Hallows, C. J.
Both parties agree the issue is whether a volunteer fireman crossing a highway on foot while in the course of acting as a fireman engaged in a search for a reported fire is to be held to a lesser standard of care for his own safety than that which is imposed upon an ordinary highway pedestrian. A request for an instruction to the jury to that effect was made and refused by the trial court as being inapplicable on the facts. Although the finding by the trial court of negligence on the part of Alfred H. Knutter as a matter of law is not assigned as an error, the question of the standard of care is properly raised because of the effect such instruction would have on the comparison of negligence by the jury. See Lovesee v. Allied Development Corp. (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 340, 173 N. W. 2d 196.
Mr. Knutter was a volunteer fireman and the chief of the fire department of Pleasant Prairie in Kenosha county. On October 6, 1969, between 1:30 and 2 o’clock in the afternoon a call came to the fire department reporting a grass fire in the vicinity of Rabs Motel, south of Kenosha on State Highway 32. The call was transferred to the volunteer firemen who proceeded to the area. Chief Knutter was picked up by John Koker, a volunteer fireman, and taken to the Rabs Motel. Koker parked the car facing south on the west side of State Highway 32 across from the Rabs Motel. Shortly after Koker’s arrival he [754]*754was joined by Kenneth Miller who parked his Volkswagen behind Koker’s car.
Knutter left Koker’s automobile and proceeded across State Highway 32 to the east to speak to a woman at the motel regarding the location of the fire. After a short conversation, Knutter started back across the highway. Koker called to Knutter and indicated a fire truck was approaching from the south. At approximately the same time the automobile driven by Bakalarski was approaching from the north. Bakalarski testified he first saw Knutter 200 to 300 feet away and at that time Knutter was going east. Bakalarski next saw Knutter when the left front of his automobile hit Knutter when Knutter was a few feet west of the center of the highway. Baka-larski saw the two automobiles parked on the west shoulder but apparently not their flashing red lights. He continued at a constant rate of speed of 40 to 45 miles an hour without the application of his brakes or giving a horn warning until he struck Knutter, seriously and permanently injuring him. At the time of the accident, Knutter was not dressed in a traditional fireman’s outfit but wore coveralls, which he was wearing for his highway department job.
The trial court was of the opinion it should not give an instruction that Knutter’s standard of care for his own safety was less than that of an ordinary highway pedestrian. The trial court thought there was no evidence which justified “any absent-mindedness with respect to the world about him,” as there may be of a workman working on a highway. In language customarily used in reference to a workman, we take the court’s language to mean “momentary diversion of attention, or preoccupation in the discharge of duties, minimizes the degree of care required in the absence of such diversion or preoccupation.” Hodgson v. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co. (1925), 188 Wis. 341, 206 N. W. 191.
[755]*755The court reasoned the chief saw no fire, did not know where the fire was, knew it was only a grass fire of some sort, and had stopped to check with a woman who did not know where the fire was. Consequently, the court concluded there was not “any terrible immediate excitement of fighting a fire,” and therefore Knutter was not in any different situation in crossing the street than is a lawyer thinking about his case. We disagree. A lawyer walking across the street has no responsibility to have his case on his mind. A fire chief going across the street in search of a fire should have the fire on his mind.
The request for an instruction of a standard of care less than that of an ordinary highway pedestrian was unfortunately phrased. The standard of care for a workman in a hazardous location is not related to the ordinarily prudent man or the great mass of mankind as defined in instruction Wis J I — Civil 1005. It is a lesser duty than a nonworkman under the same hazards. The workman’s duty of care is usually stated as the care of an “ordinarily intelligent and prudent workman to carry on his work so as to guard against injury to himself.” This is the language found in the Wisconsin cases for over forty-five years and includes the doctrine that momentary diversion of attention or preoccupation of a workman in the discharge of his duties minimizes the degree of care required of him in the absence of such diversion or preoccupation. This language is used in Wis J I — Civil 1051 1 and is based upon such cases as [756]*756Criswell v. Seaman Body Corp. (1940), 233 Wis. 606, 620, 290 N. W. 177, 183; Patterson v. Edgerton Sand & Gravel Co. (1938), 227 Wis. 11, 277 N. W. 636; Neitzke v. Kraft-Phenix Dairies, Inc. (1934), 214 Wis. 441, 253 N. W. 579; Sandeen v. Willow River Power Co. (1934), 214 Wis. 166, 252 N. W. 706; Hodgson v. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co., supra.
