McGOWAN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal is from a judgment of the District Court denying a motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing the complaint on the grounds of (1) failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted and (2) the action is an un-consented suit against the United States. Appellants are individual tenants (and associations of such tenants) of public housing facilities in the District of Columbia, suing on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (Fed.R. Civ.P. Rule 23), and complaining of the failure of such facilities to be properly maintained and repaired. Appellees are [1047]*1047officials of (1) the Department of Housing and Urban Development of the United States (HUD), (2) the National Capital Housing Authority (NCHA), and (3) the District of Columbia Government concerned with enforcement of the D.C. Housing Regulations. . The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. We are presently concerned only with the questions of (1) the District Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the action at all, and (2) whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons hereinafter appearing, we reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the case for trial.
I
Deeming it essential to an understanding of the issues raised by this appeal, we address ourselves first to the scheme under which public housing is provided in the United States generally, and in the District of Columbia in particular. The keystone statute is the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., sponsored by Senator Wagner of New York, and strongly supported by Senator Taft of Ohio. It was a recognition by the Congress that the social evils inherent in substandard housing throughout the nation would yield only to a demonstration of federal interest and the provision of federal funds.1 The substantive provisions of that Act are prefaced (§ 1401) by an explicit declaration that it is
“the policy of the United States to promote the general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and credit, as provided in this chapter, to assist the several States and their political subdivisions to alleviate present and recurring unemployment and to remedy the unsafe and insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income, in urban and rural nonfarm areas, that are injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the citizens of the Nation * *
The Act went on (§ 1402(1)) to define the “low-rent housing,” which it was its purpose to provide, as “decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings within the financial reach of families of low income;” and it characterized the latter (§ 1402 (2)) as persons unable to procure in the private market “an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for their use.” The Act authorized loans and grants of federal money for both the construction and the operation of such housing, to the end not only that its low-income nature should be preserved, but also its “decent, safe, and sanitary” character.
The making and administration of such loans and grants are vested in HUD'. They are available to locally created housing agencies throughout the country under continuing contracts in which those agencies assume certain obligations (42 U.S.C. § 1415(4)). One of those obligations is operation calculated [1048]*1048to maintain the “decent, safe, and sanitary” character of the dwellings. It is the responsibility of HUD to police the performance of these contracts; and the sanctions with which it is armed in this regard are those of (a) reducing or terminating the annual federal contributions (42 U.S.C. § 1415(3)), (b) increasing the interest rate on loans or declaring them in default (42 U.S.C. § 1415 (1)), or (c) assuming the actual management of a project. It is further authorized to make emergency financial grants “where necessary to eliminate a serious hazard to life, health, or safety of the occupants * *
Outside the District of Columbia, local housing agencies characteristically come into being under authority deriving ultimately from the state legislatures. Within the District, and in order to enable its residents to share in the purposes of the Housing Act of 1937, the Congress acted to create a qualified local housing agency. The resulting statute is contained in the District of Columbia Alley Dwelling Law, 5 D.C.Code § 103 et seq. It designates NCHA as “a public housing agency within the meaning of, and to carry out the purposes of,” the Housing Act of 1937. As such, it is authorized to receive grants or loans from HUD for the “construction, maintenance, or operation” of public housing projects, to enter into contracts incident to such receipt, and to comply with conditions contained in such contracts.
There is presently in being an agreement between NCHA and HUD entitled the “Consolidated Annual Contributions Contract.” That contract provides that NCHA shall at all times (1) “operator" each Project * * * solely for the pur-\ pose of providing decent, safe, and sani- \ tary dwellings * * * ” and (2) j “maintain each Project in good repair, / order, and condition.” These undertakings appear to be common to every such contract between HUD and a local housing agency. What is different between the District of Columbia and elsewhere is that, in the former, legal title- to the physical facilities constituting a project is in the United States.
