Lavi v. Talwar

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 16, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-10948
StatusUnknown

This text of Lavi v. Talwar (Lavi v. Talwar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lavi v. Talwar, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PIERRE LAVI, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-10948 (LTS) PUNEET TALWAR; GENERAL ORDER TO AMEND MANAGER, BANK CENTRAL POPULAIRE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Pierre Lavi brings this action on his own behalf and as “the Owner of Turbo Dynamics Corporation.” By order dated January 18, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff Pierre Lavi’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 As explained below, as a non-attorney proceeding pro se, Pierre Lavi cannot represent Turbo Dynamics Corporation. Turbo Dynamics Corporation also cannot proceed as a plaintiff without prepayment of the filing fees. See Rowland v. CA Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993) (holding that only natural persons can proceed pro se). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Pierre Lavi resides in Huntington, New York, in Suffolk County, and he provides an address for Turbo Dynamics Corporation at the same address.2 He makes the following allegations: My company, Turbo Dynamics Corporation, a manufacturing company of gas turbines and jet engine blades for over 40 years was defrauded as Defendants . . .

2 Plaintiff also uses the names Parviz Lavi and Peter Lavi. committed mail and wire fraud against . . . a United States citizen and their company . . . .[T]he top management of ONEE, the largest government agency in Morocco, . . . decided to enrich themselves by not allowing Turbo Dynamics to receive payment for the transfer of technology and shipment of their machineries to Morocco.

(ECF 1 at 1.) Plaintiff states that “[t]his is an action to recover the balance of the money due to undersigned owed by ONEE. The last payment received from Banque Centrale Populaire de Morocco (BCP) was in the amount of $39,913.19 on 12/02/2020.” (Id. at 2.) He attaches to the complaint a document that appears to indicate that a wire from originator ONEE Branche Electricite, was sent from originator’s bank, BCP, to beneficiary Turbo Dynamics Corporation, at Bank of America. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff contends that “[a] governmental authority committed fraud against undersigned . . . as they violated United States mail and wire fraud [and] are subject to criminal investigation of United States postal services located at Chicago, Illinois.” (Id.) Plaintiff repeatedly refers to harms against the “undersigned” and he signs the document as “Pierre Lavi, Owner, Turbo Dynamics Corporation.” (Id.) Plaintiff brings this suit for damages against Defendants Puneet Talwar, an American diplomat serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Morocco; and BCP, the bank that ONEE Branche Electricite used for its wire transfer. 3 DISCUSSION A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available

3 Plaintiff has also brought other similar suits. See Lavi v. BNP Paribas, No. 1:22-CV- 06922 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 12, 2022); Lavi v. Sonelgaz Group of Companies, No. 22-CV- 7514 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2023) (dismissed with 30 days’ leave to replead). only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[A]ny party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local

919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative.”). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 1.

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Bluebook (online)
Lavi v. Talwar, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lavi-v-talwar-nysd-2023.