Kelley v. Michaels

830 F. Supp. 577, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19266, 1993 WL 340931
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Oklahoma
DecidedApril 30, 1993
Docket92-C-1004-E
StatusPublished

This text of 830 F. Supp. 577 (Kelley v. Michaels) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelley v. Michaels, 830 F. Supp. 577, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19266, 1993 WL 340931 (N.D. Okla. 1993).

Opinion

*578 ORDER

ELLISON, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before the Court for consideration upon Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (# 7) on the issue of punitive damages awarded by an arbitration board and Motion to Vacate (# 6), and Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (# 16) for confirmation of the arbitration award.

The following facts are not in dispute. Defendant, William B. Michaels (“Michaels”), as a broker for PaineWebber, Inc. (“PaineWebber”) managed Plaintiffs’, B.F. and Mildred Kelley (“the Kelleys”), joint trust accounts. The Kelleys, both age 76, held the joint account, and Mr. Kelley was sole trustee for the trust account naming his mother, age 102, as the beneficiary. Plaintiffs assert that they invested their money intending to live on the interest income.

Plaintiffs claim Michaels liquidated a portion of their accounts and churned 1 the funds by trading in speculative securities without Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent. Plaintiffs contend PaineWebber fired Michaels in September 1989, and subsequently Michaels was hired by Merrill Lynch as a broker. To move Plaintiffs’ accounts to Merrill Lynch, Michaels liquified the accounts incurring an “exit” expense of $14,257.40. Plaintiffs claim they were unaware that PaineWebber fired Michaels or that they would be charged exit fees. Further, Plaintiffs claim that during Michaels’ employment with Merrill Lynch, he again churned their accounts without their knowledge or consent.

After discovering Michaels’ actions, Plaintiffs brought suit against Michaels in Oklahoma state court; however, the action was dismissed and the issues were submitted to arbitration as specified in both account agreements. Arbitration proceeded under the National Association of Security Dealers’, Inc. (“NASD”) Code of Arbitration Procedure. Both agreements contained choice-of-law provisions calling for the application of New York substantive law for the purposes of this dispute.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

First, it is crucial to decide whether arbitration decisions and awards are subject to judicial review. The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs any “contract evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce.” 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1988). In view of the commercial investments made here, there is no question that this is a situation involving interstate commerce. The FAA enumerates certain instances in which federal courts may review an arbitration award:

In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration ...
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject' matter submitted was not made. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (1988).

An arbitration award may be modified or corrected:

(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted. 9 U.S.C.A. § 11(b) (1988).

The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, in Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir.1988) set out the scope of review for arbitration awards: “The role of the courts in reviewing arbitral awards is limited to the determination of whether the arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the contract of the parties.” Id. at 635 (citation omitted). The Jenkins standard is supported by United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987), where the Supreme Court recognized that parties contracting to have disputes resolved through arbitration rather than by a judge agree to abide by the *579 arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract they agreed to accept. “Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts.” Id. at 635.

In following the scope of review set forth above, it is appropriate for this Court to look to the contents of the parties’ agreements. If it is possible that reasonable minds might differ on the meaning of the agreement, judicial review is inappropriate because the arbitration board could have decided either way. However, if the contract is clear on its face, the Court may review a contrary decision for abuse of discretion.

PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES:

At arbitration Plaintiffs requested: actual damages of $30,000.00, interest as allowed by law, punitive damages, legal fees, and costs against PaineWebber and Michaels. Plaintiffs also requested portfolio losses of $220,-000.00 for damages from Merrill Lynch, and lost opportunity damages of $75,725.00.

The arbitration panel found Michaels liable for actual damages in the amount of $292,-750.00. ' This amount represents portfolio losses of $220,000.00 sustained by the Plaintiffs’ accounts during the time they were churned by Michaels as an employee of Merrill Lynch, plus lost opportunity damages of $72,750.00. Plaintiffs received $290,000.00 in settlement proceeds from Merrill Lynch, and the arbitration panel set off the award against Michaels by the amount of settlement. Thus, Michaels was liable for the remaining $2750.00. In addition, the Board awarded Plaintiffs $505,217.50 in punitive damages against Michaels.

Michaels contends that the Kelleys did not request punitive damages against Michaels for his activities while he was an employee of Merrill Lynch. Because Merrill Lynch reached a settlement agreement with Plaintiffs before the arbitration hearing, it is reasonable that Plaintiffs did not seek costs, interest, legal fees, or punitive damages from Merrill Lynch.

Furthermore, the arbitration board could have interpreted the request for punitive damages to cover all alleged wrongdoing of Michaels no matter where he was employed. The arbitration board does not indicate whether the punitive damages awarded were for Michaels’ conduct at PaineWebber, Merrill Lynch or both. Thus, this Court will not question or review further the validity of Plaintiffs request for punitive damages, except to determine whether there is any provision of applicable law that could be interpreted by the arbitration board as allowing them to award punitive damages as requested.

AUTHORITY OF ARBITRATION PANEL TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES:-

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Bluebook (online)
830 F. Supp. 577, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19266, 1993 WL 340931, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelley-v-michaels-oknd-1993.