II
The complaint in the District Court alleged that, despite repeated efforts by tenants to call attention to, and to secure correction of, defects creating hazards to health and safety, appellees have failed to respond in compliance with their various statutory, regulatory, or contractual responsibilities, including what are asserted to be implied covenants in the formal leases entered into between each tenant and NCHA.2 It is alleged that inspectors of the D.C. Department of Licenses and Inspections have visited the premises and have served notices on NCHA of violations and deficiencies in respect of the D.C. Housing Regulations. Such notices have allegedly been ignored by the recipient, and not further pursued by the D.C. officials ultimately responsible for their enforcement. This last is said to be in contrast with enforcement actions taken against private landlords, and thereby to constitute a denial to appellants by the District officials involved of the constitutional right to equal protection guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The other ap-pellees are variously charged with violating the Housing Act of 1937, the D.C. Alley Dwelling Law, the D.C. Housing Regulations, the annual contributions contract, and the individual leases.
The declaratory relief prayed for was that appellees be adjudged (1) under a duty to repair and maintain the premises in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition “as required by the United States Housing Act, the District of Columbia [1049]*1049Alley Dwelling Law, and the Lease agreement, in compliance with the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia,” and (2) to have failed to discharge this duty. Injunctive relief to the same end was requested against all appellees; and, in addition, the D.C. officials were sought to be enjoined from failing or refusing to enforce the Housing Regulations against NCHA.
Appellants filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, accompanied by affidavits of individual tenants describing substandard conditions. The federal officials and the District officials countered with separate motions to dismiss.3 Affidavits were submitted at this juncture by officials of NCHA. Upon these papers and the arguments of counsel, the District Court concluded that it was “without jurisdiction to maintain this action” and dismissed the complaint. It wrote no opinion but entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in the form proposed by appellees.
These findings of fact are in large part a recital of what the NCHA affidavits are said by the court to “establish.” These are enumerated by the court as follows:
a. That NCHA has pending before the Department of Housing and Urban Development an application for $2,722,000 for the modernization of the Frederick Douglass Housing Project;
b. That in the absence of approval of the application so pending, NCHA has no funds available to permit maintenance of NCHA properties beyond the maintenance which is now being carried on throughout the properties operated by NCHA;
c. NCHA has not failed or refused to provide adequate screens on windows and doors of its housing properties but that to the contrary, NCHA has made significant expenditures of money in providing screens on windows and doors with respect to three of the four properties named in the complaint and with respect to the fourth, Knox Hill, a determination to rehabilitate a portion of Knox Hill was made some time ago, and NCHA has been installing jalousies in lieu of screen doors in the exterior doors of that project.
d. Adequate weather stripping has been installed on doors of all units within the housing projects but window insulation has not been provided for the reason that adequate infiltration of air in the dwelling units requires the windows to remain as originally installed.
e. NCHA has constantly maintained a trained crew of its own who together with employees of contract exterminators have regularly and adequately maintained an extermination program for vermin.
* * * 4
h. An official determination has been made by NCHA to terminate the use of the dwellings in Knox Hill and residents in occupancy have been and are being located in other low-rent housing projects operated by NCHA.
[1050]*1050The remaining findings are that (1) legal title to public housing projects operated by NCHA is in the United States, (2) tenants, including the individual appellants, entered into a lease executed on behalf of the United States by NCHA, and (3) the association appellants have no proprietary or leasehold interest in any of the premises.
The conclusions of law, apart from the ultimate one of an absence of jurisdiction, are that the NCHA affidavits negate any threat of immediate injury and disentitle appellants “to any injunctive or other relief against any of the defendants,” and that appellants “have failed to state a claim against any of the defendants for which relief may be granted.” NCHA is declared to be “an agency of the United States Government,” and appellees Washington and Fletcher, insofar as they function as NCHA, perform only a federal function. Other named appellees are declared to be, respectively, officers and employees of NCHA and HUD. The penultimate conclusion is that the suit against officers and employees of HUD and of NCHA is an unconsented suit against the United States.
