Lektophone Corp. v. Crosley Radio Corp.

46 F.2d 126, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1733
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedFebruary 27, 1928
DocketNo. 404
StatusPublished

This text of 46 F.2d 126 (Lektophone Corp. v. Crosley Radio Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lektophone Corp. v. Crosley Radio Corp., 46 F.2d 126, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1733 (S.D. Ohio 1928).

Opinion

HICKENLOOPER, District Judge.

The present action is the usual suit for infringement of patent.' The two patents in issue are No. 1,271,527 to Hopkins, July 2, 1918, claims 29 and 30, and No. 1,271,529 to Hopkins, July 2, 1918, claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8. Issued on the same day, these patents have been given reverse order in importance, and No. 1,271,529 is spoken of as the first patent and No. 1,271,527, adding an element to the combination claimed in the other, is spoken of as the second patent to Hopkins. It is freely conceded that if patent No. 1,-271,529 is invalid or not infringed, patent No. 1,271,527 must likewise be held invalid or not infringed. The defenses asserted are invalidity and noninfringement.

Both patents cover acoustic or sound-producing means consisting of a diaphragm or tympanum operating directly upon uneonfined air and producing vibrations or sound waves for the reproduction of sound. Both were originally applicable to the reproduction of sound from a phonograph record, the vibrations being transmitted from such record to the diaphragm by sensitive mechanical means. Both use the conical diaphragm in combination with other elements to produce sound waves in the free air as distinguished from the use of sound box and amplifying hom. No outstanding commercial success in connection with the phonograph is shown by the evidence, but, with the development of the radio, the demand for loud-speakers operating in' unconfined air in preference to sound box and hom loud-speakers or earphones, and the use of electromagnetic vibrating means, the patent is now claimed to blanket" the manufacture and use of aE conical loud-speakers of paper in which any means whatever are used at the periphery of the conical portion of the diaphragm to prevent" deformity and resulting irregular and accidental sounds. A precise definition of the scope of the patent monopoly is thus of great commercial importance.

The 'question of validity of the patents in suit has been passed upon by the Circuit Courts of Appeals of the Seeond and Third Circuits, as well as by several District Courts in the issuance of temporary injunctions. See Lektophone Corp. v. Sylo Lighting Fixture Co. (D. C.) 11 F.(2d) 421, 422, and the same case on appeal 16 F.(2d) 7 (C. C. A. 2); Lektophone Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 20 F.(2d) 150 (D. C. N. Y.), same case on appeal 16 F.(2d) 10 (C. C. A. 2); Lektophone Corp. v. Brandes Products Corp., 20 F.(2d) 155,156 (C. C. A. 3), reversing Lektophone Corp. v. Brandes Products Corp., 16 F.(2d) 934 (D. C. N. J.). Under these circumstances the court does not now reexamine the question of validity, but accep+s the conclusion of the eases cited that patent No. 1,271,529 is valid if construed as and limited to a combination comprising three [127]*127elements, viz. (as stated in the Sylo Case): “(a) A large, stiff, light cone of vibratile material, freely exposed to nnconfined air and of sufficient area to impart to the surrounding free air, when vibrated, sound waves substantially corresponding in intensity to the original sound waves; (b) a rigid support; and (c) an annular rim interposed between the rigid support and the conical portion, to maintain the place of the conical active portion, and yield sufficiently to permit the required motion of the conical portion, resisting displacement of the conical portion in just that degree necessary to maintain the form and neutral position of the active conical portion.”

Of the claims in suit, claim 8 offers the best foundation for complainant’s argument and may be quoted as typical: “8. An acoustic device, comprising a tympanum embodying a bodily movable, central conical portion, and an annular rim which encircles said conical portion and which is rigidly supported, said conical portion being freely exposed on all sides to unconfined air and being of sufficient area to produce self-sustaining sound waves in the surrounding air when vibrated, substantially as described.”

This claim and the others, read in the light of the specifications and teachings of Hopkins, fully support the summary of the scope and nature of the patent, in each of the claims of which all three elements of the combination appear either expressly or by necessary implication.

The defendant’s conical loud-speaker consists of a large, stiff, light cone of vibratile material, freely exposed to unconfined air, and of sufficient area to impart to the surrounding free air, when vibrated, sound waves substantially corresponding in intensity to the original sound waves. We therefore have the first element of the combination as summarized. The periphery or base of the cone does not, however, terminate in an annular rim interposed between the rigid support and the conical portion. On the contrary, the cone passes at its periphery or base, loosely and yieldingly, between layers of felt which are affixed to either interior side of a two-piece tubular metallic ring in which a segment is removed for entrance of the cone without touching the metal. The support of the tympanum at its periphery is therefore not rigid in the sense of support between the ponderous rings of the Hopkins patent, and the annular rim of the tympanum is entirely missing unless recourse may he had to the doctrine of mechanical equivalents. The decision of the ease is freely conceded by the complainant to rest upon this question of equivalents.

Counsel for complainant describe the nature of Hopkins’ invention as follows: “It must become apparent that Hopkins’ invention did not reside in the choice of a particular type of flexible connection (viz., between the cone and rigid support), but in the broader concept of a conical paper sound producer of large area acting directly on free air and supported at its edge from a rigid frame by an interposed flexible rim.” “He discovered and disclosed for the first time,” it is urged, “as Judge Buffington said, the combination of a conical shaped paper device of proper size, provided with flexible edges, coupled to a rigid frame used in free air.” Thus it is argued that, this being his concept and contribution to the art, and the description of the annular rim portion of the diaphragm and the express inclusion of this element in each of tho claims being simply the pointing out or description of the “best mode” in which he contemplated applying the principle of his invention, or the preferred form of its embodiment, as required by Rev. St. § 4888 (35 USCA § 33), the patentee would bo entitled under the doctrine of Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, 14 L. Ed. 717, and the eases following it, to that range of equivalents which would protect his. monopoly to the full extent of the advance he has made; that is, the true function of the annular rim being to avoid deformity at the base of the cone and the impure sounds incidental thereto, any means in connection with a paper cone of Hopkins’ dimensions and interposed between the cone and its circular support, which means accomplished the same result as the annular rim, would fall within the scope of equivalents properly to be allowed the patentee.

This would be so provided (1) the form the patentee describes is not, in fact, of the essence of his invention; or (2) he has not expressly limited himself to the form claimed and described; or (3) unless it is necessary to limit him to the specific form in order to save the validity of his patent. All of these exceptions, narrowing the application of the doctrine of equivalents, arise, if at all, when the patentee enters a crowded art, and an examination of the state of the art and the nature of the advance made is therefore of first importance.

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Bluebook (online)
46 F.2d 126, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1733, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lektophone-corp-v-crosley-radio-corp-ohsd-1928.