Joseph Rene Meza v. Martinez

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: February 16, 2021
• Docket: 2:20-cv-02343
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSEPH RENE MEZA, ) Case No. CV 20-2343-MCS (SP) ) 12 Petitioner, ) ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 13 v. ) SUMMARILY DISMISSING ) PETITION FOR WRIT OF 14 MARTINEZ, Warden, ) HABEAS CORPUS ) 15 Respondent. ) ) 16 ) 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 On March 11, 2020, petitioner Joseph Rene Meza filed a Petition for a Writ 21 of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 22 Petitioner is incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Victorville, 23 California, where he is serving a 55-year sentence imposed by the United States 24 District Court for the Northern District of Texas in 2001 following his convictions 25 for bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) and possession of a firearm in furtherance 26 of the crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). 27 Petitioner contests the legality of his detention by arguing that, due to 28 1 changes in the law, § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague and he would only be 2 facing a 15-year sentence today, and therefore his sentence should be reduced. On 3 March 30, 2020, this Court issued an Order directing petitioner to show cause why 4 the Petition should not be recharacterized as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and 5 dismissed as filed in the wrong jurisdiction, as an improper successive § 2255 6 motion, and as time-barred (“OSC”). 7 On April 29, 2020, petitioner responded to the OSC (“Response”). In his 8 Response, petitioner argues this Court has jurisdiction to consider the Petition 9 under § 2241 pursuant to § 2255’s savings clause. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). In 10 the alternative, petitioner argues the Petition should be recharacterized as one 11 under 18 U.S.C. § 3582, he should be given 30 days to amend the Petition, or the 12 Petition should be dismissed without prejudice. 13 For the reasons that follow, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the 14 Petition, and transfer to another court would not be in the interest of justice 15 because the Petition is impermissibly successive and time-barred. Consequently, 16 the Court summarily dismisses the Petition with prejudice. 17 II. 18 PROCEDURAL HISTORY1 19 On October 17, 2000, petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of bank 20 robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) and proceeded to trial on his charges for unlawful 21 use of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) in 22 case number 4:00-CR-121 in the United States District Court for the Northern 23 District of Texas. Petitioner was found guilty of three § 924(c) counts. On 24 25 1 The Court adopts and sets forth below the procedural history recounted by 26 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in case number 4:13-CV-831, docket no. 4, and as reflected on the dockets of case numbers 4:00- 27 CR-121, 4:03-CV-189, and 4:16-CV-688 (N.D. Tex.), and 01-10310 (5th Cir.). 28 1 February 9, 2001, petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 768 months in 2 prison. Petitioner appealed the judgment, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 3 affirmed it on December 19, 2001. 4 Petitioner filed his first motion collaterally attacking his convictions and 5 sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on March 17, 2003, in the Northern District of 6 Texas. That motion was denied on April 29, 2003. 7 On September 30, 2013, petitioner filed a second § 2255 motion in the 8 Northern District of Texas, which was denied on October 15, 2013. Petitioner 9 then filed a motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2013, which was denied 10 on December 2, 2013. 11 On July 18, 2016, petitioner filed a third § 2255 motion in the Northern 12 District of Texas. It too was denied, on July 20, 2016. 13 Nearly four years later, on March 11, 2020, petitioner filed the instant 14 § 2241 Petition in this Court. On March 30, 2020, the Court issued an OSC 15 directing petitioner to show cause why the Petition should not be recharacterized 16 as a § 2255 motion and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as improperly 17 successive, and as time-barred. On April 29, 2020, petitioner filed his Response to 18 the OSC. 19 III. 20 DISCUSSION 21 Section 2255 allows a federal prisoner claiming that his sentence was 22 imposed “in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States” to “move 23 the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 24 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Petitioner here contests the legality of his detention by 25 arguing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague as set forth in U.S. v. 26 Davis, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2019), Johnson v. U.S., 27 576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 28 1 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 200 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2018). Pet. at 3, 6; Response at 2 3.2 Petitioner contends he would only have been sentenced to 15 years today and 3 his sentence should be reduced. Pet. at 3; Response at 6. But petitioner raises this 4 challenge to his sentence not in a § 2255 motion filed in the district of conviction, 5 but rather in a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district of his 6 current incarceration. 