OPINION
APODACA, Judge.
On the court’s own motion, the opinion filed on December 12,1994 is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted in its place.
Chrysler Motor Company (Chrysler) appeals from a judgment awarding Jack Key and Jack Key Motor Company (Key) $300,-000 in damages under the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Dealers Franchising Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 57-16-1 through -16 (Repl. Pamp.1987 & Cum.Supp.1993) (the Act). Chrysler raises three issues on appeal; whether: (1) Key had standing to sue under the Act; (2) sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that Chrysler acted unreasonably in withholding its consent to the sale of the franchise and whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard in making this determination; and (3) Key’s own negligence required reduction of the damages award. Key filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to admit certain evidence of Key’s claimed future damages.
On Chrysler’s direct appeal, we hold that: (1) Key had standing to sue; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that Chrysler acted unreasonably; and (3) Key’s negligence, if any, did not require reduction of the damages awarded under the Act. On Key’s cross-appeal, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence of claimed future damages. We thus affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1988, Key entered into an agreement to purchase a Chrysler/Plymouth franchise from Borman Motor Company (Borman) in Las Cruces, New Mexico. The agreement was contingent upon Chrysler’s approval of the transfer. Key already owned and operated a Jeep/Eagle franchise with Chrysler. Key sought Chrysler’s approval of the proposed transfer under an application for an additional franchise.
Although Chrysler’s Phoenix Zone Manager recommended approval of the transfer, Chrysler refused to approve the transfer because Key failed to meet his Minimum Sales Responsibility (MSR) for the Jeep/Eagle line of vehicles sold under his existing franchise. The MSR was designed by Chrysler to measure sales performance. Under the existing franchise between Chrysler and Key, the MSR was defined as the minimum number of vehicles a dealer must sell within one year to reach the average sales penetration of a particular line of vehicles in the relevant market. The MSR was based on a formula multiplying the new car or truck registrations in the dealership’s locality with the line market share in the sales zone within the sales locality-
The trial court found that Chrysler’s reliance on Key’s MSR was unreasonable because certain economic and geographic factors rendered it inaccurate. The trial court also determined that both Key and Chrysler were negligent for failing to correct the inaccuracies. Reasoning that concepts of tort theory did not apply to the statutory cause of action, however, the trial court held that Chrysler was hable for all compensatory damages Key suffered for Chrysler’s violation of the Act, without any offset for Key’s purported negligence. These damages were based on Key’s loss of the benefit of the bargain. During the course of the non-jury trial, the trial court refused to admit Key’s evidence concerning future profits as proof of damages. Additional facts will be discussed as relevant to our discussion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Chrysler’s Direct Appeal 1. Standing
Chrysler asserts that Key, as a prospective purchaser of the Chrysler/Plymouth franchise, lacked standing under the Act to sue Chrysler for unreasonably 'withholding consent to the sale. Based on the plain language of the Act and considering the policy and purposes behind the Act, we determine that Key had standing to sue. In reaching this determination, we consider the language of the statutes at issue in the context of the entire Act, see State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353-54, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359-60 (1994), with our primary concern being to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, State ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst, 106 N.M. 732, 735, 749 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1988). Unless the legislature indicates otherwise, we give the words of the statute their ordinary meaning. Id.
Key based his claim for damages on allegations that Chrysler violated NMSA 1978, Section 57-16-5(L) (Repl.Pamp.1987). This section makes it unlawful for a manufacturer to:
prevent or attempt to prevent by contract or otherwise any motor vehicle dealer or any officer, partner or stockholder of any motor vehicle dealer from selling or transferring any part of the interest of any of them to any other person or party; provided, however, that no dealer, officer, partner or stockholder shall have the right to sell, transfer or assign the franchise or power of management or control thereunder without the consent of the manufacturer, distributor or representative except that consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Id. As stated, this provision prohibits a manufacturer from unreasonably withholding its consent to the sale, transfer or assignment of a franchise. The question before us is whether Key, as a prospective purchaser of an automobile dealership, had standing to pursue a claim under Section 57-16-5(L) against Chrysler, a manufacturer, who withheld its consent to the transfer of the franchise. Chrysler contends that the language of this section and the underlying intent of the legislature was to protect only the selling dealer, in this case Borman, and not a prospective buyer. Thus, Chrysler argues that Key, as a prospective buyer, lacked standing to sue. We disagree.