On appeal to this court, separate briefs were filed by the D.C. Corporation Counsel for what he termed the District of Columbia appellees; 5 and by the Department of Justice for what were described as the federal appellees, including Washington and Fletcher in their capacity as officials of NCHA. The only point argued in the first such brief is the asserted lack of authority of the District of Columbia to institute criminal proceedings against federal agencies and officers administering federal properties not in compliance with the D.C. Housing Regulations. It is said that, although the D.C. appellees do not consider that Congress can be understood as having subjected NCHA to the D.C. Housing Regulations, they instructed their inspectors to examine the public housing projects and to report their findings to NCHA. “It was hoped,” says the brief, “that such a report would prompt the appropriate agencies and officials to take any necessary remedial measures,” but it was not thought that their failure to do so could result in the invocation of criminal punishment — the only sanction authorized for infractions of the Housing Regulations.
The brief of the Department of Justice urges the correctness of the District Court’s conclusion that it was without jurisdiction to proceed in the case. It takes its stand on sovereign immunity, asserting that the federal ownership of the physical properties making up the housing projects insulates those who control or administer them from suit, absent the consent of the United States. It characterizes the action as affecting the management of federal property, and denies both the power of the judiciary to entertain such a case and the applicability, direct or indirect, of the D.C. Housing Regulations to the property involved.
Ill
In assessing the correctness of the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint, it is essential to differentiate between its assertion of a total want of [1051]*1051jurisdiction, on the one hand, and, on the other, its characterization of the complaint as failing to state a claim warranting any relief. The former purports to be grounded in the concept of sovereign immunity, and presumably is confined to the NCHA and HUD appellees.6 We direct our attention in the first instance to that matter.
The doctrine itself is in a considerable state of disrepair, at least in terms of intellectual respectability; and it is hardly in the original condition of pristine purity which once made it such a useful tool for Government lawyers seeking to dispense with trials on the merits. See 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 27.01 (Supp.1965); Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 229 (1965); and Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1151 (1953). For inferior federal courts, however, it is not without some measure of continuing vitality until either the Supreme Court or the Congress administers the coup de grace7 Our function is to determine whether the District Court has in this case stayed within the visibly narrowed circle of the doctrine’s current reach.
The cornerstone of the Government’s submission to us on this score is the trial court’s finding that the public housing projects in question are the legal property of the United States — a fact which is not in dispute. It is argued that, absent the consent of the United States, no suit will lie, under the existing formulations of the Supreme Court, which adversely affects the Government’s title to such property, or which puts its federal administrators under judicial compulsion with respect to its management. The Government takes its text in this connection from the Supreme Court’s statement in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 692 fn. 11, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1462, 93 L.Ed.2d 1628 (1949), that
“ * * * a suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, even if it is claimed that the officer being sued has acted unconstitutionally or beyond his statutory powers, if the relief requested cannot be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property * *
As the Government variously puts the issue in its brief, “[t]his case is simply an effort to dictate how property of the United States should be operated,” and “[i]t is firmly established that the courts [1052]*1052will not interfere with the public administration of government property.” The precedent regarded by the Government as clearly demonstrative of the barrier to jurisdiction raised by sovereign immunity here is Gardner v. Harris, 391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968), a case which has its closest counterpart in Supreme Court authority in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 82 S.Ct. 980, 8 L.Ed.2d 168 (1962). In the latter, an action of ejection against a Forest Service officer was said to be barred, even though the defendant was wrongfully occupying land belonging to the plaintiff, where there was no allegation that the defendant was acting outside his statutory authority or in contravention of the Constitution.
Gardner is at least a legitimate progeny of such reasoning. There the plaintiff claimed to be entitled to an access easement reserved in land sold to the United States by his predecessor in title for use as a parkway. When the federal officer in charge put up barricades to deny the access, plaintiff sued for their removal. It was held that, since a judgment on the claim would compel an act by the Government, and since it did not appear that any statutes forbade the putting up of the barricades, jurisdiction was barred even though the federal officer might be acting in wrongful derogation of plaintiff’s access right. These cases have been strongly criticized, see Cramton, Note 7 supra, at 412-414, but, in any event, they hardly seem controlling of the matter before us. No more do cases like Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 83 S.Ct. 999, 10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963), and Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 83 S.Ct. 1052, 10 L.Ed.2d 191 (1963), which round out the most recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court on sovereign immunity in cases involving federal lands.
