LaFrance v. Lodmell

144 A.3d 373, 322 Conn. 828, 2016 Conn. LEXIS 247

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decided: September 6, 2016
• Docket: SC19614, SC19615
• Status: Published

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J.

This consolidated appeal arises from a marital dissolution action brought by the plaintiff, Joan LaFrance, against the defendant, Dean W. Lodmell. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court improperly: (1) applied General Statutes § 46b-66 (c) to an agreement to arbitrate contained within a prenuptial agreement between the parties and limited arbitration to the sale of a jointly owned residential property (residence); (2) denied the defendant's request for leave to file an amended cross complaint to assert certain claims against the plaintiff in the dissolution action; and (3) confirmed the arbitration awards where the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority and the scope of the submission. We reject the defendant's claims and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the defendant's appeal. "In contemplation of marriage, the parties entered [a prenuptial agreement] on November 22, 2000. They were married on November 25, 2000. Neither party contests the enforceability of the [prenuptial] agreement. On March 15, 2010 ... an action for dissolution of marriage [was commenced]. [The agreement to arbitrate in] the [prenuptial] agreement provides: 'In the event of any dispute hereunder, such dispute shall be resolved by first submitting the matter to mediation. If mediation fails, then the matter shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.' ... [The trial court] ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration on the matter of 'the sale of the [residence] ... and what procedures are to be followed, and what proceeds each party is entitled to from a sale.' " Lodmell v. LaFrance, 154 Conn.App. 329 , 330-31, 107 A.3d 975 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 921 , 107 A.3d 959 (2015).

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's order and the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. Id., at 331, 107 A.3d 975 . On November 16, 2011, the Appellate Court granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. Id. In October, 2012, the parties participated in a three day hearing before an arbitrator, Donna M. Wilkerson, who issued "a partial award on November 9, 2012, which was modified on December 17, 2012, and a final award on December 17, 2012...." Id.

On December 30, 2013, the trial court rendered judgment confirming the partial arbitration award and confirming in part, modifying in part, and vacating in part the final arbitration award, from which the defendant appealed. Thereafter, on April 3, 2014, the defendant filed a request for leave to file an amended answer and cross complaint in the present case, which was denied. On January 15, 2015, the trial court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage, allocating property, interpreting the prenuptial agreement and deciding all pending motions. The defendant then filed a second appeal. These two appeals were then consolidated and transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 and Practice Book § 65-1. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly applied § 46b-66 (c) to the agreement to arbitrate contained within the prenuptial agreement. Specifically, the defendant asserts that § 46b-66 (c) applies only to an agreement to arbitrate that has been entered into after an action for dissolution has been filed. The defendant further claims that, even if § 46b-66 (c) applies to agreements to arbitrate contained in prenuptial agreements, the trial court improperly contravened the terms of the prenuptial agreement in the present case by limiting the scope of the arbitration. In response, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court properly applied § 46b-66 (c) to the agreement to arbitrate in the prenuptial agreement. The plaintiff further asserts that the trial court properly found, pursuant to § 46b-66 (c), that it would not be " 'fair and equitable under the circumstances' " to require the parties to arbitrate claims for damages that were not allowed by the prenuptial agreement. We agree with the plaintiff.

A

The resolution of whether § 46b-66 (c) applies to an agreement to arbitrate in a prenuptial agreement presents an issue of statutory construction. 2 In conducting this analysis, "we are guided by the well established principle that [i]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.... We are also guided by the plain meaning rule for statutory construction. See General Statutes § 1-2z." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cales v. Office of Victim Services, 319 Conn. 697 , 701, 127 A.3d 154 (2015).

Section 46b-66(c) provides: "The provisions of chapter 909 shall be applicable to any agreement to arbitrate in an action for dissolution of marriage under this chapter, provided (1) an arbitration pursuant to such agreement may proceed only after the court has made a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that (A) each party entered into such agreement voluntarily and without coercion, and (B) such agreement is fair and equitable under the circumstances, and (2) such agreement and an arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall not include issues related to child support, visitation and custody. An arbitration award in such action shall be confirmed, modified or vacated in accordance with the provisions of chapter 909." 3

The statutory language provides no express guidance as to whether the legislature intended for it to apply to agreements to arbitrate that are entered into as part of a prenuptial agreement. The legislature's use of the term " any agreement" rather than the term " an agreement," however, strongly suggests an intent to include all agreements to arbitrate matters related to dissolutions of marriage. See, e.g., Dowling v. Slotnik, 244 Conn. 781 , 802, 712 A.2d 396 (use of term " 'any person' " indicative of legislature's intent to include all persons), cert. denied sub nom. Slotnik v. Considine, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998).

The defendant asserts, however, that the use of the phrase "in an action for dissolution" limits the applicability of § 46b-66 (c) to only those agreements to arbitrate that are entered into after an action for dissolution has been filed and, therefore, excludes agreements to arbitrate that are entered into as part of prenuptial agreements. We disagree. There is nothing in the plain language of the statute that indicates that § 46b-66 (c) applies only to an agreement to arbitrate that is entered into after an action for dissolution has been filed. To the contrary, the broad language of § 46b-66 (c)

includes "any agreement to arbitrate in an action for dissolution...." Agreements to arbitrate contained in prenuptial agreements, like the agreement to arbitrate in the present case, are by definition agreements to arbitrate issues that would only arise once the parties are involved "in an action for dissolution...." General Statutes § 46b-66 (c).

If the legislature intended to exclude agreements to arbitrate that are contained within prenuptial agreements, it could have expressly done so. "[I]t is a well settled principle of statutory construction that the legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly ... or to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses to do so." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 309 Conn. 608 , 618, 72 A.3d 394 (2013) ; see also Gould v. Freedom of Information Commission, 314 Conn. 802 , 818, 104 A.3d 727 (2014). Indeed, the legislature did use limiting language elsewhere in § 46b-66 (c), when it provided that "such agreement and an arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall not include issues related to child support, visitation and custody." The use of such limiting language in other portions of § 46b-66 (c) is further indication that if the legislature had intended to exclude agreements to arbitrate contained in prenuptial agreements it could have done so.

Furthermore, reading § 46b-66 (c) in relationship to the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part lends additional support to our understanding that § 46b-66 (c) covers all agreements to arbitrate controversies between parties to a marriage, regardless of when the parties entered into that agreement. "In seeking to determine [the] meaning [of a statute, § 1-2z ] directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 321 Conn. 805 , 816, 139 A.3d 585 (2016).

It is important to recognize that § 46b-66 (c) explains the conditions under which agreements to arbitrate between parties to a marriage are governed by the provisions of chapter 909 of the General Statutes; see General Statutes § 52-406 et seq. ; which contains the procedures governing arbitration. Therefore, before chapter 909 can apply to an agreement to arbitrate between parties to a marriage, it must meet the requirements set forth in § 46b-66 (c). In turn, chapter 909 also explains what agreements to arbitrate are governed by its provisions. Specifically, General Statutes § 52-408 provides in relevant part: "[A]n agreement in writing between two or more persons to submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement to submit, or an agreement in writing between the parties to a marriage to submit to arbitration any controversy between them with respect to the dissolution of their marriage, except issues related to child support, visitation and custody, shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, except when there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of written contracts generally." In reading these two statutes together, "[w]e are ... guided by the principle that the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law.... [T]his tenet of statutory construction ... requires us to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter.... Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute ... we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Styslinger v. Brewster Park, LLC, 321 Conn. 312 , 317, 138 A.3d 257 (2016). Accordingly, because these two statutes are designed to relate to the same subject matter, we read them to operate harmoniously. Indeed, it is important to note that the relevant provisions within §§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408 were both adopted by the legislature in 2005. See Public Acts 2005, No. 05-258, §§ 1 and 2. Therefore, we conclude that § 46b-66 (c) explains that if a court finds an agreement to arbitrate fair and equitable, it will be subject to the provisions of chapter 909. In turn, § 52-408 includes agreements to arbitrate between parties to a marriage in those agreements to arbitrate that are governed by chapter 909, subject to the court's finding that the agreement to arbitrate is fair and equitable. 4 We reject the interpretation proposed by the defendant because it leads to absurd and unworkable results. "It is axiomatic that [w]e must interpret the statute so that it does not lead to absurd or unworkable results." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, 314 Conn. 709 , 723, 104 A.3d 671 (2014) ; see also State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622 , 710, 998 A.2d 1 (2010) ("it is axiomatic that 'those who promulgate statutes ... do not intend ... absurd consequences or bizarre results' ").

