Kungys v. United States

485 U.S. 759, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 99 L. Ed. 2d 839, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 2028, 56 U.S.L.W. 4373

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: May 2, 1988
• Docket: 86-228
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice Scalia

announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I, II-A, and III-A, and an opinion as to Parts II-B and III-B, in which The Chief Justice and Justice Brennan joined and in Part III-B of which Justice O’Connor joined.

Juozas Kungys seeks our review of a judgment and opinion of the Third Circuit remanding his case for the completion of denaturalization proceedings. The issues presented are: first, whether certain misrepresentations or concealments made by Kungys in connection with his naturalization proceeding were material within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 340(a), 66 Stat. 260, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a), and Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 (1960); and second, whether those misrepresentations, made under oath and in the form of forged documents, rendered Kungys’ citizenship “illegally procured” under 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(f)(6), 1427(a)(3), and 1451(a), because they established that he lacked the requisite good moral character when he was naturalized 34 years ago.

I

Petitioner applied for an immigration visa in Stuttgart, Germany, in 1947. In 1948, the visa was issued, and he came to the United States; he was naturalized as a citizen in 1954. In 1982, the United States, acting through the Office of Special Investigations of the Department of Justice, filed a complaint pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a) to denaturalize him.¹ The United States advanced three grounds. First, it attempted to show that Kungys had participated in executing over 2,000 Lithuanian civilians, most of them Jewish, in Kedainiai, Lithuania, between July and August 1941. As proof of this claim, the United States offered in evidence three videotaped depositions taken for use in this case in the Soviet Union. After determining that for numerous reasons the Soviet-source depositions were inherently unreliable, the District Court admitted them only for the limited purpose of showing that the atrocities actually occurred. The District Court then held that the admissible evidence was insufficient to sustain the charges that Kungys had participated in the Kedainiai atrocities.

Second, the United States attempted to show that, in applying for his visa and in his naturalization petition, Kungys had made false statements with respect to his date and place of birth, wartime occupations, and wartime residence. The District Court found that these misrepresentations had been made but held them not to be material within the meaning of 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a), as illuminated by language in Chaunt v. United States, supra.

Third, the United States argued that Kungys’ citizenship had been “illegally procured” under § 1451(a) because when he was naturalized he lacked the good moral character required of applicants for citizenship by 8 U. S. C. § 1427(a).² In support of this theory, the United States asserted that Kungys’ false representations, whether or not material, were sufficient to show that he had given false testimony to obtain immigration or naturalization benefits, which 8 U. S. C. § 1101(f)(6) makes determinative of lack of good moral character.³ The District Court ruled that the false statements at issue were not covered by 8 U. S. C. § 1101(f)(6) because they were not material.

Having rejected each of the three asserted grounds for denaturalization, the District Court entered judgment for Kungys. 571 F. Supp. 1104 (NJ 1983). The United States appealed. The Third Circuit declined to pass on the United States’ submission that the first asserted ground (participation in the Kedainiai atrocities) was wrongfully rejected because of error in failing to admit unqualifiedly the Soviet-source depositions. It reversed, however, the District Court’s rejection of the second ground, concluding that Kungys’ willful misrepresentation of the date and place of his birth in connection with his applications for visa and naturalization (which was no longer disputed), was material for purposes of the “concealment or misrepresentation” provision of § 1451(a). Finally, the Third Circuit upheld the District Court’s rejection of the third asserted ground for denaturalization agreeing that in order to establish “illegal procurement” under § 1451(a) on account of lack of good moral character under § 1101(f)(6), false testimony must be shown to have been material. 793 F. 2d 516 (1986).

We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 947 (1986), and heard argument last Term, on the question of what materiality standard applies to the “concealment or misrepresentation” clause of § 1451(a) and the false testimony provision of § 1101(f)(6) as incorporated by the “illegally procured” clause of § 1451(a). On June 26, 1987, we restored the case to the calendar and directed parties to file supplemental briefs addressing certain questions.⁴ 483 U. S. 1017. The case was reargued October 13, 1987.

