USCA4 Appeal: 22-6197 Doc: 37 Filed: 07/22/2024 Pg: 1 of 17
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-6197
KENNETH RAY JENKINS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
SHERIFF CALVIN WOODARD,
Defendants – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:19-ct-03190-BO)
Argued: March 22, 2024 Decided: July 22, 2024
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Reversed, vacated, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Harris joined.
ARGUED: Jeffrey Pierce Lamberson, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Emmett James Whelan, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James R. Morgan, Jr., WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 22-6197 Doc: 37 Filed: 07/22/2024 Pg: 2 of 17
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Kenneth Ray Jenkins was detained at Wilson County Detention Center
while awaiting trial in 2018. According to Jenkins, while there, he faced unsanitary living
conditions – including confinement in cells infested with feces – that caused him to contract
a bacterial illness. He initiated the underlying action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting
conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference claims for violations of his rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jenkins now
appeals the district court’s denial of his request for additional time to conduct discovery,
denials of his requests for counsel, and grant of Sheriff Woodard’s motion for summary
judgment. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court’s denials of Jenkins’s
requests for discovery and counsel, vacate its summary judgment decision, and remand for
discovery and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
The following allegations are drawn from Jenkins’s complaint. Jenkins suffers from
depression, bipolar disorder, and anxiety disorder and takes daily medication to treat those
conditions. Jenkins first entered Wilson County Detention Center (“WCDC”) on August
28, 2018. The next day, Jenkins requested his medication. Officers refused to allow
Jenkins to obtain his medication, and an altercation ensued. Officers placed Jenkins in
solitary confinement following the altercation. At some point while he was in solitary
confinement, Jenkins attempted suicide. Officers then moved Jenkins to “A-300”
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(presumably a padded room to prevent another suicide attempt), which Jenkins refers to as
the “Rubber Room.” J.A. 11.
The Rubber Room was unsanitary and had a persistent odor of waste and feces. It
was also “infested with feces all over the room,” including on the floor and ceiling. Id.
While Jenkins was in the Rubber Room, officers fed him his food on the floor near feces,
prohibited him from washing his hands, and told him to “eat with his hands” the “best way”
he could. Id. On at least one occasion, Jenkins’s food tray had roaches on it when officers
gave it to him. On another, Jenkins alleges his tray was soiled by a green mold-like
substance.
At some point, Jenkins was transferred from WCDC to Hanover Prison for a mental
health evaluation. He returned to WCDC on September 28, 2018, but was not placed back
in the Rubber Room. He alleges that he did not file any grievances about the Rubber
Room’s conditions or his experiences in the Rubber Room because “they wouldn’t give
[him] any[,]” indicating that WCDC officials would not provide him with the forms needed
to file a complaint. J.A. 12.
Sometime in October or November 2018, Jenkins began to bleed from his rectum.
He informed WCDC officials, including Appellee Sheriff Calvin Woodard, that he was in
severe pain and bleeding, and he asked to see a medical provider. Jenkins filed “a multitude
of complaints” regarding his medical issues but Sheriff Woodard only responded to one.
J.A. 11. WCDC refused him medical attention for months, despite his heavy bleeding.
WCDC eventually permitted Jenkins to see a medical provider in February 2019.
Sometime that month, medical providers conducted an MRI, a colonoscopy, and another
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procedure for which Jenkins had to be placed under general anesthesia. Through these
diagnostic procedures, the providers discovered three colon polyps, one of which they
described as “the worst they [had] seen.” Id. The providers diagnosed Jenkins with a
helicobacter pylori infection (a bacterial infection in the stomach), diverticulitis
(inflammation in the wall of the large intestine), and hemorrhoids.
At some point after the evaluation, a medical provider lanced and lasered Jenkins’s
colon polyps and prescribed Jenkins antibiotics to treat his infections. In total, Jenkins
suffered from heavy bleeding for eight months, and was denied medical attention for at
least three of those months. Jenkins alleges that he did not specify the dates of his medical
treatment in his filings because he did not want to include incorrect dates but notes that
“the nurse [has] all [his] medical records.” J.A. 12. Jenkins was eventually transferred to
another facility and is currently incarcerated.
II.
The procedural history in this case is extensive. We therefore recite only those
portions of the procedural history relevant to the instant appeal. In June 2019, Jenkins,
then a state pretrial detainee, filed his first pro se complaint asserting claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against WCDC. In his initial complaint, Jenkins alleged that the unsanitary
conditions of his pretrial confinement caused his medical ailments and that WCDC failed
to give him timely, necessary medical attention.
Sometime after filing his complaint, Jenkins sent a letter to the district court seeking
to amend his complaint and appointment of counsel. By order dated January 22, 2020, the
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district court granted Jenkins’s motion to file an amended complaint and denied his request
for appointment of counsel. Regarding the latter request, the court indicated that Jenkins’
abilities and the facts of the case did not rise to the level of exceptional circumstances
necessary to appoint counsel.
Jenkins filed an amended complaint on January 31, 2020. The amended complaint
referred to the same set of events covered by the initial complaint but attributed the
challenged conduct to specific WCDC officials, including Sheriff Calvin Woodard, and
named those officials as defendants. On October 7, 2020, the court conducted an initial
review of the amended complaint and dismissed all claims except Jenkins’s Fourteenth
Amendment conditions-of-confinement and deliberate-indifference claims asserted against
Sheriff Woodard. Sheriff Woodard answered the complaint, and the court entered a
scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and other pre-trial affairs.
Sheriff Woodard moved for summary judgment on April 5, 2021. He attached
affidavits of two WCDC officials to his motion, among other exhibits. On April 6, 2021,
the court mailed Jenkins a letter informing him about the motion for summary judgment,
the consequences of failing to respond, and the response deadline in accordance with our
decision in Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), in which
we held that district court’s must provide pro se plaintiffs with notice of all summary
judgment requirements before entering judgment against them. The Roseboro letter was
returned to the court as undeliverable about two weeks later. The court mailed another
Roseboro notice to Jenkins two days after it received the returned letter.
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Jenkins filed an opposition to Sheriff Woodard’s motion for summary judgment on
May 18, 2021. In it, Jenkins expressed his disagreement with Sheriff Woodard’s statements
of fact, asked the court to adopt the facts as alleged in his complaint, and asserted that
disputes of fact precluded summary judgment. He also renewed his request for
appointment of counsel and requested additional time to collect evidence and oppose the
motion.
On November 17, 2021, the court issued an order construing that filing as a request
for counsel, a Rule 56(d) motion for additional time for discovery, and a request for an
extension of time to further oppose Sheriff Woodard’s motion. The court denied Jenkins’s
renewed request for counsel and denied his Rule 56(d) motion, finding that he failed “to
provide ‘specified reasons’ why facts essential to justifying opposition . . . were
unavailable to him.” J.A. 69. It granted Jenkins’s request for an extension of time and
allowed him until December 17, 2021, to oppose the motion.
On December 2, 2021, Jenkins moved for reconsideration of the portion of the
court’s November 17 order denying his request for counsel. Sheriff Woodard opposed the
motion, and the court denied the motion days later. Jenkins did not file any additional
responses or otherwise oppose Sheriff Woodard’s motion for summary judgment before
the court’s deadline. On January 13, 2022, the district court granted Sheriff Woodard’s
motion for summary judgment, finding that Jenkins failed to demonstrate a material factual
dispute and that the allegations in Jenkins’s complaint were insufficient to create a triable
issue. Jenkins timely appealed.
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III.
In his informal brief, Jenkins purports to challenge the district court’s denials of his
requests for counsel and for additional time for discovery. However, he did not list any of
those decisions in his notice of appeal, which explicitly challenged only the court’s
summary judgment decision. Both parties maintain that this Court nonetheless has
jurisdiction to review all orders challenged on appeal because Jenkins appealed the court’s
final order. Because we have an independent obligation to assure ourselves of jurisdiction
over an appeal irrespective of the parties’ beliefs, we begin our analysis with the
jurisdictional question. See Martinez v. Garland, 86 F.4th 561, 566 (4th Cir. 2023); Sprint
Nextel Corp. v. Wireless Buybacks Holdings, LLC, 938 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2019).
The notice of appeal is meant to be a simple document that provides notice that a
party is appealing and invokes federal appellate court jurisdiction.
See Fed. R. App. P. 3 Advisory Committee’s Note to 2021 Amendment. At minimum, the
notice of appeal must state who is appealing, the order or judgment being appealed, and to
what court the appeal is being taken. Id.
In 2021, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
amended the rules to incorporate the merger principle, under which a party’s identification
of the final judgment in its notice of appeal confers appellate jurisdiction over prior
interlocutory orders that merge into the final judgment. According to the Committee, “[t]he
general merger rule can be stated simply: an appeal from a final judgment permits review
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of all rulings that led up to the judgment.” 1 Id. Thus, under the current version of the rule,
a party need not designate all orders he seeks to appeal in his notice of appeal. Fed. R.
App. P. 3(c)(4). Rather, a party’s notice of appeal of a final order encompasses all orders
that merge into that order. Id.