NMSA 1978, Section 57-16-13 (Repl. Pamp.1987), which defines the right of action for damages under the Act, states:
In addition to any other judicial relief, any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in this act may sue therefor in the district court and shall recover actual damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
(Emphasis added.) This section does not limit a right of action to the selling dealer; rather, it expressly protects “any person who shall be injured in his business or property.” (Emphasis added.) Additionally, the Act applies “to all persons, manufacturers, representatives, distributors and dealers.” NMSA 1978, § 57-16-2 (Repl.Pamp.1987) (emphasis added). A “person” is defined as “every natural person, partnership, corporation, association, trust, estate or any other legal entity.” NMSA 1978, § 57-16-3(0 (Repl.Pamp.1987). Based on the plain language of the Act, because Key is a “natural person,” and therefore is “any person,” we conclude that he has standing to sue Chrysler under the Act. Consequently, we are not persuaded by Chrysler’s argument that the legislature intended to protect only selling dealers from violations of this provision of the Act because we find nothing in the language of Section 57-16-5(L) that specifically limits a cause of action to the selling dealer only.
Our conclusion that Key, as “any person,” has standing to sue under the Act is supported by our Supreme Court’s decision in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 703 P.2d 169 (1985). There, the Court interpreted Section 57-16-13 to confer standing on individual retail buyers of an automobile who sought damages against the manufacturer for breach of warranty under the Act. Id. at 76, 703 P.2d at 173. The Court based its conclusion on the statutory language, the overall purpose of the Act, and the legislature’s intent to provide a remedy for warranty abuse. Id. Thus, in Anaya, our Supreme Court did not limit the right to sue under the Act to the selling franchise dealer only. Rather, based on the policy of the Act, the Court specifically concluded that a retail buyer “had standing to invoke the protection of the Act.” Id.
We find the rationale of Anaya helpful here. As did our Supreme Court in Anaya, we conclude that the policy of the Act implicitly evinces an intent to prohibit manufacturers from unreasonably withholding consent to the sale of a franchise. The legislature declared its policy for the Act as follows:
The distribution and sale of motor vehicles in this state vitally affects the general economy of the state and the public interest and welfare of its citizens. It is the policy of this state and the purpose of this act to exercise the state’s police power to ensure a sound system of distributing and selling motor vehicles and regulating the manufacturers, distributors, representatives and dealers of those vehicles to provide for compliance with manufacturer’s warranties, and to. prevent frauds, unfair practices, discriminations, impositions and other abuses of our citizens.
NMSA 1978, § 57-16-1 (Repl.Pamp.1987) (emphasis added); see also Anaya, 103 N.M. at 76, 703 P.2d at 173. The Act’s declaration of policy specifies the prevention of “unfair practices, discriminations, impositions and other abuses” as a priority. See id. at 76, 703 P.2d at 173 (Act’s declaration of policy to promote compliance with manufacturer’s warranties a priority). This policy, coupled with the broad language of Section 57-16-13, evinces a legislative intent to make remedies available to a wide range of potential plaintiffs, not just current franchise owners as argued by Chrysler. See Albuquerque Hilton Inn v. Haley, 90 N.M. 510, 565 P.2d 1027 (1977) (dicta that remedial legislation should be liberally construed so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy). Thus, we conclude that, based on the policy of the Act, a prospective purchaser of an automobile dealership has standing to invoke the protection of the Act. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1382-83 (3d Cir.1992) (concluding that under the plain language of the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act, which allowed “any person who is or may be injured by a violation of a provision of this act” to bring an action for damages or equitable relief, a prospective purchaser of an automobile franchise had standing to sue for violation of the Act by an automobile distributor), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1262, 122 L.Ed.2d 659 (1993).
