FLAHERTY, Judge.
Galen E. Rise’s (Rise) filed a Petition for Review of his termination as a member of the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program.1 The Department of Military and Veterans Affairs (Department) and the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania’s (Adjutant General) filed a Motion to Dismiss. We deny the Department’s Motion to Dis[255]*255miss and remand this matter to the Department for further action.
On May 25, 2000, Kise petitioned this Court to review the Department’s decision to involuntarily separate Kise from the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program. The Department contends the Adjutant General’s separation determination was a federal action beyond our jurisdiction because the Adjutant General was acting in his federal capacity, under federal regulation, to dismiss a federal employee and asks this Court to conclude that it lacks jurisdiction to consider this matter.2 The Department’s contention presents an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania. While this Court has previously exercised jurisdiction over an adjudication of the Department and the Adjutant General brought by a National Guard member, jurisdiction over the administration of the AGR program has not been addressed. See e.g., Prewitt v. Department of Military Affairs, 686 A.2d 858 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). We conclude that this Court does have jurisdiction.
We first turn to whether a member of the National Guard in the AGR program is a federal employee as opposed to a state employee. We begin with a brief overview of the National Guard’s dual status:
The Army and Air National Guard of the United States, collectively the National Guard of the United States (NGUS), are part of the “Ready Reserve,” units whose availability for active duty are most relied upon. The NGUS receives all of its funding from Congress and forms an integral part of the total armed forces of the United States. To become a member of the NGUS, a person must enlist in, and be federally recognized as a member of, the National Guard of a particular state. Since 1938, all persons who have enlisted in a state National Guard unit have simultaneously enlisted in the NGUS. Under this “dual enlistment” system, guardsmen, when not on active duty in the NGUS, are state employees of their respective state National Guard units.
Maj. Michael E. Smith, Federal Representation of National Guard Members in Civil Litigation, Army Law. 42-43 (Dec.1995) (footnotes omitted). “[T]he members of the State Guard .... must keep three hats in their elosets-a civilian hat, a state militia hat, and an army hat-only one of which is worn at any particular time.” Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 348, 110 S.Ct. 2418, 110 L.Ed.2d 312 (1990). The type of duty the member is performing determines which “hat” he or she has on:
federally funded ARNG training duty, referred to as “Title 32 duty,” is ordered by the state governor and paid for with federal funds. This form of duty is used for weekend drills, annual training, and most schools and assignments within the United States. Most National Guard duty falls into this category. Conversely, “Title 10 duty” is duty ordered by the President or the Secretary of the Air Force under the authority of federal law and paid for with federal funds. This form of duty is used for basic (initial) military training, overseas training missions, and occasions when the Guard is called or ordered to active duty (mobilized) by the U.S. Government. ARNG members are not subject to the UCMJ [256]*256unless they are performing Title 10 duty.
Maj. Grant Blowers, et al, Disciplining the Force Jurisdictional Issues in the Joint and Total Force, 42 A.F.L. Rev 1, 8 (1997).
We conclude that Kise’s status, while serving full-time National Duty under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f), was as a member of the State militia and not as a federalized soldier.3 Given this status, Kise was a State employee. See A.R. 135-18, ch. 3-1.c. (June 19, 1996) (“Personnel of the ARNGUS serving an AGR tour under the provisions of 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2) .... serve in a State status.”);4 Department of Military and Veterans Affairs v. Bowen, 953 P.2d 888, 899 (Alaska 1998) (member serving in the AGR program was a state employee and subject to state National Guard statutes and regulations); U.S. ex rel. Karr v. Castle, 746 F.Supp. 1231, 1237 (D.Del.1990), withdrawn in part, 768 F.Supp. 1087 (D.Del.1991), aff'd sub nom., U.S. v. Carper, 22 F.3d 303 (3d Cir.1994) (“The intent of Congress was, and is, that National Guard personnel serving in the ‘Full Time Manning Program’ now included in a DOD [Department of Defense] program called Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) serve under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) in conventional National Guard status, i.e., under State control as opposed to service in the active military service of the United States in Reserves of the Army or Reserves of the Air Force status.”); H.R.Rep. No. 691, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 242, 243 (1984), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1984 pp. 4174, 4201-4201 (“The Congress has always intended that such personnel [National Guard personnel serving in a full-time duty status] should remain under the control of State National Guard authorities rather than the federal government.”); Op. Comp. Gen. of the U.S., dated December 7, 1992, 1992 WL 373552 at *2 (“Thus, members of the Active Guard/Reserve ordered to duty under 32 U.S.C. 502(f) remain under the command and control of state authorities although they may be paid out of funds [257]*257appropriated by Congress”). As the Supreme Court observed in Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 48, 85 S.Ct. 1293, 14 L.Ed.2d 205 (1965), remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 159, 86 S.Ct. 305, 15 L.Ed.2d 227 (1965):
It is not argued here that military members of the Guard are federal employees, even though they are paid with federal funds and must conform to strict federal requirements in order to satisfy training and promotion standards. Their appointment by state authorities and the immediate control exercised over them by the States make it apparent that military members of the Guard are employees of the States, and so the courts of appeals have uniformly held.
