamrkp vl.a Tinatr rsaunptp Clteym.,ented by
undisputed facts plus the court's rWesilolilaumtiosonn o vf .d Tisupcukteerd facts.” 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing , 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). Importantly, the party invoking federal jurisdiction – inS eteh iCse cleasstein Kel ev.i nT r–a hnasWs tohoed burden of demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists.R amming , Inc., 467 F. App'xB .3 1F7e,d 3e1r8a l( 5Rtuhl eC ior.f 2C0iv1i2l )P (rpoecre dcuurriea m12) ((bc)it(i6n)g , 281 F.3d at 161).
To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a party must plead “suffiAcisehnctr ofaftc vtu. Iaqlb malatter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claBimel lt oA trle. lCieofr pth. av.t Tisw polmaubsliyble on its face.’” , 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the couIrdt. to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” A court Lormand v. US Unwired reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” , Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). A legally sufficienSet ec oImqbpallaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the
party's claim is true. , 556 U.S. at 678. It need not contain “‘detailed factual allegations,’” but it must go be”y o Snede “i‘dla.bels and cTownoclmubsiloyns’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’ (quoting , 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope oLr oerxmpaenctdation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” , 565 F.3d at 257 (citations omitted). The claim must be dismissed if thereT awroem inbslyufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” , 550 U.S. at 55S5ee, o Jro nife ist vis. Bapocpkarent from the face of the complaint
that there is an insuperable bar to relief. , 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). “In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a disCtorlilcitn sc ovu. Mrto mrguasnt lSitmanitl eitys eDlfe taon t hWe ictotenrtents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto.” , 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). “The court may also consider documents attached to either a motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion wheBnra tnhde dCooucupomne Nntest waroer kr, eLf.eLr.Cre. vd. Ctoa tianl itnhae Mpkletagd. Cinogrsp .and are central to a plaintiff's claims.” , 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). Otherwise, if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s complaint does not indicate clearly whether he is suing Judge Medley in her official capacity or individual capacity. Defendant thus moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against herA o. nO bfofitchi aglr-oCuanpdasc. i ty Claims
In support of her motion, Judge Medley first contends that Klein’s claim for damages against her in her official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Rec. doc. 13). In opposition, Klein argues in purely conclusory fashion, that “[n]o aspect of the Eleventh Amendment protects [Judge Medley] from the consequences of her actions in the case at bar” and that “[s]ection 1983 plaintiffs seeking damages for constitutional violations are entitled to compensatory damages and punitive damages, a fact-intensive issue too early to decide.”
(Rec. doc. 22). Because tSheies Jqeuffeesrtsioonn vis. L oan. eS toaf tseu Sbujepcrte mmae tCteoru rjutrisdiction, the Court considers it under Rule 12(b)(1). , 2002 WL 1973897, at *1 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“[E]leventh amendment immunity deprivMecsD tohnea cldo uvr. tB odf. osuf bMjiescst. mLeavtetee rC ojumrimsd'risction of the action.” (alteration in origiYnsalle)t a(q dueolt Sinugr Pueblo v. Texas , 832 F.2d 901, 906 (5th Cir. 1987))); , 36 F.3d 1325, 1336 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment operates as a jurisdictional bar.”). The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides as follows: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This language expressly encompasses not only suits brought agaiSneset Ha astnast ev. b Lyo cuiitsiizaennas of another state, but suPitasp aagsaainn svt. Aa lslatainte by citizens of that same stasetee. a lso Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman ); Edelman v. Jordan , 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 (1984 , 415 U.S. 651, 663, 694 (1974). Under the Eleventh Amendment, “anE udne-lcmoannsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her owSene cCiotizzzeon vs.. ”T angipaho,a 4 P1a5r .U C.oSu. 6nc5i1l-,