Chrysler cites Beard Motors, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., 395 Mass. 428, 480 N.E.2d 303 (1985), for the proposition that other courts examining similar statutes have denied standing to a prospective purchaser of an automobile dealership. In Beard, the plaintiff was a currently franchised Chevrolet dealer who had entered into an agreement to purchase a Toyota dealership. Id. 480 N.E.2d at 304. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue Toyota for unreasonably withholding its consent to the sales agreement. Id. The Massachusetts statute at issue permitted “[a]ny franchisee or motor vehicle dealer who suffers any loss of money or property” because of a violation of the act to bring an action for damages and equitable relief. Id. at 305 (quoting Mass. Gen.L. ch 93B, § 12A (1977)). While acknowledging that the plain language of the act would allow the plaintiff to sue, the court considered whether the plaintiffs alleged injury, namely the loss of anticipated profits and capital appreciation of the Toyota dealership, was within the area of concern of the statutory scheme. Id. Because the court in Beard determined that the legislature intended “to protect motor vehicle franchisees and dealers from the type of injury to which they had been susceptible by virtue of the inequality of their bargaining power and that of their affiliated manufacturers and distributors,” it concluded the plaintiff did not have standing. Id. at 306. Thus, Beard based its holding on the legislature’s intent behind the act.
We consider Beard distinguishable from the present case for this same reason, that is, because the New Mexico Act indicates an intent to grant standing to a broader class of people than the Massachusetts statute. Compare § 57-16-13 with Mass.Gen.L. ch. 93B, § 12A (1984); see Anaya, 103 N.M. at 76, 703 P.2d at 173 (granting standing under the Act to retail purchasers of automobile). We note that, before engaging in the analysis of whether the plaintiffs alleged injury fell within the narrowly defined area of concern, Beard recognized that the legislature could indicate a broader grant of standing. Beard, 480 N.E.2d at 306. This language indicates to us that if the Massachusetts Legislature had clearly stated a broader grant of standing, Beard may have engaged in a different analysis. See id. We therefore decline to follow Beard.
Additionally, we decline to follow other authority cited by Chrysler and amici curiae because they also involve standing statutes that contain more limiting language than that contained in our own Section 57-16-13. See, e.g., Knauz v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 1327, 1329-30 (N.D.Ill.1989) (the Illinois act provided that dealers and franchisees may bring private causes of action; plaintiff was a motor vehicle dealer but did not have an existing franchise with Toyota; the court held that plaintiff did not have standing to sue Toyota because, by statute, the alleged wrongful action had to be taken against a franchise and the statute distinguished between an existing franchise and a franchise offering); Tynan v. General Motors Corp., 248 N.J.Super. 654, 591 A.2d 1024, 1029 (Ct.App.Div.) (plaintiff, who had sold his GM franchise several months before seeking to acquire another GM franchise, did not have standing to sue GM for allegedly wrongfully rejecting him as a prospective franchisee; statute provided that franchisee may bring action against franchisor), cert. denied, 127 N.J. 548, 606 A.2d 362 (1991), rev’d in part on different grounds, 127 N.J. 269, 604 A.2d 99 (1992) Consequently, these cases do not persuade us that Key lacked standing to sue under New Mexico’s Act.
At oral argument, Chrysler cited Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 643 A.2d 956 (1994), for the proposition that a prospective purchaser of an automobile dealership lacked standing to sue under New Hampshire’s Dealership Act, N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. Section 357-C (1984 & Supp.1993), an act with a standing provision that closely resembles the standing provision in our statute. Compare § 57-16-13 with N.H.Rev. Stat.Ann. § 357-0:12, II (1984). We decline to follow the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s holding that New Hampshire’s Dealership Act did not convey standing to prospective purchasers, in light of our Supreme Court’s holding in Anaya. Anaya interpreted Section 57-16-13 to confer standing to consumer purchasers of an automobile. Thus, the New Mexico Act, as interpreted by the Court in Anaya, grants standing to a broader class of people than does the New Hampshire Dealership Act, as interpreted by the Roberts court.