In his notice of appeal, Jenkins explicitly challenged the district court’s order
granting Sheriff Woodard’s summary judgment motion and dismissing his case. That order
encompassed all prior district court orders, including those denying Jenkins’s requests for
appointment of counsel and additional time for discovery. Accordingly, we have
jurisdiction to review those decisions on appeal. We now turn to Jenkins’s challenges.
IV.
Jenkins challenges the district court’s denials of his requests for counsel.
Throughout the litigation below, Jenkins referred to court-appointed counsel on several
occasions, and expressly requested counsel at least twice. See J.A. 18–20, 65–66, 71–72.
The district court denied each request but did not explain the rationale for any of its
decisions. Rather, the court’s orders denying the requests include only conclusory
1 The Committee advised that details regarding the principle’s applicability should be resolved in case law because the rule is “subject to some exceptions and complications.” Fed. R. App. P. 3 Advisory Committee’s Note to 2021 Amendment. We have recognized that case law on this issue is limited. See Wall Guy, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 95 F.4th 862, 877 fn. 9 (4th Cir. 2024) (stating that “there has been little case law interpreting which orders ‘merge into’ a later order” since the amendments to Rule 3 were implemented). However, because interlocutory orders are not otherwise appealable in most cases, we have assumed that the merger principle applies to them in the absence of case law to the contrary. See Tyson v. Gay, No. 22-6760, 2024 WL 1636462, at *1 fn. 1 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 2024) (assuming without deciding that the plaintiff’s requests for attorney’s fees and discovery sanctions merged into the final judgment being appealed.). 8 USCA4 Appeal: 22-6197 Doc: 37 Filed: 07/22/2024 Pg: 9 of 17
statements, such as “the facts of this case and plaintiff’s abilities do not present the requisite
exceptional circumstances necessitating appointment of counsel.” J.A. 22, 65. Jenkins
contends that the court’s failure to provide an explanation for its conclusions evinces a
failure to conduct the appropriate analysis. On that basis, Jenkins urges this Court to
reverse the district court’s decisions.
We set out the standard for appointment of counsel in civil cases in our decisions in
Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard
v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989), and Brock v. City of Richmond,
963 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). In Whisenant, the district court denied the
plaintiff’s request for counsel based on the court’s mistaken belief that it could not appoint
counsel in certain cases. 739 F.2d at 162. On appeal, we noted that district courts have
discretion to appoint counsel in civil cases and abuse that discretion by declining to do so
“where the case of an indigent person presents exceptional circumstances.” Id. We advised
that a district court must conduct a fact specific, two-part inquiry to assess whether a case
presents exceptional circumstances before it decides whether to appoint counsel. Id. That
inquiry requires the court to determine (1) whether the plaintiff “has a colorable claim” and
(2) considering the claim’s objective complexity and the plaintiff’s subjective abilities,
whether the plaintiff “lacks the capacity to present it.” Id. If both questions are answered
affirmatively, the case presents exceptional circumstances. Id.
We concluded that the Whisenant plaintiff had a colorable claim because the claim
was not frivolous and that he lacked the capacity to present it because he was “ill-equipped”
to represent himself. Id. In making the latter determination, we emphasized that the
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plaintiff was relatively uneducated, lacked any legal knowledge, and could not leave the
prison to interview witnesses. Id. We also noted that the assistance of a lawyer with
training in cross-examination would be crucial because the case depended on witness
credibility. Id. We held that the case presented exceptional circumstances and that the
district court was required to appoint counsel. 2
As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, “No comprehensive definition of exceptional
circumstances is practical.” Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982). Rather,
the existence of exceptional circumstances in each case “hinges on characteristics of the
claim and the litigant.” Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 163. The district court must therefore
assess (1) whether the plaintiff asserts a claim that is not frivolous, (2) the difficulty of the
claim, and (3) whether the plaintiff can present the claim considering the skill required to
do so and the plaintiff’s individual abilities. The district court’s failure to make these
assessments is legal error. Brock, 983 F.2d at 1055.
In Brock, the district court erroneously denied the plaintiff’s request for counsel
based on its finding that the case was not sufficiently complex. Id. We held that the court
abused its discretion because it did not evaluate all the factors that must be considered
under the Whisenant test. Id. While the court addressed the complexity of the case, we
2 In directing the district court to appoint counsel, we stated that “there is a duty on the part of the bar to accept court-appointments to represent indigent plaintiffs with colorable claims.” Id. at 164. The Supreme Court later abrogated that part of our holding in Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, where it held that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “does not authorize the federal courts to make coercive appointments of counsel.” 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). The Court’s Mallard decision did not affect any other holding in Whisenant. Thus, district courts in this Circuit must still apply the Whisenant test when assessing requests for appointment of counsel. See Brock, 983 F.2d 1055. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 22-6197 Doc: 37 Filed: 07/22/2024 Pg: 11 of 17
said, it failed to consider “the equally important question” of the plaintiff’s abilities. Id.