Appellants insist, however, that they assert no claim adverse to the Government’s title to the property involved herein, nor do they seek to compel a disposition or administration of that property contrary to that expressly commanded by the Congress itself. What they seek, rather, is a judgment that the officials entrusted with that property for a particular purpose should execute that trust in accordance with its terms, and desist from ignoring the obligations imposed upon them in that regard. In neither purpose nor effect will the prosecution of this suit disturb or diminish either the Government’s title or its possession. The relief sought will rather, so it is said, return appellees to the path of their duty as marked out by the Congress.
To the extent that sovereign immunity survives as an assurance that courts, rather than the Congress, will not dictate the disposition or utilization of property which belongs to all the people and which, with good reason in democratic theory, has been immemorially thought to reside under the legislative will, we find no threshold jurisdictional bar in the record before us. There is nothing new about judicial entertainment of suits which charge that federal officials are acting outside of, or in conflict with, the responsibilities laid upon them by the Congress or the Constitution.8 Whether such charges are true, and, if so, what remedial action the court should or may direct, are questions partaking of the merits, and not of jurisdiction to explore the merits.
If, after trial, it be found that ap-pellees do in fact have a responsibility for the property in their care which they are not recognizing adequately, the court’s power, at the least, to declare that responsibility and to define that de[1053]*1053fault is not dissipated solely by the circumstance that legal title to the property is in the United States.9 To hold otherwise would be to say that sovereign immunity forecloses any judicial inquiry whatsoever into the custodianship by a federal official of federal property. There is no magic about real estate, or its ownership by the United States, which hedges its guardians about with an immunity not available to other executants of public policies committed to their care by the Congress.10
Our review hereinabove of the statutory foundations for the provision of public housing in the District of Columbia reveals a recurring preoccupation on the part of Congress with the need that such housing be “decent, safe, and sanitary.” To the degree that it is not, the legislative purposes are frustrated and fail of realization. A trial may reveal that, if such frustration exists, culpability does not lie with appellees. At this stage, however, as in any lawsuit, we deal in allegations, not proofs or remedies.11 All we decide is that no viable concept of sovereign immunity known to us, nor as yet adumbrated by the Supreme Court, closes the courthouse doors completely to these appellants.12
IV
The findings and conclusions of the District Court are such as to suggest that its dismissal of the complaint was principally, if not entirely, motivated by considerations of sovereign immunity. This indeed is the way the Department of Justice, in its brief for the federal officials in this court, has chosen to treat it; and the Department has not [1054]*1054undertaken to defend the District Court’s action by reference to the separately stated conclusion of law that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.13 The statement is in the record, however, and we think it desirable, if perhaps not essential, to deal with it as a possible independent ground for sustaining the judgment appealed from.
The physical arrangement of the District Court’s legal conclusions strongly indicates that the one in question, which is the second in the-series, is tied to the first. That first one recites that, on the basis of the NCHA affidavits, appellants “have failed to demonstrate any immediate threat of injury and therefore are not entitled to any injunctive or other relief against any of the defendants.” (Emphasis supplied.) This obviously goes beyond a mere denial of the need for injunctive relief, either preliminary or permanent; and what it says is restated in more conventional pleading terms by the immediately succeeding paragraph, i. e., that the “plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against any of the defendants for which relief may be granted.” What this all amounts to in this context is a resolution against appellants of factual issues appearing from the papers to be in dispute, and the consequent grant of summary judgment to appellees on the merits. That is error.
