Leche v. Stautz

386 S.W.2d 872
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 13, 1965
Docket11251
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 386 S.W.2d 872 (Leche v. Stautz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Leche v. Stautz, 386 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965).

Opinions

HUGHES, Justice.

In their original petition appellants, Miles F. Leche and Julian K. Lyles, sued Carl H. Stautz and wife, Paula Stautz, alleging that they, on November 6, 1963, were the owners in fee simple of a tract of land lying in Travis County, Texas, described as follows:

“BEING a tract of land 233 feet by 263 feet out of OUTLOT 18 Division ‘E,’ in the City of Austin, Travis County, Texas, and being the same tract of land which is described in a deed from BERMUDA HOMES, INC. to [873]*873C. H. Stautz dated January 25, 1962, and recorded in Volume 2407, Page 447 of the Deed Records of Travis County, Texas.”

Appellants further alleged that on September 28, 1963, Miles F. Leche “conveyed in writing a definite formal offer to buy the property” described above “to Carl Stautz” and that on September 29, 1963, “a revised offer was sent to appellees.” Appellants alleged that on October 4, 1963, Carl H. Stautz, by telegram, “did convey his formal acceptance of such offer to buy,” and that a valid contract of sale was thereby established. Appellants alleged their willingness and ability to consummate such contract, and that they have demanded performance thereof by appellees who, notwithstanding such demand, have refused to perform their obligations thereunder. Appellants prayed for judgment for the title to and possession of such property and for their damages, and in the alternative that they have specific performance of the contract alleged.

On February 26, 1964, appellees having answered appellants’ suit and having pleaded the Statute of Frauds and Statute of Conveyances, Arts. 3995 and 1288, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Civ.St. respectively, filed a motion for summary judgment. This motion was set for hearing on March 12, 1964, by the Hon. Jack Roberts, Judge of such court. Appellants were duly notified of the motion for summary judgment and the order of the court setting the hearing thereon.

On March 11, 1964, appellants, without having obtained leave of the Court, filed a First Amended Original Petition making additional allegations and adding a new party defendant.

On March 12, 1964, appellees made a motion to strike appellants’ First Amended Original Petititon alleging equitable grounds and noncompliance with Rule 63, Texas Rules Civ.Procedure. The trial court granted this motion.

Appellants’ first two points are to the effect that the trial court erred in striking their amended petition.

Rule 63 provides, in part, that any amended pleading offered for filing within seven days of the date of trial or thereafter shall be filed only after leave of the judge is obtained.

Appellants do not contend that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit them to file their amended pleading and, for this reason, we will not discuss matters relating thereto.

Appellants do contend that a summary judgment proceeding is not a “trial” within the meaning of Rule 63, and that such rule is, therefore, not applicable. We overrule this contention, and these points, upon the authority of McCormick v. Stowe Lumber Company, 356 S.W.2d 450, Austin, Tex.C.C.A., writ ref., n. r. e.

Appellants’ third, and last, point is that the court erred in granting summary take nothing judgment for appellees because “there was a material fact issue presented by the pleadings.”

In their affidavit filed in support of their motion for summary judgment, appellees state that they own in fee simple the property sued for herein and have executed no conveyances of it or any portion of it to appellants or anyone else. They also state that the instruments referred to in appellants’ Original Petition are the following, which we copy in full:

“141P CST SEP 28 63 DA 176 1963 SEP 28 PM 1 49 D LLN118 DL PD DALLAS TEX 28 100P CST CARL STAUTZ 1704 EXPOSITION BLVD AUSTIN TEX SUBJECT TO UNDISCLOSED LIABILITIES OR AN SITUATION WHICH MATERIALLY WOULD EFFECT NORMAL CONSIDERATION OF PURCHASE, ALSO ASSUMING BOARD APPROVAL, [874]*874THIS IS A FIRM OFFER TO BUY CAPABLE OF YOUR ACCEPTANCE. TO-WIT: FOR PURPOSES OF TRANSACTION, EFFECTIVE TERMINAL DATE YOUR OWNERSHIP MISS TEXAS TO BE SEPTEMBER 30 1963 AND BARUCH-FOSTER OWNERSHIP OCTOBER 30 1963. TOTAL SALE PRICE CONSIDERATION TO YOU THE SELLER TO BE $690,-000.00 LESS NINTH MONTH EARNEST DEPOSITS OF $7875.00, MAKING NET SALE PRICE CONSIDERATION TO SELLER $682,-125.00. BUYER TO PAY LYLES AND LECHE SEPARATELY ABOVE THIS FOR SERVICES RENDERED. BUYER WILL ASSUME HOME LIFE AND BANK LOANS TOTALLING $526,000.00. PAYMENT OF YOUR NET $156,-125.00 EQUITY TO BE ALL IN BARUCH-FOSTER COMMON STOCK VALUED FOR TRANSACTION AT $1.00 PER SHARE, WITH REPURCHASE AGREEMENT EXERCISABLE BY BARUCH-FOSTER AT ITS OPTION ANYTIME WITHIN THREE YEARS FROM SALE CLOSE, SUCH REPURCHASE, IF ANY, TO BE AT $2.00 PER SHARE VALUATION. ALL VOTING RIGHTS RESIDING IN YOUR STOCK TO BE CONVEYED FOR THREE YEAR TERM TO BARUCH-FOSTER PROXY. BUYER WILL ARRANGE $50,000.00 LOAN FOR YOU SECURED BY 100,000 SHARES YOUR STOCK, WHICH CASH LOAN PROCEEDS WILL BE PAID YOU AT SALE CLOSE. LOAN TO BE FOR ANY PART THREE YEAR TERM YOU WISH. ESTIMATE WILL REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS TO CLOSE BUT PREPARED TO START LEGAL WORK MONDAY AND EXPEDITE ALL POSSIBLE. IF THIS OFFER IS SATISFACTORY, WIRE ME YOUR IMMEDIATE ACCEPTANCE
MILES F LECHE
954P CST SEP 29 63 DAI 14
1963 SEP 29 PM 10 17 F LSQ230 NL PD DALLAS TEX 29
CARL STAUTZ, DLR DONT PHONE
1704 EXPOSITIONS BLVD AUSTIN TEX
SUBJECT TO UNDISCLOSED LIABILITIES OR ANY SITUATION WHICH WOULD MATERIALLY AFFECT NORMAL PURCHASE CONSIDERATION, ALSO ASSUMING BOARD APPROVAL, THIS IS A FIRM OFFER CAPABLE OF YOUR ACCEPTANCE. TO-WIT: EFFECTIVE TERMINAL DATE YOUR OWNERSHIP MISS TEXAS TO BE OCTOBER 30TH, 1963, WITH UNDERSTANDING YOU WILL COLLECT OCTOBER RENTS BUT PAY CURRENTLY ALL MISS TEXAS OCTOBER OPERATING BILLS, INCLUDING MONTHLY PAYMENT HOME LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND ALL OBLIGATIONS OTHERWISE OUTSTANDING IN ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS, RETAINING FOR YOURSELF THE RESIDUE THEREFROM. TOTAL SALE PRICE CONSIDERATION TO YOU THE SELLER TO BE $690,000 LESS NINTH MONTH EARNEST DEPOSITS OF $7,875, MAKING NET SALE PRICE CONSIDERATION TO SELLER $682,125. BUYER TO PAY LYLES AND LECHE SEPERATELY ABOVE TPIIS FOR SERVICES RENDERED. BUYER WILL ASSUME HOME LIFE AND BANK LOANS AGGREGATING $526,000 MORE OR LESS. PAYMENT OF YOUR NET $156,125 EQUITY TO BE ALL IN BARUCH-FOSTER [875]*875COMMON STOCK, VALUED FOR PURPOSES THIS TRANSACTION AT $1.00 PER SHARE, WITH REPURCHASE AGREEMENT EXERCISABLE AT ITS OPTION BY BARUCH-FOSTER OR ITS PROXY ANYTIME WITHIN THREE YEARS FROM SALE CLOSING, SUCH REPURCHASE, IF ANY, TO BE AT $2.00 PER SHARE VALUATION. ALL VOTING RIGHTS RESIDING IN YOUR STOCK TO BE CONVEYED FOR THREE YEAR TERM TO BARUCH-FOSTER PROXY. BUYER WILL ARRANGE $50,000 BANK LOAN FOR YOU SECURED BY 75,000 SHARES YOUR STOCK, WHICH CASH LOAN PROCEEDS WILL BE PAID YOU ON SIGNING CONTRACT AT SALE CLOSING. LOAN TO BE FOR ANY PART THREE YEAR TERM YOU WISH. IN VIEW LEGAL WORK, ABSTRACTS, ET CETERA, INVOLVED, WILL START ATTORNEYS WORKING MONDAY TO EXPEDITE CLOSING ALL POSSIBLE SPEED IF THIS OFFER SATISFACTORY AND YOU WIRE ME YOUR ACCEPTENCE FORTHWITH. “
MILES F. LECHE”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Nairn v. Killeen Independent School District
366 S.W.3d 229 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2012)
Phyllis Nairn v. Killeen I.S.D.
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2012
Nichols v. Bridges
163 S.W.3d 776 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Paul Reed and Deborah Marino v. Barry Kagan
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003
Rose v. Kober Financial Corp.
874 S.W.2d 358 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1994)
Hubert v. Illinois State Assistance Commission
867 S.W.2d 160 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Love v. Sneed
802 S.W.2d 422 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Goswami v. Metropolitan Savings & Loan Ass'n
751 S.W.2d 487 (Texas Supreme Court, 1988)
Dallas Symphony Ass'n v. Dallas County Appraisal District
695 S.W.2d 595 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1985)
Gallegos v. Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
550 S.W.2d 350 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1977)
Bruce v. McAdoo
531 S.W.2d 354 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1975)
Jones v. Houston Materials Company
477 S.W.2d 694 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1972)
Dunlap-Swain Tire Co. v. Simons
450 S.W.2d 378 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1970)
Medina v. Sherrod
391 S.W.2d 66 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1965)
Leche v. Stautz
386 S.W.2d 872 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1965)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
386 S.W.2d 872, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leche-v-stautz-texapp-1965.