Id (emphasis added).
Next, we consider whether the Adjutant General was acting in a federal or State capacity. The Adjutant General is appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. 51 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). As the head of the Department, the Adjutant General is responsible to the Governor and the Commonwealth for carrying out all of the duties given or delegated to the Department. Id. § 902. The Department is responsible for “perform[ing] such duties and employing] the power delegated .... by the laws of the United States and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.” Id. § 702(2). Therefore, although the Department is responsible for administering federal regulations, it does so as a State agency. Hence, the Adjutant General is a state official. We must ascertain, however, in what capacity the Adjutant General acted when he separated Rise from the AGR program (ie., was he wearing a state or federal “hat”).
The Army regulations cited by the Department as providing a basis for Rise’s separation incorporate by reference the policies and procedures for administration of the AGR program. See N.G.R. (A.R.) 600-5, ch. 6 (Feb. 20 1990) citing A.R. 135-18, ch. 5-1 (June 19, 1996).5 Although these federal regulations establish the basis to separate Rise, the authority of the Adjutant General to administer these regulations is an essential element in determining his capacity.
The final authority, under the U.S. Army regulations, to order and accomplish an administrative separation of an ARN-GUS member under these circumstances is the State Adjutant General. N.G.R. 600-5, ch. 6-1.a. Furthermore, we find the Opinion of Attorney General Packel, albeit not binding on us, to be insightful and persuasive regarding the source of the Adjutant General’s authority. In 1973, the Adjutant General inquired about the authority of the Adjutant General’s office to correct the orders of certain National Guard technicians who were assigned to active duty during the Rorean War.1973 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 54. Citing the enumerated powers of the Department, now codified at 51 Pa.C.S. § 702(2), the Attorney General advised that such authority did exist....
Since the Department is charged by the foregoing State law with authority given to the Adjutant General under laws and regulations of the United States, and the [258]*258Adjutant General is authorized to carry out the duties of the Department, the Adjutant General is thus authorized by State law to carry out the laws and regulations of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).6 We conclude, therefore, that the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania was acting as a State official when he separated Rise, a state employee, from the AGR program. '
The Department’s remaining contention is that Rise’s cause of action is based on a federal regulation and, “absent some specific federal legislative grant, jurisdiction of claims, such as this one, resides in the District Courts-of the United States.” Respondent’s Brief at 11. We believe this statement is contrary to the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court regarding concurrent jurisdiction:
Under our “system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.” Tafflin [v. Levitt], 493 U.S, [455] at 458, 110 S.Ct, [792] at 795 [,107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990)]; see Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-478, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2874-2875, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-137, 23 L.Ed. 833 (1876). To give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over a federal cause of action, Congress must, in an exercise of its powers under the Supremacy Clause, affirmatively divest state courts of their presumptively concurrent jurisdiction. Tafflin, 493 U.S, at 459-460, 110 S.Ct, at 795-796.
Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990). Neither has the Department provided a citation, nor have we been able to locate such a citation, which would affirmatively divest this Court of jurisdiction in this matter.
This Court has been given jurisdiction to hear all appeals from Commonwealth agencies under Subchapter A of Chapter 7 of Title 2 of Pennsylvania’s Administrative Agency Law. 42 Pa.C.S. § 763(a)(1). Rise brings this appeal pursuant to Section 702 of the Administrative Agency Law, which provides for a right to appeal from an adjudication of a Commonwealth agency. 2 Pa.C.S. § 702.7
To exercise jurisdiction under the Administrative Agency Law, there must first be an adjudication by a State agency.8 An adjudication is defined as:
Any final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by an agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of any or all of the parties to the proceeding in which the adjudication is made.
2 Pa.C.S. § 101. The Pennsylvania National Guard, in its amicus curiae brief, [259]*259suggests that Kise did not exhaust his administrative remedies by pursuing this matter through the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR). Amicus Brief at 19-21 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1552). We observe, however, that the ABCMR pertains to the correction of military records. The Department does not assert that the ABCMR has jurisdiction to review a final decision of the Adjutant General. As such, we find no merit in the argument that Kise failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Furthermore, Kise was explicitly informed that the Adjutant General’s “decision is final.” R.R. at 294a.