The NCHA affidavits, as characterized by the District Court, do a number of things. First, they refer to pending efforts by NCHA to get more money from HUD for modernization of one of the D.C. housing projects; and they assert that, absent success in that regard, NCHA has no resources admitting of maintenance and repair in a greater degree than that presently being carried out. Second, they deny the allegations of appellants, in complaint and affidavit, that there is inadequate provision of screens and weather stripping for windows and doors, or for vermin extermination. Third, they report steps taken to terminate, retroactively to April 1, 1968, charges to tenants for excess utility charges, of which appellants had complained. Fourth, they recite a supervening determination to end the use of the Knox Hill project and to relocate its occupants in other public housing facilities.
With respect to the first of these matters found by the District Court to have been established by the NCHA affidavits, the lawsuit surely is not to be cut off in its inception by an affidavit that NCHA is financially unable to do more than it is now doing by way of maintenance. The extent of that incapacity, and the level of current maintenance, are themselves questions of fact better determined after trial than by unilateral and ambiguous assertion; and, in any event, the fact of incapacity, if proven, would appear to bear upon the nature of the relief available to appellants rather than upon their asserted right to adequate maintenance and repair.
Similarly, the affidavits of appellants and NCHA are in conflict as to the adequacy of the maintenance presently being provided, and these present factual issues not properly resolvable except through the adversary processes of trial. The seeming capitulation by NCHA on the matter of the utility charges is not complete, so we are told, in that tenants remain liable for the challenged charges, now conceded to have been improper, before April 1, 1968. Lastly, the closing down of Knox Hill does not render this lawsuit moot, inasmuch as the claims of injury made in the complaint are not limited to Knox Hill but comprehend other projects operated by NCHA.
[1055]*1055Thus it is that we do not find, in the circumstances seemingly relied upon by the District Court, a basis for sustaining a dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim. We turn now to the other contention, made upon appeal by both the D.C. Government and the Department of Justice, which might conceivably be thought to support such a disposition. That is the argument that the D.C. Housing Regulations have no force of any kind in creating or measuring the responsibilities of appellees. It is said that those Regulations simply do not apply to dwellings owned and operated by the United States, and the principal authority pressed upon us for this proposition is United States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 69 S.Ct. 1108, 93 L.Ed. 1406 (1949). That case presented the question of whether the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act applied to Government-owned defense housing in the District. We are reminded that the Supreme Court, in reaching the result of non-applicability, stressed that the Rent Act did not refer expressly to the United States as a landlord, and reiterated a principle of statutory construction to the effect that “[a] general statute imposing restrictions does not impose them upon the Government itself without a clear expression or implication to that effect.”
Rules for the reading of statutes are general guides only, and yield to the more tangible immediacies of the particular case. The Supreme Court has elsewhere said that “[t]hei*e is no hard and fast rule of exclusion,” and that the “purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history and executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent * * * to bring state or nation within the scope of the law.” United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-605, 61 S.Ct. 742, 743-744, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1940). It was in this spirit that the Court approached the problem of construction presented to it in Wittek. It noted that the central and pressing legislative purpose there was to prevent the exploitation by private landlords of the emergency demand for housing in Washington created by the outbreak of World War II. That purpose was sought to be achieved by limiting rentals to those in being on January 1, 1941. But public housing in the District had been under Government ownership and control long prior to that date, with subsidized low-income rentals unrelated to free market rates. The Court was unwilling, in the absence of an explicit manifestation to the contrary, to attribute to the Congress an intent to lump together, for purposes of protection against rent gouging, two such disparate quantities as private and public housing.
