Brachtenbach, J.
These consolidated cases concern a single issue, i.e., the validity of a policy provision in under-insured motorist (UIM) coverage which requires the claimant to pay part of the arbitration costs when a question of coverage or amount of recovery goes to arbitration. We hold the arbitration cost provisions to be void as violative of RCW 48.22.030(3).
In the Kenworthy v. Pennsylvania General Insurance Company case, claimant, Marcea Kenworthy, was injured in an automobile accident while driving her daughter's car. Kenworthy made a claim on her daughter's UIM policy, which was denied by Pennsylvania General.
Kenworthy filed a declaratory action in Spokane County Superior Court that was later removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. In the course of the federal action, the parties agreed that the dispute over coverage was subject to arbitration. The insurer had conceded that Kenworthy's injuries were covered under the policy; the parties dispute who should bear the cost of arbitration proceedings.
In the Kenworthy case, the UIM provision of the policy provides in part:
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages under this part; or
2. As to the amount of damages;
[312]*312either party may make a written demand for arbitration. In this event, each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. Each party will:
1. Pay the expenses it incurs; and
2. Bear the expenses of the third arbitrator equally.
General Accident Insurance Personal Auto Policy, at 6.
Kenworthy argued that this provision of the policy violated RCW 48.22.030(3), and was therefore void as against public policy. The District Court certified the following question to this court:
Does the insurance policy provision requiring insured persons to share in the costs of arbitration under underinsured motorist coverage violate the requirement of RCW 48.22.030(3) that underinsured coverage of an automobile insurance policy shall be in the same amount as the insured's third party liability coverage?
In the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Hooks and Anderson case, a car driven by Lynn Hooks, in which Judith Anderson was a passenger, was rear-ended by a car driven by Frank Holzberger. Anderson filed suit against Holzberger and simultaneously made a demand on a UIM policy issued by State Farm covering Hooks' car. In the dispute over coverage, Anderson successfully moved to compel arbitration, which has been completed. Anderson then moved to compel State Farm to pay all arbitrators' fees for the UIM arbitration. This appeal is from denial of that motion.
In the Hooks and Anderson case, the UIM provision of the policy provides in part:
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the insured and us:
(1) Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages from the
owner or driver of the underinsured motor vehicle; and
(2) If so, in what amount?
If there is no agreement, these questions shall be decided by arbitration upon written request of the insured or us. Each party shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator. These two shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the third one within 30 days either party may request a judge of a court of record in the county in which the arbitration is pending to [313]*313select a third one. The written decision of any two arbitrators shall be binding on each party.
The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be paid by the party who hired them.
The cost of the third arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared equally by both parties.
Clerk's Papers, at 119.
The policy provisions in these consolidated cases lead essentially to the same result: the claimant must pay the cost of the arbitrator that the claimant names, and one-half of the cost of the third arbitrator. The State Farm policy requires sharing of "other expenses of arbitration."
Our analysis necessarily begins with the applicable statute, RCW 48.22.030(3), which mandates UIM coverage "in the same amount as the insured's third party liability coverage . . .".
The statute itself, and its predecessor uninsured motorist statute, does not specifically answer the question posed in these cases. However, we have a long-standing series of cases that compel our conclusion herein. The principles of our cases have not been modified or discarded by the Legislature.
In Touchette v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 335, 494 P.2d 479 (1972), we expressed the general philosophy that the legislative purpose of UIM coverage, to expand insurance protection for the public while reducing the consequences of risk associated with careless and insolvent drivers, "is not to be eroded or, as the cases say, whittled away by a myriad of legal niceties arising from exclusionary clauses."
We have consistently held that RCW 48.22.030 "is to be liberally construed in order to provide broad protection against financially irresponsible motorists." Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co., 92 Wn.2d 748, 751, 600 P.2d 1272 (1979).
This body of law, which developed under the previous uninsured motorist statute, has been carried over to the interpretation of the underinsured motorist statute. Britton v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 104 Wn.2d 518, 530, 707 P.2d 125 (1985).
[314]*314Over the years we have conscientiously adhered to the inevitable and unassailable interpretation of the purpose of the UIM statute: "[T]o allow an injured party to recover those damages which would have been received had the responsible party maintained liability insurance." Finney, at 751; Keenan v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co., 108 Wn.2d 314, 320, 738 P.2d 270 (1987).
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Brachtenbach, J.
These consolidated cases concern a single issue, i.e., the validity of a policy provision in under-insured motorist (UIM) coverage which requires the claimant to pay part of the arbitration costs when a question of coverage or amount of recovery goes to arbitration. We hold the arbitration cost provisions to be void as violative of RCW 48.22.030(3).
In the Kenworthy v. Pennsylvania General Insurance Company case, claimant, Marcea Kenworthy, was injured in an automobile accident while driving her daughter's car. Kenworthy made a claim on her daughter's UIM policy, which was denied by Pennsylvania General.
Kenworthy filed a declaratory action in Spokane County Superior Court that was later removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. In the course of the federal action, the parties agreed that the dispute over coverage was subject to arbitration. The insurer had conceded that Kenworthy's injuries were covered under the policy; the parties dispute who should bear the cost of arbitration proceedings.
In the Kenworthy case, the UIM provision of the policy provides in part:
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages under this part; or
2. As to the amount of damages;
[312]*312either party may make a written demand for arbitration. In this event, each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. Each party will:
1. Pay the expenses it incurs; and
2. Bear the expenses of the third arbitrator equally.
General Accident Insurance Personal Auto Policy, at 6.
Kenworthy argued that this provision of the policy violated RCW 48.22.030(3), and was therefore void as against public policy. The District Court certified the following question to this court:
Does the insurance policy provision requiring insured persons to share in the costs of arbitration under underinsured motorist coverage violate the requirement of RCW 48.22.030(3) that underinsured coverage of an automobile insurance policy shall be in the same amount as the insured's third party liability coverage?
In the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Hooks and Anderson case, a car driven by Lynn Hooks, in which Judith Anderson was a passenger, was rear-ended by a car driven by Frank Holzberger. Anderson filed suit against Holzberger and simultaneously made a demand on a UIM policy issued by State Farm covering Hooks' car. In the dispute over coverage, Anderson successfully moved to compel arbitration, which has been completed. Anderson then moved to compel State Farm to pay all arbitrators' fees for the UIM arbitration. This appeal is from denial of that motion.
In the Hooks and Anderson case, the UIM provision of the policy provides in part:
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the insured and us:
(1) Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages from the
owner or driver of the underinsured motor vehicle; and
(2) If so, in what amount?
If there is no agreement, these questions shall be decided by arbitration upon written request of the insured or us. Each party shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator. These two shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the third one within 30 days either party may request a judge of a court of record in the county in which the arbitration is pending to [313]*313select a third one. The written decision of any two arbitrators shall be binding on each party.
The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be paid by the party who hired them.
The cost of the third arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared equally by both parties.
Clerk's Papers, at 119.
The policy provisions in these consolidated cases lead essentially to the same result: the claimant must pay the cost of the arbitrator that the claimant names, and one-half of the cost of the third arbitrator. The State Farm policy requires sharing of "other expenses of arbitration."
Our analysis necessarily begins with the applicable statute, RCW 48.22.030(3), which mandates UIM coverage "in the same amount as the insured's third party liability coverage . . .".
The statute itself, and its predecessor uninsured motorist statute, does not specifically answer the question posed in these cases. However, we have a long-standing series of cases that compel our conclusion herein. The principles of our cases have not been modified or discarded by the Legislature.
In Touchette v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 335, 494 P.2d 479 (1972), we expressed the general philosophy that the legislative purpose of UIM coverage, to expand insurance protection for the public while reducing the consequences of risk associated with careless and insolvent drivers, "is not to be eroded or, as the cases say, whittled away by a myriad of legal niceties arising from exclusionary clauses."