II

A

As noted above, 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a) provides for the denaturalization of citizens whose citizenship orders and certificates of naturalization “were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation . . . This Court has previously suggested, and the parties do not dispute, that this requires misrepresentations or concealments that are both willful and material. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 507-508, n. 28 (1981). So understood, the provision plainly contains four independent requirements: the naturalized citizen must have misrepresented or concealed some fact, the misrepresentation or concealment must have been willful, the fact must have been material, and the naturalized citizen must have procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or concealment. It is no longer in dispute that the first two of these requirements were met here, since petitioner now concedes that he willfully misrepresented the date and place of his birth in his naturalization proceeding in 1954 as well as in applying for his visa in 1947.⁵

This Court has had occasion to consider the last two requirements only twice. In Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 (1960), we held that a naturalized citizen who had willfully and falsely stated during the naturalization process that he had never been arrested could nevertheless not be denaturalized pursuant to § 1451. A year later, in Costello v. United States, 365 U. S. 265 (1961), we held that a naturalized citizen who had willfully and falsely stated during the naturalization process that his occupation was “real estate,” when in fact it would more accurately have been described as “bootlegging,” could be denaturalized pursuant to § 1451. In neither case did the Court’s opinion purport to announce a conclusive judicial test to guide the determination whether a given misrepresentation or concealment was “material” and whether it “procured” a naturalization certificate. Indeed, in neither case did the opinion clearly differentiate between these two separate requirements. Nevertheless, it has been thought that a test for materiality can profitably be derived from certain language in Chaunt. That language comes at the end of the opinion, where the Court, in summarizing its holding, states that “the Government has failed to show by ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence either (1) that' facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship.” 364 U. S., at 355. The efforts to make this formulation the test for materiality have not met with notable success. Not only have the Courts of Appeals failed to arrive at a single interpretation (compare United States v. Riela, 337 F. 2d 986 (CA3 1964), and United States v. Rossi, 299 F. 2d 650 (CA9 1962), with Kassab v. INS, 364 F. 2d 806 (CA6 1966), and Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F. 2d 642 (CA1 1961)), but our one attempt to dispel their confusion, see Fedorenko, 449 U. S., at 521, n. 4 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment), seemingly ^produced at least three variants'on this Court, see id., at 508-509; id., at 523-526 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 528-530 (White, J., dissenting); id., at 536-538 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

With the wisdom of experience, we now conclude that the attempts to construct a standard from the Chaunt dicta have been both unnecessary and unfortunate. The term “material” in § 1451(a) is not a hapax legomenon. Its use in the context of false statements to public officials goes back as far as Lord Coke, who defined the crime of perjury as follows:

“Perjury is a crime committed, when a lawful oath is ministred by any that hath authority, to any person, in any judicial proceeding, who sweareth absolutely, and falsly in a matter material to the issue, or cause in question, by their own act, or by the subornation of others.” 3 E. Coke, Institutes 164 (6th ed. 1680).

Blackstone used the same term, writing that in order to constitute “the crime of wilful and corrupt perjury” the false statement “must be in some point material to the question in dispute; for if it only be in some trifling collateral circumstance, to which no regard is paid,” it is not punishable. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *137. See also 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 27, § 8, p. 433 (Curwood ed. 1824). Given these common-law antecedents, it is unsurprising that a number of federal statutes criminalizing false statements to public officials use the term “material.” The most prominent of these is perhaps 18 U. S. C. § 1001, which makes unlawful willful concealment of material facts in any matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States. The federal courts have long displayed a quite uniform understanding of the “materiality” concept as embodied in such statutes. See, e. g., Gonzales v. United States, 286 F. 2d 118, 122 (CA10) (construing 18 U. S. C. § 1001), cert. denied, 365 U. S. 878 (1961); Weinstock v. United States, 97 U. S. App. D. C. 365, 367-368, and n. 6, 231 F. 2d 699, 701-702, and n. 6 (1956) (same); Blackmon v. United States, 108 F. 2d 572, 573 (CA5 1940) (construing language now codified at 18 U. S. C. § 1621); Carroll v. United States, 16 F. 2d 951, 953 (CA2) (same), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 763 (1927); United States v. Lardieri, 497 F. 2d 317, 319 (CA3 1974) (construing 18 U. S. C. § 1623); United States v. Koonce, 485 F. 2d 374, 380 (CA8 1973) (same). The most common formulation of that understanding is that a concealment or misrepresentation is material if it “has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of” the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed. See, e. g., Weinstock v. United States, supra, at 367-368, 231 F. 2d at, 701-702; United States v. Corsino, 812 F. 2d 26, 30-31 (CA1 1987) (citing cases). While we have before us here a statute revoking citizenship rather than imposing criminal fine or imprisonment, neither the evident objective sought to be achieved by the materiality requirement, nor the gravity of the consequences that follow from its being met, is so different as to justify adoption of a different standard. “Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under either equity or the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.” NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U. S. 322, 329 (1981). See also Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42-43 (1979).

