BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring in the Court’s judgment.
I agree with the majority that the public trust doctrine applies to state-owned submerged lands within the state. I also agree with the majority’s general discussion of the doctrine. On rehearing I now agree with the majority’s application of that doctrine to the facts of this case.
I.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that case law in other states has uniformly required that state-owned submerged lands be alienated or encumbered only for public purposes. See Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979) (fill may be for non-water related purposes so long as public need for project outweighs interference with traditional trust purposes); State v. Public Service Commission, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73-74 (1957) (“In [upholding a grant of an interest in submerged lands], we attach importance to these facts: (1) Public bodies will control the use of the area. (2) The area will be devoted to public purposes and open to the public.... (4) No one of the public uses of the lake ... will be destroyed or greatly impaired. (5) The disappointment of those members of the public who may desire to boat, fish or swim in the area to be filled is negligible when compared with the greater convenience to be afforded those members of the public who use the city park.”); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal.3d 515, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362, 373 (1980) (“[T]he principle we apply is that the interests of the public are paramount in property that is still physically adaptable for trust uses ....”); see generally The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law. and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 181 (1980). A true public purpose in this case is here very difficult to find. Unfortunately, although the majority adopts a public trust doctrine which apparently includes a public purpose requirement, the majority opinion does not provide a convincing analysis of the public purpose fulfilled by granting the encroachment permit to the private yacht club.
An intimation of KEA’s brief, to some extent supported by the record, and a proposition which in turn seems to have escaped the attention of the hearing officer, the Director, the district court, and now this Court, is that the real public purpose here being served, if such it be, is that there will be a substantial number of sailboats henceforth missing from their “moorages” on trailers parked on driveways in the City of Spokane and throughout Spokane County, while a commensurate number of Idaho sailboat owners, less affluent perhaps, or not one of the 112 yacht club members, will continue trailering their boats back and forth from home to public launching pads. Perhaps the neighorboring state of Washington, if asked to give moorage on the Hood Canal, would be as kind to Idaho people. Perhaps the commands of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the federal constitution precludes such concerns.
The hearing officer and the director of the Department of Lands found that the encroachment would not interfere with nav[634]*634igation or impair visual aesthetics on the lake, although it would interfere with fishing in the area. Under the public trust doctrine, however, the state must demonstrate not only that certain public uses will not be interfered with or only minimally interfered with; it must demonstrate that the purpose for the encumbrance of the state-owned lands is in fact a public one. In this regard the only findings by the hearing officer and director relevant to public purpose were: (1) “an economic need exists as evidenced by unrefuted testimony because sailboat moorage is not available on Lake Coeur d’Alene except after a long wait, seasonal rentals for 1978 was [sic] $450 to $500, and because demand for rental moorage exceeds the supply,” and (2) “the use is an alternative to rental at established commercial marinas, and each slip will be individually owned and ... the operation is quasi-commercial albeit proposed by a nonprofit organization.”
If in fact the moorage at the yacht club would be open to the public, or if the moor-age were available for term rentals on a lottery, or on a first-come, first-serve basis, I would outright agree that the club serves a public purpose. I am not this day brought to say that this exclusive private yacht club will serve a public purpose. Where there is no evidence that a like facility will later be allowed, it would be extremely difficult to join the majority view. Following the granting of a rehearing, and further briefing and argument, I see considerable merit in the more relaxed view expressed by Justice Shepard in his opinion of July 8, 1982, which today brings me to concur in the Court’s judgment although I decline to join the majority opinion. Justice Shepard earlier wrote the following, which was earlier concurred in by Chief Justice Donaldson, and which I now deferentially adopt as my view — that we do review a very de minimus situation.
“Further I note that the lower court in essence found that the proposal of Panhandle Yacht Club would be a ‘public purpose.’ I do not disagree, although in my opinion it is of an extremely limited sort. That court found that the facility was to. be used by ‘large numbers of people’ and that there was a ‘reasonable expectation of frequent changes in membership.’ Of perhaps more significance are the findings indicating the limited numbers of, and pressures for, dockage and moorage facilities for recreational boats on Lake Coeur d’Alene. It was indicated that the facilities of Panhandle would, to some extent, relieve the pressure on other commercial and totally public facilities, thereby giving the public more access to dockage and mooring facilities.
“Hence, I believe that when such a limited ‘public’ use is measured against the limited infringement upon the remaining public uses, there is no violation of the trust doctrine. It is probable, in my mind at least, that if Panhandle’s use were less ‘public’ then the same infringement would not be permitted. It would appear to me that the greater the benefits received by the public, the more encroachment and the more leeway the courts should allow inhibiting the public trust. Conversely, a greater encroachment with less benefit to the public, the more loath the courts should be to permit such intrusion onto the public trust.”
II.