Notwithstanding the standing issue, Chrysler argues that if an existing dealer receives fair and reasonable compensation for the value of its business, a prospective purchaser has no cause of action. Chrysler bases this argument on NMSA 1978, Section 57-16-9 (Repl.Pamp.1987), that states:
Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be unlawful for the manufacturer, distributor or representative without due cause to fail to renew on terms then equally available to all its motor vehicle dealers, to terminate a franchise or to restrict the transfer of a franchise unless the dealer shall receive fair and reasonable compensation for the value of the business.
(Emphasis added.) Based on this language, Chrysler contends a manufacturer can restrict the transfer of a dealership, either reasonably or unreasonably, as long as the existing dealer receives “fair and reasonable compensation.” In such a case, argues Chrysler, a prospective purchaser has no cause of action. Chrysler therefore argues that, because Borman received fair and reasonable compensation for the sale of its dealership, Key has no cause of action against Chrysler. We disagree.
We do not interpret Section 57-16-9 to prevent a prospective purchaser from bringing a cause of action. We find no language in that section to the effect that, if the existing dealer receives fair and reasonable compensation, despite the manufacturer’s lack of due cause for terminating the franchise or restricting its transfer, no other person has a cause of action despite being injured by the manufacturer’s actions. Rather, we conclude that Section 57-16-9 more reasonably applies only to restrict the existing dealership itself, thus preventing the existing dealer from bringing an action despite the manufacturer’s unlawful behavior, so long as the dealer has received fair and reasonable compensation. This is a reasonable interpretation of the purpose of this section because, under general principles of contract law, if the dealer received fair and reasonable compensation, the dealer would have no damages. See Board of Educ. v. Jennings, 102 N.M. 762, 765, 701 P.2d 361, 364 (1985) (“ ‘[T]he purpose of allowing damages in a breach of contract case is the restoration to the injured of what he has lost by the breach, and what he reasonably could have expected to gain if there had been no breach.’ ”) (citation omitted); Fredenburgh v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 79 N.M. 593, 596, 446 P.2d 868, 871 (1968) (“The measure of damages should be that which fully and fairly compensates for the injuries received.”).
Additionally, if we were to interpret Section 57-16-9 to prevent any aggrieved person from pursuing a cause of action based on the manufacturer’s wrongful conduct in refusing to transfer, terminating, or failing to renew a franchise, we would negate several other sections of the Act, including Section 57-16-8, Section 57-16-11, and Section 57-16-13. This would be contrary to the general rule of statutory construction that an interpretation of a statute that creates an inconsistency should be avoided, and since all laws are presumed to be consistent with each other, every effort should be made to harmonize and reconcile them. See State ex rel. Maloney v. Neal, 80 N.M. 460, 462, 457 P.2d 708, 710 (1969) (stating established rule of statutory construction that, if possible, statute should be construed to give effect to all of its provisions so that one part will not destroy another). For example, interpreting Section 57-16-9 to allow a manufacturer to fail to renew, terminate, or restrict the transfer of a franchise without due cause and escape all liability so long as fair and reasonable compensation was paid to the dealer, would allow a manufacturer to impose unreasonable restrictions in these areas and thereby avoid the applicability of Section 57-16-8. It would also prevent other “injured” persons from pursuing a cause of action and thereby conflict with Section 57-16-11 and Section 57-16-13, which unequivocally grant standing to pursue a cause of action to “the aggrieved person” and to “any person who shall be injured in his business or property,” respectively. Thus, we conclude that, while Section 57-16-9 may prevent an existing dealer from bringing a cause of action in certain circumstances, it does not restrict a prospective purchaser from bringing suit.
Arguing against the holding we have chosen to adopt in this opinion, Chrysler and amici curiae predict dire consequences, in particular, the threat of litigation whenever an application is denied, to manufacturers and consumers if prospective buyers of franchises are allowed to sue for violations of Section 57-16-5(L). As noted in Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1383, however, when a manufacturer has reasonably denied an application, it has the defense of reasonableness.
[T]he fear of litigation is not alien to car manufacturers nor limited exclusively to them; they are subject to all kinds of liabilities — product, negligence, and, even under this statute, liability to franchisees. These are subsumed in the cost of doing business and from society’s viewpoint have favorable aspects [that] outweigh the negative ones.
Id. We emphasize that our decision does not force a manufacturer to accept involuntarily a prospective franchisee, but merely makes a manufacturer potentially liable to a prospective buyer when it unreasonably withholds its consent.
Finally, any potential problems posed by the possibility of injunctive relief should be readily addressed by the equitable nature of such relief. Specifically, Chrysler and amici curiae contend that the selling dealer may be placed in a position where it cannot sell the dealership pending the outcome of an action brought by a prospective buyer or may be forced out of business by prolonged litigation in which it is an involuntary participant and consumers are deprived of its services. If injunctive relief is sought, however, the interests of the selling dealer and consumers would be protected because, before granting injunctive relief, the trial court must exercise its discretion and balance the equities and hardships. See generally Wilcox v. Timberon Protective Ass’n, 111 N.M. 478, 485-86, 806 P.2d 1068, 1075-76 (Ct.App.1990) (in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, the trial court will consider a number of factors, including the interests of third parties and whether plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 529, 807 P.2d 227 (1991). Also, SCRA 1986, 1-066 (Repl.1991), requires a plaintiff seeking equitable relief to post security for payment of costs and damages to any party wrongfully enjoined or restrained. Additionally, in La-Balbo v. Hymes, 115 N.M. 314, 850 P.2d 1017 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 359, 851 P.2d 481 (1993), this Court recently set out the factors the trial court must consider in ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction. In LaBalbo, this court stated:
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; (2) the threatened injury outweighs any damage the injunction might cause the defendant; (3) issuance of the injunction will not be adverse to the public’s interest; and (4) there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will prevail on the merits.
Id. at 318, 850 P.2d at 1021. Therefore, we are not persuaded that, by allowing a prospective purchaser of an automobile dealership to sue the manufacturer for unreasonably withholding consent for the transfer, will wreak the havoc predicted by Chrysler and amici curiae.
Based on the legislature’s apparent intent to provide a broad grant of standing in Section 57-16-13 and the substantive cause of action defined in Section 57-16-5(L), we determine that Key, as a prospective purchaser of an automobile dealership, had standing to sue Chrysler for unreasonably withholding its consent to transfer an additional franchise to him. See Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1383; Anaya, 103 N.M. at 76, 703 P.2d at 173; cf. Beard Motors Inc., 480 N.E.2d at 305 (standing limited to “[a]ny franchisee or motor vehicle dealer”).
2. Standard of Review
The trial court found that the use of the MSR when properly applied was a reasonable basis for assessing sales ability. In this case, however, it determined that Chrysler was negligent in establishing the MSR area for Key’s dealership “without taking into account the distorted market sales area caused by fraudulent registration in New Mexico of vehicles owned by Texas residents and the proximity of competing dealers in El Paso.” The trial court also determined that Chrysler, through its Market Review Committee, relied on the reported MSR. Although at the time it denied approval of the franchise transfer Chrysler was not actually aware of the circumstances making the MSR inaccurate, the trial court nevertheless concluded that the mathematical formula for determining the MSR was inaccurate and that application by Chrysler of the inaccurate MSR was unreasonable.
Chrysler argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of review and asserts that the proper standard was whether Chrysler could have reasonably concluded, based on the facts known to Chrysler’s Market Review Committee at the time, that Key was materially deficient with respect to one or more appropriate, performance-related criteria. See, e.g., In re Van Ness Auto Plaza, Inc., 120 B.R. 545, 549 (Bankr. N.D.Cal.1990). Even if we were to accept this statement as the appropriate standard for determining unreasonableness, we would find no error nonetheless because the trial court found the MSR formula to be inaccurate. Although not stated in precisely the language urged by Chrysler, the findings and conclusions indicate that the trial court implicitly considered the inaccurate MSR to be an inappropriate criterion for judging Key’s sales performance and Chrysler’s reliance on it in refusing to consent to the franchise transfer was therefore unreasonable.
The more difficult question is whether Chrysler should be liable for relying on the inaccurate MSR when it did not actually know the facts rendering the MSR inaccurate. We are persuaded that, because Chrysler determined the elements for calculating the MSR and the formula for measuring a dealer’s sales performance, Chrysler had an obligation to make reasonable inquiries about whether local conditions rendered the MSR on which it relied inaccurate.