We noted that, under Whisenant, a plaintiff’s lack of general education and legal
knowledge could warrant appointment of counsel. Id. On that basis, we concluded that
the court erred in failing to evaluate whether and how the plaintiff’s education, background,
knowledge of the law, and ability to litigate while incarcerated affected his capacity to
present his claim. Id. We reversed the court’s decision and remanded the case with
instructions for the court to properly apply the Whisenant test. Id.
Jenkins contends that remand is warranted because the district court “never
seriously engaged with the exceptional circumstances analysis” and therefore failed “to
meaningfully grapple with the proper analysis” regarding his repeated requests for
counsel. Opening Br. 25. His contention is premised on the assumption that the district
court’s failure to explain its application of the Whisenant test necessarily means that the
court did not apply the test at all. See J.A. 22 (district court stating only that “the facts of
this case and plaintiff’s abilities do not present the requisite exceptional circumstances
necessitating appointment of counsel”). We need not make that assumption, nor must we
determine today whether a district court must always document its Whisenant analysis
because it is obvious from the record before us that Jenkins lacks the ability to present his
claims given his physical, mental, and intellectual limitations. Thus, even assuming the
district court considered all the necessary factors, albeit without documenting its analysis,
the court’s determination that this case does not present exceptional circumstances
demonstrates a clear error of judgment under our prior decisions.
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This Court is obliged to reverse a district court’s decision if it has a “definite and
firm conviction” that the court “committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Gannett Co. v. Clark Const. Grp., Inc.,
286 F.3d 737, 741 (4th Cir. 2002). Like the plaintiffs in Whisenant and Brock, Jenkins is
incarcerated and informed the district court that he lacks general education and legal
knowledge. This Court has already determined that those factors can limit one’s ability
to present his claims. See Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 163. So, too, does Jenkins’s inability
to access legal materials and evidence because even the most skilled attorney would
struggle representing a client under those circumstances. See Evans v. Kuplinski, 713 F.
App’x 167, 170 (4th Cir. 2017). As in Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 163, the absence of a lawyer
with the ability to cross-examine is especially problematic because Jenkins’s case, too,
turns on witness credibility, given the stark contrast between his account of the relevant
events and Sheriff Woodard’s. And importantly, Jenkins’s severe mental illness further
diminishes his ability to represent himself, especially considering his other limitations.
See Evans, 713 F. App’x at 170 (exceptional circumstances presented where the claim
was complex, and the plaintiff suffered from severe mental illness and was committed to
a psychiatric facility without access to legal materials). Collectively, these facts
demonstrate that this case presents the requisite exceptional circumstances necessitating
appointment of counsel.
Sheriff Woodard nonetheless urges this Court to affirm the court’s denials of
Jenkins’s requests. He offers three arguments in support of his position, all of which are
unavailing. First, Sheriff Woodard argues that the court appropriately denied Jenkins’s
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requests because Jenkins’s legal inexperience and prisoner status do not constitute
exceptional circumstances. Sheriff Woodard is correct that inexperience and incarceration
alone do not warrant appointment of counsel. But that does not account for the effect of
Jenkins’s severe mental illness on his ability to present his claim.
Second, Sheriff Woodard maintains that the court properly denied Jenkins’s requests
because this case is simple and “manageable for someone without legal training.” Id.
According to Woodard, Jenkins can represent himself because the relevant events occurred
over an eight-month span, the facts and potential witnesses are limited in scope and
number, and the claims presented are “narrow” and “conventional.” Id. In making this
argument, Sheriff Woodard seems to misunderstand the standard. We pause to note that
eight months is not necessarily a short time frame, particularly where the alleged
constitutional violations were continuous. There is also no basis for us to conclude that
this case which will require collection of evidence from the facility accused of such
egregious constitutional violations, cross-examination of witnesses, and assessment of
important constitutional issues under a new standard (which the parties failed to mention
on appeal, see infra fn. 3) is “manageable for someone without legal training” as Sheriff
Woodard contends. Furthermore, the Whisenant test requires the district court to assess
the claim’s complexity in connection with the plaintiff’s subjective ability. See Brock, 983
F.2d at 1055. Consequently, even if the average layman could present these claims pro se
given the time frame and narrow scope at issue, that fact says nothing about Jenkins’s
capacity to present the claims.
