LaBarge v. Benda (In Re Merrifield)

214 B.R. 362, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1866, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1835, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 964, 1997 WL 721549
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedNovember 21, 1997
DocketBAP 97-6043
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 214 B.R. 362 (LaBarge v. Benda (In Re Merrifield)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
LaBarge v. Benda (In Re Merrifield), 214 B.R. 362, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1866, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1835, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 964, 1997 WL 721549 (bap8 1997).

Opinion

KRESSEL, Bankruptcy Judge.

The debtor, Caryn Merrifield, appeals an order of the bankruptcy court 1 denying her request to avoid a pre-petition transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548. Since we conclude that the debtor lacks standing, we dismiss her appeal.

BACKGROUND

The debtor filed a Chapter 13 case on April 9, 1996. On February 10, 1997, she filed a complaint against John Benda, alleging that her pre-petition transfer to him of a condominium unit was fraudulent in fact under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1), and was for less than reasonably equivalent value under § 548(a)(2). The bankruptcy court granted the motion of John V. LaBarge, the trustee, to join the proceeding as a plaintiff. At trial, the debtor withdrew the allegation that the transfer was fraudulent in fact and pursued only her claim that the transfer was for less than reasonably equivalent value. The bankruptcy court found that the transfer was for reasonably equivalent value and entered judgment for the defendant. The debtor has appealed but the trustee has not. We dismiss the appeal because the debtor lacked standing to avoid the transfer and therefore lacks standing to pursue this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Statutory Standing

In this appeal, the debtor invokes 11 U.S.C. § 548 as the basis for avoiding her pre-petition transfer of a condominium unit. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code expressly confers avoidance powers on trustees. 11 U.S.C. § 548. 2 Therefore, we must preliminarily determine whether a debtor enjoys standing to bring an avoidance action under § 548.

While Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 debtors in possession enjoy the powers of a trustee, 3 with one limited exception, the Bankruptcy Code contains no provision conferring avoidance powers on debtors. “There is no specific statutory provision generally authorizing Chapter 13 debtors to exercise trustees’ avoidance powers.” Hamilton v. Realty Portfolio, Inc. (In the Matter of Hamilton), 125 F.3d 292 (5th Cir.1997). 4

While we acknowledge that some courts have allowed Chapter 13 debtors to exercise the trustee’s avoidance powers, see Freeman v. Eli Lilly Fed. Credit Union (In re Freeman), 72 B.R. 850 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1987); Ottaviano v. Sorokin & Sorokin (Matter of Ottaviano), 68 B.R. 238 (Bankr.D.Conn.1986); Einoder v. Mount Greenwood Bank (In re Einoder), 55 B.R. 319 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1985); In re Boyette, 33 B.R. 10 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1983), we think those cases are inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.

*365 The Eighth Circuit has determined that the statutory language of § 548 expressly confers avoidance powers exclusively on the trustee. See Nangle v. Lauer (In re Lauer), 98 F.3d 378, 388 (8th Cir.1996) (“Section 548 by its terms provides that certain transfers by the debtor prior to bankruptcy may be voided only by ‘the trustee.’ ”) (emphasis added); Saline State Bank v. Mahloch, 834 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir.1987) (holding that “only the trustee or debtor in possession can invoke the avoidance powers ____”); see also Realty Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 125 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir.1997) (“There is no specific statutory provision generally authorizing Chapter 13 debtors to exercise trustees’ avoidance powers.”); Hansen v. Finn (In re Curry & Sorensen, Inc.), 57 B.R. 824, 827 (9th Cir. BAP 1986) (holding that § 548 actions “may only be asserted by a trustee____”). Where Congress has promulgated specific rules about who can exercise avoidance powers and under what circumstances, it is not within the province of courts to confer those powers on others.

§ 522(h)

Despite section 548’s reservation of avoidance powers solely to trustees, the Code allows debtors to avoid transfers in limited circumstances. In re Hamilton, 125 F.3d at 297 (“Congress has specifically authorized narrow exceptions to the general rule that Chapter 13 debtors lack standing to exercise the strong-arm powers of Chapter 13 trustees.”). 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid a transfer of the debtor’s property “to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided such transfer____” 11 U.S.C. § 522(h).

In DeMarah v. United States (In re DeMarah), 62 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir.1995), the Ninth Circuit articulated a five-part test to determine whether a debtor may exercise avoidance powers under § 522(h). Under the test, a debtor may avoid the transfer if: (1) the debtor’s transfer of property was involuntary; (2) the debtor did not conceal the property; (3) the trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfer; (4) the debtor seeks to exercise an avoidance power enumerated under § 522(h); and (5) the transferred property could have been exempted if the trustee had avoided the transfer under the provisions of § 522(g). Id. at 1250.

In this case, the debtor fails to satisfy the first, third and final DeMarah factors since she voluntarily transferred the condominium unit, the trustee attempted to avoid the transfer and the debtor would not have been able to exempt the unit if the transfer were successfully avoided. Therefore, § 522(h) does not give the debtor standing to avoid the transfer.

Standing to Appeal

Since the debtor lacked standing to bring the avoidance action, she also lacks standing to appeal the decision of the bankruptcy court. In order to have appellate standing, courts require that a party make an independent showing that he or she is aggrieved by the challenged order. McGuirl v. White, 86 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C.Cir.1996); Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K Porter Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 737, 741 (3d Cir.1995); Lopez v. Behles (In re Am. Ready Mix, Inc.),

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214 B.R. 362, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1866, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1835, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 964, 1997 WL 721549, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/labarge-v-benda-in-re-merrifield-bap8-1997.