7 In his Response to the Court’s OSC, petitioner primarily argues that this 8 Court may exercise jurisdiction over the Petition under § 2255(e), but in the 9 alternative, petitioner requests that his Petition be recharacterized as a request for 10 resentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 if the Court is not inclined to grant habeas 11 relief. A motion for reduction of a sentence is “beyond the scope of a habeas 12 petition.” Garcia v. U.S., 2012 WL 3217707, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2012) 13 (citation omitted). Furthermore, even if the Court recharacterized the instant 14 Petition, petitioner has provided no explanation of why his sentence warrants 15 modification under § 3582. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (listing limited circumstances 16 in which a court may modify a sentence). Accordingly, since there is no basis for 17 the Court to recharacterize the Petition as brought under § 3582, the Court turns to 18 its jurisdiction over the Petition as filed, and whether it should be recharacterized 19 as a § 2255 motion. 20 “Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence must be filed under 21 § 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, location, 22 or conditions of a sentence’s execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241 in the 23 custodial court.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000) (per 24 curiam); see Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In general, 25 § 2255 provides the exclusive procedural mechanism by which a federal prisoner 26 27 2 Citations to pages in the Petition and Response refer to those designated by 28 CM/ECF. 1 may test the legality of detention.”). A prisoner may not bring a second or 2 successive § 2255 motion in district court without first seeking and obtaining 3 certification from “a panel of the appropriate court of appeals.” 28 U.S.C. 4 § 2255(h); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2008). Only the 5 sentencing court has jurisdiction over a § 2255 motion. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 6 864; Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 7 The Petition here is plainly a challenge to the legality of petitioner’s 8 convictions and sentence. Thus, the relief petitioner seeks here can only be 9 obtained by way of a § 2255 motion filed in the Northern District of Texas. As 10 noted above, petitioner has previously filed three § 2255 motions in the Northern 11 District of Texas, and there is no indication petitioner has received permission 12 from the Fifth or Ninth Circuits to bring a second or successive § 2255 motion. 13 There is an exception – a “savings clause” or “escape hatch” – to the general 14 rule that claims such as those petitioner raises here must be brought in a § 2255 15 motion. See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 956; Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864 n.2. A 16 federal prisoner may file a habeas petition under § 2241 to challenge the legality 17 of a sentence when the prisoner’s remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or 18 ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). In his 19 Response to the Court’s March 30, 2020 OSC, petitioner contends he falls under 20 the savings clause. 21 A. The Petition Does Not Qualify for § 2255(e)’s Savings Clause 22 The exception under § 2255(e) is “narrow” and will not apply “merely 23 because § 2255’s gatekeeping provisions,” such as the statute of limitations or the 24 limitation on successive petitions, now prevent the courts from considering a 25 § 2255 motion. Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 26 Lorentsen, 223 F.3d at 953 (ban on unauthorized successive petitions does not per 27 se make § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective”); Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055 28 1 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (§ 2255 not inadequate or ineffective simply because 2 the district court dismissed the § 2255 motion as successive and court of appeals 3 did not authorize a successive motion). A petition meets the savings clause 4 criteria of § 2255(e) “when a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and 5 (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim.” 6 Harrison, 519 F.3d at 959 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 Petitioner here does not satisfy either of these criteria. 8 In his Response to the Court’s March 30, 2020 OSC, petitioner contends he 9 is actually innocent, but then states he has had an unobstructed procedural shot at 10 presenting his claim. Response at 2. Even if petitioner meant to say the opposite 11 – that he has not had an unobstructed procedural shot – petitioner still would not 12 qualify for § 2255(e)’s savings clause. 13 Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence goes solely to his § 924(c) 14 convictions. Petitioner acknowledges he committed the robberies, but appears to 15 claim innocence of his convictions for using a firearm in connection with a crime 16 of violence, arguing robbery armed with a pellet gun cannot constitute a crime of 17 violence and § 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. See Pet. at 3, 18 6; Response at 3-4. The Court assumes petitioner is raising a claim of actual 19 innocence and can meet the first element to qualify for § 2255(e)’s savings clause. 20 But petitioner cannot meet the second element. Petitioner fails to 21 demonstrate he never had an “unobstructed procedural shot” to raise his claims on 22 appeal or in a § 2255 motion. See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. In making this 23 determination, the court considers “(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s 24 claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 25 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim 26 after that first § 2255 motion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 27 Here, the Fifth Circuit affirmed petitioner’s convictions on appeal on 28 1 December 19, 2001, and petitioner filed his first § 2255 motion on March 17, 2 2003, which was denied on April 29, 2003. See Meza v. U.S., No. 4:13-CV-00831 3 (N.D. Tex.), docket no. 4 at 2. In the Petition and Response, petitioner cites to 4 three cases decided after his first § 2255 motion was filed on March 17, 2003: 5 Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2319, Johnson, 576 U.S. at 591, and Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 6 1204. Pet. at 3, 6; Response at 3. 