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Third, Sheriff Woodard contends that Jenkins demonstrated his ability to litigate
this case by “competently present[ing] and coherently explain[ing]” his claims, flagging
the relevant issues to the district court, and remaining “highly engaged” in the matter.
Resp. Br. 14. That characterization overstates Jenkins’s participation in the litigation
below. Indeed, nothing in the record demonstrates that Jenkins competently or coherently
presented his claims, or that he can litigate this case. At best, Jenkins demonstrated his
ability to tell portions of his story, explicitly disagree with Sheriff Woodard’s version of
the facts and inform the district court of his personal limitations. Moreover, even if Jenkins
was “highly engaged” in responding to the letters he received, his inability to conduct
discovery, file motions, or otherwise litigate his case while incarcerated demonstrates that
he was not “highly engaged” in the matter as Sheriff Woodard suggests.
As discussed above, Jenkins’s unique limitations evince that his lack of capacity to
present his claims. The district court therefore abused its discretion by concluding
otherwise. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denials of Jenkins’s requests for
counsel and direct the district court to appoint counsel on remand.
Jenkins also challenges the district court’s denial of his request for additional time
to “discover other evidence to support his argument,” J.A. 65, which the district court
construed as a motion for additional time under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. J.A. 69. The district court denied Jenkins’s motion because, according to the
court, Jenkins failed to “specif[y] reasons” why he could not obtain facts essential to
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oppose Sheriff Woodard’s motion during the period set in the court’s scheduling order. Id.
Because the district court erred by refusing to appoint Jenkins counsel, we conclude it also
erred by refusing to grant his request to extend discovery.
This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a request for additional time for
discovery for abuse of discretion. Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 524 (4th Cir. 2021). Under
that standard, we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo, and its factual findings for
clear error. Moses Enterprises, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 66 F.4th 523, 526 (4th Cir. 2023).
Under Rule 56(d), where a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that “for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition” to a motion for
summary judgment, a district court may deny or defer consideration of the motion, allow
time for the nonmovant to take discovery before assessing the motion, or issue any other
order it deems appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Rule 56(d) therefore permits a district
court to extend the discovery period after a party moves for summary judgment where the
court is aware that additional discovery is necessary. Id.
Although the language used in Rule 56(d) is discretionary, the Supreme Court has
instructed that summary judgment motions should only be granted “after adequate time for
discovery.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Consistent with that
instruction, this Court has cautioned that district courts should not consider summary
judgment motions where the nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to discover
information essential to its opposition. Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 128–29 (4th Cir.
2023). Relief under Rule 56(d) is therefore “broadly favored” in this Circuit and should
be “liberally granted.” Pledger, 5 F.4th at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is
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especially true in the context of pro se litigation and when the movant exclusively controls
evidence relevant to the nonmovant’s opposition. Id.
Jenkins concedes that he did not submit an affidavit or declaration to the district
court when he requested additional time for discovery. But contrary to the district
court’s conclusion (that Jenkins failed to “specif[y] reasons” for needing additional time
for discovery), Jenkins nonetheless explained in his filings why he was unable to obtain
evidence during the scheduled discovery period. Specifically, Jenkins noted that he could
not access legal materials and evidence, has a low IQ, lacks general education and legal
knowledge, has a history of severe mental health issues, and suffered from complications
related to the COVID-19 pandemic at various points during the litigation. See J.A. 65–
67, 71. And, immediately after discussing why he needed additional time in which to
conduct discovery, he again requested that the court appoint him counsel. See J.A. 67.
Jenkins’s justifications readily explain his failure to conduct discovery. And each
of those barriers would have been remedied had the district court appointed counsel.
Therefore, because the district court’s failure to appoint Jenkins counsel was an abuse of
discretion and Jenkins’s lack of counsel denied him a meaningful opportunity to conduct
discovery, the district court’s refusal to grant an extension of discovery was also an abuse
of discretion. Having so determined, we need not review the district court’s summary
judgment decision on the merits. See Calderon v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 809 F.3d 111, 120
(4th Cir. 2015) (stating that we will review the district court’s summary judgment decision
on the merits de novo only if we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in assessing the motion before discovery).
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VI.
The district court abused its discretion in denying Jenkins’s requests for
appointment of counsel and additional time for discovery. Additionally, because the
district court erred in denying Jenkins’s request for additional time for discovery, its pre-
discovery summary judgment decision was premature. We therefore reverse the court’s
denials of Jenkins’s requests for appointment of counsel and additional time for discovery,
vacate the court’s summary judgment decision on the merits, and remand this case for
additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. We direct the district court to appoint
counsel on remand to assist Jenkins with presenting his claims.
REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED