King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc.

454 F.2d 66, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11945
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit·Decided January 7, 1972·No. 274, Docket 71-1544·Published·Cited by 45 cases

Opinion

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge:

Under what circumstances the owner of a trademark can protect it against use on products other than those to which he has applied the mark is a familiar problem in this court. But, as we noted in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 820, 82 S.Ct. 36, 7 L.Ed.2d 25 (1961), the question “does not become easier of solution with the years.” This case is no exception. Plaintiff King Research, Inc. sells a comb and brush cleaner under its trademark SHIP-SHAPE, and relying on the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., claims that defendant Shulton, Inc. has infringed by using SHIP SHAPE as a mark on a hair spray for men. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Richard *67 H. Levet, J., found no infringement, in an opinion reported at 324 F.Supp. 631 (19711. 1 2Although the ease is a close one, we agree with Judge Levet.

Plaintiff manufactures a comb and brush cleaner, which it has sold under its mark SHIP-SHAPE since about 1949. 2 The product is apparently distributed primarily in large packages to beauty parlors and barber shops for their own use or for resale to customers, although the item is also marketed in smaller packages to drug wholesalers for drug stores and to rack jobbers for supermarkets and variety stores. For the years 1968 and 1969, plaintiff’s sales of SHIP-SHAPE comb and brush cleaner were $140,000 and $150,000, respectively. Plaintiff does sell some toiletry products, but all have been marketed under marks other than SHIP-SHAPE: STAX for a hair dressing and conditioner; DANDRICIDE for an anti-dandruff rinse; DY-ZOFF for a hair color stain remover; and LOVE & KISSES for a hand cream.

Defendant Shulton, Inc. manufactures and distributes well-known lines of men’s toilet articles. For over 30 years, it has used the trademark OLD SPICE and other marks, consisting of sailing ships under various names, on several cosmetics and grooming aids for men. It first marketed SHIP SHAPE hair spray for men on a national basis in 1967. For the years 1968 and 1969, defendant’s gross sales of the product were $338,000 and $362,000, respectively. Prior to using the mark SHIP SHAPE, defendant conducted a search that turned up two of plaintiff’s registrations. 3 But, as the district court found, 324 F. Supp. at 634, “defendant considered the goods in plaintiff’s two registrations to be entirely different from defendant’s proposed hair spray for men.” Not unexpectedly, plaintiff disagreed and in June 1967 commenced this action. A month later, plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. Judge Harold R. Tyler, Jr., denied the motion, holding that “there is no substantial likelihood of public confusion between the soap or detergent marketed by plaintiff for cleaning brushes and combs” and defendant’s hair spray. 4 After a non-jury trial on the merits over three years later, Judge Levet reached basically the same conclusion. 324 F.Supp. at 636-638.

Prior to 1961, this area of the law had been in a state of considerable flux, at least in this circuit, and our decisions were something less than wonderfully consistent both in their approach and in the results reached. 5 *Finally, in Pola *68 roid Corp., supra, 287 F.2d at 495, Judge Friendly made an extensive listing of criteria useful in assessing a prior owner’s claim that a non-competitor’s use of a mark constitutes an infringement:

[T]he prior owner’s chance of success is a function of many variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities — the court may have to take still other variables into account. American Law Institute, Restatement of Torts, §§ 729, 730, 731.

The decision in Polaroid went off on plaintiff’s laches but the quoted list of relevant considerations was specifically approved in Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph International Corp., 308 F. 2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1962) (“Triumph” women’s stockings not protected against “Distinction by Triumph of Europe” women’s foundation garments). In Chandon Champagne. Corp. v. San Mari-no Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1964) (“Dom Pérignon” imported champagne not protected against “Pierre Perignon” domestic champagne), we considered additional factors including “the serious harm an injunction would cause the defendant as against the trifling benefit to the plaintiffs.” We used the same “method of approach” in Kiki Undies Corp. v. Promenade Hosiery Mills, Inc., 411 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, dismissed, 396 U.S. 1054, 90 S.Ct. 707, 24 L.Ed.2d 698 (1970) (“Kiki” women’s undergarments protected against “Kiki” tights, swimwear and sportswear).

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King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 454 F.2d 66, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11945 (2d Cir. 1972).

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