In this case the instruction Wis J I — Civil 1051 was used as a basis for framing1 the requested instruction. Unmodified, it hardly fits this case but it might be applicable to accidents arising at the location of a fire. While it may be true the doctrine is referred to as a lesser degree of care for workmen under certain circumstances than for an ordinarily prudent man, that is of no significance. The reasoning supporting the rule applicable to workmen is grounded on public policy and recognizes that because a workman who is necessarily in the location of hazard, and necessarily must be absorbed in his work if it is to be efficiently performed has only a limited [757]*757ability to watch out for the hazards, and a momentary preoccupation is not negligence if ordinarily prudent workmen under such conditions would have acted similarly. This concept has for years been stated in terms of lesser degree of care in relation to a workman and sometimes in relation to an ordinarily prudent man.
Thus in Turtenwald v. Wisconsin Lakes Ice & Cartage Co. (1904), 121 Wis. 65, 98 N. W. 948, it was held a street cleaner absorbed in his duties does not have the same duty of care for his own safety as an ordinarily prudent traveler. In Dinan v. Chicago & M. E. Ry. Co. (1916), 164 Wis. 295, 159 N. W. 944, a steamroller driver working on a streetcar right-of-way was not required to keep the same lookout as an ordinarily prudent traveler. In Hodgson v. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co., supra, a lineman who inadvertently touched a live wire was not held negligent as a matter of law as he was required to work in a place of danger. In Sandeen v. Willow River Power Co., supra, the operators of a derrick which hit wires were not held negligent as a matter of law because they were preoccupied with their task. See also: Patterson v. Edgerton Sand & Gravel Co., supra; Criswell v. Seaman Body Corp., supra; Knowles v. Stargel (1952), 261 Wis. 106, 52 N. W. 2d 387; Campbell, Recent Developments of the Law of Negligence in Wisconsin, 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 5; Annot. (1949), Liability for injury by vehicle to construction or maintenance worker in street or highway, 5 A. L. R. 2d 757, 784.
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Hallows, C. J.
Both parties agree the issue is whether a volunteer fireman crossing a highway on foot while in the course of acting as a fireman engaged in a search for a reported fire is to be held to a lesser standard of care for his own safety than that which is imposed upon an ordinary highway pedestrian. A request for an instruction to the jury to that effect was made and refused by the trial court as being inapplicable on the facts. Although the finding by the trial court of negligence on the part of Alfred H. Knutter as a matter of law is not assigned as an error, the question of the standard of care is properly raised because of the effect such instruction would have on the comparison of negligence by the jury. See Lovesee v. Allied Development Corp. (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 340, 173 N. W. 2d 196.
Mr. Knutter was a volunteer fireman and the chief of the fire department of Pleasant Prairie in Kenosha county. On October 6, 1969, between 1:30 and 2 o’clock in the afternoon a call came to the fire department reporting a grass fire in the vicinity of Rabs Motel, south of Kenosha on State Highway 32. The call was transferred to the volunteer firemen who proceeded to the area. Chief Knutter was picked up by John Koker, a volunteer fireman, and taken to the Rabs Motel. Koker parked the car facing south on the west side of State Highway 32 across from the Rabs Motel. Shortly after Koker’s arrival he [754]*754was joined by Kenneth Miller who parked his Volkswagen behind Koker’s car.