The reading of § 46b-66 (c) proposed by the defendant and the concurring and dissenting opinion would mean that any agreement to arbitrate that is entered into as part of a prenuptial agreement is not afforded the protections of § 46b-66 (c) and, accordingly, would make such prenuptial agreements less desirable. Such a result is contrary to the public policy of this state regarding prenuptial agreements, which has been previously recognized by this court. "[R]ecent statistics on divorce have forced people to deal with the reality that many marriages do not last a lifetime. As desirable as it may seem for couples to embark upon marriage in a state of optimism and hope, the reality is that many marriages end in divorce. There is a growing trend toward serial marriage; more people expect to have more than one spouse during their lifetime.... [B]oth the realities of our society and policy reasons favor judicial recognition of prenuptial agreements. Rather than inducing divorce, such agreements simply acknowledge its ordinariness. With divorce as likely an outcome of marriage as permanence, we see no logical or compelling reason why public policy should not allow two mature adults to handle their own financial affairs.... The reasoning that once found them contrary to public policy has no place in today's matrimonial law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bedrick v. Bedrick, 300 Conn. 691 , 698-99, 17 A.3d 17 (2011). In light of this state's policy, which favors recognizing prenuptial agreements, it would not be reasonable to conclude that the legislature would have intended to exclude parties who enter into agreements to arbitrate contained within prenuptial agreements from the protections afforded by § 46b-66 (c). Moreover, the position advocated by the defendant and the concurring and dissenting opinion would allow parties that enter into an agreement to arbitrate one day prior to the filing of an action for dissolution of marriage to be subject to a different standard for enforcement of that agreement-namely, unconscionability and contractual defenses-while parties who enter into the same agreement one day after an action for dissolution has been filed receive the greater protections afforded by the standard of "fair and equitable" under § 46b-66 (c). It is not reasonable to think that the legislature intended to afford parties who agree to arbitrate controversies related to dissolution different protections based solely on when they entered into that agreement.

Furthermore, the defendant's interpretation of § 46b-66 (c) is also inconsistent with prior judicial interpretations of the statute. In Budrawich v. Budrawich, 156 Conn.App. 628 , 648-49, 115 A.3d 39 , cert. denied, 317 Conn. 921 , 118 A.3d 63 (2015), the Appellate Court concluded that "[p]ursuant to ... § 46b-66 (c), parties may agree, with the court's permission, to pursue arbitration to resolve certain issues related to their dissolution. A court does not, however, have the authority to order parties to submit such issues to arbitration absent a voluntary arbitration agreement executed between the parties. 'Arbitration is a creature of contract and without a contractual agreement to arbitrate there can be no arbitration.... [T]he basis for arbitration in a particular case is to be found in the written agreement between the parties.' ...

Young v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Conn.App. 107 , 115-16, 758 A.2d 452 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 906 , 762 A.2d 912 (2000). 'Parties who have contracted to arbitrate certain matters have no duty to arbitrate other matters which they have not agreed to arbitrate. Nor can the courts, absent a statute, compel the parties to arbitrate those other matters.' American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178 , 185, 530 A.2d 171 (1987)." (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) These prior judicial interpretations of § 46b-66 (c) are consistent with our understanding of that statute as applying to all agreements to arbitrate between parties to a marriage, regardless of when the parties enter into those agreements. 5

The defendant and the concurring and dissenting opinion urge this court to interpret § 46b-66 (c) as applying only to agreements to arbitrate issues related to dissolution proceedings that are entered into after an action for dissolution has been filed, and not those entered into within prenuptial agreements. That interpretation is inconsistent with the language of § 46b-66 (c) and prior judicial interpretations of the statute that recognize that the legislature intended to give the trial court the authority to oversee agreements to arbitrate matters related to dissolution proceedings.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly applied § 46b-66 (c) to the agreement to arbitrate contained in the prenuptial agreement in the present case.

B

The defendant next claims that, even if § 46b-66 (c) applies to agreements to arbitrate contained within prenuptial agreements, the trial court improperly applied that statute in the present case. Specifically, the defendant claims that § 46b-66 (c) requires the trial court to determine only whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate voluntarily and without coercion and whether that agreement, as a whole, is fair and equitable under the circumstances. The defendant asserts that, in the present case, the trial court improperly applied § 46b-66 (c) so as to limit the scope of the issues that were submitted to arbitration pursuant to the prenuptial agreement. 6 In response, the plaintiff claims that the trial court properly applied § 46b-66 (c) in the present case. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the trial court properly determined the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate and properly determined that it would be fair and equitable to arbitrate only those issues that were within the scope of the parties' agreement. We agree with the plaintiff.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. "The well settled standard of review in domestic relations cases is that this court will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court has abused its legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in the facts.... As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case.... Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494 , 502, 927 A.2d 894 (2007), quoting Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729 , 739, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994). In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.... Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733 , 740, 785 A.2d 197 (2001). Notwithstanding the great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a trial court's ruling ... may be reversed if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies the wrong standard of law. Borkowski v. Borkowski, supra [at] 740 [ 638 A.2d 1060 ]. See In re T.K., 105 Conn.App. 502 , 506, 939 A.2d 9 ( [t]he application of a statute to a particular set of facts is a question of law to which we apply a plenary standard of review), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 914 , 945 A.2d 976 (2008) ; Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350 , 357, 710 A.2d 717 (1998) (interpretation of statutory scheme that governs child support determinations constitutes question of law)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuckman v. Tuckman, 308 Conn. 194 , 200, 61 A.3d 449 (2013).

In the present case, the trial court determined as follows: "The prenuptial agreement between the parties dated November 22, 2000, addresses the disputed claims of the parties [regarding the sale of joint assets].... [The prenuptial agreement] ... specifically addresses arbitration. The only matter in dispute for arbitration is the sale of the [residence] ... and what procedures are to be followed, and what proceeds each party is entitled to from a sale." On the basis of this determination, the trial court submitted only that one issue to the arbitrator. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation. In her motion for articulation, the plaintiff asked the following: "Having found in pertinent part that: 'the only issue in dispute for arbitration is the sale of the [residence]' ... did the [trial] court conclude based on its interpretation and construction of [the prenuptial] agreement ... that the relief 'fixed,' 'limited,' and agreed upon between these parties did not include damages?" (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) In framing this question, the plaintiff then quoted the following language from the prenuptial agreement: "Whereas, the parties, to promote marital tranquility, desire to fix, limit, and determine by this [a]greement the interest, rights, and claims that may accrue to each of them in the property and estate of the other by reason of their marriage or in the event of marital difficulties herein referred to, and to accept the provisions of this [a]greement in lieu and in full discharge, settlement, and satisfaction, of any and all interests, rights, and claims that otherwise each might or could have under the law, in and to the property and estate of the other, both before and after the other's death...." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In response to the plaintiff's question, the trial court answered as follows: "Granted."

In doing so, the trial court followed the requirements of § 46b-66 (c). Specifically, the trial court engaged in a thorough inquiry into the agreement of the parties. Indeed, in its memorandum of decision, the trial court explained that "[t]he parties ... have agreed that the [prenuptial] agreement between them is in full force and effect." The trial court further explained that, on the basis of the prenuptial agreement, specifically the provision related to the sale of joint assets and the agreement to arbitrate, it was appropriate to submit the matter of the sale of the residence to the arbitrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court implicitly determined, in accordance with § 46b-66 (c), that applying the agreement to arbitrate to the sale of the residence was fair and equitable under the circumstances.

As the trial court explained in response to the plaintiff's motion for articulation, it had determined, after a thorough inquiry of the parties' agreement to arbitrate, that claims for damages arising out of the marriage were barred under the prenuptial agreement. We agree with the trial court's interpretation of the prenuptial agreement and, therefore, conclude that the trial court properly refused to submit any claims for damages to the arbitrator. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly applied § 46b-66 (c) to the facts of present case.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for leave to file an amended answer and cross complaint. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his request for leave to file an amended cross complaint in which he asserted eight claims that were not submitted to the arbitrator. In response, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for leave to file an amended answer and cross complaint. The plaintiff claims that the trial court properly precluded the defendant's request to raise claims for damages based on the law of the case because the trial court had previously determined that the prenuptial agreement barred claims for damages. The plaintiff further asserts that the trial court properly denied the defendant's request to amend because it was untimely and any amendment at that point would have been prejudicial to the plaintiff. We agree with the plaintiff.

On April 3, 2014, the defendant filed a request for leave to file an amended answer and cross complaint. The defendant asserted eight claims that he was not able to raise in the arbitration proceeding because they were not contained within the arbitration order entered by the trial court. In his proposed amended cross complaint, the defendant sought to assert the following claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) civil theft; (3) conversion; (4) violation of General Statutes § 53a-250 et seq., which governs computer crimes; (5) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant sought compensatory damages; treble damages under General Statutes § 52-564 ; double damages under General Statutes § 47a-46 ; treble damages under General Statutes § 52-570b (c) ; punitive damages; indemnification; and attorney's fees. The defendant also demanded a jury trial.

The plaintiff objected to the defendant's request, claiming that it was barred by the trial court's memorandum of decision dated September 2, 2011, and the arbitration submission contained therein. The plaintiff also asserted that the trial court's articulation, in which the trial court clarified that it had previously determined that the prenuptial agreement barred any claims for damages related to the dissolution proceeding, should be determinative of any inquiry.

The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and, accordingly, denied the defendant's request for leave to file an amended answer and complaint. In doing so, the trial court explained that the "ruling of September 2, 2011, as clarified [in the articulation of] November 16, 2011, is the law of the case." The trial court further explained that "[i]nterspousal tort and contract claims" are "more appropriately pursued in a separate civil action."

We begin by setting forth the standard of review applicable to the defendant's claim. "Our standard of review ... is well settled. While our courts have been liberal in permitting amendments ... this liberality has limitations. Amendments should be made seasonably.