The fact that the Jeep/Eagle franchise agreement with Key stated that Chrysler would adjust the MSR at the dealer’s request if appropriate to do so fails to fulfill this obligation. First, this agreement related only to the Jeep/Eagle dealership, not to the dealership Key was attempting to acquire from Borman, and the trial court found that Chrysler had not called Key’s attention to the importance of achieving the MSR. Second, the agreement does not explicitly place an affirmative duty on Key to request an adjustment in the MSR, but merely gives Key the option of requesting such an adjustment.1
Chrysler does not challenge the trial court’s findings that the registration of vehicles in New Mexico by Texas residents and the proximity of the El Paso, Texas, metropolitan area to Key’s sales area rendered the MSR inaccurate. As stated above, the trial court could correctly determine that this inaccuracy rendered the MSR an inappropriate criterion for judging Key’s sales performance and that Chrysler’s sole reliance on Key’s failure to meet the inaccurate MSR rendered its withholding consent unreasonable.
3. Offset of Damages for Key’s Negligence
Chrysler argues that the amount of the award should be reduced to reflect Key’s liability for his own negligence in failing to inform Chrysler of the conditions making the MSR inaccurate. Although the trial court found Key fifty percent negligent in this regard, it determined this negligence was not a factor in awarding damages because Key did not owe Chrysler any statutory duty and the doctrine of comparative negligence did not apply to an action that was in the nature of a breach of contract. See Bowlin’s, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., 99 N.M. 660, 672, 662 P.2d 661, 673 (Ct.App.) (comparative liability not part of the Uniform Commercial Code), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P.2d 645 (1983); see also Gallegos v. Citizens Ins. Agency, 108 N.M. 722, 728, 779 P.2d 99, 105 (1989) (findings of comparative negligence are inapplicable for breach of contract and the vicarious liability of partners). We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the Act imposed no duty on Key. Cf. § 57-16-5 (imposing duty on manufacturers, distributors and representatives). Additionally, the Act does not provide for any damage offset. See § 57-16-13 (injured person may recover actual damages, costs and attorney’s fees).
Although it may appear inequitable at first blush to hold Chrysler totally responsible for the inaccuracies in the MSR, we are not persuaded that Key owed Chrysler any legal duty to request adjustment of the MSR. Key’s cause of action in this case derives solely from the statute. Cf. Carmine R. Zarlenga, Defending Against Litigation by Third Parties in the Franchise Context, 11 Franchise Law J., Summer 1991, at 19-23 (outlining potential causes of action based on breach of contract, tort, and equitable estoppel theories). Chrysler does not argue that Key had a statutory duty relating to the MSR. Instead, Chrysler relies on the sales agreement relating to the Jeep/Eagle dealership as imposing a duty on Key. As noted above, this agreement allows Key to request an adjustment, but it does not require Key to do so. The agreement required Key to meet the MSR and provided that Chrysler could terminate the agreement if Key failed to do so. The agreement did not impose any duty on Key to request a change in the MSR when he applied for an additional franchise. Because there was no statutory or contractual duty imposed on Key to inform Chrysler of the inaccuracy of the MSR, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Chrysler is liable for all the compensatory damages Key suffered from its unreasonably withholding consent to the transfer.
B. Key’s Cross-Appeal
1. Evidence of Future Damages
In his cross-appeal, Key challenges the trial court’s exclusion of evidence concerning projections of potential lost future profits over a twenty-five-year period. Phillip T. Kolbe, Ph.D., Key’s expert witness, testified concerning various documents he consulted in reviewing industry trends. He also testified about the growth of the Las Cruces metropolitan area and the positive effect that growth would have on increasing vehicle sales for dealers. He testified his projections were based on a twenty-five-year period because industry studies showed that the average life of a dealership is twenty-five years and because Jack Key and his son planned to operate the dealership for that period of time. In his projections, he considered the financial statements from Key’s Jeep/Eagle dealership and an estimate of sales for the Chrysler/Plymouth dealership. Although the trial court refused to admit Dr. Kolbe’s reports projecting future damages, evidence was admitted on what the projected net earnings of the Chrysler/Plymouth dealership would be and what the owners’ salaries would be. In determining the present value of the sales price of the Chrysler/Plymouth dealership, Dr. Kolbe testified concerning his calculations for the potential cash flows for the years 1989 through 1992. This testimony was also reflected in Plaintiffs Exhibit 38 that the trial court deemed inadmissible.