One might perhaps view the Chaunt test as not a repudiation of the established meaning of “material,” but as an attempt to craft a more precise test for what constitutes “a natural tendency to influence” a naturalization decision. Surely, however, there is no less need for precision in the criminal context than in the denaturalization context. The more general formulation is preferable there, as we think it is here, because the judgment in question does not lend itself to mechanical resolution. The disagreement between the District Court and the Court of Appeals in Fedorenko turned on whether the Chaunt test required that, had the truth been told, an investigation would have resulted which would have disclosed disqualifying facts, or rather that an investigation would have resulted which might have disclosed disqualifying facts. Fedorenko, supra, at 528 (White, J., dissenting). But if the ultimate question is “natural tendency to influence,” it would seem to make little difference whether the probabilities of investigation and resulting disclosure, respectively, are 100%-20%, 20%-100%, 51%-51%, or even 30%-30%. It has never been the test of materiality that the misrepresentation or concealment would more likely than not have produced an erroneous decision, or even that it would more likely than not have triggered an investigation. Thus, while the Chaunt formulation may be an adequate explanation of why the misrepresentation in that case was judged not to have had a natural tendency to influence the decision, it does not necessarily facilitate judgment in the infinite variety of other factual patterns that may emerge — which is perhaps why we did not employ it in Costello a year later. We think it safer in the naturalization context, as elsewhere, to fix as our guide the central object of the inquiry: whether the misrepresentation or concealment was predictably capable of affecting, i. e., had a natural tendency to affect, the official decision. The official decision in question, of course, is whether the applicant meets the requirements for citizenship, so that the test more specifically is whether the misrepreservation or concealment had a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified. This test must be met, of course, by evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and convincing. See, e. g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 158 (1943). Though this formulation may seem less verbally precise than Chaunt, in application it may well produce greater uniformity, since judges are accustomed to using it, and can consult a large body of case precedent.

We hold, therefore, that the test of whether Kungys’ concealments or misrepresentations were material is whether they had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. To determine the effect of this holding upon our disposition of the present case, we must first consider whether materiality under § 1451(a) is an issue of law, which we may decide for ourselves, or one of fact, which must be decided by the trial court. Here again we see no reason not to follow what has been done with the materiality requirement under other statutes dealing with misrepresentations to public officers. “[T]he materiality of what is falsely sworn, when an element in the crime of perjury, is one for the court.” Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 298 (1929). As the Sixth Circuit has said in a case involving 18 U. S. C. § 1001:

“[Although the materiality of a statement rests upon a factual evidentiary showing, the ultimate finding of materiality turns on an interpretation of substantive law. Since it is the court’s responsibility to interpret the substantive law, we believe [it is proper to treat] the issue of materiality as a legal question.” United States v. Abadi, 706 F. 2d 178, 180, cert. denied, 464 U. S. 821 (1983).

B

We turn, then, to whether the one misrepresentation on which the trial court’s finding was considered and upheld by the Third Circuit — misrepresentation of the date and place of Kungys’ birth — was material under the foregoing test.⁶ As discussed earlier, Kungys made that misrepresentation in both the 1947 visa proceeding and the 1954 naturalization proceeding. But insofar as application of the “concealment or misrepresentation” clause of § 1451(a) is concerned, we find it improper to address the 1947 episode. Unlike § 1101(f)(6), which covers false testimony “for the purpose of obtaining any benefits” under the immigration and naturalization laws, the “concealment or misrepresentation” clause of § 1451(a) applies only where the “order and certificate of naturalization . . . were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” Procurement of other benefits, including visas, is not covered. Especially in light of this contrast with § 1101(f)(6), we are unpersuaded by the Government’s argument that a misrepresentation in the visa proceeding “procures” the naturalization because it obtains United States residence, which in turn is a prerequisite to naturalization, see 8 U. S. C. § 1429. The same argument could be made with respect to a misrepresentation that effects free enrollment in a reading course, which produces the prerequisite of English literacy, see 8 U. S. C. § 1423.⁷ Such analysis stretches the “concealment or misrepresentation” clause of § 1451(a) beyond its intent, which we think is limited to falsehoods or deceptions in the naturalization proceeding.⁸

Looking, therefore, solely to the question whether Kungys’ misrepresentation of the date and place of his birth in his naturalization petition was material within the meaning of § 1451(a), we conclude that it was not. There has been no suggestion that those facts were themselves relevant to his qualifications for citizenship. Even though they were not, the misrepresentation of them would have a natural tendency to influence the citizenship determination, and thus be a misrepresentation of material facts, if the true date and place of birth would predictably have disclosed other facts relevant to his qualifications.⁹ But not even that has been found here. The Third Circuit merely held:

“[H]ad [Kungys] told the truth at the time he applied for his citizenship, the discrepancies between the truth and his visa materials would have resulted in either a field investigation or an outright denial of the petition. Had an investigation transpired, . . . such investigation probably would have resulted in a denial of the petition since it would have tended to prove his ineligibility for a visa in the first instance. In this case, as previously noted, the defendant’s claim of persecution by the Nazis —which is directly related to eligibility — would be called into question.” 793 F. 2d, at 533.

It seems to us not so clear that, had Kungys explained his earlier misstatement of date and place of birth as he has here, see n. 5, supra, the discrepancy would likely have produced either “outright denial” or an investigation, or that an investigation would have produced the described outcome.¹⁰ But even a high probability that one or another of those consequences would have resulted from the discrepancy does not establish that Kungys’ misrepresentation was material. Section 1451(a) imposes denaturalization for “concealment of a material fact” (emphasis added); and the materiality requirement implicit in the misrepresentation provision likewise relates to misrepresentation of a material fact. Thus, for purposes of determining the natural tendency of a misrepresentation to affect a decision under § 1451(a), what is relevant is what would have ensued from official knowledge of the misrepresented fact (in this case, Kungys’ true date and place of birth), not what would have ensued from official knowledge of inconsistency between a posited assertion of the truth and an earlier assertion of falsehood. On the basis of the Third Circuit’s reasoning, a misrepresentation that, in and of itself, is utterly immaterial both in the visa proceeding and in the naturalization proceeding, becomes material simply because it is repeated in both. That is not what the statute intends. What must have a natural tendency to influence the official decision is the misrepresentation itself, not the failure to create an inconsistency with an earlier misrepresentation; the failure to state the truth, not the failure to state what had been stated earlier. The Government has failed to establish clearly, unequivocally, and convincingly that Kungys’ misrepresentation of the date and place of his birth had this natural tendency.

We leave it to the Third Circuit on remand to determine whether the other misrepresentations or concealments that the District Court found to have been made in 1954 were supported by the evidence and material to the naturalization decision under the standard we have described — bearing in mind the unusually high burden of proof in denaturalization cases. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 670 (1944); Schneiderman, 320 U. S., at 158. If so, it will have to reach the fourth § 1451(a) issue described in our earlier analysis: whether Kungys “procured” his citizenship by means of those misrepresentations or concealments. That requirement demands, first of all, that citizenship be obtained as a result of the application process in which the misrepresentations or concealments were made. The difficult question, and that on which we part company with Justice Stevens’ opinion concurring in the judgment, is what it demands beyond that. We do not agree with petitioner’s contention that it requires the Government to establish that naturalization would not have been granted if the misrepresentations or concealments had not occurred. If such a “but for” causation requirement existed in § 1451(a), it is most unlikely that a materiality requirement would have been added as well — requiring, in addition to distortion of the decision, a natural tendency to distort the decision. Moreover, the difficulty of establishing “but for” causality, by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence many years after the fact, is so great that we cannot conceive that Congress intended such a burden to be met before a material misrepresentation could be sanctioned. We do think, however, that the “procured by” language can and should be given some effect beyond the mere requirement that the misrepresentation have been made in the application proceeding. Proof of materiality can sometimes be regarded as establishing a rebuttable presumption. See, e. g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, 245-249 (1988). Though the “procured by” language of the present statute cannot be read to require proof of disqualification, we think it can be read to express the notion that one who obtained his citizenship in a proceeding where he made material misrepresentations was presumably disqualified. The importance of the rights at issue leads us to conclude that the naturalized citizen should be able to refute that presumption, and avoid the consequence of denaturalization, by showing, through a preponderance of the evidence, that the statutory requirement as to which the misrepresentation had a natural tendency to produce a favorable decision was in fact met.¹¹ Such a construction gives ample meaning to both the “materiality” and “procured by” requirements.

Justice Stevens’ concurrence would adopt a requirement of “but for” causality, emphasizing the necessity that the Government establish, at least, that the misrepresenting applicant was in fact not qualified to be naturalized. This emphasis highlights another difficulty with “but for” causality: that requirement is simply not a conceivable construction of the “procured by misrepresentation” provision of § 1451(a) if one adheres, as Justice Stevens’ concurrence purports to do, see post, at 795-796, to our holding in Fedorenko that even without any misrepresentation the applicant’s failure to meet a statutory requirement for naturalization subjects him to denaturalization under the “illegally procured” provision of § 1451(a). Fedorenko, 449 U. S., at 506-507, 514-515.¹² Thus, Justice Stevens’ concurrence’s construction violates the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant. See, e. g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392 (1979); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307-308 (1961); United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955). It makes nonsense of the statute to say that its misrepresentation provision can only be the basis of denaturalization if the Government establishes in addition a factor that is itself, without misrepresentation, a basis for denaturalization anyway. On Justice Stevens’ concurrence’s reading, the law says, in effect: Citizenship you obtain by lying may be revoked, but only for a reason other than lying. This is likely to have the congressionally desired deterrent effect upon only the most dim-witted of prevaricators. But worse than making an enigma of the statute, Justice Stevens’ concurrence’s position makes a scandal of the results the statute achieves: Proof that an applicant lied when he said he was not an SS officer at Dachau would not suffice for denaturalization without clear, unequivocal, and convincing proof — after 40 years of disappearing evidence — that he was guilty of war crimes.

Ill

The United States argues, as an alternative basis for affirming the Third Circuit’s upholding of denaturalization, that Kungys’ misrepresentations, made under oath and in the form of forged documents, rendered his citizenship “illegally procured” under 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(f)(6), 1427(a)(3), and 1451(a). As discussed earlier, the alleged ground of “illegal procurement” is that Kungys lacked the requisite good moral character in 1954, at the time of his naturalization, because he had given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining benefits in both the visa and naturalization proceedings, in violation of § 1101(f)(6). In connection with this aspect of the judgment, we address only the issue considered (and resolved in the affirmative) by the Third Circuit: whether § 1101(f)(6) contains a materiality requirement for false testimony. We hold that it does not.

Under 8 U. S. C. § 1101(f)(6), a person shall be deemed not to be of good moral character if he “has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining” immigration or naturalization benefits. On its face, § 1101(f)(6) does not distinguish between material and immaterial misrepresentations. Literally read, it denominates a person to be of bad moral character on account of having given false testimony if he has told even the most immaterial of lies with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration or naturalization benefits. We think it means precisely what it says.

The absence of a materiality requirement in § 1101(f)(6) can be explained by the fact that its primary purpose is not (like § 1451(a)) to prevent false pertinent data from being introduced into the naturalization process (and to correct the result of the proceedings where that has occured), but to identify lack of good moral character. The latter appears to some degree whenever there is a subjective intent to deceive, no matter how immaterial the deception. A literal reading of the statute does not produce draconian results, for several reasons. First, “testimony” is limited to oral statements made under oath. The United States concedes that it does not include “other types of misrepresentations or concealments, such as falsified documents or statements not made under oath.” Supplemental Brief for United States 3. See, e. g., Sharaiha v. Hoy, 169 F. Supp. 598, 601 (SD Cal. 1959); Matter of Ngan, 10 I. & N. Dec. 725, 726 (1964); Matter of G — L—T—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 403, 404-405 (1959). See also Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U. S. 592, 599 (1913). Second, § 1101(f)(6) applies to only those misrepresentations made with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits. As the Government acknowledges:

“It is only dishonesty accompanied by this precise intent that Congress found morally unacceptable. Willful misrepresentations made for other reasons, such as embarrassment, fear, or a desire for privacy, were not deemed sufficiently culpable to brand the applicant as someone who lacks good moral character.” Supplemental Brief for United States 12.

Obviously, it will be relatively rare that the Government will be able to prove that a misrepresentation that does not have the natural tendency to influence the decision regarding immigration or naturalization benefits was nonetheless made with the subjective intent of obtaining those benefits. This is especially so since the invalidating intent, like all other factual matters necessary to support denaturalization, must be proved by “‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence which does not leave ‘the issue in doubt.’” Schneiderman, 320 U. S., at 158. Third, unlike the misrepresentation clause of § 1451(a), the false testimony provisions of § 1101(f)(6) do not apply to “concealments.” With all these built-in limitations, and given the evident purpose of the provision, we see no reason for straining to avoid its natural meaning.