Knutter left Koker’s automobile and proceeded across State Highway 32 to the east to speak to a woman at the motel regarding the location of the fire. After a short conversation, Knutter started back across the highway. Koker called to Knutter and indicated a fire truck was approaching from the south. At approximately the same time the automobile driven by Bakalarski was approaching from the north. Bakalarski testified he first saw Knutter 200 to 300 feet away and at that time Knutter was going east. Bakalarski next saw Knutter when the left front of his automobile hit Knutter when Knutter was a few feet west of the center of the highway. Baka-larski saw the two automobiles parked on the west shoulder but apparently not their flashing red lights. He continued at a constant rate of speed of 40 to 45 miles an hour without the application of his brakes or giving a horn warning until he struck Knutter, seriously and permanently injuring him. At the time of the accident, Knutter was not dressed in a traditional fireman’s outfit but wore coveralls, which he was wearing for his highway department job.
The trial court was of the opinion it should not give an instruction that Knutter’s standard of care for his own safety was less than that of an ordinary highway pedestrian. The trial court thought there was no evidence which justified “any absent-mindedness with respect to the world about him,” as there may be of a workman working on a highway. In language customarily used in reference to a workman, we take the court’s language to mean “momentary diversion of attention, or preoccupation in the discharge of duties, minimizes the degree of care required in the absence of such diversion or preoccupation.” Hodgson v. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co. (1925), 188 Wis. 341, 206 N. W. 191.
[755]*755The court reasoned the chief saw no fire, did not know where the fire was, knew it was only a grass fire of some sort, and had stopped to check with a woman who did not know where the fire was. Consequently, the court concluded there was not “any terrible immediate excitement of fighting a fire,” and therefore Knutter was not in any different situation in crossing the street than is a lawyer thinking about his case. We disagree. A lawyer walking across the street has no responsibility to have his case on his mind. A fire chief going across the street in search of a fire should have the fire on his mind.
The request for an instruction of a standard of care less than that of an ordinary highway pedestrian was unfortunately phrased. The standard of care for a workman in a hazardous location is not related to the ordinarily prudent man or the great mass of mankind as defined in instruction Wis J I — Civil 1005. It is a lesser duty than a nonworkman under the same hazards. The workman’s duty of care is usually stated as the care of an “ordinarily intelligent and prudent workman to carry on his work so as to guard against injury to himself.” This is the language found in the Wisconsin cases for over forty-five years and includes the doctrine that momentary diversion of attention or preoccupation of a workman in the discharge of his duties minimizes the degree of care required of him in the absence of such diversion or preoccupation. This language is used in Wis J I — Civil 1051 1 and is based upon such cases as [756]*756Criswell v. Seaman Body Corp. (1940), 233 Wis. 606, 620, 290 N. W. 177, 183; Patterson v. Edgerton Sand & Gravel Co. (1938), 227 Wis. 11, 277 N. W. 636; Neitzke v. Kraft-Phenix Dairies, Inc. (1934), 214 Wis. 441, 253 N. W. 579; Sandeen v. Willow River Power Co. (1934), 214 Wis. 166, 252 N. W. 706; Hodgson v. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co., supra.
In this case the instruction Wis J I — Civil 1051 was used as a basis for framing1 the requested instruction. Unmodified, it hardly fits this case but it might be applicable to accidents arising at the location of a fire. While it may be true the doctrine is referred to as a lesser degree of care for workmen under certain circumstances than for an ordinarily prudent man, that is of no significance. The reasoning supporting the rule applicable to workmen is grounded on public policy and recognizes that because a workman who is necessarily in the location of hazard, and necessarily must be absorbed in his work if it is to be efficiently performed has only a limited [757]*757ability to watch out for the hazards, and a momentary preoccupation is not negligence if ordinarily prudent workmen under such conditions would have acted similarly. This concept has for years been stated in terms of lesser degree of care in relation to a workman and sometimes in relation to an ordinarily prudent man.
