MANSFIELD, District Judge.
This appeal by a state prisoner from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint under the Federal Civil Rights Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, raises the question of whether a prisoner is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to procedural due process rights upon his being interviewed and considered by the New York State Board of Parole for release on parole before the termination of the sentence imposed by the court. For the reasons hereinafter stated we affirm the judgment below.
The essential facts are not in dispute. Appellant is imprisoned in Green Haven Prison, Stormville, N. Y., under a sentence of from 20 years to life imposed on May 6, 1947, by the New York County Court of General Sessions pursuant to his plea of guilty to the charge of murder in the second degree. After having been paroled from Attica Prison on August 14, 1963, he was declared delinquent by the Parole Board on December 31, 1964, and was returned to prison. In May 1965 he appeared without counsel before members of the Parole Board and admitted consorting with individuals having criminal records and giving misleading information to his parole officer.
Following revocation of his parole in May, 1965, appellant appeared on March 16, 1967, at a brief session before three members of the Board of Parole for reconsideration of parole release, which was denied, the Board deciding that his case would be reconsidered in 18 months. In July, 1968, appellant commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Supreme Court, New York County, claiming that his federal and state constitutional rights had been violated by the absence of legal counsel at his May, 1965, revocation hearing, and that the March, 1967, hearing constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The complaint demanded a new hearing. An initial decision in appellant’s favor by the state Supreme Court on August 27, 1968, was, on June 17, 1969, reversed by the Appellate Division, First Department, which denied his application, holding that he had “no general constitutional right to representation by counsel at the parole revocation hearing before the Board of Parole.” In the meantime, in September, 1968, appellant again appeared before the Board without counsel and was again denied parole with the proviso that his ease be considered in another 18 months.
In August 1969, appellant commenced the present action in the district court, invoking its jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 1361 and 42 U. S.C. § 1983. His complaint alleges that defendants, in violation of his constitutional rights, determined that he is
“Not qualified for release on parole, which, in effect, constitutes a denial of liberty, without adhering to the minimum requirements of procedural due process: (i) notice of charges; (ii) a fair hearing, with the right to counsel, to cross-examination and to present favorable evidence and compel the attendance of favorable witnesses; and (iii) specification of the grounds and underlying facts upon which the determination was based” (Complaint P3).
[405]*405The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment to the effect that
“plaintiff is entitled under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) notice of charges, including a substantial summary of the evidence and reports before the Board, (ii) a fair hearing, including the right of counsel, to cross-examination and confrontation and to present favorable evidence and compel the attendance of favorable witnesses, and (iii) a specification of the grounds and underlying facts upon which the determination is based; * *
Consideration of the questions raised by appellant requires an understanding of the function and procedures of the New York Board of Parole. The Board, which consists of five members appointed by the Governor (N.Y. Executive Law, McKinney’s Consol.Laws, c. 18, § 241), is required “to personally .study * * * prisoners * * * to determine their ultimate fitness to be paroled” (N.Y. Correction Law, McKinney’s ConsoLLaws, c. 43, § 210). Toward this purpose the members have the duty of meeting at such prisons and at such times as are necessary for a full study of the cases of prisoners eligible for release on parole and of determining “when and under what conditions and to whom such parole may be granted” (N. Y. Correction Law § 210).
Release of a prisoner on parole in New York is done “solely on the initiative of the board of parole” (N.Y. Correction Law § 214) and no application for parole may be made by or on behalf of the prisoner. The Board is given broad discretionary power to grant parole, not as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of a prisoner’s duties, but “only if the board of parole is of opinion that there is a reasonable probability that, if such prisoner is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society” (N.Y. Correction Law § 213). The members of the Board must also be “satisfied that he will be suitably employed in self-sustaining employment if so released” (N.Y. Correction Law § 214).