Justice Stevens would read a materiality requirement into § 1101(f) because in his view “[t]here is no ‘material’ distinction,” post, at 797, between the language of that provision and the language of § 10 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA), which we found to contain a materiality requirement in Fedorenko. We think there is a world of difference between the two. First, the texts of the statutes are significantly different. Section 10 of the DPA uses the phrase “willfully make a misrepresentation.” Our conclusion in Fedorenko that this contains a materiality requirement was grounded in the word “misrepresentation,” which has been held to have that implication in many contexts — as the name of the common-law tort of misrepresentation (which requires a material falsehood) adequately demonstrates. Section 1101(f), by contrast, uses the phrase “giv[e] false testimony.” While we do not say that statutory use of the term “false” or “falsity” can never imply a requirement of materiality, such a requirement is at least not so commonly associated with that term as it is with misrepresentation. In fact, we recently described falsity and materiality as separate requirements of misrepresentation, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S., at 238, 239-240, n. 17. Second, the statutory provisions differ in their purpose and their relationship to other provisions in their respective statutory schemes. Section 10 of the DPA, like the willful misrepresentation provision of § 1451(a), is a freestanding provision having no apparent purpose but to punish and thereby deter misrepresentation in the immigration process. Section 1101(f)(6), on the other hand, is part of a definition of what constitutes a lack of “good moral character” for purposes of qualifying for immigration. More importantly, § 10 is the only provision treating misrepresentation in the DPA, whereas § 1101(f)(6) must be reconciled with the willful misrepresentation provision of § 1451(a). That seems to us ill achieved by reading the two differently worded provisions (or, as the concurrence would have it, three differently worded provisions, see, supra, at 777-779) to be redundant.

Accordingly, it is clear that the Third Circuit erred in importing a materiality requirement into § 1101(f)(6). Nevertheless, we cannot affirm denaturalization under that section because the question whether any misrepresentation made by Kungys constituted “false testimony for the purpose of obtaining” immigration or naturalization benefits cannot be answered without resolving an additional question of law and an additional question of fact. The former, which we choose not to resolve ourselves, since the case must be remanded in any event, is whether Kungys’ misrepresentations constituted “testimony.” The latter, which must be resolved by the trier of fact, is whether in making the misrepresentations Kungys possessed the subjective intent of thereby obtaining immigration or naturalization benefits. See generally Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 288 (1982) (issues of intent are factual matters for the trier of fact); Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U. S. 630, 634-635 (1967). We are unpersuaded by the United States’ argument that Kungys’ so-called pattern of lies establishes the illegal subjective intent of his alleged false testimony as a matter of law.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is- so ordered.

Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

1 Section 1451(a) provides in pertinent part:

“(a) It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any court specified in subsection (a) of section 1421 of this title in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation . . . .”

2 Section 1427(a) provides:

“No person, except as otherwise provided in this subehapter, shall be naturalized unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his petition for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State in which the petitioner filed the petition for at least six months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the petition up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.”

3 Section 1101(f)(6) provides in pertinent part:

“(f) For the purposes of this chapter—

No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established, is, or was —

(6) one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter.”

4 Those questions were:

“‘(1) Whether petitioner is subject to denaturalization for want of good moral character under 8 U. S. C. §§ 1451(a), 1427(a), and 1101(f)(6), with particular attention to:

“‘(a) whether the “false testimony” provision of 8 U. S. C. § 1101(f)(6) should be interpreted to include a requirement that the false testimony concern a material fact;

“ ‘(b) what standards should govern the determination under 8 U. S. C. § 1101(f)(6) whether “false testimony” has been given “for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter ....”; and

“ ‘(e) whether the latter determination is one of law or fact.

“ ‘(2)(a) Should the materiality standard articulated in Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 (1960), be abandoned and, if so, what standard should govern the materiality inquiry under 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a); and

“‘(b) is the determination of materiality under 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a) one of law or fact.

“‘(3) When a misrepresentation has been established as “material” within the meaning of 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a), must any further showing be made to establish that citizenship was “procured by” that misrepresentation.’” 483 U. S. 1017.

