Lamoria v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.

Michigan Court of Appeals

Lamoria v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.

593 N.W.2d 699, 233 Mich. App. 560

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedApril 5, 1999

DocketDocket 199795

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 593 N.W.2d 699 (Lamoria v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lamoria v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 593 N.W.2d 699, 233 Mich. App. 560 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinions

Per Curiam.

This Court convened this special panel under MCR 7.215(H)(3) to resolve the conflict between the prior vacated opinion in this case, Lamoria v Health Care & Retirement Corp, 230 Mich App 801; 584 NW2d 589 (1998), and Rymar v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 190 Mich App 504; 476 NW2d 451 (1991), regarding the “reasonable time to heal” doctrine under the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq.

The original Lamoria panel, in compliance with MCR 7.215(H)(1), followed this Court’s holding in Rymar that an employee who on the date of his discharge is unable to perform the requirements of his job because of a disability may still have a claim under the hcra if he would have regained the capacity to do the work within a reasonable time. If not for the precedential effect of Rymar, the Lamoria majority¹ would have affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendants regarding plaintiff’s HCRA claim. We agree with the Lamoria majority and hold for the reasons it expressed that the hcra does not require that an employer allow a disabled employee a reasonable time to heal. We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition regarding plaintiff’s HCRA claim. In all other respects, we adopt the opinion of the prior Lamoria panel as our own.

[563]*563Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, may tax costs under MCR 7.219.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Per Curiam.

This Court convened this special panel under MCR 7.215(H)(3) to resolve the conflict between the prior vacated opinion in this case, Lamoria v Health Care & Retirement Corp, 230 Mich App 801; 584 NW2d 589 (1998), and Rymar v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 190 Mich App 504; 476 NW2d 451 (1991), regarding the “reasonable time to heal” doctrine under the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq.

The original Lamoria panel, in compliance with MCR 7.215(H)(1), followed this Court’s holding in Rymar that an employee who on the date of his discharge is unable to perform the requirements of his job because of a disability may still have a claim under the hcra if he would have regained the capacity to do the work within a reasonable time. If not for the precedential effect of Rymar, the Lamoria majority¹ would have affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendants regarding plaintiff’s HCRA claim. We agree with the Lamoria majority and hold for the reasons it expressed that the hcra does not require that an employer allow a disabled employee a reasonable time to heal. We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition regarding plaintiff’s HCRA claim. In all other respects, we adopt the opinion of the prior Lamoria panel as our own.

[563]*563Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, may tax costs under MCR 7.219.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

593 N.W.2d 699, 233 Mich. App. 560, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lamoria-v-health-care-retirement-corp-michctapp-1999.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack