GEORGE CLIFTON EDWARDS, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Kathy Thomas appeals from summary judgment granted as a matter of law by a District Judge in the Western District of Kentucky against her claim for damages arising out of her husband’s death. It is appellant’s contention that there were fact issues requiring a jury trial of her complaint against appellee Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
TVA was the owner of the air separator tower at TVA’s Paradise Steam Plant near Drakesboro, Kentucky which the J.A. Jones Company was constructing under a TVA contract at the time appellant’s husband, a Jones employee, fell through a cable guardrail 70 feet to his death. Appellant alleged diversity jurisdiction and that the case was governed by Kentucky law. Appellee TVA originally admitted that diversity jurisdiction applied. Now, however, TVA’s position has changed and it argues that this case involves federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It also contends that under either Kentucky or federal law, the District Judge should be affirmed.
Shortly before the subject accident, a TVA inspector had inspected this construction project, subsequently writing a report as follows: “Inspection of J.A. Jones’ project was made with their safety engineer. Several areas having cable guardrails and an open-ended scaffold were noted. They are taking corrective action.” This record does not show any subsequent action taken pursuant to the warning by TVA or the J.A. Jones Company prior to the fatal accident.
The TVA contract with Jones was designed quite obviously and to the degree possible to insulate TVA from liability for [369]*369the type of personal injury accident here involved. The contract provided in part:
The Contractor shall be an independent Contractor for all purposes of this contract, and all persons engaged in carrying out any of the Contractor’s obligations hereunder shall be the servants of the Contractor or its subcontractors and not the servants or agents of TVA. The Contractor is aware of the location, nature and hazards of the work covered by this contract.
Appellant, however, points out that TVA reserved rights to inspect for violations of safety regulations and to direct changes as shown in the following contract provisions:
The contractor shall be responsible for enforcing regulations in accordance with American National Standards Institute and other recognized national codes, including OSHA. Any work attempted to be made or actually accomplished in violation of any existing applicable law, ordinance, regulation or approved safety practice shall be the contractor’s sole responsibility.
During the progress of the work, the contractor shall cooperate fully with TVA’s safety representatives. They shall have access to the site at all times and shall be given every facility for making unhampered inspection. They may direct any changes they deem necessary.
Appellant further claims that by noticing a safety violation and warning the contractor of it, TVA contributed to appellant’s husband’s death and by not doing anything more to correct the violation, TVA was guilty of causal negligence. She also argues that whether TVA was guilty of causal negligence was a question of fact for the jury.
Before turning to that question, however, we must decide the preliminary question of what law applies in this case.
TVA correctly notes that this court has held that TVA may be sued under Federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. Jackson v. TVA, 595 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir.1979), affirming, 462 F.Supp. 45, 49-55 (M.D.Tenn.1978). TVA asserts that federal common law should control this case, because of its assertion that the claim is essentially a contract claim and not one sounding in tort. TVA concedes that if the claim is construed as a tort claim, state law, in this instance Kentucky law, controls the outcome.
We hold against TVA’s contention. This suit, filed by the widow of the deceased employee, does not sound in contract and does sound in tort. The only contract involved is that between TVA and the Jones Construction Company (which as noted above is not a party to this suit). TVA may, of course, urge the terms of its contract with Jones in mitigation of any duty that it had to the deceased Jones employee. But the widow’s action to recover damages for her husband’s death is clearly a tort claim alleging TVA’s knowledge of a risk and assumption of a duty and a claim that TVA failed to take or immediately to require Jones to take steps to remedy the perceived safety violation.
The District Court chose to apply Kentucky law to appellant’s claims. We believe the District Court was correct regardless of whether jurisdiction in this case is based on federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Appellant challenges the District Court’s application of Kentucky law. Additional facts are required for this issue.
The use of the cable guardrail was in violation of TVA’s safety manual which required wooden handrails be used. While TVA protested this violation of its (TVA’s) safety rules by decedent’s employer, it did nothing more about it until appellant’s decedent fell to his death while installing yet another cable guardrail. It appears that this accident occurred a little over a week after a TVA engineer made an inspection of the construction site, noted the violation referred to above and demanded correction by the contractor. TVA’s safety rules which had been pointed out to the J.A. Jones Company called for wooden handrails, which were in fact installed within two weeks after the accident.
[370]*370Appellant points out that Charles Morgan, Chief of Safety Engineering, for TVA Construction Division, stated in a deposition in this case as follows:
Q. 99 Under the contract the safety man could have ordered that immediately that date no further cable should be used. Isn’t that correct?
A. It would depend again on the situation. Normally m TVA that would not be done except in a very eminent [sic] danger situation maybe and the other way it would have to be done would be through our purchasing people.