Factors to be considered in passing on a motion to amend are the length of the delay, fairness to the opposing parties and the negligence, if any, of the party offering the amendment.... The motion to amend is addressed to the trial court's discretion which may be exercised to restrain the amendment of pleadings so far as necessary to prevent unreasonable delay of the trial.... Whether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. This court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a proposed amendment unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.... It is [the] burden [of the party proposing the amendment] to demonstrate that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.... That an amendment would confuse the issues in the case also supports a trial court's decision to deny permission to amend a complaint or special defense." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 312 Conn. 714 , 759, 95 A.3d 1031 (2014).

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for permission to amend his pleadings to assert additional claims against the plaintiff. First, the defendant's motion was filed approximately two and one-half years after the trial court had determined the issue to submit to the arbitrator, and more than one and one-half years after the parties' arbitration hearing. Second, the defendant's motion was filed approximately three months before the parties' dissolution trial. The defendant's cross complaint and the related defenses would have raised many complex issues, which would have required motions and discovery. Therefore, granting the defendant's request to amend at such a late stage would have significantly delayed the trial and prejudiced the plaintiff. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's request to amend. See Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225 , 257-58, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006) ("[b]ecause the trial court reasonably could have concluded that granting the plaintiff's request to file a second amended complaint would have delayed the trial and prejudiced the defendants, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff's request" [footnote omitted] ).

Furthermore, as the trial court explained, the defendant could have filed a separate civil action to raise his claims against the plaintiff. Even if claims were not released in the prenuptial agreement, this court has recognized that, "a final decree of divorce is res judicata with respect to all issues which were, or could have been, litigated in the proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loughlin v. Loughlin, 280 Conn. 632 , 645, 910 A.2d 963 (2006). "[I]n Delahunty [ v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 236 Conn. 582 , 583-84, 674 A.2d 1290 (1996) ], we created an exception to the rule of res judicata by concluding that the doctrine did not preclude the plaintiff's tort action against her former spouse even though the alleged conduct occurred during the marriage and she had made her claims at the dissolution proceeding.... After considering the purposes of res judicata, we concluded that the doctrine should not require parties to bring tort actions based on claims that arise during a marriage in the dissolution proceeding and that 'because there are significant differences between a tort action and a dissolution action, the maintenance of a separate tort action will not subject the courts and the defendant to the type of piecemeal litigation that the doctrine was intended to prevent.' ... Specifically, we relied on the fact that '[a] tort action, the purpose of which is to redress a legal wrong by an award of damages, is not based on the same underlying claim as an action for dissolution, the purpose of which is to sever the marital relationship ... and to divide the marital estate.' " (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446 , 467-68, 998 A.2d 766 (2010). 7 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for leave to file an amended answer and cross complaint.

III

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly confirmed the partial award of the arbitrator and improperly confirmed in part and modified in part the final award of the arbitrator. 8 Specifically, the defendant asserts that the arbitrator exceeded her authority and the scope of the submission by issuing orders in contravention of the express terms of the prenuptial agreement. 9 In response, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court properly confirmed the partial award of the arbitrator and properly confirmed in part and vacated in part the final award of the arbitrator because the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of her authority under this unrestricted submission. We agree with the plaintiff.

Our analysis of the defendant's claim is guided by the well established principles of law governing arbitration. "Arbitration is a creature of contract and the parties themselves, by the terms of their submission, define the powers of the arbitrators." Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401 , 403, 407 A.2d 1013 (1979) ; see also United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hutchinson, 244 Conn. 513 , 519, 710 A.2d 1343 (1998). "The authority of an arbitrator to adjudicate the controversy is limited only if the agreement contains express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review. In the absence of any such qualifications, an agreement is unrestricted. Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16 , 20, 453 A.2d 1158 (1983) ; Bic Pen [Corp.] v. Local No. 134, 183 Conn. 579 , 584-85, 440 A.2d 774 (1981) ; Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Police Local 1159, 183 Conn. 102 , 106-107, 438 A.2d 1171 (1981)." Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1 , 5, 612 A.2d 742 (1992).

"Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution. Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., 238 Conn. 293 , 304, 680 A.2d 1274 (1996). Under an unrestricted submission, [an arbitrator's] decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the [arbitrator] nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact. American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, [supra, 205 Conn. at 186 , 530 A.2d 171 ]; Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 189 Conn. at 19 , 453 A.2d 1158 . The resulting award can be reviewed, however, to determine if the award conforms to the submission. Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. at 4 , 612 A.2d 742 . Such a limited scope of judicial review is warranted given the fact that the parties voluntarily bargained for the decision of the arbitrator and, as such, the parties are presumed to have assumed the risks of and waived objections to that decision.... It is clear that a party cannot object to an award which accomplishes precisely what the [arbitrator was] authorized to do merely because that party dislikes the results.... American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, supra, at 186-87, 530 A.2d 171 . The significance, therefore, of a determination that an arbitration submission was unrestricted or restricted is not to determine what [the arbitrator is] obligated to do, but to determine the scope of judicial review of what [he or she has] done. Put another way, the submission tells [the arbitrator] what [he or she is] obligated to decide. The determination by a court of whether the submission was restricted or unrestricted tells the court what its scope of review is regarding the [arbitrator's] decision." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hutchinson, supra, 244 Conn. at 519-20, 710 A.2d 1343 ; see also Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 258 Conn. 101 , 109-10, 779 A.2d 737 (2001).

In the present case, the defendant asserts that the submission to the arbitrator was restricted, and that, therefore, the appropriate standard of review is de novo. In support of his claim that the submission is restricted, the defendant relies on the fact that the trial court determined that "[t]he only matter in dispute for arbitration is the sale of the [residence] ... and what procedures are to be followed, and what proceeds each party is entitled to from a sale." We disagree.

This court has previously considered whether a submission is unrestricted because it requires an arbitrator to address only one issue. In Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., supra, 258 Conn. at 112-13, 779 A.2d 737 , this court rejected the claim that the use of the terms " 'the sole issue' " or " 'the sole purpose' " supported a claim that the parties intended to form a restricted submission. This court reasoned as follows: "[The plaintiff] also relies on the references in [a] settlement agreement to 'the sole issue' to be determined and 'the sole purpose' of the ... arbitration to support its claim that the parties intended to form a restricted submission. That reliance is misplaced. A 'submission is unrestricted unless otherwise agreed by the parties.' Bennett v. Meader, [ 208 Conn. 352 , 363, 545 A.2d 553 (1988) ]. We are not persuaded that the mere inclusion of the word 'sole' in the settlement agreement evidences the parties' intent to form a restricted submission. Although the references to the 'sole question' and the 'sole issue' resemble 'language restricting the breadth of issues'; Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. at 5 , 612 A.2d 742 ; if we were to adopt [the plaintiff's] argument that the parties' submission is restricted because it required the arbitration panel to address only one question, many otherwise unrestricted submissions to arbitration would be transformed into restricted ones. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hutchinson, supra, 244 Conn. at 521-22, 710 A.2d 1343 (whether plaintiff 'legally entitled to recover damages' pursuant to language of insurance policy created unrestricted submission); Bic Pen Corp. v. Local No. 134, supra, 183 Conn. at 581-85, 440 A.2d 774 ('whether the [plaintiff] violated ... relevant provisions of the collective bargaining agreement by failing to distribute overtime equally among all toolmakers' constituted unrestricted submission)." Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., supra, at 112-13, 779 A.2d 737 .

Like the submissions in Industrial Risk Insurers, the submission in the present case did not contain any conditional language. The submission here required the arbitrator to determine the procedures for the sale of the residence and the proceeds to be paid by and to each party. The fact that the trial court limited the issue to be decided by the arbitrator to one issue did not render the submission a restricted one. Accordingly, we conclude that the submission to the arbitrator in the present case was unrestricted.

"The well established general rule is that [w]hen the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties' agreement. American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, [supra, 205 Conn. at 185 , 530 A.2d 171 ].

When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission. Hartford v. Board of Mediation & Arbitration, 211 Conn. 7 , 14, 557 A.2d 1236 (1989) ; New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, 208 Conn. 411 , 415-16, 544 A.2d 186 (1988). Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution. Garrity v. McCaskey, [supra, 223 Conn. at 4-5 , 612 A.2d 742 ]. Furthermore, in applying this general rule of deference to an arbitrator's award, [e]very reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the [arbitral] award and of the arbitrators' acts and proceedings.... Metropolitan District Commission v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 184, 237 Conn. 114 , 119, 676 A.2d 825 (1996)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35 , 43-44, 757 A.2d 501 (2000).

"When the parties have agreed to a procedure and have delineated the authority of the arbitrator, they must be bound by those limits. Waterbury Board of Education v. Waterbury Teachers Assn., [ 168 Conn. 54 , 62, 357 A.2d 466 (1975) ]. An application to vacate or correct an award should be granted where an arbitrator has exceeded his power. In deciding whether an arbitrator has exceeded his power, we need only examine the submission and the award to determine whether the award conforms to the submission. New Britain v. Connecticut State Board of Mediation & Arbitration, 178 Conn. 557 , 562, 424 A.2d 263 (1979) ; Board of Education v. Bridgeport Education Assn., 173 Conn. 287 , 291, 377 A.2d 323 (1977).

"A challenge of the arbitrator's authority is limited to a comparison of the award to the submission....

Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the [arbitrator's] decision of the legal questions involved. Meyers v. Lakeridge Development Co., 173 Conn. 133 , 135, 376 A.2d 1105 [ (1977) ]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bic Pen Corp. v. Local No. 134, supra, 183 Conn. at 584, 440 A.2d 774 . The party challenging the award bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to demonstrate a violation of General Statutes § 52-418. See Metropolitan District Commission v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 184, supra, 237 Conn. at 119 , 676 A.2d 825 .

With these legal principles in mind, we examine whether the award conformed to the submission in the present case. As this court has previously explained, the submission consists "of a composite of the authorizing clause in the separation agreement and the ... demand for arbitration, including ... claim[s] for relief...." (Footnote omitted.) Masters v. Masters, 201 Conn. 50 , 71, 513 A.2d 104 (1986). Therefore, in the present case, the submission includes the prenuptial agreement and the trial court's memorandum of decision, which determined that "[t]he only matter in dispute for arbitration is the sale of the [residence] ... and what procedures are to be followed, and what proceeds each party is entitled to from a sale."

The defendant first claims that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority by awarding the plaintiff certain maintenance expenses and other costs associated with the residence from July, 2012 through November, 2012, plus interest.

The following additional facts are necessary for the resolution of this claim. The parties were initially scheduled to proceed to arbitration on August 27, 2012. On June 25, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to suspend deadlines in the arbitration proceeding so that he could obtain new counsel. On June 29, 2012, the defendant's counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and requested a four week continuance of all deadlines. On July 2, 2012, the arbitrator granted the defendant's request for counsel to withdraw and for a continuance pursuant to the following interim order: "By granting the [defendant's] continuance, the [plaintiff] is further burdened by having to continue to incur [the] costs of maintaining the [residence]. Pursuant to the [prenuptial] [a]greement ... the parties agreed that they would act in good faith and would deal ' fairly toward the other pursuant to this agreement.' ... In order to ensure fairness to both parties with regard to the present dispute, which deals primarily with the sale of the [residence], the [defendant] shall take over the costs of maintaining the [residence] by paying the mortgage, [homeowners] insurance, real estate taxes, and external grounds maintenance.... [T]he [defendant] shall bear the costs of the maintenance of the [residence] as stated ... until either [residence] is sold or the arbitration hearing is completed, whichever occurs first." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted.)

In August, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel, which the arbitrator granted. Specifically, the arbitrator ordered the defendant to provide "full reimbursement" to the plaintiff for the costs incurred in maintaining the residence since July 2, 2012. At the time of the arbitration hearing in October, 2012, the residence had not yet been sold. In November, 2012, the arbitrator issued the partial arbitration award, which confirmed her interim order and required the defendant to pay the expenses for the residence from July, 2012 through October, 2012. In addition, the partial arbitration award ordered the defendant to pay $9649.02 in maintenance and costs for November, 2012. The partial arbitration award also ordered the defendant to pay statutory interest of 10 percent per annum on these sums beginning on the date of its issuance.

In her motion to compel, the plaintiff also sought attorney's fees pursuant to the prenuptial agreement. As grounds for the attorney's fees, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant had failed to comply with the partial arbitration award, requiring the plaintiff to file the motion to confirm. The arbitrator granted the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees in the final arbitration award, requiring the defendant to pay $8403.75 plus interest of 10 percent per annum from the date of its issuance.

The defendant asserts that the arbitrator acted beyond the scope of her authority in requiring the defendant to contribute to the maintenance of the residence from June, 2012 through November, 2012, and by awarding the plaintiff interest and attorney's fees. We disagree. As the arbitrator recognized, the prenuptial agreement provided that the parties would act in good faith and would deal " fairly toward the other pursuant to this agreement." (Emphasis added.) The arbitrator interpreted this provision in the submission to authorize payment of expenses incurred by the plaintiff related to the residence caused by the delay of the arbitration hearing, which was requested by the defendant. As we have explained previously herein, "[w]here the submission does not otherwise state, the [arbitrator is] empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or the interpretation of the agreement by the [arbitrator] was erroneous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Masters v. Masters, supra, 201 Conn. at 72 , 513 A.2d 104 . Because the submission in the present case contains no limitations on the power of the arbitrator to interpret the agreement, "[t]o the extent that the defendant claims that the arbitrator misapplied or overlooked part of the agreement, then appellate review is foreclosed." Id., at 72-73, 513 A.2d 104 . Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority by ordering the defendant to pay expenses relating to the maintenance of the residence for the period of time that the arbitration hearing was delayed at the defendant's request. B

The defendant also claims that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority by awarding the plaintiff $45,000, which represents $3000 per month for the common household expenses for the fifteen months prior to the notice of separation, in the final arbitration award because "the [defendant] had not contributed to the common household expenses pursuant to the [prenuptial] [a]greement." The prenuptial agreement provided that the parties were "to contribute in mutually agreeable amounts" to inter alia, the mortgage, property taxes, insurance and maintenance expenses of the residence. Although the defendant asserts that there was no such mutual agreement and that the plaintiff was solely responsible for all expenses associated with the residence, the defendant has not pointed to any evidence to call the arbitrator's conclusion to the contrary into question. The defendant also claims that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority in the final arbitration award because she required the defendant to pay the plaintiff $66,000 plus interest, representing $5500 per month for the twelve month period following the notice of separation. The defendant asserts that this portion of the final arbitration award is clearly erroneous, because he "had already paid his [post separation] notice obligations," and falls outside the scope of the submission, because it does not concern either the sale of, or proceeds from, the residence. We disagree with these claims of the defendant. First, as we have explained previously in this opinion, "the [arbitrator is] empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Masters v. Masters, supra, 201 Conn. at 72 , 513 A.2d 104 . Second, we also conclude that the issue of whether the defendant satisfied his obligations to pay expenses on the residence is within the submission because it relates to "what proceeds each party is entitled to from a sale." Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority by ordering the defendant to pay expenses associated with the residence.

C

The defendant further claims that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority by entering orders in the final arbitration award pertaining to the return of certain items of personal property to the defendant that were located at the residence and in the possession of the plaintiff. Specifically, the arbitrator proscribed certain times and terms for the return of the defendant's property. The defendant asserts that these limitations exceeded the scope of the arbitrator's authority because the prenuptial agreement provides that the parties have " 'the sole and exclusive right at all times to manage and control [their] [s]eparate [p]roperty' " and no provision of the submission gave the arbitrator the authority to place restrictions on the defendant's personal property. We disagree with the defendant's claim. The submission to the arbitrator clearly authorized the arbitrator to decide "what procedures are to be followed" for the sale of the residence. It is reasonable that removal and return of the defendant's personal property from the residence is an important aspect of the procedures by which the sale will occur because the defendant's personal property would need to be removed prior to any sale. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority by addressing the return of the defendant's personal property.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of her authority. 10

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, McDONALD and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

ZARELLA, J., with whom ROBINSON, J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join parts II and III of the majority opinion. I do not agree, however, that the trial court applied General Statutes § 46b-66 (c) in the present case, nor do I agree that § 46b-66 (c) applies to an agreement to arbitrate contained in a premarital agreement. Therefore, I do not join part I of the majority opinion.

Preliminarily, I note that a careful reading of the record does not support the assertion of the defendant, Dean W. Lodmell, that the trial court applied § 46b-66 (c) in the present case. 1 Instead, the record reveals that the court, Malone, J., undertook to interpret the premarital agreement, including the arbitration clause. In response to the defendant's motions to stay judicial proceedings and to compel arbitration, and the motion in limine, pendente lite, for a " 'thorough inquiry' " of the arbitration agreement under § 46b-66 (c) filed by the plaintiff, Joan LaFrance, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision on September 2, 2011. In that memorandum of decision, the court observed that the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant concerned what should be submitted to arbitration. The court stated: "The contract law applies to agreements to arbitrate. In the event the parties cannot agree as to the issues to be submitted to the arbitrator, then the court is to make that determination." (Emphasis added.) Nowhere in this one page memorandum of decision does the court cite to § 46b-66 (c), conduct a "thorough inquiry" of the agreement, mention the words "fair and equitable," or explain why it would be unfair or inequitable to arbitrate certain issues. Instead, applying contract law, the court concluded that, pursuant to the premarital agreement, only one matter was in dispute for arbitration, namely, the sale of the marital home.

Further evidence that the trial court's memorandum of decision was based on its interpretation of the premarital agreement, rather than the application of § 46b-66 (c), is the court's affirmative response to the plaintiff's motion for articulation, which asked: "Having found in [relevant] part that ... the only issue in dispute for arbitration is the sale of the joint asset ... did the court conclude, based on its interpretation and construction of this premarital agreement ... that the relief fixed, limited, and agreed [on] between these parties did not include damages?" (Citation omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Then, in June, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for an order regarding arbitrability, which, in essence, sought to revisit the trial court's September 2, 2011 determination regarding arbitrability. Counsel for the defendant specifically argued, in light of a then recent decision from this court, New Britain v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1186, 304 Conn. 639 , 43 A.3d 143 (2012), that the arbitrator, and not the court, should determine the issue of arbitrability. During oral argument on that motion, neither party made reference to § 46b-66 (c) or argued that the court should determine whether it is fair and equitable to arbitrate the defendant's additional claims. 2 In an August 8, 2012 memorandum of decision, in which the court denied the defendant's motion for an order regarding arbitrability, the court relied on New Britain v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1186, supra, at 647-48, 43 A.3d 143 , reasoning that "[i]t is well established that, absent the parties' contrary intent, it is the court that has the primary authority to determine whether a particular dispute is arbitrable, not the arbitrators.... [W]hen deciding whether a party has agreed that an arbitrator should have the sole authority to decide arbitrability, we must not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clea[r] and unmistakabl[e] evidence that they did so." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court, yet again, made no reference to § 46b-66 (c) or the "fair and equitable" standard. Thus, I conclude that the trial court never applied § 46b-66 (c) to the parties agreement to arbitrate. 3 "Generally, because our review is limited to matters in the record, we will not address issues not decided by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 99 , 106, 890 A.2d 104 (2006). When, however, "an issue is raised in the trial court but the court declines to address it, an appellate court may consider it if the facts are undisputed and the issue is purely a question of law." Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672 , 684, 911 A.2d 300 (2006). Because the applicability of § 46b-66 (c) raises a question of law, it would not be improper to consider that issue in the present case. Nevertheless, we need not consider the defendant's claim that the statute does not apply because, as I have noted, the trial court did not apply § 46b-66 (c).

Although I need not consider whether § 46b-66 (c) applies to arbitration clauses contained in premarital agreements, I do so in response to the majority opinion. The applicability of § 46b-66 (c) raises a question of statutory interpretation over which this court's review is plenary. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 317 Conn. 338 , 346, 118 A.3d 49 (2015). General Statutes § 1-2z provides in relevant part that, when interpreting statutes, we shall first consider "the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes...." Extratextual evidence of legislative intent is considered only if, after attention has been given to the statute's text and relationship with other statutes, we determine that the statute in question is ambiguous or that a literal interpretation would lead to absurd or unworkable results. See General Statutes § 1-2z. Section 46b-66(c) provides: "The provisions of chapter 909 [concerning arbitration proceedings] shall be applicable to any agreement to arbitrate in an action for dissolution of marriage under this chapter, provided (1) an arbitration pursuant to such agreement may proceed only after the court has made a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that (A) each party entered into such agreement voluntarily and without coercion, and (B) such agreement is fair and equitable under the circumstances, and (2) such agreement and an arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall not include issues related to child support, visitation and custody. An arbitration award in such action shall be confirmed, modified or vacated in accordance with the provisions of chapter 909." The defendant claims that § 46b-66 (c) applies only to arbitration agreements entered into after a dissolution proceeding has commenced, arguing that the statute's language, "in an action for dissolution of marriage," creates a temporal limitation to the statute's applicability. The plaintiff responds that the statute applies to arbitration clauses contained in premarital agreements, contending that the use of the phrase "in an action for dissolution of marriage" merely distinguishes the type of proceeding the statute applies to, namely, a dissolution action rather than a civil action. In addition, on the basis of the statute's prescription that "an arbitration pursuant to such agreement may proceed only after the court has made a thorough inquiry"; (emphasis added) General Statutes § 46b-66 (c)(1) ; the plaintiff asserts that the statute is triggered by the commencement of arbitration regardless of when the agreement to arbitrate is made. The majority agrees that § 46b-66 (c) applies to arbitration agreements contained in premarital agreements because they "are by definition agreements to arbitrate issues that would only arise once the parties are involved 'in an action for dissolution....' " Part I A of the majority opinion.

The text of § 46b-66 (c) does not support the plaintiff's or the majority's interpretation. The language in § 46b-66 (c)(1), "an arbitration pursuant to [an] agreement [to arbitrate] may proceed only after the court has made a thorough inquiry"; (emphasis added); supports a temporal limitation to the application of the statute. If the parties agree to arbitrate after they institute a dissolution action, it makes sense that they would need the court's permission before proceeding to arbitration; after all, the court's jurisdiction has been invoked. On the other hand, if, as part of the premarital agreement, the parties agreed to arbitrate and, upon deciding to divorce, wish to go directly to arbitration, it makes little sense that they would first need to file an action with the Superior Court and seek that court's permission to arbitrate.

Moreover, when the relationship of § 46b-66 (c) to other statutes is considered, only the defendant's reading is probable. Under the circumstances of the present case, there are two statutory schemes that relate to § 46b-66 (c), namely, chapter 909 of the General Statutes, comprising General Statutes §§ 52-408 through 52-424, and relating to arbitration proceedings, and the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act, General Statutes §§ 46b-36a through 46b-36j.

Section 52-408 provides in relevant part that "an agreement in writing between the parties to a marriage to submit to arbitration any controversy between them with respect to the dissolution of their marriage, except issues related to child support, visitation and custody, shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, except when there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of written contracts generally. " (Emphasis added.)

The emphasized language conflicts with the reading of § 46b-66 (c) that the plaintiff advocates and the majority adopts. If, as the plaintiff and the majority contend, § 46b-66 (c) applies to all agreements to arbitrate dissolution matters, despite when such agreements are entered into, then the test for enforceability prescribed in § 52-408 -general contract defenses-would be completely supplanted by the test set forth in § 46b-66 (c)(1)(B) -fair and equitable. This construction of § 46b-66 (c) would, therefore, render § 52-408 void in part. Stated differently, an agreement to arbitrate that is enforceable under § 52-408 because the party challenging enforcement cannot establish a general contract defense, such as unconscionability, fraud, or duress, nonetheless may be unenforceable under § 46b-66 (c) if a trial court determines that the agreement is not fair and equitable. Conversely, any agreement enforceable under § 46b-66 (c) would also be enforceable under § 52-408 because, I presume, it would not be fair and equitable to enforce an agreement that is unconscionable or a product of fraud or duress. Thus, the majority's construction renders a portion of § 52-408 meaningless. 4

Well established principles of statutory interpretation, however, do not permit such a construction. First, this court is guided by the presumption that the legislature has enacted a harmonious and consistent body of law, and, accordingly, I must construe § 46b-66 (c) in a manner that ensures coherence within the broader statutory scheme. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 297 Conn. 391 , 404, 999 A.2d 682 (2010) ("We are further guided ... by the presumption that the legislature, in amending or enacting statutes, always [is] presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law.... Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute ... we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction." [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.] ); Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279 , 310, 819 A.2d 260 (2003) (same). Second, it is a "cardinal maxim" of statutory interpretation "that statutes shall not be construed to render any sentence, clause, or phrase superfluous or meaningless." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 312 Conn. 513 , 543, 93 A.3d 1142 (2014) ; see also Connecticut Podiatric Medical Assn. v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., 302 Conn. 464 , 474, 28 A.3d 958 (2011) ("[I]t is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions.... [I]n construing statutes, we presume that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ).

Reading § 46b-66 (c) to apply to agreements to arbitrate entered into after a dissolution proceeding has commenced complies with both principles of statutory construction in that it harmonizes §§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408, and ensures that neither provision is superfluous or meaningless. Under such a construction, the standard for the enforceability of arbitration agreements set forth in § 52-408 would apply to, at the very least, agreements to arbitrate contained in premarital agreements, thereby retaining the validity of § 52-408. At the same time, § 46b-66 (c) will continue to have meaning as it will apply to agreements entered into after a dissolution proceeding has begun. 5 This construction also avoids the apparent conflict between the statutes regarding the standard for determining the enforceability of arbitration agreements in that it applies each to factually distinct circumstances, which results in a coherent statutory scheme.

Furthermore, construing § 46b-66 (c) to apply to those arbitration agreements entered into after the commencement of a marital dissolution proceeding achieves harmony between § 46b-66 (c) and the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act, specifically, General Statutes § 46b-36g (a)(2). Section 46b-36g (a) provides in relevant part: "A premarital agreement or amendment shall not be enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that ... (2) [t]he agreement was unconscionable when it was executed or when enforcement is sought...." Construing § 46b-66 (c) to apply to arbitration clauses in premarital agreements creates a conflict in the standard for determining enforceability by supplanting the unconscionability standard prescribed in § 46b-36g (a)(2) with the "fair and equitable" standard of § 46b-66 (c)(1)(B). 6 As I stated previously, the legislature is presumed to have enacted harmonious statutory schemes, and this court must strive to construe statutes to avoid conflict. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dept. of Developmental Services, supra, 297 Conn. at 404, 999 A.2d 682 . Constructing § 46b-66 (c) to apply when arbitration agreements are entered into after a dissolution proceeding has commenced attains such a goal. Under such reading, the unconscionability standard of § 46b-36g (a)(2) will continue to apply to premarital agreements, and the fair and equitable standard of § 46b-66 (c)(1)(B) will govern the enforceability of agreements made during the course of the dissolution proceeding.

Instead of attempting to read §§ 46b-66 (c) and 46b-36g (a) to be consistent, the majority relies on the canon of interpretation that directs courts to apply the more specific, rather than general, statutory provisions relating to a subject matter. See footnote 3 of the majority opinion. Generally, I agree with this principle of statutory construction, but only after it becomes clear that the statutes in question do not each have an exclusive area of operation or cannot be read in harmony. It is elementary that, when two or more statutory provisions are involved, this court will "construe the [provisions], if possible, to avoid conflict between them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Efstathiadis v. Holder, 317 Conn. 482 , 493, 119 A.3d 522 (2015) ; see also id. ("when more than one [statutory provision] is involved, we presume that the legislature intended [those provisions] to be read together to create a harmonious body of law" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Gipson v. Commissioner of Correction, 257 Conn. 632 , 649-51, 778 A.2d 121 (2001) (court is precluded from interpreting statutes to create conflict when statutes can be read in harmony). Thus, because §§ 46b-66 (c) and 46b-36g (a) can be read to avoid conflict, it is improper to resort to the canon on which the majority relies. The majority, in effect, rewrites the statute and allows a trial court to substitute its judgment regarding what is "fair and equitable" for what the legislature has required for the enforceability of a premarital agreement, namely, that such agreement is enforceable-and will not be second-guessed by the courts-unless the agreement was unconscionable at the time it was entered into or is unconscionable at the time enforcement is sought.

Interpreting § 46b-66 (c) to apply to agreements to arbitrate that are entered into after a dissolution proceeding has commenced is consistent with the public policy of this state. First, allowing parties to enter into premarital agreements containing arbitration clauses encourages the private resolution of family matters and settlement of financial affairs. 7 See, e.g., Bedrick v. Bedrick, 300 Conn. 691 , 698, 17 A.3d 17 (2011) (state has interest in encouraging private agreements between prospective and divorcing spouses); Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212 , 221, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991) ("private settlement of the financial affairs of estranged marital partners is a goal that courts should support rather than undermine" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). For example, prospective spouses may enter into a premarital agreement that provides for the division of property in the event of divorce, and further agree to arbitrate any controversy arising from such agreement. Under my reading of § 46b-66 (c), if the spouses decide to divorce, they could arbitrate their disagreements prior to filing for dissolution. After arbitration concludes, and the spouses have privately settled the distribution of property, they can file the dissolution action, asking the court to dissolve the marriage and to confirm the arbitration award. Under the majority's interpretation, however, the arbitration could not be commenced unless and until an action for dissolution has been filed and the trial court determines that it is fair and equitable to arbitrate. See General Statutes § 46b-66 (c)(1) ("an arbitration pursuant to [an] agreement [to arbitrate] may proceed only after the court has made a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that ... (B) such agreement is fair and equitable under the circumstances" [emphasis added] ). Thus, even if the divorcing parties do not contest the enforceability of the premarital agreement or the arbitration clause, and desire to arbitrate their dispute, the trial court may disregard their will and determine if arbitration would be, in its view, unfair and inequitable. Thus, the majority's construction of § 46b-66 (c) is inconsistent with this state's public policy of encouraging the private settlement of disputes. 8

Second, arbitration is an efficient and economical method for resolving disputes and, therefore, is a favored tool for dispute resolution. See, e.g., AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663 v. Dept. of Children & Families, 317 Conn. 238 , 249, 117 A.3d 470 (2015). Because arbitration is favored, judicial interference with the arbitration process is generally limited to minimize encroachment on the system's efficiency. See id. Construing § 46b-66 (c) not to apply to arbitration clauses in premarital agreements is consistent with our policy of encouraging the economical resolution of disputes through the use of arbitration. Under such a construction, divorcing spouses who wish to arbitrate their dispute may proceed to arbitration without the trial court's permission and, if they so desire, prior to the commencement of the dissolution action. Conversely, under the majority's interpretation, spouses who wish to proceed to arbitration will first be delayed by a need to file an action for dissolution and, then, will be further delayed while awaiting the trial court's permission to arbitrate. 9 Moreover, spouses who submit to arbitration prior to filing a dissolution action may find their arbitration orders subsequently vacated by a trial court that concludes that it was not fair and equitable to arbitrate. 10 Such a result is inconsistent with the well established principle that courts are not to second-guess the wisdom or fairness of premarital agreements into which prospective spouses voluntarily enter. Cf. Crews v. Crews, 295 Conn. 153 , 167, 989 A.2d 1060 (2010) ( "whether the trial court or this court thinks the [premarital] agreement was a good bargain for [either spouse] does not enter into the analysis of [its enforceability]"). The need to first seek court permission prior to arbitrating or the risk of having an arbitration order vacated because the court does not think it was fair and equitable to arbitrate, despite the parties' intention to arbitrate, does not serve the goal of encouraging efficient and economical resolution of disputes. Moreover, construing § 46b-66 (c) to permit trial courts to prohibit spouses who wish to arbitrate from doing so, or to vacate an arbitration order that resulted from a consensual arbitration, leads to an absurd result.

Third, applying a different standard to determine the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, depending on when the agreement was entered into, is consistent with our practice, and the policy set forth by the legislature, of affording greater deference to agreements reached before prospective spouses marry. In Bedrick v. Bedrick, supra, 300 Conn. at 691 , 17 A.3d 17 , this court recognized "that spouses do not contract under the same conditions as either prospective spouses or spouses who have determined to dissolve their marriage." Id., at 701, 17 A.3d 17 . Prospective spouses contract under nonadversarial conditions, and either party can freely reject unsatisfactory terms. See id. And, presumably, when the parties are first embarking on their marital journey, there is less concern regarding unfair dealing between them. On the other hand, postnuptial agreements are negotiated under circumstances in which one party may gain an unfair bargaining position by threatening dissolution if the other does not agree to the terms of the agreement. See id.

Such a possibility persuaded this court that postnuptial agreements must be more closely scrutinized than premarital agreements. Id., at 703, 17 A.3d 17 . Similarly, when divorcing spouses negotiate a separation agreement, they have already decided to dissolve the marriage, and, therefore, an adversarial relationship exists. See id., at 701, 17 A.3d 17 . Under such circumstances, the court should more closely scrutinize the agreement to ensure that the spouses have dealt fairly with one another. The legislature has expressed its belief that premarital agreements and settlement agreements are not to be treated alike, enacting different standards regarding the enforceability of each agreement. Compare General Statutes § 46b-36g (a)(2) (premarital agreement is enforceable unless it is unconscionable), with General Statutes § 46b-66 (a) (settlement agreement concerning alimony or division of property will be reviewed to determine if it is fair and equitable under circumstances). It is logical to conclude that the legislature intended the same disparate treatment to exist between arbitration agreements entered into prior to marriage and agreements entered into after dissolution proceedings have commenced. 11 Finally, I do not agree that my reading of § 46b-66 (c) is inconsistent with case law. In fact, I conclude that the case law is inapposite. First, neither this court nor the Appellate Court has ever addressed the question presented in the present case, namely, whether § 46b-66 (c) applies to an arbitration clause in a premarital agreement. Second, the scant cases concerning § 46b-66 (c) are significantly distinct from the present case because they either involved agreements to arbitrate entered into after a dissolution action had been filed; see Weyher v. Weyher, 164 Conn.App. 734 , 737-38, 138 A.3d 969 (2016) (judgment of dissolution provided that parties should divide personal property by agreement within thirty days and that, if parties were unable to agree, personal property division was to be submitted to binding arbitration); or situations in which the parties had not agreed to arbitrate at all. See Barcelo v. Barcelo, 158 Conn.App. 201 , 224-25, 118 A.3d 657 (trial court abused its discretion in ordering parties to submit to arbitration concerning distribution of their personal property in absence of voluntary agreement between parties to submit to binding arbitration, as court cannot compel parties to arbitrate unless they have so agreed), cert. denied, 319 Conn. 910 , 123 A.3d 882 (2015) ; Budrawich v. Budrawich, 156 Conn.App. 628 , 648, 115 A.3d 39 (trial court improperly ordered parties to submit to binding arbitration to resolve issue of unreimbursed child care expenses "because the parties did not execute a voluntary arbitration agreement"), cert. denied, 317 Conn. 921 , 118 A.3d 63 (2015).

For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that § 46b-66 (c) does not apply to agreements to arbitrate that are contained in premarital agreements. Because the trial court did not apply § 46b-66 (c) in the present case, however, I find no error in that regard. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of this court and dissent in part. 12

1 We note that, in light of this conclusion, we need not reach the alternative grounds for affirmance raised by the plaintiff.

2 The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that the trial court did not apply § 46b-66 (c) and instead "that the [trial] court ... undertook to interpret the [prenuptial] agreement, including the [agreement to arbitrate]." As a result, the concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that it is unnecessary for this court to reach the issue of whether § 46b-66 (c) is applicable in the present case. We disagree. First, we conclude that the trial court did apply § 46b-66 (c). Specifically, the trial court's memorandum of decision dated September 2, 2011, arose from the plaintiff's motion in limine, pendente lite, dated April 11, 2011. In that motion, the plaintiff explicitly invoked § 46b-66 (c) and moved for the court to conduct a " 'thorough inquiry' " under that statute to determine which issues should be submitted to arbitration. Furthermore, during two days of oral argument on the motion, both the plaintiff's attorney and the defendant's attorney addressed the applicability of § 46b-66 (c). Indeed, the applicability of § 46b-66 (c) was at the forefront of the parties' oral arguments and the trial court's questioning. Indeed, the plaintiff's claim that the issues submitted to the arbitrator should be limited was based on § 46b-66 (c). Therefore, although the trial court does not explicitly cite § 46b-66 (c) in the memorandum of decision dated September 2, 2011, the fact that it limited the issues submitted to the arbitrator indicates that the trial court found § 46b-66 (c) applicable. In addition, in the memorandum of decision dated January 15, 2015, the trial court explicitly referenced that the plaintiff's motion in limine was filed under § 46b-66 (c) and that the trial court had considered § 46b-66 (c). Furthermore, neither party sought an articulation from the trial court on whether it applied § 46b-66 (c), and the defendant concedes that the trial court did apply the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did apply § 46b-66 (c) in the present case. Second, contrary to the concurring and dissenting opinion, we conclude that a determination of whether § 46b-66 (c) applies in the present case is necessary to the resolution of the claims on appeal.