In the case of a prisoner sentenced in New York to an indeterminate term, such as appellant, the collection of information forming the dossier used as the basis for the Board’s decision commences almost immediately after he is sentenced. The Board is required to 'oiA tain “while the case is still fresh” infor-\ mation as “complete as may be obtainable” with respect to the prisoner, including a complete statement of the crime, the nature of the sentence, the names of the judge and district attorney, the probation report, and reports as to the “prisoner’s social, physical, mental and psychiatric condition and history” (N.Y. Correction Law § 211). Before the prisoner is released on parole the Board must further obtain a report from the warden of each prison in which the prisoner has been confined as to the prisoner’s conduct in the institution, with a detailed statement as to any infractions of prison rules or discipline; the extent to which the prisoner has responded to efforts made to improve his mental and moral condition; his then attitude toward society, the judge who sentenced him, the district attorney who prosecuted him, and the policeman who arrested him; and his attitude toward his crime and his previous criminal career. The Board is also required to have before it a report from the superintendent of prison industries giving the prisoner’s industrial record in prison, and a recommendation as to the kind of work he is best fitted to perform and at which he is most likely to succeed. Lastly, the Board must also have a report as to any physical, mental and psychological examination of the prisoner which has been made within two months of his eligibility for parole.
After a prisoner sentenced to an indeterminate term has served one year, the date when he may become eligible for release on parole is “discretionary with the board of parole” (N.Y. Correction Law § 212). When a prisoner becomes [406]*406eligible the Board’s practice as revealed in its rules is to schedule his appearance before three or more Board members visiting the institution where he is incarcerated, at which time he is interviewed and his case considered (N.Y. Code of Rules & Regs. § 155). Rule 155.9 expressly provides:
“155.9 Attendance at hearings. Neither the inmate’s attorney nor any other party will be permitted to attend or speak in person in the inmate’s behalf or against him at any meeting of the Board of Parole at which the inmate’s release on parole is being considered. The board shall have complete discretion with respect to the presence of any other persons at such hearings.”
Following such an interview the Board decides whether the prisoner shall be released after it has considered the various reports and factors prescribed. In addition it considers “the environment to which he plans to return” and “the kind of employment secured for him.” If parole is denied, the Board in its discretion may fix a future date for “reconsideration” of the ease.
The Board’s exercise of this discretionary power has been held by New York’s highest court to be absolute and beyond court review as long as the Board violates no positive statutory requirement. Hines v. State Board of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 56 N.E.2d 572 (1944); Briguglio v. New York State Board of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 298 N.Y. S.2d 704, 246 N.E.2d 512 (1969). Once released on parole the prisoner, although outside prison walls, continues to be in the legal custody of the warden of the prison from which he is released and is subject to being retaken and returned to actual custody until the expiration of the term of his sentence (N.Y. Correction Law § 213); People ex rel. Natoli .v. Lewis, 287 N.Y. 478, 41 N.E.2d 62 (1942); People v. Santos, 31 A.D.2d 508, 298 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep’t 1969).
The issue before us is not whether New York, instead of expressly forbidding a prisoner to be represented by counsel or by some other person before the Board of Parole, would have been better advised to adopt statutory measures permitting such representation.1 The question before us [407]*407is whether the Constitution mandates the minimum procedural due process demanded by appellant. In resolving that issue we recognize that a fundamental condition for requiring constitutional (as distinguished from statutory) due process is the existence of governmental action which threatens to destroy or impair an existing private interest. Usually such action is accomplished through an adversary proceeding in which a vital issue of fact is resolved against a person without according him the benefit of certain fundamental safeguards. Whether such safeguards are required depends upon the nature of the governmental action and of the private interest affected by that action. The Constitution “does not require a trial-type hearing in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest,” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961).