In addition, we must determine, however, if Kise’s personal or property rights were affected. As stated in Delliponti v. DeAngelis, 545 Pa. 434, 681 A.2d 1261 (1996):
An individual employed by a government agency does not enjoy a property right in her employment unless she has an expectation of continued employment. Guthrie, 505 Pa. at 256, 478 A.2d at 1282. That expectation may be guaranteed by statute, contract, or be quasi-contractual in nature. Id. If the individual has such an expectation, she is entitled to notice and a hearing under Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 553. Gough v. Borough of Norristown, 66 Pa.Commw. 401, 444 A.2d 839 (1982). If, however, the individual does not have an expectation of continued employment, she is an at-will employee who does not have a right to a hearing. Rowe v. Township of Lower Merion, 120 Pa.Commw. 73, 547 A.2d 880 (1988).
Id. at 438-39, 681 A.2d at 1263 (citing Guthrie v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 505 Pa. 249, 478 A.2d 1279 (1984)).
We have closely examined N.G.R. 600-5 to determine whether Kise could have a reasonable expectation in continued employment. The regulation neither explicitly states that Kise may only be separated for cause nor does it state that Kise is an at-will participant in the AGR program. There are six chapters contained in the regulation, each addressing a distinct aspect of the program.9 Chapter six, “Separation”, sets forth seven bases for premature separation from the AGR program. These include medical (e.g., physical disabilities from injury or illness), voluntary, mandatory (e.g., enlisted personnel who reach the age 60, failure to obtain/maintain security clearance, conviction by civilian or military authorities), elimination or downgrade of position, retirement, and separation for cause. N.G.R. 600-5, ch. 6. The reasons for a separation for cause are:
(1) Inappropriate professional and personal conduct.
(2) Moral or professional dereliction.
(3) Loss of professional qualifications required for the performance of assigned duties.
(4) Substandard duty performance.
(5) Acts of expressed sentiments of racism, sexism, or prejudice against ethnic or religious groups.
(6) Failure to attain and maintain medical, physical fitness and weight standards.
Id. ch. 6-5(c)(1)(7). Upon review of this regulation, we find that a quasi-contract of [260]*260continued employment did exist to the extent that Kise would not be prematurely terminated from an initial or continued tour in the AGR program (ie., separated) unless for cause. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to hear the merits of Rise’s Petition for Review.
Under the process set forth under N.G.R. 600-5, an involuntary separation for cause recommendation is first made by the soldier’s commander or supervisor. This recommendation is then given to the soldier who has 15 days for comments or rebuttal, after which the commander forwards the recommendation to the State Adjutant General.10 Id. ch. 6-5(b). On July 17, 1999, the Commander of the 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Support Command (DISCOM) initiated an investigation relating to allegations of Rise’s improper sexual relationships in disregard of regulations governing fraternization.11 Pursuant to Army regulations, the DIS-COM Commander appointed an investigating officer (IO) and instructed the IO to follow the formal procedures for investigations found in Army Regulation 15-6 (Sept. 30, 1996).12 R.R. at 4a. After the IO’s report, the subordinate DISCOM Commander recommended to the Division Commander that an action to separate Kise for cause be initiated and that an Administrative Board be convened. See Memorandum of Lt. Col. Griffith, Jr. dated December 17, 1999, Oswald Attachment l.13 The Division Commander reviewed the recommendation and the IO’s report, and concurred with the initiation of a separation action. The DISCOM Commander was advised by the Division Commander, however, that an Administrative Board was not necessary for separation from the AGR program. On January 3, 2000, Kise received a copy of the IO report and in rebuttal he submitted 83 pages of statements and evidence.14 The Administrative Officer (AO) for DISCOM then sent the recommendation, IO report, and rebuttal documents to the Human Resource Office of the AGR program. See Memorandum to SGM Kramer, HRO AGR Manager dated January 22, 2000, Oswald Attachment 1.
Documentation supplied to this Court indicates that Lt. Col. Kane, Judge Advocate, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, then provided a legal review of the separation action, which was communicated to the DISCOM Commander. See Memorandum of Lt. Col. Kane dated February 25, 2000, Oswald Attachment 1. Lt. Col. Kane’s advice was to separate Kise through a formal board action. Despite [261]*261Lt. Col. Kane’s recommendation, Kise was informed on March 16, 2000 by the DIS-COM AO that the AO had recommended involuntary separation for Kise, which did not necessitate formal board action, because of inappropriate professional conduct and moral dereliction. The AO’s recommendation was then advanced through the Division Commander to the Adjutant General. On April 26, 2001, Kise was informed that the Adjutant General reviewed and approved the recommendation.
