OPINION
BILL J. CORNELIUS, Commissioner.
Conviction was for passing a forged instrument. The punishment, assessed by the court at appellant’s election, was five years confinement.
The indictment charged that appellant had passed to Don Neece a forged check dated March 23, 1972, drawn on the Carpet Mart through the Lakewood Bank, payable to appellant in the sum of $92.46, numbered 1114 and purportedly signed by Dan E. Butler.
The State proved by Martin Morachnick, President of the Carpet Mart, that on the 18th or 19th of March 1972 his business was burglarized and a “book of checks” on the Lakewood Bank and a checkwriting machine were taken. He further said that the account at the Lakewood Bank had been closed and not used for a year or more but that a few days after the burglary he began receiving calls from numerous stores about checks being presented to them for payment. He testified that he was called to a Sears store on March 24, 1972, where a man he identified as appellant was being detained by a security guard. He identified State’s Exhibit No. 1 (the check specified in the indictment) and another check, State’s Exhibit No. 2, as being checks taken in the burglary, and stated that he had never had anyone by the name of Dan E. Butler working for him and that no one other than himself was authorized to sign checks for his company. The State also produced Frank Collins, an employee of Sears’ Valley View store. He testified that on the evening of March 24, 1972, the appellant attempted to cash State’s Exhibit No. 2, which was a check (not specified in the indictment) drawn on the Carpet Mart through the Lakewood Bank, dated March 24, 1972, numbered 1148, payable to appellant in the sum of $172.40 and purportedly signed by Dan E. Butler. The check was not accepted, but the police were called and appellant was arrested. The State also produced Don Neece, who testified that he worked for the Sears store in Mesquite and that on March 23, 1972, the night before appellant attempted to cash State’s Exhibit No. 2 when he was arrested, the appellant actually cashed State’s Exhibit No. 1 (the check specified in the indictment), and that it was later learned that the check was a forgery.
Thus, it is seen that State’s Exhibit No. 2 was evidence of an extraneous offense. Appellant’s objection on that ground was overruled by the trial court, and the State introduced both Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 into evidence. This was done at a time when appellant had offered no testimony and the State’s witness had positively identified appellant as the party who cashed the check specified in the indictment. After the State rested, the appellant testified. [117]*117He denied that he cashed Exhibit Number 1. He admitted attempting to cash Exhibit Number 2, but he claimed it was given to him as wages for laying carpet for the Carpet Mart under the supervision of Dan E. Butler.
Appellant urges five grounds of error. Ground No. 1 is multifarious, but in the interest of justice has been considered. In that ground appellant complains, among other things, of the introduction of State’s Exhibit No. 3 into evidence. That exhibit was a check also drawn on the Carpet Mart through the Lakewood Bank. It was payable to appellant in the sum of $92.46 and purported to be signed by Dan E. Butler. It was numbered 1151 and was dated March 23, 1972.
When it was offered and admitted into evidence, State’s Exhibit No. 3 was not identified in any way. It was merely shown to the appellant, who was then testifying, accompanied by this comment of the prosecuting attorney: "I guess the clerk that turned in Exhibit 3 was also mistaken?" Appellant did not identify Exhibit 3 and gave no testimony about it, except to concede that someone had placed his name and driver’s license and social security numbers on it. The State offered no testimony or proof whatever as to where the check came from, in whose possession it had been, whether or not it had ever been passed or attempted to be passed by anyone, who had put the information on it, or whether it had ever been paid. It was simply admitted into evidence and exhibited to the jury without any explanation whatever as to its relevancy or as to any connection whatever with the appellant. Appellant’s objection on these grounds was overruled. Previously, in response to appellant’s motion made prior to the trial for the discovery and inspection of documents, the State’s counsel had produced and exhibited only two checks, presumably State’s Exhibits 1 and 2, stating that, “I will let you see both checks that we have.” When Exhibit 3 was introduced in evidence, however, appellant objected only on the ground of lack of identification and of proper predicate.
Even if this case was a proper one for the admission of extraneous offenses or acts on the part of the appellant, State’s Exhibit No. 3 must have been identified and its relevancy demonstrated before it was admissible. McCormick & Ray on Texas Evidence, Sec. 1481, and cases there cited; Sec. 2103, Note 3, and cases there cited. It was incumbent upon the State to prove that such exhibit was a forgery and that appellant was connected with it. Verner v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 112, 35 S.W.2d 428; Laudermilk v. State, 47 Tex.Cr.R. 427, 83 S.W. 1107; Cox v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 368 S.W.2d 600; Reyes v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 82, 353 S.W.2d 450; Olivio v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 182; Carmean v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 218, 290 S.W.2d 240. No proof of any kind was made with regard to State’s Exhibit No. 3.
As authority for the admission of the check, the State cites Vandall v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 438 S.W.2d 578, which held that three checks which were within the numerical range of a series of checks which the accused had stolen, and which were signed and endorsed the same way as the check which the accused had passed, with his driver’s license and social security numbers written on the back, were sufficiently connected with the accused to be admissible. The facts in that case are close to those here, but that case is distinguished from this case in that it appears that the checks there had been identified by a witness as having been passed and presented for payment at about the time the check specified in the indictment had been passed. In the case at bar no witness gave testimony of any kind concerning Exhibit No. 3. There is no indication in the record where the check came from or who had it. Except for a stamped notation on the back, which would be hearsay (Holland v. State, 108 Tex.Cr.R. 615, 2 S.W.2d 248; Freeman v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 158, 147 S.W.2d 1095; Buckner v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 321, 72 S.W.2d 274), there is no indi[118]*118cation in the record if it had ever been paid or presented for payment anywhere by anyone. It was simply introduced into evidence (together with the prosecutor’s reference to facts not in evidence) without proof or attempted explanation, for the jury to speculate about.
Apart from the question of relevancy, if evidence is to be admitted in a trial without any authentication or identifying testimony whatsoever, it would open the door to the easy fabrication or manufacture of evidence and possibly lead to serious injustices.
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OPINION
BILL J. CORNELIUS, Commissioner.
Conviction was for passing a forged instrument. The punishment, assessed by the court at appellant’s election, was five years confinement.
The indictment charged that appellant had passed to Don Neece a forged check dated March 23, 1972, drawn on the Carpet Mart through the Lakewood Bank, payable to appellant in the sum of $92.46, numbered 1114 and purportedly signed by Dan E. Butler.
The State proved by Martin Morachnick, President of the Carpet Mart, that on the 18th or 19th of March 1972 his business was burglarized and a “book of checks” on the Lakewood Bank and a checkwriting machine were taken. He further said that the account at the Lakewood Bank had been closed and not used for a year or more but that a few days after the burglary he began receiving calls from numerous stores about checks being presented to them for payment. He testified that he was called to a Sears store on March 24, 1972, where a man he identified as appellant was being detained by a security guard. He identified State’s Exhibit No. 1 (the check specified in the indictment) and another check, State’s Exhibit No. 2, as being checks taken in the burglary, and stated that he had never had anyone by the name of Dan E. Butler working for him and that no one other than himself was authorized to sign checks for his company. The State also produced Frank Collins, an employee of Sears’ Valley View store. He testified that on the evening of March 24, 1972, the appellant attempted to cash State’s Exhibit No. 2, which was a check (not specified in the indictment) drawn on the Carpet Mart through the Lakewood Bank, dated March 24, 1972, numbered 1148, payable to appellant in the sum of $172.40 and purportedly signed by Dan E. Butler. The check was not accepted, but the police were called and appellant was arrested. The State also produced Don Neece, who testified that he worked for the Sears store in Mesquite and that on March 23, 1972, the night before appellant attempted to cash State’s Exhibit No. 2 when he was arrested, the appellant actually cashed State’s Exhibit No. 1 (the check specified in the indictment), and that it was later learned that the check was a forgery.
Thus, it is seen that State’s Exhibit No. 2 was evidence of an extraneous offense. Appellant’s objection on that ground was overruled by the trial court, and the State introduced both Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 into evidence. This was done at a time when appellant had offered no testimony and the State’s witness had positively identified appellant as the party who cashed the check specified in the indictment. After the State rested, the appellant testified. [117]*117He denied that he cashed Exhibit Number 1. He admitted attempting to cash Exhibit Number 2, but he claimed it was given to him as wages for laying carpet for the Carpet Mart under the supervision of Dan E. Butler.
Appellant urges five grounds of error. Ground No. 1 is multifarious, but in the interest of justice has been considered. In that ground appellant complains, among other things, of the introduction of State’s Exhibit No. 3 into evidence. That exhibit was a check also drawn on the Carpet Mart through the Lakewood Bank. It was payable to appellant in the sum of $92.46 and purported to be signed by Dan E. Butler. It was numbered 1151 and was dated March 23, 1972.