In the present case some of the essential conditions for requiring procedural due process as a matter of constitutional right are missing. In the first place the Board of Parole is not appellant’s adversary. On the contrary the Board has an identity of interest with him to the extent that it is seeking to encourage and foster his rehabilitation and readjustment to society. The Board’s position was well described by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger in Hyser v. Reed, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 318 F.2d 225, cert. denied sub nom. Thompson v. United States Board of Parole, 375 U.S. 957, 84 S.Ct. 446, 11 L. Ed.2d 315 (1963), where the court, sitting en banc, held that procedural due process was not required by the Constitution in federal parole revocation proceedings :
“The Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Board operate from the basic premise that prisoners placed in their custody are to be rehabilitated and restored to useful lives as soon as in the Board’s judgment that transition can be safely made. This is plainly what ; Congress intends. Thus there is a genuine identity of interest if not purpose in the prisoner’s desire to be released and the Board’s policy to grant release as soon as possible. Here there is not the attitude of adverse, conflicting objectives as between the parolee and the Board inherent between prosecution and defense in a criminal case. Here we do not have pursuer and quarry but a relationship partaking of parens patriae. In a real sense the Parole Board in revoking parole occupies the role of parent withdrawing a privilege from an errant child not as punishment but for misuse of the privilege. ‘Probation workers making reports of their investigations have not been trained to prosecute but to aid offenders.’ Williams v. People of State of New York, 337 U.S. 241, at 249, 69 S.Ct. 1079, at 1084, 93 L.Ed. 1337.
* * * •* * *
“Fundamentally the Parole Board’s interest and its objective are to release a prisoner as soon as he is a good parole risk and to allow him to remain at liberty under supervision as long as he is a good risk” (318 F.2d at 237, 242).
On the erroneous assumption that the Board’s determination of whether the prisoner should be paroled is an adversary proceeding, the complaint alleges that the Board fails to give appellant “notice of charges” against him and demands that such notice be furnished. There are no “charges” or accusations against appellant. Nor is the Board necessarily called upon, in deciding whether he should be released on parole, to resolve disputed issues of fact, which might be the occasion for use of skills associated with lawyers, judges and the judicial process.
The Board’s function is a different one. It must make the broad determination of whether rehabilitation of the prisoner and the interests of society generally would best be served by permitting him to serve his sentence beyond the confines of prison walls rather than [408]*408by being continued in physical confinement. In making that determination the Board is not restricted by rules of evidence or procedures developed for the purpose of determining legal or factual issues. It must consider many factors of a non-legal nature, such as psychiatric reports with respect to the prisoner, his mental and moral attitudes, his vocational education and training, the manner in which he has used his recreation time, his physical and emotional health, his intra-personal relations with prison staff and other inmates, his habits, and the nature and extent of community resources that will be available to him upon his release, including the environment to which he plans to return.
Without suggesting that legal counsel or a social worker could not render any assistance at all with respect to the numerous facets of the picture before the Board,2 the problem to be resolved is not one which usually demands the traditional skills, training and expertise of legal counsel. Far more important is an understanding of the numerous other factors we have mentioned, which have to do with medicine, psychiatry, criminology, penology, psychology and human relations.
Another essential element missing is the existence of a private interest enjoyed by appellant, or to which he is entitled, of the type qualifying for due process protection. We readily acknowledge, of course, that appellant has an “interest” in being considered by the Board which has the power, in its absolute discretion, to grant him the liberty of serving his sentence outside óf prison walls. The type of interest protected by procedural due process, however, is usually one presently enjoyed, e. g., welfare benefits (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)); occupation of premises (Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. April 29, 1970); attendance at school (Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961)); status as an alien immigrant (Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1246 (1958)); employment (Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959)); or existence as a charitable organization (Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951)). Appellant, however, does not presently enjoy freedom of movement beyond the prison walls and nothing in the state court’s sentence, or in state statutes or rules, entitles him to it, whether it be labeled a “right” or a “privilege.”3 He is entitled only to be released after full service of his sentence less good time earned during incarceration. The Board is given absolute and exclusive discretion to decide whether or not to initiate parole release proceedings and, if so, whether parole should be granted to him. Appellant has been constitutionally deprived of his right to liberty for the period of his sentence. Like an alien seeking entry into the [409]*409United States (as distinguished from a lawful resident alien) he does not qualify for procedural due process in seeking parole. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953); Wong Hing Fun v. Esperdy, 335 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1964) (per Judge Marshall), cert. denied sub nom. Ng Sui Sang v. Esperdy, 379 U.S. 970, 85 S.Ct. 667, 13 L.Ed.2d 562 (1965).