We have consistently held that RCW 48.22.030 "is to be liberally construed in order to provide broad protection against financially irresponsible motorists." Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co., 92 Wn.2d 748, 751, 600 P.2d 1272 (1979).
This body of law, which developed under the previous uninsured motorist statute, has been carried over to the interpretation of the underinsured motorist statute. Britton v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 104 Wn.2d 518, 530, 707 P.2d 125 (1985).
[314]*314Over the years we have conscientiously adhered to the inevitable and unassailable interpretation of the purpose of the UIM statute: "[T]o allow an injured party to recover those damages which would have been received had the responsible party maintained liability insurance." Finney, at 751; Keenan v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co., 108 Wn.2d 314, 320, 738 P.2d 270 (1987).
The pertinent question then is whether a policy that shifts the costs of arbitration to the claimant provides the statutorily mandated coverage. Put another way, as the cases hold, is the underinsured claimant recovering those damages that the claimant would have received from an insured responsible party? To pose the question is to answer it. The claimant's recovery from an insured responsible party would not be reduced by any arbitration costs or their equivalent.
Our conclusion finds support in the one case cited by the parties addressing this specific issue. In Nickla v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 38 Ill. App. 3d 927, 349 N.E.2d 644 (1976), the court considered whether an arbitration provision virtually identical to those at issue here was valid, or whether it violated a statutory requirement of UIM minimum coverage similar to Washington's. The court held the costs provision void:
It is clear that an insured who is required to settle his uninsured motorist claim through arbitration under the policy issued by defendant . . . must pay the entire fee of the arbitrator that he has selected, plus one-half the fee of the third arbitrator and one-half the costs of the arbitration hearing itself. Read together, the . . . [statutes] mandate that uninsured motorist coverage be at least $10,000/$20,000 exclusive of interest and costs. Since none of the arbitration fees and costs incurred by an insured are recoverable under the instant policy, the statutorily prescribed uninsured motorist coverage to which an insured is entitled is indirectly diluted. It is axiomatic that any conflict between the provisions of an insurance policy and a section of the Illinois Insurance Code must be resolved in favor of the statute.
(Italics ours.) Nickla, at 931.
The insurers in the instant case advance several arguments to sustain the clause. First, they argue that [315]*315arbitration is authorized by RCW 7.04, and that as a matter of contract law the parties can provide for cost shifting. However, there is no doubt that a policy provision cannot contravene the mandate of the statute as judicially interpreted. Britton v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., supra at 531.
Second, the insurers contend that claimants confuse recovery with coverage. Insurers contend these arbitration costs are analogous to those that a claimant might otherwise incur in effectuating coverage, e.g., attorney fees and costs of experts. The critical and controlling distinction, however, is between those expenses that the claimant voluntarily incurs and those required by the policy in order for the claimant to recover by arbitration. The logical result of the insurers' argument is that so long as gross coverage meets the minimum statutory limit, the policy could require that the claimant cover virtually any cost. This is the very sort of "erosion" and "whittling away" of protection our cases prohibit.
It is readily apparent that this mandatory cost-shifting provision would deny the claimant those damages that would have been received from an insured motorist. An award reduced by costs of arbitration is not equivalent to the damages that the injured person would otherwise receive. Therefore, the requirement that the claimant pay costs of arbitration materially dilutes the coverage mandated by the statute and is void. We note that costs such as fees for expert witnesses hired by a party and claimant's attorney fees, payment of which might be required by the arbitration clause of the policy, are distinguishable because they are normally associated with recovery in civil litigation between an injured party and an insured motorist, and would be assumed voluntarily.
The Superior Court order is reversed in the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Hooks and Anderson case. The certified question in the Kenworthy case is answered in the affirmative.
Utter, Dore, Pearson, and Smith, JJ., concur.