Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney

90 F.3d 1431, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5415, 96 Daily Journal DAR 8834, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18145
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJuly 23, 1996
DocketNos. 94-56379, 94-56380 and 94-56381
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 90 F.3d 1431 (Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5415, 96 Daily Journal DAR 8834, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18145 (9th Cir. 1996).

Opinion

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Ernst & Whinney appeals from a general jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff class (Knapp). Knapp cross-appeals from the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest and the dismissal of various state-law causes of action. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78aa and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

I

ATV Systems, Inc. (ATV) was founded by Philip Gomez, Douglas O’Connor, and Frank Gleason in 1981. The company specialized in point-of-sale microprocessing systems designed for retail applications and also dealt in more generalized data processing and communications equipment for office use. The principals had been involved in the high-tech [1434]*1434field and considered themselves well-versed in “turn-around” techniques. They were experienced in taking troubled companies, slashing waste, increasing productivity, improving the bottom line, and turning the companies into profitable enterprises. There were many businesses in need of such redirection in the early 1980s because interest rates were high and credit was tight. ATVs business plan was to acquire bankrupt companies at bargain prices, liquidate unprofitable product lines, and merge profitable lines into its own operations.

Although this mode of operation allowed ATV to acquire research and technology at wholesale prices that would have required years to develop independently, the approach also forced ATV to inherit the management, marketing, production, and service woes that brought the companies down in the first place. In other words, ATV acquired assets that might have become valuable in the future as research and development ripened into product lines. But at the same time, ATV acquired significant current liabilities and start-up costs as operations were restructured and redirected.

Because of this business plan, ATV was a cash-hungry venture and the founders’ personal resources were fast becoming inadequate to meet the company’s needs. The founders first considered taking ATV public in late 1982, but because the company needed immediate financial assistance, ATVs founders sought alternate sources of cash. Help arrived in the form of a $10 million injection of funding in early 1988 from various venture capital investment groups. ATV in return issued convertible debentures.

The debenture holders were not interested in a long-term investment. The game plan was to boost ATVs respectability in the industry to the point where it could be taken public. The debenture holders would then exercise their conversion rights and sell their shares on the open market. If all went well, the venture capitalists would recoup their $10 million plus a tidy profit, ATV would be out from under the burden of the debt and positioned to pursue its aims even more aggressively, and the founders, through their stock holdings, would be rewarded accordingly.

All did not go well. As a practical matter, taking the company public was now no longer an option, but a necessity. A failure to go public would not only trigger an obligation to retire most of the debenture debt, but also would increase that debt by $2 million. In retrospect, ATV was not well-positioned to make a public offering. Nevertheless, ATV retained a prestigious securities law firm, a large accounting firm, and E.F. Hutton as lead underwriter during the spring and summer of 1983.

As originally planned, the initial public offering (IPO) was to be 2.2 million shares with a price range of $15 — $18 per share. As time passed, the number of shares and the price per share declined. When the company filed the preliminary prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Commission in August 1983, it still proposed to issue 2.2 million shares, but the price had dropped to $13 — $15 per share. E.F. Hutton further reduced the price to $10 and the number of shares to only 600,000. By that time, high-tech IPOs had fallen out of favor with the market and ATVs “road shows” had not generated the interest expected. Thus, instead of the $30 million ATV hoped to generate, the gross would only be $6 million. In the end, most of the 600,-000 shares were sold by the debenture holders and after deducting substantial legal and accounting fees and other costs, ATV realized no net cash. In fact, Gomez drafted an internal memorandum indicating that the IPO cost ATV money. Taking the company public accomplished two things: ATV was relieved of some debenture debt, and the stage was set for this action.

The IPO was effective on October 18,1983. Beginning in January 1984, ATV released a series of negative earnings reports and the stock reacted sharply. Far from being a growth company poised for continued expansion, as the prospectus suggested, it became clear to the market that ATV was not doing well. In the quarter in which the company went public, ATV recorded a net loss of almost $2 million. ATV would ultimately post a loss of more than $31 million for the fiscal year ending March 31,1984. The stock was delisted by the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation [1435]*1435Market System. ATV eventually returned to a position of modest profitability, but closed its doors in 1988.

Investors who had purchased ATV stock at $10 per share and sold it for a quarter of that amount several months later wondered if there was more to the story than unexpected business reversals. This class action followed against Gomez, O’Connor, Gleason, E.F. Hutton, Ernst & Whinney (now Ernst & Young), the debenture holders who exercised their conversion rights, two ATV board members, and several others. Knapp asserted liability on a variety of theories, including federal racketeering and securities laws violations and numerous state-law claims.

All defendants settled pretrial, or were otherwise removed from the ease, except for Gomez (ATV’s chief executive officer and chairman of the board), O’Connor (ATV’s executive vice-president), and Ernst & Whin-ney (ATV’s outside auditor). At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court dismissed the RICO and pendent state-law claims.

At Knapp’s request, the case was bifurcated into a trial of class-wide issues to be followed, if necessary, by a second-stage proceeding to adjudicate individual issues of reliance and damages. After a four-week trial, the court submitted to the jury only the securities claim, based on section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

At trial, Knapp attempted to show that Ernst & Whinney should have included a “going concern” statement in its audited financial statements. Knapp also presented some evidence suggesting that Ernst & Whinney should have recognized the many problems within ATV and that, given these problems, it should have further investigated and distanced itself from ATV’s unaudited financial statements. The jury returned a general verdict against all defendants and set forth what it found to be the “true value” of ATV stock for each trading day of the class period. In addition, the jury found the proportionate fault of the settling defendants to be zero.

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Bluebook (online)
90 F.3d 1431, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5415, 96 Daily Journal DAR 8834, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knapp-v-ernst-whinney-ca9-1996.