It is questionable whether a Board of Parole is even required to hold a hearing on the question of whether a prisoner should be released on parole.4 In this respect the determination to be made differs from revocation of parole, where plausible reasons might be advanced in favor of minimum procedural due process. It may be argued that a parolee, having been released, enjoys a liberty akin to a private interest, and that the Board is seeking to deprive him of that liberty because of his alleged violation of one or more of the conditions of his parole. Upon his denial of the allegation the Board is called upon to resolve the relatively narrow issue thus presented. Under such circumstances, it may further be contended, fundamental fairness dictates that the prisoner be accorded constitutional due process at a trial-type hearing, including the right to legal counsel with traditional skills suited to just such a controversy. Nevertheless, although various jurisdictions by statute permit the parolee to be represented by retained counsel in such a revocation proceeding, all circuit courts of appeal which have passed upon the issue —seven in number — have held that the prisoner is not entitled to due process as a matter of constitutional right. Hyser v. Reed, supra; Rose v. Haskins, 388 F. 2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946, 88 S.Ct. 2300, 20 L.Ed.2d 1408 (1968); Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968); Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970, 81 S.Ct. 1934, 6 L.Ed.2d 1259 (196-1); Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964); Hodge v. Markley, 339 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1965); Mead v. California Adult Authority, 415 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Dunn v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 401 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1968) (dictum); Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 866, 88 S.Ct. 131, 19 L.Ed.2d 137 (1967); Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969); Cotner v. United States, 409 F. 2d 853 (10th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Halprin v. Parker, 418 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1969).
In accord is the recent unanimous decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Briguglio v. New York State Board of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969). In view of the unanimous rejection of constitutional due process in parole revocation proceedings, which at least present plausible grounds for such a right, the claim must fail in a release determination, where not even such grounds exist.
A final factor we are entitled to weigh is the burden which minimum due process requirements (advance notice, hearing, provision of counsel, cross-examination and findings) would place upon the State of New York and its parole procedures. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960). According to the Annual Report of the New York Division of Parole for the year 1967, which has been furnished by counsel, New York holds [410]*410more than 11,000 parole interviews or hearings annually. From the record of appellant’s interviews it appears that while the dossier of written information before the Board may be voluminous, the hearing is usually brief. If, as appellant demands, each prisoner is to appear with counsel we may reasonably anticipate that the administrative burden (including the preparation of advance notice, the subpoenaing and cross-examination of witnesses, arguments of counsel and preparation of written decisions) would be enormously increased, accompanied by the usual delays attendant upon clogged calendars. Initially, of course, there would be the problem of providing competent legal services to the prisoners themselves, most of whom are indigent. It would hardly be fair to provide that the wealthy prisoner should have the right to legal counsel whereas the great majority of prisoners would be denied that right simply because they are too poor. Although the increased administrative burden, standing alone, might not justify denial of the procedural steps demanded by appellant, we believe that when considered with the other relevant factors we have discussed, it militates against such relief.
Urging that parole release represents a form of deferred sentencing, which enables authorities to “tailor a sentence to a particular offender,” appellant contends that the situation before us is governed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967), which held that a defendant was entitled to be represented by counsel at a deferred sentencing hearing held after revocation of probation. Our attention is particularly directed to the fact that the sentencing court in Mempa was required under Washington state law to sentence the defendant to the maximum statutory term and that its function, like that of the Board of Parole here, was limited to making a recommendation to the Board as to the amount of time which the defendant should be required to serve before parole. The Supreme Court noted that aid of counsel was necessary to assist the sentencing judge by marshalling the facts and introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances. Appellant argues that this would be the very function served by counsel in a parole release hearing.