7 These United States Supreme Court cases addressed whether clauses in 8 criminal statutes that rely on a categorical approach to define terms such as “crime 9 of violence” or “violent felony” are unconstitutionally vague. Each of these cases 10 addressed a different clause, with Johnson addressing 18 U.S.C. 11 § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), Dimaya 18 U.S.C. § 16; and Davis 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). In 12 all three cases, the clauses at issue used the “categorical approach,” which requires 13 judges to estimate the degree of risk that an imagined “ordinary case” of a crime 14 poses to determine whether a particular offense is a “crime of violence” or “violent 15 felony.” Johnson, 576 U.S. at 597-602; Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1215-16; Davis, 16 139 S. Ct. at 2336. The Supreme Court rejected this categorical approach in all 17 three cases, holding that it rendered the residual clauses in these criminal statutes 18 unconstitutionally vague. Id. 19 These cases are not applicable here. As petitioner argues, he was convicted 20 of firearm charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which was the same clause at issue in 21 Davis. But in Davis, the Supreme Court explained that § 924(c)(3) defines a crime 22 of violence as an offense that is a felony and relies on either the elements clause of 23 subsection (A) or the residual clause of subsection (B). The elements clause 24 includes felonies that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use 25 of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. 26 § 924(c)(3)(A); see Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2324. The residual clause includes a 27 felony that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the 28 1 person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the 2 offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B); see Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2324. 3 The limited question presented to the Supreme Court in Davis was whether 4 the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. Whether the 5 elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A) is similarly unconstitutional was not at issue. 6 Indeed, before the case was heard by the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit held that 7 the Davis defendants’ convictions on one of their two § 924(c) counts, which 8 charged robbery as the predicate crime of violence, could be sustained under the 9 elements clause. Id. at 2325. Accordingly, the holding in Davis only invalidated 10 the residual clause of § 924(c) and did not extend to the entirety of § 924(c). 11 To the extent petitioner argues his robberies were not crimes of violence 12 under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A), this argument is not supported by the 13 caselaw or statutes. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Davis did not 14 address the question of whether a robbery qualifies as a predicate offense under 15 the elements clause of § 924(c). But courts of appeals in other circuits have held 16 that a bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) – whether armed or not – is a crime 17 of violence because it includes as an element the use, attempted use, or threat of 18 force. See, e.g., In re Price, 964 F.3d 1045, 1049 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Bank robbery 19 is a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause.”) (citing In re Sams, 830 20 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding bank robbery, and not just armed bank 21 robbery, involves use or threatened use of force and therefore is a crime of 22 violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause)); U.S. v. Pervis, 937 F.3d 546, 23 552 (5th Cir. 2019) (Bank robbery under “§2113(a) is a crime of violence under 18 24 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)”). Similarly, in a case of armed bank robbery, the Ninth 25 Circuit’s reasoning in finding the robbery to be a crime of violence under 26 § 924(c)’s elements clause looked only at the elements required for a bank robbery 27 conviction, not an armed bank robbery conviction. U.S. v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 28 1 1028 (9th Cir. 2000); accord U.S. v. Pritchard, 692 Fed. Appx. 349, 351-52 (9th 2 Cir. 2017). Accordingly, petitioner’s argument that the bank robberies he 3 committed were not crimes of violence because he carried a pellet gun necessarily 4 fails since a bank robbery without any gun at all qualifies as a crime of violence 5 under § 924(c)’s elements clause. Indeed, petitioner’s arguments are similar to 6 those he has previously made to the United States District Court for the Northern 7 District of Texas, which that court rejected. See Meza v. U.S., No. 4:16-CV-688 8 (N.D. Tex.), docket no. 4 at 3 (finding “the bank robberies for which [petitioner] 9 was convicted, clearly were crimes of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 10 § 924(c)(1)(A). . .”). 11 As such, the cases petitioner cites do not present any change in the pertinent 12 law for purposes of the Court’s determination of whether petitioner had an 13 “unobstructed procedural shot” to raise his claims on appeal or in a § 2255 motion. 