When it was offered and admitted into evidence, State’s Exhibit No. 3 was not identified in any way. It was merely shown to the appellant, who was then testifying, accompanied by this comment of the prosecuting attorney: "I guess the clerk that turned in Exhibit 3 was also mistaken?" Appellant did not identify Exhibit 3 and gave no testimony about it, except to concede that someone had placed his name and driver’s license and social security numbers on it. The State offered no testimony or proof whatever as to where the check came from, in whose possession it had been, whether or not it had ever been passed or attempted to be passed by anyone, who had put the information on it, or whether it had ever been paid. It was simply admitted into evidence and exhibited to the jury without any explanation whatever as to its relevancy or as to any connection whatever with the appellant. Appellant’s objection on these grounds was overruled. Previously, in response to appellant’s motion made prior to the trial for the discovery and inspection of documents, the State’s counsel had produced and exhibited only two checks, presumably State’s Exhibits 1 and 2, stating that, “I will let you see both checks that we have.” When Exhibit 3 was introduced in evidence, however, appellant objected only on the ground of lack of identification and of proper predicate.
Even if this case was a proper one for the admission of extraneous offenses or acts on the part of the appellant, State’s Exhibit No. 3 must have been identified and its relevancy demonstrated before it was admissible. McCormick & Ray on Texas Evidence, Sec. 1481, and cases there cited; Sec. 2103, Note 3, and cases there cited. It was incumbent upon the State to prove that such exhibit was a forgery and that appellant was connected with it. Verner v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 112, 35 S.W.2d 428; Laudermilk v. State, 47 Tex.Cr.R. 427, 83 S.W. 1107; Cox v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 368 S.W.2d 600; Reyes v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 82, 353 S.W.2d 450; Olivio v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 182; Carmean v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 218, 290 S.W.2d 240. No proof of any kind was made with regard to State’s Exhibit No. 3.
As authority for the admission of the check, the State cites Vandall v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 438 S.W.2d 578, which held that three checks which were within the numerical range of a series of checks which the accused had stolen, and which were signed and endorsed the same way as the check which the accused had passed, with his driver’s license and social security numbers written on the back, were sufficiently connected with the accused to be admissible. The facts in that case are close to those here, but that case is distinguished from this case in that it appears that the checks there had been identified by a witness as having been passed and presented for payment at about the time the check specified in the indictment had been passed. In the case at bar no witness gave testimony of any kind concerning Exhibit No. 3. There is no indication in the record where the check came from or who had it. Except for a stamped notation on the back, which would be hearsay (Holland v. State, 108 Tex.Cr.R. 615, 2 S.W.2d 248; Freeman v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 158, 147 S.W.2d 1095; Buckner v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 321, 72 S.W.2d 274), there is no indi[118]*118cation in the record if it had ever been paid or presented for payment anywhere by anyone. It was simply introduced into evidence (together with the prosecutor’s reference to facts not in evidence) without proof or attempted explanation, for the jury to speculate about.
Apart from the question of relevancy, if evidence is to be admitted in a trial without any authentication or identifying testimony whatsoever, it would open the door to the easy fabrication or manufacture of evidence and possibly lead to serious injustices. It would have been simple for anyone to write appellant’s name and place his driver’s license and social security number on the back of the check, and thus incriminate him and bolster the charge against him falsely, even though the check might never have been in his possession or had never been cashed or presented for payment anywhere. Had the handwriting been compared, or had the check been identified as having been in possession of the appellant, or as one of those stolen from the Carpet Mart, or as being one either passed or attempted to be passed by someone, we would have had an entirely different situation. Then the additional facts showing that it was payable to appellant, signed by Dan E. Butler, and had appellant’s name, driver’s license number and social security number on the back, would, in a proper case where intent is an issue, sufficiently connect appellant to it that the jury could have inferred guilty intent or unlawful scheme and design because the jury could deem it inconsistent with appellant’s innocence for him to have signed his name to such a. check, or to have had possession of it, or for anyone other than himself to pass a check made payable to and endorsed by him. Albrecht v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 486 S.W.2d 97. But there was no such identification or proof of relevancy here.
Having totally failed to identify State’s Exhibit 3 or to show that it had any relevance to appellant’s actions or intent, the State should not have been allowed to introduce it into evidence and exhibit the same to the jury for their speculation. In the case of Tomlinson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 474, very similar action was held to be prejudicial error requiring reversal, even though the trial court there later withdrew the unidentified check from evidence and instructed the jury not to consider it. Neither was done in the case at bar. See Lucas v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 378 S.W.2d 340. For the error noted, the case is reversed and remanded for a new trial. Appellant’s other grounds of error are not reached.
Opinion approved by the Court.