Leach v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Leach v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company

324 S.E.2d 494, 172 Ga. App. 785, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2663

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedNovember 6, 1984

Docket68268

StatusPublished

Cited by14 cases

This text of 324 S.E.2d 494 (Leach v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Leach v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 324 S.E.2d 494, 172 Ga. App. 785, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2663 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).

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Opinions

McMurray, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from the dismissal with prejudice of a civil action. The order dismissing the case reads as follows: “The above case having come on regularly for trial on August 15, 1983, after having been published as provided by law, and no appearance having been made, the plaintiff’s complaint in the above action is hereby ordered and adjudged, dismissed with prejudice for want of prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) upon motion duly made by counsel of record for the defendant at the call of said case for trial.” Held:

Previously, under former Code Ann. § 81A-141 (b) (now OCGA § 9-11-41 (b), effective November 1, 1982), a dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute was discretionary and was subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion. Spyropoulos v. John Linard Estate, 243 Ga. 518, 519 (255 SE2d 40) (1979).

However, on November 1, 1982, OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) became effective and applies to the case sub judice. In pertinent part, that Code section provides that: “For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with this chapter or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him . . . The effect of dismissals shall be as follows: (l) A dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute does not operate as an adjudication upon the merits; and (2) Any other dismissal under this subsection and any dismissal not provided for in this Code section, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, does operate as an adjudication upon the merits unless the court in its order for dismissal specifies otherwise.” (Emphasis supplied.) Since a dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute does not operate as an adjudication upon the merits, it follows that such a dismissal cannot be with prejudice. See generally Trice v. Howard, 234 Ga. 189 (214 SE2d 907) (1975), which applied former Code Ann. § 81A-141 (b) applicable at that point in time.

In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice “for want of prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41 (b).” On and after November 1, 1982, when OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) became effective, a dismissal with prejudice for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is not authorized and the trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice the plaintiff’s action.

Judgment reversed.

Deen, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur. [786]*786Gregory T. Presmanes, for appellee.

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McMurray, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from the dismissal with prejudice of a civil action. The order dismissing the case reads as follows: “The above case having come on regularly for trial on August 15, 1983, after having been published as provided by law, and no appearance having been made, the plaintiff’s complaint in the above action is hereby ordered and adjudged, dismissed with prejudice for want of prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) upon motion duly made by counsel of record for the defendant at the call of said case for trial.” Held:

Previously, under former Code Ann. § 81A-141 (b) (now OCGA § 9-11-41 (b), effective November 1, 1982), a dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute was discretionary and was subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion. Spyropoulos v. John Linard Estate, 243 Ga. 518, 519 (255 SE2d 40) (1979).

However, on November 1, 1982, OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) became effective and applies to the case sub judice. In pertinent part, that Code section provides that: “For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with this chapter or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him . . . The effect of dismissals shall be as follows: (l) A dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute does not operate as an adjudication upon the merits; and (2) Any other dismissal under this subsection and any dismissal not provided for in this Code section, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, does operate as an adjudication upon the merits unless the court in its order for dismissal specifies otherwise.” (Emphasis supplied.) Since a dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute does not operate as an adjudication upon the merits, it follows that such a dismissal cannot be with prejudice. See generally Trice v. Howard, 234 Ga. 189 (214 SE2d 907) (1975), which applied former Code Ann. § 81A-141 (b) applicable at that point in time.

In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice “for want of prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41 (b).” On and after November 1, 1982, when OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) became effective, a dismissal with prejudice for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is not authorized and the trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice the plaintiff’s action.

Judgment reversed.

Deen, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur. [786]*786Gregory T. Presmanes, for appellee.

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324 S.E.2d 494, 172 Ga. App. 785, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2663, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leach-v-aetna-casualty-surety-company-gactapp-1984.

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