Leon v. Boise State University

870 P.2d 1324, 125 Idaho 365, 1994 Ida. LEXIS 37

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: March 21, 1994
• Docket: 20491
• Status: Published

Opinions

JOHNSON, Justice.

This is a public employment case, arising out of the decision of Boise State University (BSU) to issue a “terminal contract,” rather than a “renewal contract,” to a faculty member.

We conclude that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing the faculty member’s claims for breach of contract, denial of due process of law, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with contract.

I.

THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.

In August 1985, Manuel Leon was hired by BSU as an assistant professor in the psychology department (the department) pursuant to a one year contract. BSU renewed Leon’s employment each year, through the 1990-1991 school year, by means of a one-year contract.

The BSU faculty handbook (the handbook) provides that the department chair shall provide for an annual performance evaluation of all official faculty members of the department. The chair must send a copy of the final evaluation to the faculty member by April 1, covering the faculty member’s performance during the previous calendar year.

The handbook also provides that faculty members become eligible to apply for tenure during the fifth year of service, and that all faculty members must apply for tenure no later than during the seventh year of service. The state board of education (the state board) policies require that no later than the seventh full year of a faculty member’s employment, the faculty member must be evaluated for tenure. IDAPA 08.00.B.10,1.

The “tenure guidelines” that applied to the department in 1990 provided that faculty members were required to apply for tenure no later than during their sixth year of employment.

In the summer of 1990, Dr. Linda Anooshian, chair of the department, sent a memorandum to Leon suggesting that he submit tenure materials that fall for consideration by the department. Anooshian said in this memorandum:

In putting these materials together for you, I was surprised to find that, in the 1984 guidelines, application for tenure was not required until the seventh year (rather than the sixth year, as in current policy). Hence, although I would not recommend it, you could technically delay your application for tenure until your seventh year. Also, although the 1984 policy suggests other options, you should understand that a failure to achieve tenure would lead to a terminal contract for the following year.

In an affidavit submitted in this lawsuit, Leon states that following receipt of this memo, he met with Anooshian to discuss the timing of his tenure application and that he informed Anooshian that for “personal and professional” reasons he did not want to submit his tenure materials until the fall of 1991. Leon further states: “I believe Dr. Anooshian understood my intention regarding my application for tenure because she specifically agreed that I could wait until the Fall of 1991 to apply for tenure; she clearly understood and agreed that I would submit my tenure materials at that time.”

In a deposition taken in this lawsuit, Anooshian states that Leon indicated to her after receiving the memo that he planned to submit materials for tenure consideration. According to Anooshian, it was several months later when Leon communicated to her that he wished to delay his tenure application until the fall of 1991. Anooshian states that she cautioned Leon against such a delay and that she informed Leon she anticipated problems with his tenure application.

In late October or early November 1990, Anooshian met with the departmental personnel committee (the committee) to discuss Leon’s performance and to consider issuing him a terminal contract. The committee reached a tentative decision to recommend that BSU issue a terminal contract to Leon for the ensuing academic year. On November 28, 1990, Anooshian advised Leon about the committee’s tentative conclusions regarding his 1991-1992 employment contract. She also invited Leon to submit to her by January 10, 1991, any additional materials that he would like the committee to consider.

In his affidavit, Leon states that during the fall of 1990 he was not told that his performance was being reviewed or that a terminal contract was being considered. Furthermore, Leon states that he was not provided an opportunity to participate in the review process. Leon also notes that he was unable to provide Anooshian with any supporting materials during the fall “due to the demands of fulfilling my professional duties and due to health problems stemming from severe allergies.”

In early January 1991, Leon wrote to Richard L. Hart, dean of the BSU college of education, expressing his displeasure with Anooshian’s “unscheduled review” and asking Hart to mediate his dispute with Anooshian. Hart advised Leon that he was “completely willing to receive and carefully consider any materials which [Leon] wish[ed] to supply which would assist [Hart] in making a decision [regarding a terminal contract].” Leon subsequently submitted materials to Hart for this purpose. In late February, however, Hart advised Leon by written memorandum that, after considering Leon’s materials and Anooshian’s recommendations, he had chosen to recommend to BSU’s executive vice president, Larry Selland, that Leon’s 1991-1992 contract be a terminal contract.

Leon wrote to Selland expressing his concerns with the review process and met with Selland on April 9,1991. According to Leon, Selland informed him that it would be difficult to overturn the negative recommendations from Anooshian and Hart. Several weeks later, Selland telephoned Leon and told him that he had spoken with Anooshian and had decided not to reverse Anooshian’s recommendation to issue Leon a terminal contract. Selland forwarded his recommendation regarding the terminal contract to the BSU president for official action.

Leon subsequently received a terminal contract for the 1991-1992 academic year, which he signed under protest and returned to BSU along with a “Notice of Claim for Breach of Contract and Tort Damages.”

Several months before the expiration of his terminal contract, Leon sued BSU and Anooshian, alleging: (1) BSU and Anooshian breached his employment contract by issuing a terminal contract; (2) BSU and Anooshian violated his civil rights by denying him equal protection, procedural, and substantive due process; (3) BSU and Anooshian breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by issuing a terminal contract motivated by personal antagonism or callous disregard of the truth; and (4) Anooshian, individually, intentionally interfered with Leon’s employment relationship with BSU by conducting a “special review” in derogation of BSU’s established employment policies and procedures.

Acting on a motion for summary judgment filed by BSU and Anooshian, the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing Leon’s claims. Leon appealed.

II.

THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LEON’S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM.

Leon asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether BSU and Anooshian breached his employment contract by conducting a “special review” which resulted in a decision to issue a terminal contract. We disagree.