The Congress that authorized the D.C. Government to promulgate the Housing Regulations to assure D.C. residents suitable housing is, however, the same legislative body that, in the Housing Act of 1937 and the D.C. Alley Dwelling Law, acted to provide lower-income D.C. residents with “decent, safe, and sanitary” living accommodations. The concern for the condition of these premises voiced in these latter enactments hardly suggests that Congress consciously rejected the thought that the D.C. Housing Regulations, unlike similar local codes in other parts of the country, should bear no relationship whatsoever to the people living in Government-owned, as distinct from privately-owned, homes.14
Such a differentiation between citizens of this country similarly situated makes no sense at all in terms of the purposes [1056]*1056of a Congress which has repeatedly voiced its concern for the social conditions which obtain in the Nation’s Capital. Certainly those charged with the administration of the Housing Regulations have detected no such discrimination in the terms of their mandate. The D.C. Board of Appeals and Review has held that the Housing Regulations are directly applicable to public housing units, and that the elimination of a noncomplying condition is the obligation of the landlord. Appeal of Belk, Docket No. H 126, January 31, 1967. And, as we have seen, the D.C. appellees in charge of enforcement have thought it their duty to inspect NCHA premises like all others and to report violations, even though they felt the Housing Regulations to be inapplicable in the sense of providing no enforceable sanctions against their fellow appellees.15
The District Court, in any event, made no determination that the Housing Regulations are inapplicable or irrelevant to the projects operated by NCHA. Indeed, there is no reference of any kind to those Regulations in either its findings of fact or conclusions of law, which suggests that they played no part in its decision to dismiss the complaint. The complaint alleged, however, that appellees were variously violating and refusing to enforce the Regulations; and it is argued by appellants that the Regulations are either directly applicable or provide a standard by which to measure the alleged obligation to provide “decent, safe, and sanitary” dwellings. The record shows, moreover, that tenants of NCHA execute individual leases covering the premises occupied; and appellants allege that those leases, properly viewed, contain an implied warranty of habitability, the observance of which is to be gauged by the Housing Regulations in force from time to time.
Since this appeal came under submission, this court has found such a warranty to reside in all leases relating to premises covered by the Regulations. Javins v. First National Realty Corporation, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 369, 428 F.2d 1071 (1970). Building upon an earlier ruling of the D.C. Court of Appeals that the Housing Regulations operated to invalidate a lease of premises not in compliance when the lease was executed, Brown v. Southall Realty Corp., D.C.App., 237 A.2d 834 (1968), we were unable to distinguish the situation where violations develop because of improper maintenance during the life of the lease. We held that, “by1 signing the lease the landlord has under-; taken a continuing obligation to the tenant to maintain the premises in accord-l anee with all applicable law,” which law\ included the Housing Regulations. Thus, we said, whether or not those Regulations are enforced directly by official action— and we remarked the widespread failures in this regard — the tenant will have available for his protection the defenses and claims normally associated with breach of contract.
It may or may not be true that the parallel between private leases and public housing leases is, for this purpose, exact. But the issue is at least a very substantial one in the light of Southall and Javins, and appellants are entitled to have it considered as part of their other conten[1057]*1057tions. They allege in their complaint the existence of an implied warranty of habitability in their leases, and they base upon that allegation a request for both’J declaratory and injunctive relief. With)1 that complaint reinstated by reason of our recognition of jurisdiction in the District Court, they are at liberty to pursue the matter at trial.
What we do not contemplate is that the issue of the D.C. Housing Regulations shall be made the occasion of a second resolution of this suit against appellants without trial. In their main brief in this court appellants, after making their jurisdictional arguments, recognized that this court “may not wish to consider * * * in the abstract context of an appeal from a dismissal on the pleadings” the merits issues of whether “the unsafe and unsanitary condition of the public housing projects violates applicable legal requirements.” They noted by way of example that. “the precise relevance of the various provisions relied upon by [appellants] may turn on how seriously substandard is the actual condition of [appellants’] housing, as disclosed by the proof at trial.” Such considerations, it was said, “may counsel postponing consideration of some or all of [such] issues * * * until after trial.” We think this to be an approach as rational as it is candid.
Appellants formulate these merits issues in several ways. First, they assert that, even if there were no Housing Regulations, the explicit Congressional purpose in the Housing Act, reiterated in the D.C. Alley Dwelling Law, to provide “decent, safe, and sanitary” housing creates a duty which has been violated. They deny that this statutory standard, standing alone, is too vague to admit of a judicial determination that it has been breached, at least in respect of sueh matters as inadequate screens, stopped-up plumbing, and similar defects which they have alleged.