Q. 100 How do you define an eminent danger situation?
A. An eminent danger is a condition that exists which may likely cause a serious or fatal injury.
Q. 101 That’s a fairly widely accepted principle in engineering basically isn’t it?
A. That’s correct.
Q. 102 Do you recall the height of the precipitator or the platform?
A. No I do not.
Q. 103 Any height above twenty feet is an area that poses eminent danger to workmen in an improperly guarded area. Is that accepted in safety engineering?
A. I would agree that’s generally accepted.
Q. 104 The use of the cable was an unacceptable form of railing.
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GEORGE CLIFTON EDWARDS, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Kathy Thomas appeals from summary judgment granted as a matter of law by a District Judge in the Western District of Kentucky against her claim for damages arising out of her husband’s death. It is appellant’s contention that there were fact issues requiring a jury trial of her complaint against appellee Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
TVA was the owner of the air separator tower at TVA’s Paradise Steam Plant near Drakesboro, Kentucky which the J.A. Jones Company was constructing under a TVA contract at the time appellant’s husband, a Jones employee, fell through a cable guardrail 70 feet to his death. Appellant alleged diversity jurisdiction and that the case was governed by Kentucky law. Appellee TVA originally admitted that diversity jurisdiction applied. Now, however, TVA’s position has changed and it argues that this case involves federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It also contends that under either Kentucky or federal law, the District Judge should be affirmed.
Shortly before the subject accident, a TVA inspector had inspected this construction project, subsequently writing a report as follows: “Inspection of J.A. Jones’ project was made with their safety engineer. Several areas having cable guardrails and an open-ended scaffold were noted. They are taking corrective action.” This record does not show any subsequent action taken pursuant to the warning by TVA or the J.A. Jones Company prior to the fatal accident.
The TVA contract with Jones was designed quite obviously and to the degree possible to insulate TVA from liability for [369]*369the type of personal injury accident here involved. The contract provided in part:
The Contractor shall be an independent Contractor for all purposes of this contract, and all persons engaged in carrying out any of the Contractor’s obligations hereunder shall be the servants of the Contractor or its subcontractors and not the servants or agents of TVA. The Contractor is aware of the location, nature and hazards of the work covered by this contract.
Appellant, however, points out that TVA reserved rights to inspect for violations of safety regulations and to direct changes as shown in the following contract provisions:
The contractor shall be responsible for enforcing regulations in accordance with American National Standards Institute and other recognized national codes, including OSHA. Any work attempted to be made or actually accomplished in violation of any existing applicable law, ordinance, regulation or approved safety practice shall be the contractor’s sole responsibility.
During the progress of the work, the contractor shall cooperate fully with TVA’s safety representatives. They shall have access to the site at all times and shall be given every facility for making unhampered inspection. They may direct any changes they deem necessary.
Appellant further claims that by noticing a safety violation and warning the contractor of it, TVA contributed to appellant’s husband’s death and by not doing anything more to correct the violation, TVA was guilty of causal negligence. She also argues that whether TVA was guilty of causal negligence was a question of fact for the jury.
Before turning to that question, however, we must decide the preliminary question of what law applies in this case.
TVA correctly notes that this court has held that TVA may be sued under Federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. Jackson v. TVA, 595 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir.1979), affirming, 462 F.Supp. 45, 49-55 (M.D.Tenn.1978). TVA asserts that federal common law should control this case, because of its assertion that the claim is essentially a contract claim and not one sounding in tort. TVA concedes that if the claim is construed as a tort claim, state law, in this instance Kentucky law, controls the outcome.
We hold against TVA’s contention. This suit, filed by the widow of the deceased employee, does not sound in contract and does sound in tort. The only contract involved is that between TVA and the Jones Construction Company (which as noted above is not a party to this suit). TVA may, of course, urge the terms of its contract with Jones in mitigation of any duty that it had to the deceased Jones employee. But the widow’s action to recover damages for her husband’s death is clearly a tort claim alleging TVA’s knowledge of a risk and assumption of a duty and a claim that TVA failed to take or immediately to require Jones to take steps to remedy the perceived safety violation.
The District Court chose to apply Kentucky law to appellant’s claims. We believe the District Court was correct regardless of whether jurisdiction in this case is based on federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Appellant challenges the District Court’s application of Kentucky law. Additional facts are required for this issue.
The use of the cable guardrail was in violation of TVA’s safety manual which required wooden handrails be used. While TVA protested this violation of its (TVA’s) safety rules by decedent’s employer, it did nothing more about it until appellant’s decedent fell to his death while installing yet another cable guardrail. It appears that this accident occurred a little over a week after a TVA engineer made an inspection of the construction site, noted the violation referred to above and demanded correction by the contractor. TVA’s safety rules which had been pointed out to the J.A. Jones Company called for wooden handrails, which were in fact installed within two weeks after the accident.
[370]*370Appellant points out that Charles Morgan, Chief of Safety Engineering, for TVA Construction Division, stated in a deposition in this case as follows:
Q. 99 Under the contract the safety man could have ordered that immediately that date no further cable should be used. Isn’t that correct?
A. It would depend again on the situation. Normally m TVA that would not be done except in a very eminent [sic] danger situation maybe and the other way it would have to be done would be through our purchasing people.
Q. 100 How do you define an eminent danger situation?
A. An eminent danger is a condition that exists which may likely cause a serious or fatal injury.
Q. 101 That’s a fairly widely accepted principle in engineering basically isn’t it?
A. That’s correct.
Q. 102 Do you recall the height of the precipitator or the platform?
A. No I do not.
Q. 103 Any height above twenty feet is an area that poses eminent danger to workmen in an improperly guarded area. Is that accepted in safety engineering?
A. I would agree that’s generally accepted.
Q. 104 The use of the cable was an unacceptable form of railing. Isn’t that correct?
A. It was unacceptable by TVA standards right.
Q. 105 As a result of the memorandum of May 27th or May 28th at some point later pursuant to TVA’s direction wooden handrails were used to replace the cable in question. Isn’t that correct?
A. Yes.
(Jt.App. pp. 208-209).
It is appellant’s earnest contention in this case, which contention was rejected as a matter of law by the District Judge’s summary judgment order in favor of TVA, that TVA had, by its inspection and its instruction to correct, assumed the duty of enforcing the safety regulations.
At appellate argument of this case, appellant’s counsel was asked whether the TVA inspector, on noting the use of cable guardrails, had a duty to stop the job immediately until corrections were made. The response was affirmative.
TVA contends that, as a matter of Kentucky law, it may not be held liable for its own negligence to employees of independent contractors. TVA relies on King v. Shelby Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659 (Ky.Ct.App.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932, 94 S.Ct. 2644, 41 L.Ed.2d 235 (1974). King, however, held only that a general contractor could not be held liable to employees of an independent contractor engaged in inherently dangerous work on the basis of the non-delegable duty doctrine. As the Kentucky Supreme Court has since made clear, a general contractor may be held liable to employees of an independent contractor on the basis of the general contractor’s own negligence. Caskey v. Hammonds Construction, Inc., 536 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Ky.1976). Appellant’s theory is not premised on the non-delegable duty doctrine, but on allegations regarding TVA’s own negligence in failing to require immediate correction of the safety hazard created by use of cable guardrails.
Although not so stated, appellant’s theory appears to be premised on the “good Samaritan” doctrine: one who voluntarily assumes a duty must perform that duty with reasonable care. This court has held that the Kentucky Supreme Court would adopt the principles of liability as stated in Restatement of Torts, Second § 324A. See Raymer v. United States, 660 F.2d 1136, 1142-1143 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944, 102 S.Ct. 2009, 72 L.Ed.2d 466 (1982). Section 324A reads as follows:
§ 324A. Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as [371]*371necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
TVA’s duty, if any, was simply to exercise reasonable care. The written and verbal instruction to cease using cable guardrails was a reasonable response to the hazard under the circumstances. TVA had no reason to foresee that Jones would continue using and constructing the unsafe cable guardrails.
Analyzing each of the three liability conditions of § 324A, we find no evidence that TVA’s warnings to Jones “increase[d] the risk of harm” under (a) or undertook to perform a duty to correct the hazard which it pointed out to the contractor under (b) or that the harm was suffered because of the reliance of the deceased or Jones upon any TVA undertaking under (c).
Appellant’s reliance on Haddad v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 449 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Ky.Ct.App.1970) for the proposition that TVA had a duty completely and immediately to abate the hazard fails for the same reasons that such reliance failed in Raymer v. United States, 660 F.2d at 1140-1141:
In Haddad v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., supra, the Kentucky court held that a public utility had a “duty to do something protective” when its employee found a highly dangerous concentration of carbon monoxide while inspecting a floor furnace inside the residence of a customer. 449 S.W.2d at 918. The court made clear that the gas company had no duty to make an inspection or to “police” appliances generally but that the “duty grows out of an inspection which the company has chosen to make.” Id. The plaintiffs argue that Haddad establishes the principle that a private individual who undertakes an inspection of the premises of another is liable under Kentucky law for failing to abate a dangerous condition discovered during the inspection if that condition results in injury or damage.
* * * * * *
This analysis indicates to us that Had-dad would not be applied as broadly as the plaintiffs contend. The humane rule which Haddad establishes is that when members of the general public enlist the services of specially qualified persons to determine whether potentially dangerous substances do in fact constitute a danger, the persons so engaged have a duty to take some steps to abate any dangers found to exist. Haddad and the authorities upon which it was based all have as underlying premises danger from a substance whose presence is not obvious to a layman, an undertaking to inspect or install by one having superior knowledge of the dangerous substance, and reliance on the expertise of the person who assumes the undertaking.
TVA’s duty, if any, was to exercise reasonable care. We find no evidence in this record from which a jury could have found that TVA failed in performing that duty.
The judgment of the District Court in favor of TVA is affirmed.