Thus in Turtenwald v. Wisconsin Lakes Ice & Cartage Co. (1904), 121 Wis. 65, 98 N. W. 948, it was held a street cleaner absorbed in his duties does not have the same duty of care for his own safety as an ordinarily prudent traveler. In Dinan v. Chicago & M. E. Ry. Co. (1916), 164 Wis. 295, 159 N. W. 944, a steamroller driver working on a streetcar right-of-way was not required to keep the same lookout as an ordinarily prudent traveler. In Hodgson v. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co., supra, a lineman who inadvertently touched a live wire was not held negligent as a matter of law as he was required to work in a place of danger. In Sandeen v. Willow River Power Co., supra, the operators of a derrick which hit wires were not held negligent as a matter of law because they were preoccupied with their task. See also: Patterson v. Edgerton Sand & Gravel Co., supra; Criswell v. Seaman Body Corp., supra; Knowles v. Stargel (1952), 261 Wis. 106, 52 N. W. 2d 387; Campbell, Recent Developments of the Law of Negligence in Wisconsin, 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 5; Annot. (1949), Liability for injury by vehicle to construction or maintenance worker in street or highway, 5 A. L. R. 2d 757, 784.
In the instant case, Knutter was fire chief with a responsibility to get to the fire promptly and get there first so he could direct the efforts of his men. A fire is a public emergency. A fireman should not work on the assumption a grass fire is unimportant or the alarm may be false. Knutter was entitled to have uppermost and predominantly in his mind the fact he was attempting to locate a fire and prevent destruction. In such a frame of [758]*758mind, he cannot and should not be compared with the average pedestrian crossing a street but with an ordinarily prudent fireman under similar conditions. The momentary diversion of attention or preoccupation of a fireman ought not to depend upon the seriousness of the fire or the fire’s location.
Knutter’s situation is not analogous to Gunning v. King (1946), 249 Wis. 176, 23 N. W. 2d 602, where a watchman was struck by a car while carrying barricades across the street. The court correctly said the mere fact he was carrying two angle irons did not require him to give attention to the angle irons and distract him in his lookout. Here, Knutter, as fire chief, was pursuing his job which required him to have his attention concentrated on finding the fire while crossing the street. Such duty is the same whether he is a paid or a volunteer fireman, whether he is full time or part time and he need not be in a state of excitement or agitation or be in the immediate presence of the fire in order to be found mentally preoccupied with his official duties. We do not hold a fireman can violate the speed limit or any law in the performance of his duties. The issue here is a momentary diversion of attention while performing his duty. If he can qualify as operating an emergency vehicle, he is entitled to the rights of an emergency vehicle but no more. The fact that Knutter was not dressed as a fireman and the flashing red lights on the cars were not standard lights and could not be seen from the rear are matters which go to the negligence of Bakalarski and his contribution to the accident, not to the contributory negligence of Knutter.
One may wonder why it is necessary to have a special instruction in terms of an ordinarily prudent workman rather than explain under the general negligence instruction that an ordinarily prudent man under similar circumstances means a workman. It has generally been [759]*759considered the standard instruction for negligence of an ordinarily prudent man under similar circumstances does not mean that an ordinarily prudent man is a fireman. While it is possible to use the general instruction with an added instruction that an ordinarily prudent man does mean a workman as one of similar circumstances, understanding and clarity for the jury is best obtained by giving the specialized instruction in terms of an ordinarily prudent workman and not confuse the jury with a nonexistent ordinarily prudent man converted into a workman by indirection.
We think the trial court committed reversible error in not giving an instruction based upon the doctrine of care applicable to an ordinarily prudent workman under the circumstances because of his claimed preoccupation with his duty as fire chief. Since no complaint is made as to the amount of damages found by the jury, a new trial need not be had on that issue.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed and a new trial granted limited to the issues of negligence, causation, and apportionment.