Before addressing the merits of Kise’s Petition for Review, we must consider the issue of justiciability.15 In essence, the Department argues that judicial involvement in this matter would amount to “judicial second-guessing of military actions.” Respondent’s Memorandum of Law at 7 citing Crawford v. Texas Army National Guard, 794 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir.1986)(asserting a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(c)). We do not agree. As stated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals:
[In] Dillard, a woman Guard member who was discharged from the Guard because of a regulation that forbade the enlistment of single parents. She alleged that the Guard had applied the regulation in an unconstitutionally discriminatory manner. The district court had held that this military matter was not reviewable in the civilian courts. This court reversed, holding that suits against the military are non-cognizable in federal court only in the rare case where finding for plaintiff “require[s] a court to run the military.” 652 F.2d at 322. We gave as one example, Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973), in which the plaintiffs asked the court to engage in ongoing regulatory supervision of the Guard. Absent such an extreme case, “[i]f the military justification outweighs the infringement of the plaintiffs individual freedom, we may hold for the military on the merits, but we will not find the claim to be non-justiciable.” Dillard, at 323-24 (emphasis added).
Jorden v. National Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 110-11 (3rd Cir.1986) citing Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316 (3rd Cir.1981). Whether the procedures used by the Pennsylvania Adjutant General deprived a state employee of Constitutional due process is not a question of military expertise or one that causes interference with the military mission. This Court is not being called upon to intrude into any issues of military doctrine or other matters committed to the [262]*262expertise of military commanders.16 Rather, we are asked to determine whether a State agency transgressed the Constitutional rights of one of its employees. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704. The issues on appeal are justiciable.
Rise contends that he was not afforded adequate due process under Pennsylvania’s Administrative Agency Law. The DISCOM Commander selected the procedures used to inquire into Rise’s conduct after consultation with the Division Commander. The authority of the DISCOM Commander to do so is derived from his status as the “appointing authority” for the inquiry. A.R. 15-6, ch. l-4.a and ch. 2-1.a. Selection of formal procedures, which provide a soldier with substantially greater due process, is “not mandatory unless required by other applicable regulations or directed by a higher authority.”17 Id. ch. 1-4.b.(2). The investigation regulations direct that the minimal procedural safeguards of notice, opportunity to respond in writing and submit rebuttal evidence, and consideration of the soldier’s response must be adhered to unless the regulations used as the basis for the adverse action (i.e., N.G.R. 600-5) provide similar procedural safeguards. Under N.G.R. 600-5, Rise was furnished with the DISCOM Commander’s written recommendation for involuntary separation and he was given the opportunity to comment. Further, the recommendation, IO’s report, and Rise’s rebuttal were transmitted to the Adjutant General for his consideration.
Rise does not argue that N.G.R. 600-5 merely provides a “floor” for procedural due process. Nor does Rise assert that his interest in continued participation in the AGR program requires additional due process considerations, such as those provided with a formal proceeding. We note the recent concerns of Constitutional due process in AGR separations. See John A. Wickham, The Total Force Concept, Involuntary Administrative Separation, and Constitutional Due Process: Are Reservists on Active Duty Still Second Class Citizens?, Army Law, 13 (Oct.2000) (discussing Gonzalez v. United States, No. 97-526C (Fed.Cl. July 1, 1998) and the “substantial disparity” in due process afforded by the Army to reservists); Department of Military and Veterans Affairs v. Bowen, 958 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1998). In Bowen, State procedural safeguards were imputed because the National Guard member was an officer. Bowen, 953 P.2d at 895. Federal statute requires that “the appointment of an officer of the National Guard may be terminated as provided by the laws of the State .... whose National Guard he is a member....” 32 U.S.C. § 324(b). The State court therefore concluded that State procedural protections were implicated. Unlike Bowen, Rise is an enlisted person. Under the Bowen court approach, we turn to the federal statute pertaining to the discharge of enlisted members to determine whether a similar reference to State law exists. It does not. 32 U.S.C. § 322(c) (“In times of peace, an enlisted member of the National Guard may be [263]*263discharged before his enlistment expires, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army....).
