Kurtas v. Kurtas

555 A.2d 804, 521 Pa. 105, 1989 Pa. LEXIS 67

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 3, 1989
• Docket: 11 E.D. Appeal Dkt. 1988
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

ZAPPALA, Justice.

In this appeal, we are requested to review the order and memorandum opinion of the Superior Court, 368 Pa.Super. 648, 531 A.2d 39, affirming the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County which had denied the appellant’s post-trial motions. The basis of the Superior Court’s order was the untimeliness of the appellant’s post-trial motions. Because Superior Court abused its discretion, we reverse.

The facts germane to this appeal are as follows: The parties were married in 1950, separated in 1972 and divorced in 1985 in response to a complaint filed by the appellee in 1982 under § 201(d) of the Divorce Code. A master’s hearing was held in March of 1985. Because of the appellant’s absence, no testimony was presented in support of her economic claims, resulting in the master recommending that all her economic claims be denied.

Exceptions were filed to this recommendation requiring a de novo hearing before the Court of Common Pleas. After taking testimony, the trial judge entered a decree and order on November 15, 1985 divorcing the parties and disposing of the economic claims.¹ Appellant’s trial counsel filed post-trial motions on November 27, 1985. At some point prior to November 27, the appellant retained new counsel who filed exceptions to the adjudication on November 29, 1985.² After appellate counsel received the appellant’s file from her trial counsel, appellate counsel filed supplemental post-trial motions on January 3, 1986, the date set for oral arguments on the post-trial motions. At the argument, neither the appellee nor the trial judge raised or objected to the timeliness of the filing of the post-trial motions or exceptions. After hearing the arguments on the merits, the trial judge entered an order dismissing the appellant’s post-trial motions. Appellant then filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court.

Relying upon its decision in Colagioia v. Colagioia, 362 Pa.Super. 213, 523 A.2d 1158 (1987), the Superior Court held that the appellant waived all her issues by failing to file her post-trial motions within ten days of the November 15, 1985 order in violation of Pa.R.C.P. 1920.52(a) and Pa.R.C.P. 227.1. Superior Court so ruled even though neither the appellee nor the trial judge raised the waiver issue.

Article V, Section 10 of our Constitution vests in this Court the power “... to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts ... if such rules are consistent with the Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court, ... nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation or repose.” Regarding appellate jurisdiction, the legislature has prescribed that appeals from trial courts to appellate courts must be commenced within 30 days after the entry of a final order. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(b). By case law, we have set the parameters as to what is a final order. Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A2d 211 (1985), T.C.R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 372 A2d 721 (1977), Bell v. Consumer Discount Company, 465 Pa. 225, 348 A2d 734 (1975). The legislature has designated appellate authority by limiting jurisdiction to reviewing final orders, if that review is sought within 30 days of docketing of that order. By our Constitution we have no authority to alter our own jurisdiction, nor do we try.

In implementing our authority to control the court system, this Court promulgated our Rules of Civil Procedure keeping in mind that we had no authority to usurp the legislative powers to establish jurisdictional limitations. As a method of administering a complex judicial scheme we promulgated rules to limit the issues raised on appeal. {See Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 et seq.). The need for procedural rules and the necessity for strict compliance was acknowledged by this Court in Tagnani v. Lew, 493 Pa. 371, 376, 426 A.2d 595, 597 (1981) wherein we stated:

With the volume and complexities of the matters coming to our judicial system for resolution, it has become imperative that the former paternalistic approach be disregarded and a high degree of professionalism be insisted upon. Our resources are not unlimited and must be utilized to provide the greatest good to the greatest number. To maximize our efficiency and to maintain and enhance the quality of our dispute resolution process, strict compliance with the procedure designed for issue preservation is essential.

We are cognizant that at times the rigid application of our rules does not serve the intended purpose of justice and fairness but rather results in a harsh or even unjust consequence. For this reason, we promulgated Pa.R.C.P. 126 wherein we granted to the trial court latitude to overlook any procedural defect which does not prejudice the rights of a party. These procedural rules are not jurisdictional limitations and the failure to comply with such rules does not divest the trial court of such jurisdiction. By allowing a trial court to overlook a procedural defect does not in any way in and of itself alter the jurisdiction of that court.

In this instance, the trial court chose to ignore the untimely filing of the appellant’s post-trial motions and addressed the merits of her alleged errors. Since such consideration was permitted under Rule 126 and did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction, the Superior Court erred in not reviewing the merits of the appeal.

The Order of the Superior Court is reversed and the matter is remanded to that Court for disposition of the appeal on its merits.

STOUT, J., concurs in the result. LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion in which FLAHERTY and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join.

1 . Confusion seems to have occurred because the trial court filed an Adjudication and Finding of Facts dated November 7, 1985 but not entered until November 19, 1985. Even the order from which post-trial relief was sought was dated November 12, 1985, although not docketed until November 15, 1985.

2 . The record is unclear as to why the change in counsel occurred. In any event, both prior counsel and present counsel filed post-trial pleadings.