14 See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. There has been no change in relevant law since 15 petitioner filed his first § 2255 motion. Petitioner has failed to show he lacked an 16 unobstructed procedural shot to raise his claims previously on appeal or in a 17 § 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court, and therefore petitioner does not 18 qualify for § 2255(e)’s savings clause. 19 B. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction 20 Because petitioner does not qualify for § 2255(e)’s savings clause, 21 petitioner may not pursue his claims in a § 2241 habeas petition, but may instead 22 pursue his claims only in a § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). This raises 23 the question of whether this Court should recharacterize the Petition as a § 2255 24 motion. There are restrictions on the Court doing so. See U.S. v. Seesing, 234 25 F.3d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 2000). But because, as discussed below, dismissal of the 26 Petition rather than recharacterization is warranted here, the Court finds there is no 27 need for it to go through the steps required by Seesing. 28 1 If the Petition were construed as a § 2255 motion, this Court would lack 2 jurisdiction. As previously noted, only the sentencing court has jurisdiction over a 3 § 2255 motion. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864-65; Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1163; see 28 4 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2012) (“§ 2255 5 motions must be filed in the district where the petitioner was sentenced”). Since 6 petitioner is seeking to challenge a sentence imposed by the United States District 7 Court for the Northern District of Texas, only that court has jurisdiction to 8 entertain a § 2255 motion by petitioner. 9 The question then is whether the Court should dismiss the Petition for lack 10 of jurisdiction or transfer it to the Northern District of Texas. 11 C. The Petition Warrants Dismissal Rather Than Transfer 12 The transfer of civil actions to cure jurisdictional defects is governed by 28 13 U.S.C. § 1631. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 865 n.6. Transfer is appropriate under 14 § 1631 if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the transferring court lacks jurisdiction; 15 (2) the transferee court could have exercised jurisdiction at the time the action was 16 filed; and (3) the transfer is in the interest of justice. Cruz Aguilera v. INS, 245 17 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Kolek v. Engen, 869 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th 18 Cir. 1989)). Here, the first condition is met, as this Court lacks jurisdiction, but 19 the second and third conditions are not. 20 At the time of filing, the sentencing court was effectively barred from 21 exercising jurisdiction over the Petition, which challenges petitioner’s conviction 22 and sentence. A prisoner may not bring a second or successive § 2255 motion in 23 district court without first seeking and obtaining permission to do so from “a panel 24 of the appropriate court of appeals.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). As discussed, 25 petitioner already brought several § 2255 motions, which were all denied by the 26 United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. There is no 27 indication petitioner has received permission from the Fifth Circuit to bring a 28 1 second or successive § 2255 motion. The Court therefore expects the instant 2 Petition would be denied as an impermissible successive § 2255 motion if it were 3 transferred to the Northern District of Texas. 4 In addition, transfer would not be in the interest of justice. Before 5 transferring a case to another jurisdiction, district courts may “consider the 6 consequences of transfer.” Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F.3d 609, 610-11 (7th Cir. 7 1999). To determine if transfer is in the interest of justice, the court undertakes a 8 limited review of a petition in light of its likelihood of success. Miller v. 9 Hambrick, 905 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1990); Boultinghouse v. Lappin, 816 F. 10 Supp. 2d 107, 113 (D.D.C. 2011). Here, transfer would be futile since, in addition 11 to being impermissibly successive, the Petition as a whole is time-barred. 12 There is a one-year statute of limitations to bring a § 2255 motion. 28 13 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The one-year limitation period runs from, as pertinent here, “the 14 date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). 15 A judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition 16 for writ of certiorari contesting the appellate court ruling. Clay v. U.S., 537 U.S. 17 522, 524-25, 123 S. Ct. 1072, 155 L. Ed. 2d 88 (2003). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 18 § 2101(c), petitioner had ninety days after the entry of judgment to file his petition 19 for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Since the Fifth Circuit denied 20 petitioner’s appeal and affirmed his convictions on December 19, 2001, 21 petitioner’s filing of this Petition on March 11, 2020 was well after the one-year 22 period to bring a § 2255 motion expired. 23 As such, transfer to the Northern District of Texas would be futile and is not 24 in the interest of justice. Instead, the Petition will be dismissed for lack of 25 jurisdiction. 26 27 28 l IV. 2 CONCLUSION 3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment be entered summarily 4 || dismissing the Petition and this action with prejudice. 5 6 | DATED: February 16, 2021

Presented by: PQ Te 13 Dinited States Magistrate Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12