3 We recognize that General Statutes § 46b-36g (a) provides in relevant part that "[a] premarital agreement ... shall not be enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that ... (2) [t]he agreement was unconscionable when it was executed or when enforcement is sought...." This standard differs from the requirement in § 46b-66 (c)(1)(B) that the trial court find that the agreement to arbitrate is "fair and equitable under the circumstances...." To the extent that §§ 46b-36g (a) and 46b-66 (c)(1)(B) are facially in tension, "we are mindful of the well established principle of statutory interpretation that requires courts to apply the more specific statute relating to a particular subject matter in favor of the more general statute that otherwise might apply in the absence of the specific statute. [I]t is a [well settled] principle of construction that specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling.... The provisions of one statute which specifically focus on a particular problem will always, in the absence of express contrary legislative intent, be held to prevail over provisions of a different statute more general in its coverage." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Studer v. Studer, 320 Conn. 483 , 497-98, 131 A.3d 240 (2016). Therefore, we conclude that the general standard set forth in § 46b-36g governs whether a prenuptial agreement, as a whole, is enforceable. The enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate is, however, governed by the specific standard set forth in § 46b-66 (c), even if it is contained within a prenuptial agreement. Accordingly, although a prenuptial agreement is enforceable under § 46b-36g if the court is satisfied that it is not unconscionable, an arbitration provision contained within a prenuptial agreement is enforceable under § 46b-66 (c) only if the court finds that enforcement of the arbitration provision itself is fair and equitable under the circumstances.

4 The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that § 52-408 "conflicts with the reading of § 46b-66 (c) that the plaintiff advocates and the majority adopts." Specifically, the concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that "[i]f, as the plaintiff and the majority contend, § 46b-66 (c) applies to all agreements to arbitrate dissolution matters, despite when such agreements are entered into, then the test for enforceability prescribed in § 52-408 -general contract defenses-would be completely supplanted by the test set forth in § 46b-66 (c)(1)(B) -fair and equitable." We disagree. Instead, as we explained previously in this opinion, § 46b-66 (c) governs the circumstances in which the provisions of chapter 909 of the General Statutes, including § 52-408, apply to agreements to arbitrate between parties to a marriage. Therefore, even if the "fair and equitable" standard of § 46b-66 (c) encompasses the test of § 52-408, it does not make the statutes inconsistent; instead it allows the two to operate harmoniously. Contrary to the concurring and dissenting opinion, the language in § 52-408 is not rendered meaningless, but is made consistent with § 46b-66 (c) by recognizing that agreements to arbitrate between parties to a marriage are subject to the provisions of chapter 909 if the court has determined that the agreement is fair and equitable.

5 The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that our interpretation of § 46b-66 (c) may interfere with the arbitration of disputes between parties to a marriage. Although our interpretation of § 46b-66 (c) would require a trial court to determine that an agreement to arbitrate is fair and equitable prior to an arbitration proceeding, such an interpretation both furthers the public policy of this state to protect parties to a marriage in the dissolution process and fosters judicial economy by not allowing an arbitration proceeding to go forward that may ultimately be challenged.

6 The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly limited the scope of the issues submitted to the arbitrator because the parties had not agreed to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability. On the basis of our conclusion that § 46b-66 (c) applies to agreements to arbitrate contained in prenuptial agreements, we conclude that it was proper for the trial court to examine the agreement to arbitrate in the present case and determine which issues were "fair and equitable" to submit to the arbitrator, and that the issue of whether the parties intended to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability is not relevant under the circumstances. See General Statutes § 46b-66 (c).

7 The defendant asserts that if he were to bring his claims in a postdissolution action, those claims may be barred by the doctrine of res judicata pursuant to this court's decision in Weiss. Although we make no determination of whether res judicata will bar any possible future claims by the defendant, we take this opportunity to explain that, in Weiss, this court did not overrule Delahunty. Instead, this court explained in Weiss that the reasoning in Delahunty was "inapplicable ... because although the plaintiff's claim sounds in tort and contract, it is, in substance, a claim regarding the meaning of a phrase in the agreement. Additionally, the crux of the plaintiff's claim is an assertion that she is entitled to an additional portion of the marital estate pursuant to the agreement-a contract they had entered into to dissolve their relationships-not to damages as traditionally conceived in tort actions. To conclude that the plaintiff may avoid res judicata by characterizing her claim as a tort claim would be to elevate form over substance, which we will not do." (Footnote omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, supra, 297 Conn. at 468, 998 A.2d 766 . Accordingly, in Weiss, this court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

8 We understand the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motions to reargue and to reconsider the orders of the trial court regarding the partial and final award of the arbitrator, to be a claim that the trial court improperly confirmed the partial award of the arbitrator and confirmed in part and modified in part the final award of the arbitrator.

9 The defendant further asserts that, by confirming the awards of the arbitrator and incorporating those awards into its judgment, the trial court improperly distributed property in violation of the prenuptial agreement. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly distributed property in violation of the prenuptial agreement raises the same issues as his claim that the trial court improperly confirmed the awards of the arbitrator. Because we conclude that the trial court properly confirmed the awards of the arbitrator, we need not reach the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly distributed property in violation of the prenuptial agreement.

To the extent that the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly distributed property in violation of the prenuptial agreement includes the trial court's award of interest and attorney's fees for the costs the plaintiff incurred to remove and store the defendant's personal property after he was ordered to remove the same from the residence, which was about to be sold, we conclude that it is proper for the trial court to award interest when a former spouse is not justified in failing to pay sums due. "It is well established that we will not overrule a trial court's determination regarding an award of interest absent a clear abuse of discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowd v. Dowd, 96 Conn.App. 75 , 85, 899 A.2d 76 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 907 , 907 A.2d 89 (2006). "The determination of whether ... interest is to be recognized as a proper element of [recovery] is one to be made in view of the demands of justice rather than through the application of any arbitrary rule." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "When a former spouse is not justified in failing to pay sums due ... the award of interest is proper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 86, 899 A.2d 76 . Furthermore, the defendant does not point to any portion of the prenuptial agreement that precludes the award of interest.

10 The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly modified paragraph 4 of the final arbitration award, which detailed the formula for calculating the total net proceeds from the sale of the residence and the parties' respective settlement amounts. We disagree. General Statutes § 52-419(a) specifically authorizes the trial court to "make an order modifying or correcting the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If there has been an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (2) if the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted; or (3) if the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy." In the present case, a review of the trial court's modification reveals that it properly modified the award to correct a material mistake regarding the amount of the mortgage on the residence, and to correct material miscalculations of figures and mistakes that did not affect the merits of the controversy. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly confirmed in part, modified in part, and vacated in part the final award.

1 The plaintiff concedes as much in her brief: "Although [the] plaintiff had moved for a thorough inquiry under § 46b-66 (c)... the trial court ultimately did not need to perform this inquiry because it concluded that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate arbitrability." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

2 Moreover, the arguments of the plaintiff's counsel demonstrate that she understood that the trial court's September 2, 2011 memorandum of decision did not apply § 46b-66 (c) but, instead, was based on the law of contracts. In discussing the September 2, 2011 memorandum of decision, the plaintiff's counsel stated: "Your Honor undertook a review of the [premarital] agreement, reviewed the arbitration demand that was filed or attached to [the plaintiff's] motion in limine, pendente lite, and determined in Your Honor's September 2 [2011] ruling that the only matter in dispute for arbitration [was] the sale of the joint asset...." Counsel continued: "Your Honor has already undertaken as a matter of contract interpretation a review of the [premarital] agreement and has determined that it does not provide for damages claims to be asserted between the parties." (Emphasis added.)

3 The majority concludes to the contrary, reasoning that the September 2, 2011 memorandum of decision arose from the plaintiff's motion in limine, pendente lite, in which the plaintiff requested the court to conduct a " 'thorough inquiry' " of the arbitration agreement under § 46b-66 (c). It further reasons that arguments on that motion addressed the applicability of the statute. See footnote 2 of the majority opinion. By this logic, it is equally plausible that the court did not apply the statute because the trial court also was considering the defendant's motions to stay judicial proceedings and to compel arbitration. In addition, the defendant argued that § 46b-66 (c) did not apply to the arbitration clause in the premarital agreement. In light of the defendant's motions and arguments, and the fact that the September 2, 2011 memorandum of decision does not cite § 46b-66 (c), mention a "thorough inquiry," or use the words "fair and equitable," it seems implausible-perhaps impossible-that the court applied the statute. Furthermore, the plaintiff agrees that the court did not apply the statute, despite her request that it do so. See footnote 1 of this opinion.

The majority also asserts that the trial court's January 15, 2015 memorandum of decision, in which the court dissolved the marriage, referred to the plaintiff's motion in limine, pendente lite. See footnote 2 of the majority opinion. The court, Heller, J., does refer to the plaintiff's motion in its recitation of the procedural history of the case. Judge Heller, however, does not conclude that Judge Malone in fact applied § 46b-66 (c) in response to such motion. In fact, after reviewing Judge Malone's September 2, 2011 memorandum of decision and subsequent articulation, Judge Heller concluded that Judge Malone "confirmed that one party could not maintain a claim for damages against the other party under the [ premarital ] agreement. " (Emphasis added.) The majority also reasons that Judge Heller considered § 46b-66 (c) in reaching her January 15, 2015 decision. See footnote 2 of the majority opinion. Although that may be true, it seems irrelevant that the court considered the statute at that point, after arbitration was completed. First, the statute requires the inquiry to be made prior to the arbitration submission. Second, the error of which the defendant complained was that Judge Malone improperly limited the scope of arbitration by applying § 46b-66 (c) to the agreement to arbitrate between the plaintiff and the defendant. Thus, the fact that Judge Heller subsequently applied the statute has no bearing on the claimed error. Third, the purported application of the statute by Judge Heller came after the arbitration was completed, and, therefore, it could not be the application of the statute that improperly limited arbitration. Fourth, the fact that Judge Heller applied the statute likely indicates that she did not believe that Judge Malone conducted the inquiry required by § 46b-66 (c).

Finally, the majority faults the parties for not seeking an articulation regarding whether the trial court applied § 46b-66 (c). See id. If the majority believes that clarification is necessary, however, it should order an articulation by the trial court. See Practice Book § 60-5 ("[i]f the [reviewing] court deems it necessary to the proper disposition of the cause, it may order a further articulation of the basis of the trial court's factual findings or decision"); Practice Book § 61-10(b) ("The failure of any party on appeal to seek articulation ... shall not be the sole ground upon which the [reviewing] court declines to review any issue or claim on appeal. If the court determines that articulation of the trial court decision is appropriate, it may ... order articulation by the trial court....").

4 In reading § 46b-66 (c) to prescribe a condition precedent to chapter 909's application to arbitration agreements between parties to a marriage, the majority contends that it has "harmoni[zed]" the statutory scheme. Footnote 4 of the majority opinion. First, I note that this is an unlikely reading. As I already explained, § 52-408, the first section in chapter 909 of the General Statutes, provides for arbitration agreements between parties to a marriage, and it provides that such agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, except when there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of written contracts generally. " (Emphasis added.) The statute makes no reference to § 46b-66 (c), nor does it provide that arbitration agreements between parties to a marriage are valid except when they are not fair and equitable. Second, the majority contends that the avoidance clause of § 52-408, which provides for the enforceability of arbitration agreements "except when there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of written contracts generally," is not rendered meaningless by its reading of § 46b-66 (c) because it will apply to agreements that the court determines are "fair and equitable." Footnote 4 of the majority opinion. By requiring arbitration agreements to clear the higher hurdle established by § 46b-66 (c) first, however, the majority has ensured that § 52-408 will apply only to agreements that will pass its enforcement test. Therefore, its reading has rendered § 52-408 meaningless.

5 The question of what standard will apply to agreements falling between these two extremes, such as arbitration clauses contained in postnuptial agreements or agreements to arbitrate reached after the parties have decided to divorce but before an action for dissolution has been filed, is not before the court in the present case. Therefore, I do not resolve that question. I do note, however, that it is possible that arbitration clauses in postnuptial agreements will be governed by the standard, previously articulated by this court, that "a court may enforce a postnuptial agreement only if it complies with applicable contract principles, and the terms of the agreement are both fair and equitable at the time of execution and not unconscionable at the time of dissolution." (Footnote omitted.) Bedrick v. Bedrick, 300 Conn. 691 , 703-704, 17 A.3d 17 (2011). In addition, agreements to arbitrate entered into after the parties have decided to dissolve their marriage but before either party has filed for dissolution may be settlement agreements governed by § 46b-66 (a). See General Statutes § 46b-66 (a) ("[i]n any case under this chapter where the parties have submitted to the court an agreement ... concerning alimony or the disposition of property, the court shall ... determine whether the agreement of the spouses is fair and equitable under all the circumstances").

6 An arbitration clause in a premarital agreement would also be unenforceable if the party contesting enforcement establishes that "[s]uch party did not execute the agreement voluntarily"; General Statutes § 46b-36g (a)(1) ; or if, "[b]efore execution of the agreement, such party was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character and value of property, financial obligations and income of the other party"; General Statutes § 46b-36g (a)(3) ; or if "[s]uch party was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel."General Statutes § 46b-36g (a)(4).

7 The majority argues that my reading of § 46b-66 (c) makes arbitration clauses in premarital agreements less desirable because the parties will not be afforded the protections of § 46b-66 (c). See part I A of the majority opinion. I disagree. My reading ensures that the courts will not meddle in the parties' private resolution of their marital affairs. My understanding of the purpose of premarital agreements is to displace the discretion of the dissolution court by privately deciding issues of property distribution or alimony; see, e.g., Hannon v. Hannon, 740 So.2d 1181 , 1187 (Fla.App.1999) ("[a] primary purpose of [a premarital] agreement is to modify or shrink the general discretion of the dissolution of marriage judge in doing equity between the parties"); and, therefore, a reading of § 46b-66 (c) that limits the dissolution court's ability to interfere with such agreements, it seems to me, makes them more, not less, desirable.

8 Because the majority's interpretation of § 46b-66 (c) has the potential to supersede the will of divorcing spouses, even when both spouses wish to arbitrate their disagreement, it reaches an absurd result. It is fundamental, however, that "[w]e construe a statute in a manner that will not ... lead to absurd results." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gould v. Freedom of Information Commission, 314 Conn. 802 , 816, 104 A.3d 727 (2014).

9 The facts of the present case provide an apt illustration. The defendant filed his motions to stay judicial proceedings and to compel arbitration on April 6, 2011, and the plaintiff filed her motion in limine, pendente lite, requesting a thorough inquiry into the arbitration agreement, on April 12, 2011. The trial court, however, did not rule on these motions or submit the matter to arbitration until September 2, 2011. Moreover, the efficiency of arbitration was dwarfed by the need for the parties' attorneys to file motions and briefs and to appear for arguments on two separate dates.

10 There exists a possible situation that is even more troubling. Prior to marrying, two spouses enter into a premarital agreement containing an arbitration clause. Subsequently, they decide to divorce. Before filing for dissolution, however, they agree to submit their property dispute to arbitration, and neither spouse thinks it is unfair or inequitable to do so. At the conclusion of the arbitration, one of the spouses is dissatisfied with the arbitrator's award and files an application with the Superior Court to vacate the order. Generally, it is difficult to vacate the order of an arbitrator. Section 52-418(a), a provision of chapter 909 of the General Statutes, provides: "Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court ... shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." According to the majority, however, before the court can apply chapter 909 to an agreement to arbitrate between parties to a marriage, the court must first determine that such agreement is fair and equitable. Thus, the dissatisfied spouse will first be allowed to argue that the agreement to arbitrate was unfair or inequitable, a standard that undoubtedly is easier to satisfy than the standard applicable to vacating an arbitration order.

11 In light of the different treatment afforded to premarital, postnuptial, and settlement agreements, the majority's contention that "[i]t is not reasonable to think that the legislature intended to afford parties who agree to arbitrate controversies related to dissolution different protections based solely on when they entered into that agreement" is contrary to reality and simply unwarranted. Part I A of the majority opinion.

The majority also suggests that it is absurd to apply one standard to arbitration agreements entered into one day before the dissolution action is filed and a different standard to arbitration agreements entered into the day after the dissolution action is filed. See id. It is unclear, however, what standard would apply to arbitration agreements that are entered into prior to the filing of a dissolution action but after the parties have already decided to divorce. It certainly would not be the unconscionability standard of § 46b-36g (a)(2) because such an agreement would not be a premarital agreement. See General Statutes § 46b-36b (1) (defining "premarital agreement" as "an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage" [emphasis added] ). It is possible that such agreements would be governed by § 46b-66 (a), which would require the court to consider whether the agreement is "fair and equitable...." General Statutes § 46b-66 (a). That question is not before the court in the present case, however, and, therefore, it would be inappropriate to decide it.

12 The defendant does not argue on appeal that the trial court incorrectly determined that the parties did not agree to arbitrate arbitrability. Instead, he contends that the trial court improperly limited the scope of arbitration by applying § 46b-66 (c). In the alternative, the defendant argues that, if § 46b-66 (c) applies, the agreement was fair and equitable, and, when conducting a thorough inquiry under § 46b-66 (c), the court is not to consider the issues to be arbitrated. To the extent that the defendant's statement that "[t]he [court, Malone, J. ] erred by contravening the terms of the parties' agreement and [by] concluding that, absent the parties' agreement, it would determine ... what issues would be submitted to arbitration" was an attempt to claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that it, rather than the arbitrator, was to determine arbitrability, he has not adequately briefed that claim. See, e.g., Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402 , 444, 35 A.3d 188 (2012) ("[W]e are not obligated to consider issues that are not adequately briefed.... Whe[n] an issue is merely mentioned, but not briefed beyond a bare assertion of the claim, it is deemed to have been waived.... In addition, mere conclusory assertions regarding a claim, with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record, will not suffice." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ). In his reply brief, the defendant does argue, in response to the plaintiff's argument to the contrary, that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. Nevertheless, his argument is styled as a retort to the plaintiff's contrary contention and is not a claim of trial court error. Moreover, "it is well settled that this court generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief." Fairfield Merrittview Ltd. Partnership v. Norwalk, 320 Conn. 535 , 561, 133 A.3d 140 (2016) ; see also Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, supra, at 444 n. 40, 35 A.3d 188 ("[c]laims are also inadequately briefed when they are raised for the first time in a reply brief").