We have reviewed Dr. Kolbe’s testimony, as well as Plaintiffs tendered Exhibits Nos. 38 through 42 that were not admitted. From this review, it appears to us that Dr. Kolbe’s oral testimony overlapped the evidence in these exhibits, except for the evidence concerning the present value of cash flows for the years 1993 through 2013.
We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that this evidence was inadmissible. See generally City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 114 N.M. 659, 663, 845 P.2d 753, 757 (1992) (trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion). The trial court correctly considered the measure of damages to be Key’s loss of the benefit of the bargain. See generally 3 Charles L. Knapp, Commercial Damages: A Guide to Remedies in Business Litigation ¶ 61.06[9] (1994). Although Key’s lost profits may be relevant in computing damages, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that the actual evidence Key sought to admit was too speculative to be of any use in that regard. There was evidence that the Chrysler/Plymouth dealership had been losing substantial amounts of money and, although Key was able to make a small profit during the few weeks he managed that dealership, this period was too short on which to base long-term, substantial profit projections.
The trial court allowed a tender of the evidence, but stated in doing so that it was not aware of any New Mexico authority authorizing future damages projected through a period of twenty-five years. The court also stated, “I just cannot see those kind of damages. I see no basis for picking out 25 years or 10 years, or any reasonable basis for that.” The trial court reiterated that it did not believe that kind of evidence represented a proper measure of damages.
In taking the above-noted approach, the trial court clearly indicated that it did not believe lost profits projected over a twenty-five year period, or any period, were a reasonable basis for damages. Unlike the cases cited by Key, it is apparent that here, the trial court considered the evidence on this issue, even if it did not accept the exact figures contained in the excluded exhibits. Cf. Normand ex rel. Normand v. Ray, 107 N.M. 346, 348-49, 758 P.2d 296, 298-99 (1988) (trial court erred in not allowing evidence on the issue of the best interests of the children in a habeas corpus action to determine custody); Padilla v. Montano, 116 N.M. 398, 406, 862 P.2d 1257, 1265 (Ct.App.1993) (trial court erred in limiting determination of father’s income to tax returns and not considering evidence of other sources of revenue such as cash savings and IRA); State v. Aragon, 116 N.M. 291, 293-95, 861 P.2d 972, 974-76 (Ct.App.) (trial court had no basis to exclude evidence of polygraph because it refused to allow defendant to make an offer of proof), cert. denied, 116 N.M. 71, 860 P.2d 201 (1993). For these reasons, we determine that the trial court’s action in excluding the evidence of future profits was not contrary to logic or reason. See Komis, 114 N.M. at 663, 845 P.2d at 757 (the trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is contrary to logic and reason).
2. Attorney Fees
Key requests reasonable attorney fees for the services of his counsel on appeal. Attorney fees are authorized by statute. See § 57-16-13. Where an award of fees is authorized by statute, fees are appropriate for services performed on appeal. Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 110 N.M. 314, 321-22, 795 P.2d 1006, 1013-14 (1990). Based on our affirmance of the trial court’s judgment, we determine that Key is entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees for the services of Key’s counsel on the direct appeal, to be paid by Defendant and to be determined by the trial court on remand. No attorney fees are awarded on the cross-appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
On the direct appeal, we conclude that Key had standing, that the trial court applied the correct standard, and that there should be no offset under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Franchising Act for Key’s own negligence, if any. On the cross-appeal, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence of projected future damages. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. Key is awarded attorney fees, plus applicable gross receipt tax, for the services of his attorney on appeal. This case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Key.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ALARID, J., concurs. HARTZ, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.