We face a unique set of circumstances: A State agency has applied a federal regulation to a State employee. While federal law does not preempt this Court from hearing this appeal, we are restrained by different principles of preemption. States are preempted from applying additional or different procedures where the federal government has acted to regulate comprehensively, such as the administration of the AGR program. See N.G.R. 600-5, ch. l.l.bl (“Local supplementation of this regulation is not authorized unless approved by the Chief, National Guard Bureau. State memorandums, pamphlets, SOP’s, guides, regulations, etc., may not alter the policies in this regulation.”); Carpenters Local 261 Health & Welfare Fund v. National Union Fire Insurance, 686 A.2d 1373, 1375 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996); English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). Therefore, Kise has a property right to continued employment and a Constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court, however, may not impose Pennsylvania’s statutory requirements to a due process hearing under 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 501-508.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The issue of due process rights as they apply to the termination of public employees has been addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). In Loudermill, the Court held that due process requires that a hearing be given to a civil servant who has a property right to continued employment prior to being terminated, regardless of the reason.
The purpose of this hearing is to give the individual being deprived of a property right to continued employment, either by suspension or termination, the opportunity to respond to allegations made against her before she is deprived of that significant property interest. This also allows the public employer the opportunity to correct its action based on any misapprehension of facts that led to its action against the public employee. Because such a hearing is not held to definitively resolve the propriety of the termination but is only to give the terminated employee the opportunity to respond to the allegations against her and to allow the employer to cure a mistaken suspension or discharge, absent any statutory requirement, a full-blown hearing is not required and the employee is not entitled to a full panoply of rights. Id. 470 U.S. at 534, 105 S.Ct. at 1489. Only a meeting with the employer or a written notice sent by the employer to the employee setting forth the reasons for her termination and requesting the employee to respond in wilting to the allegations is necessary to satisfy the basic due process rights guaranteed by Loudermill.
Pavonarius v. City of Allentown, 157 Pa.Cmwlth. 116, 629 A.2d 204, 207 (1993). Accordingly, our consideration of due process issues is limited to those under the United States Constitution and N.G.R. 600-5. Rise’s arguments rely solely on the due process requirements found in Pennsylvania’s Administrative Agency Law, which are not implicated in this appeal.
Kise raises several other issues in his appeal of the Adjutant General’s decision. First, Kise c'ontends that the Adjutant [264]*264General abused his discretion by failing to address “mandatory” factors that must be explored when contemplating whether to initiate an involuntary separation.18 N.G.R. 600-5, ch. 6-5.a(2). Kise also asserts that his commander or supervisor failed to counsel or issue a letter of reprimand concerning Kise’s alleged misconduct before initiating the separation.19 N.G.R. 600-5, ch. 6-5.a(l). Kise also challenges the sufficiency and competency of the evidence cited in the 10 report and used to demonstrate an improper relationship between Kise and two other soldiers.20 Moreover, Kise argues that the rules of fraternization did not apply to his relationship with another soldier because she was not in his chain-of-command.
Our ability to address these issues, however, is impaired because the Pennsylvania National Guard has refused to certify and submit a record to this Court in accordance with Pa. R.A.P.1952. The Pennsylvania National Guard, citing the federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, disclosed some documentation, which is generously referred to as a Reproduced Record.21 See letter of Michael C. Barrett dated July 18, 2000 and accompanying Affidavits of Lt. Col. Oswald and Maj. Gen. Lynch, Adjutant General of Pennsylvania. The incomplete record, however, prevents us from conducting an effective appellate review of Kise’s claims. For example, there is no mention in the IO’s report that a letter of reprimand or counseling was unnecessary. Nor is there any notation to indicate that this requirement was considered.22 The IO’s report also repeatedly states that Kise violated Army regulations and policies governing fraternization, abuse of power, violations of the PMCJ, unprofessional behavior, and misuse of government property, but fails to identify [265]*265the regulations and policies. Moreover, the Adjutant General’s basis for separation was Rise’s inappropriate professional conduct and moral dereliction. The bases for Rise’s separation are not in dispute, however the record fails to define or include a citation to a definition of the bases.23 Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Department with instructions to supply a more complete record that would permit this Court to conduct an effective appellate review.
We conclude that this Court has jurisdiction over Rise’s Petition for Review of the Adjutant General’s determination to separate Rise from the AGR program for cause. The record, however, is incomplete. Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the Adjutant General for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.
The decision in this case was decided prior to Judge Flaherty becoming a senior judge.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of September, 2001, the Motion to Dismiss the Petition to Review the involuntary separation of Galen E. Rise from the Active Guard/Reserve program is denied. The decision by the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania to involuntary separate Galen E. Rise is vacated. This matter is hereby remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.