Secondly, they point to the Annual Contributions Contract, p. 6 supra, under which HUD undertakes to provide continuing operating subsidies on condition that NCHA shall provide “decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings,” and “maintain each Project in good repair, order, and condition.” They assert that they will show NCHA to be in default in the observance of these conditions, and that they, as the intended beneficiaries of that contract, are thereby entitled to relief against both HUD and NCHA. \
The Housing Regulations enter into\ this picture in either of two ways, according to appellants. Without the necessity of holding the Regulations directly and immediately applicable in the fullest sense, as they surely are to private! housing in the District, they constitute | at the least a point of reference for giving content and meaning to the statutory standard of “decent, safe, and sanitary” reflected in the Housing Act and Alley Dwelling Law, and to the contractual standard embodied in the Annual Contributions Contract. Alternatively, they assert that, in this closely-woven matrix of Congressional concerns about housing in the District of Columbia, it is not farfetched to insist that Congress may fairly be taken to have intended that the Housing Regulations, which it authorized the District to promulgate, were conceived of as extending to public, as well as private, housing.
Lastly, there is the issue of whether, under either of the foregoing views of the relevance of the Housing Regulations, the individual lease agreements between the tenants and NCHA are to be taken as containing warranties of habitability by implication, as is true of private leases under Southall and Javins.
What we have said above indicates that we do not regard any of these approaches as insubstantial. Now that appellants’ right to be in court has been established, we think that the orderly administration of justice is best served by leaving their definitive resolution to abide the illumination of trial and the consequent es[1058]*1058tablishment of facts which should prove helpful in that resolution.16
V
In reversing and remanding for trial, we hold only that the District Court erred in regarding itself as without jurisdiction by reason of sovereign immunity and, to the extent that its dismissal was founded upon separate factors subsumed under the formula of failure to state a claim, in nonsuiting appellants for that reason. As appellants themselves assert, the only issue before us on this appeal is the one of their right to stay in court for inquiry into, and resolution of, the claims put forward in their complaint. The merits of those claims abide trial.
There are suggestions before us that, even if appellants be right in at least some of their claims, there is nothing that can be done about them. This is notably true of the brief filed on behalf of the D.C. officials charged with enforcement of the Housing Regulations. They say in effect that they have enforced the Regulations against NCHA up to the point of invoking criminal sanctions — a step they feel powerless to take against federal officials. We are persuaded that, as to these appellees alone, the record before us shows a want of the equity which must underlie the grant of both injunctive and declaratory relief; and we see no real purpose to be served by compelling them to continue as parties to this proceeding. Their future . jurse of conduct will undoubtedly be i taped in good faith by reference to the f.nal resolution of the issues presented by this litigation. See Palmer v. District of Columbia, 26 App.D.C. 31 (1905). We affirm, therefore, the dismissal of the complaint in respect of the D.C. appellees responsible for enforcement of the Housing Regulations.
In the same way, it is intimated that the officers of both NCHA and HUD are not happy about the physical condition of these housing units but are doing the best they can with the limited funds at their disposal. HUD further suggests that the sanctions available for its use against NCHA not only rest in a discretion so broad as to render their use or non-use immune from judicial compulsion, but are also of such a character as to be far from being uniformly in the interest of the tenants themselves. There may well prove to be some practical, and perhaps legal, significance in these suggestions. But their precise contours are poorly defined in the present state of the record, and they will profit by the clarifying processes of trial. More to the point, they would appear to be most clearly relevant to remedies as distinct from rights. It is one thing to declare a duty and another to compel its performance under the threat of contempt. Appellants have, throughout their presentation to this court, exhibited a realistic appreciation of this distinction, and of the large discretion reserved to the trial court to withhold or to shape the relief [1059]*1059given in the light of the practicalities emerging from the record.
We think it premature, however, to affirm the dismissal of any of these two groups of appellees from the case at this time because of the possibility that some, or any, relief may prove to be unwarranted or inappropriate.17 With jurisdiction established in the District Court, those are matters to be determined by it in the first instance.
The judgment of dismissal of the complaint is reversed, except as to the D.C. appellees responsible for the enforcement of the Housing Regulations; and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.