Lester Bros. v. United States

151 Ct. Cl. 536, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 165, 1960 WL 8461
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 1, 1960
DocketNo. 70-57
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 151 Ct. Cl. 536 (Lester Bros. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lester Bros. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 536, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 165, 1960 WL 8461 (cc 1960).

Opinion

Dueeee, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of tlie court:

The plaintiff is in the business of manufacturing wood products. In December 1950 and January 1951 it entered into two contracts with the Department of the Army for the manufacture of wood desks and tables. The contracts were terminated by the defendant as to the desks for default in delivery in September 1951 and the plaintiff alleges a series of arbitrary and capricious actions: in the termination itself, in the manner of procuring replacement contracts, and in the appellate decision of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. The Government incurred excess replacement costs in reletting the contracts which costs were withheld from monies otherwise due the plaintiff. Plaintiff’s claim in this action is for the recovery of that amount.

Plaintiff filed two appeals to the Under Secretary of the Army from the contracting officer’s notices of termination. This was the first such action although the contracting officer had thrice previously ordered partial termination of the desk contracts. These appeals offered reasons why the plaintiff believed that its default in delivery was excusable. Supplementary appeals complained that the contracting officer ought to have permitted the plaintiff to continue to deliver notwithstanding the decision to terminate.

The two contracts were similar in all significant aspects. The disputes clause provided that the contractor could appeal within 30 days from a decision of the contracting officer to the Secretary of the Army and that the decision of the Secretary or his representative would be final and conclusive. During the pendency of the appeals before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, plaintiff claimed, for the first time, that the conduct of defendant’s inspector had baused unforeseeable production delays. This allegation was not made within the 30-day appeal period referred to' in the disputes clause. The appeals board decided in April 19.54 that the termination action was proper, that the assessment of excess costs was proper, and that the Government had hot failed to minimize damages.

In view of plaintiff’s allegations of arbitrary and capricious conduct by the contracting officer and by the appeals board, and since the appeals board found the termination [538]*538to have been correct in law, we have granted the plaintiff a trial de novo. See Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321, 322 (1958 Ed.) ; Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 638 (1956) ; P.L.S. Coat & Suit Corp. v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 296 (1960). As a result, we have before us not merely the administrative record but all of the pertinent facts of this case.

We believe that the evidence before us conclusively establishes the soundness of the appeals board decision, that the decision to terminate the contracts was legally correct in view of the admitted default, and that none of the actions taken by the Government, particularly in the termination and reletting of the contracts, was arbitrary or capricious.

There is no question that plaintiff was in serious default in delivery on all phases of its contracts on the date that the desks were ordered fully terminated. Plaintiff alone was responsible for this situation and its default cannot be characterized as excusable. Plaintiff’s president and a draftsman employed by the company misinterpreted the contract specifications and a large quantity of desks were produced according to outmoded specifications before this error was discovered. Meanwhile, this log-jam of unacceptable desks forced a slow-down of the entire production line. Before the desks were cleared out of the plant the impairment of plaintiff’s ability to meet delivery schedules had become irreparable.

Plaintiff blames the defendant for not promptly dispatching an inspector to clear the completed items and make room for further production, but we do not think this contention is valid. The contract required the manufacturer to notify the Army when the services of an inspector were required. There is no evidence that Lester Bros, gave any such notification before February 13,1951, the date on which the inspector arrived at the plant. Moreover, when the inspector did arrive, there was nothing he could do to expedite Government acceptance of the desks on hand since it was quite clear to all parties that they failed to meet specifications. It took about a month for change orders to be issued which would have rendered these desks acceptable and by the [539]*539time they were issued the plaintiff had already disposed of most, if not all, of the finished desks.

In addition to the production stoppage because of the backlog of unacceptable desks, the record shows that plaintiff’s president listed several factors which he believed excused the delay. They were: the changeover from civilian production, the acquisition and installation of new machinery, and delay in the delivery of hardware. None of these factors are attributable to the actions of the defendant.

The defendant suggests that plaintiff has waived its right to complain that the inspection procedures of the Government’s representative contributed to the delays since this complaint was not made within the 30-day appeals period of the contract. We are not prepared to say that this constitutes a failure to exhaust an administrative remedy since the appeals from the termination action on other grounds were certainly timely. Had no timely appeal been pursued at all, we might be required to decide otherwise. In any event, it appears that this ground for appeal was before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals when it considered this case. As a matter of evidence, however, the only delays caused by defendant’s inspectors occurred when they rejected items which did not meet the contract specifications, a condition to acceptance on which they had every right to insist.

In view of the fact that the contract items were urgently required for support of the United States’ efforts in the defense of the [Republic of Korea, we are of the view that the defendant’s method of procuring replacement contracts was not imprudent. It was necessary to obtain quick delivery of the desks and it was only natural for the defendant to attempt to make up for lost time by contracting the work originally given to the plaintiff to a number of manufacturers. To have advertised for bids in the same manner as it had originally done, would have cost the defendant additional delay. Furthermore, in the first instance, solicitation from a very large number of manufacturers had elicited responses from less than one percent. Yet when replacement contractors were sought, seven out of about a dozen contacts replied. The contracting officer acted judiciously in re-[540]*540letting the contracts, yet he was also more than fair with the plaintiff. He permitted plaintiff to make some additional deliveries of desks even after the date of the termination.

It is our conclusion that the Government legally terminated the contracts at issue, and no arbitrary action has been shown in connection with the termination or reletting. Furthermore, the defendant did not fail to minimize its damages and the reletting procedures and the excess costs resulting therefrom were proper. Consequently, the plaintiff’s petition must be dismissed.

It is so ordered.

Laramore, Judge;

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Golden Eagle Refining Co. v. United States
31 Cont. Cas. Fed. 72,190 (Court of Claims, 1984)
H & H Manufacturing Co. v. United States
168 Ct. Cl. 873 (Court of Claims, 1964)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
151 Ct. Cl. 536, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 165, 1960 WL 8461, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lester-bros-v-united-states-cc-1960.