We do not accept appellant’s contention that a parole release determination is simply a continuation or deferment of sentencing. The prisoner’s sentence has already been finally decreed by the court and cannot be changed. A parole Board’s determination as to release, on the other hand, is not final and may be reviewed and changed at any time in the Board’s discretion. We recognize that Mempa is analogous to our case to the extent that a sentencing hearing is essentially non-adversarial in nature, guilt having been determined, and that legal counsel, among other things, may perform a function similar to that which he might or might not perform at a parole release hearing, i. e., bringing out relevant information and arguing for clemency. However, at a sentencing hearing a lawyer may also be required to perform functions of a legal nature not required before the Board of Parole. For one thing he may be called upon to insure that certain legal rights, such as the right of appeal, are not waived. He may well decide at the hearing, depending upon further development of the facts, to advise a client to move to withdraw his plea of guilty 5 or to assert additional grounds for setting aside a guilty verdict or moving in arrest of judgment. These services demand his skill and training as a lawyer, not merely non-legal assistance in pleading for clemency. Thus sentencing represents a defendant’s “last clear chance” to protect his legal rights at the trial court level. For this reason it has repeatedly been held that representation by legal [411]*411counsel is constitutionally required. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948). As the Supreme Court stated in Mempa:
“Even more important in a case such as this is the fact that certain legal rights may be lost if not exercised at this stage. For one, Washington law provides that an appeal in a case involving a plea of guilty followed by probation can only be taken after sentence is imposed following revocation of probation. State v. Farmer, 39 Wash.2d 675, 237 P.2d 734 (1951). Therefore in a case where an accused agreed to plead guilty, although he had a valid defense, because he was offered probation, absence of counsel at the imposition of the deferred sentence might well result in loss of the right to appeal. While ordinarily appeals from a plea of guilty are less frequent than those following a trial on the merits, the incidence of improperly obtained guilty pleas is not so slight as to be capable of being characterized as de minimis. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F.Supp. 244 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1966). Cf. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962).
“Likewise the Washington statutes provide that a plea of guilty can be withdrawn at any time prior to the imposition of sentence, Wash.Rev.Code § 10.40.175, State v. Farmer, supra, if the trial judge in his discretion finds that the ends of justice will be served, State v. Shannon, 60 Wash.2d 883, 376 P.2d 646 (1962). Without undertaking to catalog the various situations in which a lawyer could be of substantial assistance to a defendant in such a case, it can be reiterated that a plea of guilty might well be improperly obtained by the promise to have a defendant placed on the very probation the revocation of which furnishes the occasion for desiring to withdraw the plea. An uncounseled defendant might very likely be unaware of this opportunity” (389 U.S. at 135-136, 88 S.Ct. at 257-258).
None of these considerations noted by the Supreme Court in Mempa are found here.
The other decisions relied upon by appellant differ in legally significant respects from the case before us and are therefore neither controlling nor persuasive. For instance, the Board of Parole was not here confronted with the necessity of making new findings as the basis for imposing a new sentence, new deprivations, or new hardships for which minimum due process would be required. See, e. g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967) (defendant must be represented by counsel where court was required to find that he “constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public” in order to impose sentence under a statute different from that to which he pleaded guilty); United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969) (Equal Protection Clause requires that before prisoner may be found insane and transferred to a mental institution where he would be subjected to “substantial deprivations, hardships and indignities” and loss of opportunity for parole, he be accorded the same due process to which a civilian is entitled); Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1969) (Equal Protection Clause required due process in order to find juvenile offender “incorrigible” as basis for transferring him from Boys Training Center to Men’s Correctional Center). Nor is this the case where the state, in an adversary proceeding, is seeking to deprive a person of liberty, property or a status presently enjoyed. See, e. g., Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (expulsion from tax-supported college); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (termination of welfare payments); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (adjudication as juvenile delinquent and commitment); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. [412]*412544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968) (disbarment).
In the last analysis the Board’s determination as to whether a prisoner is a good parole risk represents an aspect of state prison discipline, not an adjudication of rights in an adversary proceeding. Rose v. Haskins, 388 E.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968). If the federal judiciary, in the name of the Due Process Clause, undertook the supervision of such disciplinary procedures, it would become inextricably involved, upon the suits that would inevitably follow, in non-legal, non-judicial determinations for which it is not equipped by training or experience. Although appellant’s counsel, upon oral argument, indicated that initially he seeks only rudimentary due process in the form of providing that counsel be permitted to “assist” the Board, we have no doubt that this would be followed by demands (by appellant or others) for the full panoply of procedural rights demanded in the complaint, including cross-examination of doctors, psychiatrists, case workers, prison officials, and the like. We believe that to embark upon such a course would be unwise.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.