I recognize, of course, that docks and moorages are aids to navigation. In the seminal public trust case, Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892), the Supreme Court stated:
“It [title to submerged lands] is a title held in trust for the people of the State, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long
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BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring in the Court’s judgment.
I agree with the majority that the public trust doctrine applies to state-owned submerged lands within the state. I also agree with the majority’s general discussion of the doctrine. On rehearing I now agree with the majority’s application of that doctrine to the facts of this case.
I.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that case law in other states has uniformly required that state-owned submerged lands be alienated or encumbered only for public purposes. See Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979) (fill may be for non-water related purposes so long as public need for project outweighs interference with traditional trust purposes); State v. Public Service Commission, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73-74 (1957) (“In [upholding a grant of an interest in submerged lands], we attach importance to these facts: (1) Public bodies will control the use of the area. (2) The area will be devoted to public purposes and open to the public.... (4) No one of the public uses of the lake ... will be destroyed or greatly impaired. (5) The disappointment of those members of the public who may desire to boat, fish or swim in the area to be filled is negligible when compared with the greater convenience to be afforded those members of the public who use the city park.”); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal.3d 515, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362, 373 (1980) (“[T]he principle we apply is that the interests of the public are paramount in property that is still physically adaptable for trust uses ....”); see generally The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law. and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 181 (1980). A true public purpose in this case is here very difficult to find. Unfortunately, although the majority adopts a public trust doctrine which apparently includes a public purpose requirement, the majority opinion does not provide a convincing analysis of the public purpose fulfilled by granting the encroachment permit to the private yacht club.
An intimation of KEA’s brief, to some extent supported by the record, and a proposition which in turn seems to have escaped the attention of the hearing officer, the Director, the district court, and now this Court, is that the real public purpose here being served, if such it be, is that there will be a substantial number of sailboats henceforth missing from their “moorages” on trailers parked on driveways in the City of Spokane and throughout Spokane County, while a commensurate number of Idaho sailboat owners, less affluent perhaps, or not one of the 112 yacht club members, will continue trailering their boats back and forth from home to public launching pads. Perhaps the neighorboring state of Washington, if asked to give moorage on the Hood Canal, would be as kind to Idaho people. Perhaps the commands of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the federal constitution precludes such concerns.
The hearing officer and the director of the Department of Lands found that the encroachment would not interfere with nav[634]*634igation or impair visual aesthetics on the lake, although it would interfere with fishing in the area. Under the public trust doctrine, however, the state must demonstrate not only that certain public uses will not be interfered with or only minimally interfered with; it must demonstrate that the purpose for the encumbrance of the state-owned lands is in fact a public one. In this regard the only findings by the hearing officer and director relevant to public purpose were: (1) “an economic need exists as evidenced by unrefuted testimony because sailboat moorage is not available on Lake Coeur d’Alene except after a long wait, seasonal rentals for 1978 was [sic] $450 to $500, and because demand for rental moorage exceeds the supply,” and (2) “the use is an alternative to rental at established commercial marinas, and each slip will be individually owned and ... the operation is quasi-commercial albeit proposed by a nonprofit organization.”
If in fact the moorage at the yacht club would be open to the public, or if the moor-age were available for term rentals on a lottery, or on a first-come, first-serve basis, I would outright agree that the club serves a public purpose. I am not this day brought to say that this exclusive private yacht club will serve a public purpose. Where there is no evidence that a like facility will later be allowed, it would be extremely difficult to join the majority view. Following the granting of a rehearing, and further briefing and argument, I see considerable merit in the more relaxed view expressed by Justice Shepard in his opinion of July 8, 1982, which today brings me to concur in the Court’s judgment although I decline to join the majority opinion. Justice Shepard earlier wrote the following, which was earlier concurred in by Chief Justice Donaldson, and which I now deferentially adopt as my view — that we do review a very de minimus situation.
“Further I note that the lower court in essence found that the proposal of Panhandle Yacht Club would be a ‘public purpose.’ I do not disagree, although in my opinion it is of an extremely limited sort. That court found that the facility was to. be used by ‘large numbers of people’ and that there was a ‘reasonable expectation of frequent changes in membership.’ Of perhaps more significance are the findings indicating the limited numbers of, and pressures for, dockage and moorage facilities for recreational boats on Lake Coeur d’Alene. It was indicated that the facilities of Panhandle would, to some extent, relieve the pressure on other commercial and totally public facilities, thereby giving the public more access to dockage and mooring facilities.
“Hence, I believe that when such a limited ‘public’ use is measured against the limited infringement upon the remaining public uses, there is no violation of the trust doctrine. It is probable, in my mind at least, that if Panhandle’s use were less ‘public’ then the same infringement would not be permitted. It would appear to me that the greater the benefits received by the public, the more encroachment and the more leeway the courts should allow inhibiting the public trust. Conversely, a greater encroachment with less benefit to the public, the more loath the courts should be to permit such intrusion onto the public trust.”