5 The Government asserted that the purpose of the misrepresentations was to distance Kungys from Kedainiai, where atrocities had occurred, and to make it more difficult to identify him as one of the perpetrators. Kungys contended that even greater atrocities had occurred in the city he falsely listed as his birthplace; and that the age difference (two years) was of little consequence for identification purposes. Kungys asserted that he had lied concerning his date and place of birth in obtaining identity documents from the Nazis to go from Lithuania to Germany — the purpose of the dissembling at that time being to place him above the age of conscription and to avoid the risk of persecution for his participation in the Lithuanian resistance movement. (Vydaudas Yidiekunas, a leader of the Resistance movement validated Kungys’ account of his participation.) Kungys asserted that in applying for his visa he simply repeated the information contained on his identity documents, believing the falsities inconsequential for United States immigration purposes; and that with similar belief he conformed his naturalization petition to his visa application.

6 Although as Justice White observes there is no requirement that we focus only on this one misrepresentation, post, at 809, it is not our normal practice to consider fact-bound legal consequences of contested district court findings not yet reviewed by the court of appeals.

7 Justice White considers the prospect of such coverage “foolish. Post, at 808. As a policy matter it assuredly is, which is precisely why we use it as an example. Justice White fails to establish, however, how language requiring that the “order and certificate of naturalization [be] . . . procured by . . . misrepresentation” can conceivably be interpreted to exclude this example while yet including the misrepresentation at the visa stage which (we concede) would not as a policy matter be foolish. It is not our function to construct prudent policy except within the confines of the statutory text.

8 It is a quite different question, not argued here, whether, under the statutes governing the issuance of visas in 1947, Kungys’ misrepresentations or concealments at that time rendered his visa invalid, thus causing his United States residence to be unlawful, and (since lawful residence is a requirement of naturalization) his naturalization to be “illegally procured” under that separate provision of § 1451(a). See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 509 (1981).

9 Justice Stevens minimizes the substance of what we require by describing it as no more than a showing “by clear and convincing evidence that the true facts would have led to further investigation.” Post, at 793. But further investigation would not occur — and its predictability could assuredly not be clear and convincing — if the facts at issue were not such as gave cause to believe that the applicant was not qualified. We are not talking about investigations by detective hobbyists, but by public officials seeking only evidence concerning citizenship qualifications.

10 We note in this regard that there was a factual dispute whether those who had been victims of Nazi persecution were given priority for non-preference visas. Although the District Court apparently found the evidence on this point inconclusive, 571 F. Supp. 1104, 1137, n. 7 (NJ 1983), the Court of Appeals resolved the dispute in the Government’s favor. We do not believe that resolution is the only one that could be drawn from the record, and thus conclude that the Court of Appeals improperly made a finding on a disputed question of fact. See Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U. S. 709 (1986).

11 The italicized language in this sentence is ignored by the statement in Justice Stevens’ concurrence that we require the applicant to “refute the existence of every disqualifying fact that might have been revealed by an investigation.” Post, at 793 (emphasis added).

Justice Stevens is correct that “even demonstrating that there is a completely innocent explanation for the misrepresentation would not be sufficient” always to prevent a finding of procurement by willful misrepresentation. Ibid. Sometimes it might, however, since it is certainly one of the factors that the court can take into account in determining whether the applicant has established that the disqualifying fact relevant to the misrepresentation did not exist. In any case, it will assuredly be rare that a lie which has been shown, clearly, unequivocally, and convincingly, to have a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified, will have a “completely innocent explanation.”

12 Justice Stevens’ concurrence avoids this difficulty by saying that Fedorenko does not apply to “insignificant,” or “trivia[l],” or “technical!]” requirements. Post, at 799-800, n. 11. Apart from the less than precise character of this qualification, it is nowhere to be found in Fedorenko, which said:

“At the same time, our cases have also recognized that there must be strict compliance with all the eongressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship. Failure to comply with any of these conditions renders the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally procured,’ and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside.” 449 U. S., at 506 (emphasis added).

It is, moreover, difficult to see how any willful misrepresentation regarding compliance with a naturalization requirement, no matter how technical that requirement, can be considered merely an “insignificant” or “trivial” violation for purposes of determining whether citizenship has been unlawfully procured. Thus, even by amending Fedorenko Justice Stevens has not succeeded in showing how the willful misrepresentation provision, interpreted as he would prefer, would do anything not already achieved by the “illegally procured” provision.