P6r6e3s i(d1e9n7t4 G)o. vL'touisiana is such an un-consenting state. , 279 F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 2002) (“By statute, Louisiana has refused any such waiver of its Eleventh Amendment sosevee raelsigon H oimllimdauyn vit. yB dr.e ogfa Srudpinegr vsisuoirtss oifn L SfeUd Aergarl. c&o Muretcsh.”. (Ccoiltli.ng La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5106(A))); , 149 So. 3d 227, 229 (La. 2014) (“While Louisiana may have waived sovereign immunity with respect to some claims, La. Const. art. 1 § 26 makes it clear the State has not waived its sovereignty within the federal system.”). PGreincee rva. lIlryo, ntsherefore, Louisiana enjoys immunity against suits brought in federal
court. , No. CV 19-11451, 2020 WL 1638Se3e7 R6,i cahta *r3d (sEo.nD v. .L Sa. .U Anpivr.. 2, 2020). This immunity extends to suits brought under state law. , 118 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that state-law claim is barred where “the plaintiff's claim was against the State of Louisiana and not the named defendant acting in his individSueael Ccaopzzaocity”). Importantly for present purposes, it also applies to suits under Section 1983. , 279 F.3d at 281 (stating that “Congress may only abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity by ‘unequivocally’ expresFslian. gP rietsp aiindt ePnots ttsoe cdonod saory aEnddu cb. yE xapcetninseg ‘Bpdu. rvs.u Caonltl. tSoa va. vBaalnidk exercise of power,’” (quoting
, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999)), and “that in enacting § 1983, Congress did ‘not explicitly and by clear langQuaugeern i vn.d Jiocradtaen on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States’” (quoting , 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979))). The Eleventh Amendment bar ePxetennndhsu rtost suits against state officials when “the state is a real, substantial party in interest.” , 465 U.S. at 101–02. Thus, the general rule is that relief sought againstH aanll ovf. fLicoeuri siisa nina fact against the sovereign if the decree would
operate against the latter. , 974 F. Supp. 2d 964 (M.D. La. 2013). And, as when the state itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a Psueintn ahguarisntst a state is barred rseegea ardlsloesOsk opfa lwobhie vth. Feor sitte rseeks damages or injunctive relief. , 465 U.S. at 101–02; , 244 F.3d 405, 412 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff cannot evade Eleventh Amendment immunity by naming an individual state officer as a defendant in lieu of the state itself). Therefore, this immunity extends not only to suits against Louisiana itself, but also to Psuriictse avg. Iarionnsst Louisiana officials acting in their official capacity, including state-court judges.
, 2020 WL 1638376, at *3. Indeed, “[s]uit.”s aHgaafienrs vt. sMtaetloe officials in their official cseaep aaclsitoy W. . .i lslh vo. uMldic bhe. Dtreepa'tte odf aSst sauteit sP aogliacienst the State , 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”). Here, Judge Medley, as a Louisiana state district court judge, is a state actor and is being sued as such. Accordingly, the Court considers Plaintiff’s claim for damages against Judge Medley as Soenee D aagvaiisn vs.t T haerrr ainnt h Cetry .o, Tffeicxial capacity; the Eleventh Amendment therefore bars
the claim. ., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Texas judges are entitled to Eleventh AmendmCeanint ivm. mCiutyn oitfy N foerw c Olarilmeasn assserted against them in their official capacitiCesa ians vs.t aWteh aitcetors.”); , 281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646 (E.D. La. immunity would applyS utmo ma esrus ivt . fLooru irseiatrnoaspective relief against Orleans Parish Criminal District Court judges); , No. 13-4573, 2013 WL 3818560, at *4 (E.D. La. July 22, 2013) (finding that “an official-capacity claim against [a Louisiana judge] would in
reality be a claim against the state itself, and any such claims would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment”). As best as the Court can glean from the pleadings and statements made at oral argument, Klein urges that the Eleventh Amendment does not shield Judge Medley’s conduct here because her acts were “administrative,” not “adjudicative.” The argument is that Judge Medley’s “unconventional and unprecedented practice of summary denials of all Klein Motions . . . without a hearing were not ‘adjudications’ but administrative abberations.” (Rec. doc. 22). There is nothing of substance offered in support of this conclusory argument, save
for citation to a Louisiana Supreme Court decision that bears no factual resemblance to the underlying facts of this case. Palowsky v. Campbell , 4 Klein relies heavily on a Louisiana case involving allegations that the judge’s law clerk had a history of intentionally destroying or concealing court documents, that she destroyed multiple court documents related to plaintiff’s underlying suits, and that all of the jIudd.ges ofP tahloawt csokuyrt conspired with the clerk to cover-up her alleged document destruction. The Court consIdid.ered these to be “highly unusual and specific allegations” meriting further investigation. at 467. Here, Klein (again in purely conclusory fashion and only in his opposition memorandum) claims that Judge Medley’s clerk, non-party Chelsea Hale, committed the Palowsky v. Campbell rev’d by Palowsky v. Campbell 4 , 22-589 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/23), 378 So.3d 212, 216, , Palowsky “exact misconduct” in this case as was alleged in by making a handwritten caption correction on a document whose importance is never described or alleged by Klein. Even after oral argument, the Court still has no idea what the significance of this alleged caption
correction is or was or how Klein was in any way prejudiced bPy aitlo. wTshkey argument is a classic red herring, made solely in an attempt to align this case with . It does not align at all – even taking Klein’s allegations as true. It is worth noting again here that it is Klein’s burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction, meaning it is his burden to establish to the Court’s satisfaction that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply here to bar his official-capacity claims. His conclusory and confusing arguments do not satisfy that burden. The Court is convinced that the Eleventh Amendment bars his official-capacity claims against Judge Medley and that dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate. Given that the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against Judge MReodolkeeyr i-nF ehldemr oafnficial capacity, the Court does not pYrooucnegeedr to consider the application of the doctrine or to consider whether abstention would otheBr.w Iisned bivei dapuparl-oCparpiaatcei.t y Claims
Judge Medley also argues that any claims against her in her individual capacity or any claims arising under state law (the existence of which are unclear), also fail because she is entitled to absolute juSdeiec iBaal lilmarmd uvn. Witya.l l (Rec. doc. 13). The Court considers this argument
under Rule 12(b)(6). , 413 F.3d 510, 514, 520 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming a district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the basis of judicial immunity). “Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity fro.m” B colaydim vs. Bfoigrg dearsmages arising 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Such absolute immunity Smeee aMnisr ethleast v j.u Wdgaecso are “immun[e] from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” , 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Indeed, “[j]udicial immunity can be overcome only by showing that the actions
complained of were nonjudicial in natBuoryed or by showing thcaitt itnhge M aicrteiolenss were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” , 31 F.3d at 284 ( , 502 U.S. at 11-12). Actions are “judicial in nature if they are ‘normally peIrdf.ormed by aM jiurdelgees’ and the parties affected ‘dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.’” (quoting , 502 U.S. at 12). Accordingly, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, heP whailnl bv.e H saunbejenct to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”M ays v. Sudderth, No. 23-20598, 2024 WL 3593902, at *1 (5th Cir. July 31, 2024) (quoting , 97
F.3d 107, 111 (5thId C.ir. 1996 S)t)u. m “pJu vd. iScpiaalr ikmmmanunity is also applicable in caPsieesr saosns evr. tRinayg civil rights violations.” (citing , 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); , 286 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967)). ThereforeS, eeev eMni raellleesging that a judge acted with “bad faith or malice” d oMesc Anloets tperre cvl.u Bdreo iwmnmunity. , 502 U.S. at 11. In , the Fifth Circuit relied upon the following four factors to determine whether a judge was acting within his judicial jurisdiction: (1) whether the precise act complained of, use of the contempt power, is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the events involved occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy
centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) whether the confrontation arose directly and immediately out oMf ac Avliessitte tro the judge in his official capacity. 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir.1972). The four factors are to be broadly construed in favor of immunity, and immunity should not be denied where the denial carries the potential of raising more than a frivolous concAedrna mins av . juMdcgIelh'sa nmyind that to take proper action might expose him to personal liability. , 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985) (emphMasciAsl aedstdeerd). In some situatioInds., immunity is to be afforded even though one or more
of the factors is not met. In this case, Klein essentially argues that the first factor – whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function – is not met. The relevant inquirMy irreegleasrding this is an examination of the “nature and function” of the act, not the act itself. , 502 U.S. at 288. The Court is toI dlo. ok to the particular act's relation to a general function normally performed by a judge. The acts that Klein complains of are clearly judicial in nature. Klein contends that Judge Medley “engaged in a pattern of summary denials of rules to show cause without
hearings,” denied a motion to enroll, issued a subpoena to Klein’s wife as part of post- judgment discovery regarding Kleins assets, and threatened him with sanctions if he violated her orders. (Rec. doc. 1). His claims arise out of judicial acts occurring during, or arising from, state-court matters over which she has presided and is currently presiding. Any ruling that Plaintiff may seek to disturb, revisit, or derive money damages from arose directly out of Judge Medley’s official-capacity duties in light of a motion or other proceeding held in her chambers or respective courtroom – all related to the Underlying Matter. The acts complained of here are inescapably judicial. Palowsky
As he does in addressing the Eleventh Amendment argument, Klein relies on to argue that Judge Medley was not acting in her adjudicatory role during the “unconventional and unprecedented practice of SUMMARY DENIALS of all [his] motions” in the Underlying matter. (Rec. doc. 22). As noted earlier, he argues that Judge Medley’s “serial denials without a hearing wIde.re not ‘. . . adPjuadloicwastkioyn vs. .C .a .m ’ pbbuet laldministrative aberrations,” not entitled to immunity. ( ). However, is not applicable here. The Court in that case found that judicial immunity did not extend to a judge’s supervision and
Iind.vestigation of a law clerk’s activities, considering these acts to be administrative functions. at 467. Here, the thrust of Klein’s claims arises from issuance of orders and the management andP rciocentrol of Judge Medley’s docket—actions that are core aspects of judicial administration. , 2020 WL 1638376, at *4. Subpoenas and summary denials without hearings pertain to judicial acts inherent in case management and procedural oversight, duties that lie within the authority of judges to control the orderly progression of litigation. And Ms. Hale’s name isn’t even mentioned in the Complaint, so tethering his case against Judge Medley to a non-articulated claim for failing to supervise her law clerk is unavailing.
Furthermore, Klein doesn’t bother to explain the nature of any the various summary denials – what relief did the motions or rules seek and under what circumstances were they denied? And finally, even if Plaintiff’s allegations could be read as suggesting that Judge Medley acted with malice, it nonetheless involves Judge Medley acting in her judicial capacity of presiding over Plaintiff’s proceedings. Based on the substance of Plaintiff’s claims, the judge enjoyCs. aRbesoqluuetest i mfomr Purneit-yfi.l Tinhgu sIn, djuisnmctisiosanl under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.
In her Motion to Dismiss, Judge Medley also seeks an order of this Court directing that
Klein be enjoined from filing any additional pleadings or complaints in this Court, unless and until he has obtained leave of Court from the Chief Judge. As I noted at the hearing on the motion, while such relief is available under certain circumstances, I do not believe it litigant’s rights cross the entire Court for the foreseeable future. That portion of the motion will be denDie. dD wisitmhoisusta pl rWejiutdhi coer tWo iDthefoeuntd Parnet jtuod riecfei le before a District Judge.