II.
I recognize, of course, that docks and moorages are aids to navigation. In the seminal public trust case, Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892), the Supreme Court stated:
“It [title to submerged lands] is a title held in trust for the people of the State, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long [635]*635as their disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can be made to the grants. It is grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters, that may afford foundation for wharves, piers, docks, and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with the trust to the public upon which such lands are held by the state.” 146 U.S. at 452,13 S.Ct. at 118 (emphasis added).
It is clear from the quoted language that grants in aid of navigation are permissible so long as they are in aid of public navigation; grants in aid of the navigation of a small, exclusive class of yacht owners do not satisfy the public purpose requirement. The legislature has recognized this distinction in I.C. § 67-4304, which provides:
“Priest, Pend d’Oreille, and Coeur d’Alene Lakes — Appropriation of waters in trust for people. — The governor is hereby authorized and directed to appropriate in trust for the people of the state of Idaho all the unappropriated water of Priest, Pend d’Oreille and Coeur d’Alene Lakes or so much thereof as may be necessary to preserve said lakes in their present condition. The preservation of said water in said lakes for scenic beauty, health, recreation, transportation and commercial purposes necessary and desirable for all the inhabitants of the state is hereby declared to be a beneficial use of such water.
“No fee shall be required in connection with said appropriation by the governor or the permit issued in connection therewith, and no proof of completion of any works of diversion shall be required, but license shall issue at any time upon proof of beneficial use to which said waters are now devoted.
“Each succeeding governor in office shall be deemed to be a holder of such permit, in trust for the people of the state.” (Emphasis added.)
Yacht club membership is limited; members of the public are not allowed to use the yacht club facilities. Memberships become available to the public only upon the whim of existing members who wish to sell their membership; the fee is not inexpensive. I cannot see how this can be a beneficial use, as defined in I.C. § 67-4304, that the waters of the lake be preserved for “commercial purposes necessary and desirable for all the inhabitants of the state ... . ” At the best, the club moorage may produce some incidental benefits for the other boaters on the lake by reducing the number of boats riding at anchor in a widespread area, but this was not recognized as a purpose by the state in granting the lease. In short, a private yacht club is not a commercial purpose that is necessary and desirable for all the inhabitants of the state. Neither is it a public purpose which is within the power of the state to grant under its trust duties to the public which it serves.
III.
Finally, I want to emphasize that small and reasonable private navigational encroachments of riparian owners necessary for their recreational enjoyment of their own property and the waters to which that property is appurtenant do not violate the public trust doctrine. The degree of intrusion is minimal and the public’s access to and use of the beds and waters is not improperly disturbed.
I.C. § 58-142 establishes a state system for regulating all encroachments upon navigable lakes. It provides:
“Encroachment on navigable lakes — Legislative intent. — The legislature of the state of Idaho hereby declares that the public health, interest, safety and welfare requires that all encroachments upon, in or above the beds or waters of navigable lakes of the state be regulated in order that the protection of property, navigation, fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water quality be given due consideration and weighed against the navigational or [636]*636economic necessity or justification for, or benefit to be derived from the proposed encroachment. No encroachment on, in or above the beds or waters of any navigable lake in the state shall hereafter be made unless approval therefor has been given as provided in this act.”
The regulatory scheme, however, distinguishes between encroachments for private (noncommercial) purposes and encroachment for commercial purposes. I.C. § 58-146 provides in part:
“Noncommercial navigational encroachments — Procedures—Repairs—Forms.— (a) Applications for construction, enlargement or replacement of navigational encroachments not extending beyond the line of navigability nor intended primarily for commercial use shall be processed by the board with a minimum of procedural requirements and shall not be denied nor appearance required except in the most unusual of circumstances or if the proposed encroachment infringes upon or it appears it may infringe upon the riparian or littoral rights of an adjacent property owner.”
This provision, the constitutionality of which may some day be before the Court, seemingly in a negative manner simply restates the pre-existing case law recognizing the right of riparian owners to wharf out, but not to the point where infringement is made upon other rights. The prerequisites to obtaining a permit for a commercial encroachment, however, are extensive. See I.C. § 58-147. Implicit in this regulatory scheme is the legislative recognition of the fact that private, noncommercial encroachments, if such they are, as a general matter involve very little intrusion upon the public’s interest, and allow aesthetic and recreational use of the lake by the riparian owner, who apparently is by the legislature left unfettered by the stringent requirements of would-be commercial enterprises. Commercial developments such as the yacht club, however, receive an economic benefit at the expense of the general public which uses the waters encroached upon. The distinction made by the legislature in this regard is consistent with the traditional public trust doctrine.