Leon focuses his argument on the following policy of the state board that governs faculty evaluations at BSU:

Each year the chairman of a department must submit to the dean of the chairman’s college an evaluation of each faculty member in the department. This evaluation, together with the opinion of higher administrators, will be used as one basis for the final recommendation relative to reappointment [or] nonreappointment ...

IDAPA 08.00.B.13,1.

In Leon’s view, this policy prohibited Anooshian from reviewing Leon’s performanee between annual reviews. This overlooks, however, the fact that the policies and procedures of the state board also require that a faculty member receive twelve months’ notice of a contract non-renewal. IDAPA 08.00.B.12. Leon’s interpretation would prevent BSU from making any employment decisions except in the context of an annual review. Additionally, the state board’s policies and procedures also provide that the employment of a faculty member who has not attained tenure is subject to non-renewal with or without cause. Id. Pursuant to these state board policies and procedures, BSU had the authority to terminate Leon prior to his attaining tenure by giving him twelve months’ notice.

Leon also contends that BSU breached a promise Anooshian made to him. He states in his affidavit that Anooshian “specifically agreed that [he] could wait until the Fall of 1991 to apply for tenure ...”

The fundamental problem with this claim is that the policies of the state board that apply to BSU provide: “Any commitment to employ a nontenured member of the faculty beyond the period of his or her current appointment is wholly ineffective without prior approval of the Board.” IDAPA 08.00.B.10. There is no evidence that the state board approved employment of Leon beyond his annual contract. Therefore, even if Anooshian had promised Leon that he could defer his tenure application until the seventh year, this would have been an unauthorized act and wholly ineffective.

III.

THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LEON’S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.

Leon asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether BSU and Anooshian breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by issuing a terminal contract “motivated by personal antagonism or callous disregard of the truth, as regards [Leon’s] conduct.” We disagree.

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing applied by the Court to employment contracts or relationships provides that “any action which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit or right which either party has in the employment contract, whether express or implied, is a violation of the covenant____” Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 627, 778 P.2d 744, 749 (1989) (plurality opinion), reaffirmed in Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 669, 799 P.2d 70, 75 (1990).

Leon’s 1990-1991 contract was completed according to its terms, as was his 1991-1992 terminal contract. The opportunity to apply for tenure is not a benefit or right guaranteed to Leon by his one-year employment contracts. In Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Idaho 298, 300, 766 P.2d 768, 770 (1988), the Court ruled that express contract terms are not overridden by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

IV.

THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LEON’S CLAIM FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH HIS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

Leon asserts that there is a factual issue whether Anooshian intentionally interfered with Leon’s employment contract. We disagree.

Leon characterizes Anooshian’s tortious interference as her “avoidance of established procedural mechanisms in recommending that [Leon] be issued a terminal contract.”

In Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 123 Idaho 650, 851 P.2d 946 (1993), the Court noted that “a party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract,” and that “an agent is only liable for actions which are outside its scope of duty to the [principal].” Id. at 654, 851 P.2d at 950.

In his complaint, Leon does not allege that Anooshian took any actions that were outside her capacity as department chair. In fact, Leon alleges that “at all times pertinent hereto ... [Anooshian was] acting within the scope of her employment as Chair of the Psychology Department____” Also, the facts asserted in conjunction with the motion for summary judgment indicate, without dispute, that Anooshian acted within the scope of her duties as department chair in reviewing Leon’s performance in connection with the issuance of the terminal contract.

Leon argues that if Anooshian acted with malice, it does not matter if she also acted within the scope of her employment. Without accepting whether or not this is a limitation on the rule noted in Ostrander, we note that Leon did not allege in his complaint that Anooshian acted with malice toward him nor did he assert any facts in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that would create a genuine issue of material fact concerning malice.

V.

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT CONCERNING LEON’S LACK OF A PROPERTY INTEREST IN HIS EMPLOYMENT.

Leon asserts that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether he had a property interest in his employment that entitled him to the protections of procedural and substantive due process of law pursuant to both the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho State Constitution. We disagree.

Leon’s right to due process before the termination of his employment depends upon whether he had a property interest in his employment. Loebeck v. Idaho State Board of Education, 96 Idaho 459, 461, 530 P.2d 1149, 1151 (1975).

The facts in Leon’s case are very similar to those in Loebeck. Loebeck was a faculty member at Idaho State University (ISU) who was employed for five years by means of five, one-year contracts. In the sixth year, ISU offered Loebeck a terminal contract. Loebeck signed and returned the contract together with a letter from her attorney “advising that by signing the proffered contract she was not waiving or releasing any claim she might have in regard to tenure.” Id. at 460, 530 P.2d at 1150. In affirming the trial court’s decision rejecting Loebeck’s claim that she had a property interest, the Court said:

Nothing in the terms of the year to year contracts entered into between [Loebeck] and [ISU] or in any state statute or university rule or policy conferred on [Loebeck] any legitimate entitlement to tenure. She had nothing more than a hope of receiving tenure. “That hope is not a property right and the frustration of such a hope does not trigger the right to a hearing * * *” Although [Loebeck] had been rehired in consecutive years that did not change her nontenured status. She had only come closer to the time at which a decision had to be made as to granting or non-granting of tenure.

Id. at 461, 530 P.2d at 1151 (citations omitted).

The same analysis applies to Leon’s claim that he had a property interest in his employment. The policies upon which Leon relies to establish his property interest indicate that a tenure award requires affirmative action by the state board and the BSU president. Until Leon acquired tenure, he did not have a property interest in his employment.

VI.

CONCLUSION.

We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment.

We award costs, but not attorney fees, to BSU and Anooshian.

McDEVITT, C.J., and TROUT and SILAK, JJ., concur.