OrHdainlea vri. lKyi, n“ga court should grant a pro se party every reasonPaebñlae vo. pUpnoitretdu nSittayt etso amend,” , 642 F.3d 492, 503 n.36 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting , 157 F.3d 984, 987 n.3 (5Idt.h Cir. 19s9e8e) a),l s“ou nPlreiscse it is obvious from the record that the plaintiff has pled his best case.” at 503; , 2020 WL 1638376, at *5. Klein filed with his Complaint twelve (12) exhibits thOaptp toostiatilo 1n2 t1o Mpaogteiosn. t(oR Decis. mdioscs. 1). He then filed ten (10) exhibits that total 82 pages in his . (Rec. doc. 22). He has had the benefit of oral argument and thereafter filed two more pleadings totaling some 480 pages. (Rec. doc. 28, 31). Despite these prolix filings, the precise bases for his claim for
damages against Judge Medley remain in turns vague, conclusory, and rambling. Moreover, Klein spends most of his Complaint and other filings complaining about the actions of GirodLoanCo and its counsel, as well as his representation of non-parties in other related litigation, Regina Heisler and the Pittmans, neither of whom are parties even toP otshte- AUrngduemrleynint gO bMsaetrtveart.i o nEsven after the presentation of oral argument and the filing of , Klein does not suggest how he could ever amend the substance of his allegations to cure the jurisdictional defects discussed above. These are not curable defects in tEh.e CMooutrito’ns vtioe wSt.a y Discovery
Because the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims and is dismissing this matter, the Motion to Stay Discovery will be denied as moot. IV. CONCLUSION
For reasons known only to him, Mr. Klein has decided to forego the appellate processes in state court and resort to this Court to redress his grievances against a state-
court judge who did no more than rule against him in her court. Following oral argument, it is clear he seeks to substitute this Court’s jurisdiction for a state-court appeal of the rulings he objects to. These statements are telling: THE COURT: I'm going to ask you a question again: Why didn't you appeal any of these orders? Henson v. Santander MR. KLEIN: I have seen -- I've been before 50 state judges who have not -- who have not enforced . I've been before 50 state court judges.
THE COURT: You're going to tell me that you think it was a waste of time.
MR. KLEIN: Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes, I am. I have told you.
. . . .
MR. KLEIN: I am seeking what the United States Supreme Court called prompt succor in a court that is capable of giving me prompt succor. I have said often -- and I have said to you, Your Honor -- filing matters in the Fourth Circuit – state court of appeals is a vain and useless thing.
MR. KLEIN: I do not have to tilt at windmills, Your Honor. I don't.
(Rec. doc. 35 (Transcript) at 13, 19-20)(emphasis added). Klein’s belief – no matter how sincerely held – that his appellate efforts would be unsuccessful is not an excuse to run to federal court with a lawsuit against the state district 5 judge who ruled against him. This is an inappropriate and unavailing gambit, which should come as no surprise to any lawyer with even a basic understanding of the concepts of federalism and comity. His words reveal that Klein is apparently not one of those lawyers: Comity and federalism are, of course, very important. But NOT when the state court proceedings are NOT " . . . judpiaciraeln . s. .p" aatnrdia ae multibillion dollar fleecing of Louisiana citizenry is taking place unchecked. This Court of law and order has a responsibility to take command and protect the vulnerable.
(Rec. doc. 22 at 8). The Court begs to differ. Comity and federalism are bedrock principles and are always important – and they do not allow or require this Court to “take command” of an ongoing state-court proceeding to protect a litigant who won’t even avail himself of available state appellate processes. What they require is dismissal of this case. FITo rI Sth OeR foDrEeRgoEiDng reasons, GRANTED that the Motion to DDisImSMissIS oSnE SB eWhaITlf HoOf JUuTdg PeR JeEnJUniDfeIrC EM6edley (rec. doc. 13) is IN PART. The Court DISMISSES WITH PR pElJaUinDtiIfCf’Es claims against Judge Medley in her official capacity and DENIES Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Medley in her indiviDdEuaNlI EcaSp AacSi tMy.O OThTe Court the request for pre-filing injunction (rec. doc. 13) and the Motion to Stay Discovery. (Rec. doc. 18). 5 The Court does not doubt that Klein sincerely believes that he and his clients have been wronged by the various parties in the related cases and it’s clear that his lack of success in state court has both frustrated him and fueled his increasingly overzealous efforts to seek redress for those alleged wrongs. But too much is too much and suing a presiding state-court judge in federal court rather than using the state appellate process is s6imply beyoMnidtc thheell pv.a Blea. i l ey see also Taylor v. Owens The Fifth Circuit has made clear that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must bHe ammapdteo nw vit. hPoauct. pInrve.j uMdgimcet.. Co. LLC , 982 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2020); , 990 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice); , 869 F.3d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . 23rd October New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2025.
MICHAEL B. NORTH UNIT ED ST ATES M AGIST RATE JUDGE