Joseph Dumont v. County of Sacramento, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 JOSEPH DUMONT, an individual, No. 2:25-cv-01396-JAM-CKD 9 Plaintiff, 10 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO’S MOTION TO 11 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a DISMISS public entity, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 This matter is before the Court on Defendant County of 15 Sacramento’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Joseph Dumont’s Fifth, 16 Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Causes of Action. ECF No. 8-1, 17 Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Mot.”). 18 Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 10 19 “Opp’n”)), and Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 11 (“Reply”)). 20 For the reasons detailed below, Defendant’s motion is granted.1 21 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff’s claims stem from law enforcement deploying a K-9 23 during the execution of an arrest warrant for Plaintiff. See 24 Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 24-25. Plaintiff alleges in June 2024, 25 “Sacramento County Sheriff’s deputies and[/]or City of Rancho 26 Cordova police officers” came to his home “to effectuate an 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 28 oral argument. See ECF No. 12; E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). 1 arrest warrant based on two missed court appearances related to 2 non-violent misdemeanor charges . . . .” Id. ¶ 24. Despite 3 coming outside his home “voluntarily and peacefully,” without 4 fleeing, resisting, or presenting a threat, law enforcement 5 released a German Shepherd that attacked and latched onto 6 Plaintiff “without warning or provocation.” Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff 7 alleges the deputies or officers, identified as Deputy John Doe 8 1, Deputy John Doe 2, and Does 3-10, “failed to intervene or 9 control the K-9, instead laughing and refusing to call off the 10 dog, despite [Plaintiff’s] visible compliance and distress.” Id. 11 Plaintiff was transported to UC Davis Medical Center for his 12 “deep tissue wounds,” resulting in “multiple doctor’s visits[,] 13 wound care treatment,” and continued “neuropathic pain, mobility 14 limitations, and psychological trauma.” Id. ¶ 26. 15 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges seven causes of action under 16 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five state law claims. See Compl. Counts 17 One through Four and Twelve are against Deputy Does 1 and 2, as 18 well as Does 3-10, for unreasonable search and seizure, excessive 19 force, denial of medical care, failure to intervene, and 20 intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. These counts, 21 and Counts Nine (Battery) and Eleven (Violation of Bane Act), are 22 not subject to Defendant’s pending motion. See Mot. Counts 23 Five, Six, and Seven are claims under several theories of Monell 24 liability, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant, as 25 well as named defendants City of Rancho Cordova and Does 3-10. 26 See Compl.; Mot. at 3 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 27 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Counts Eight and Ten are state law claims 28 asserted against all defendants for “False Arrest/False 1 Imprisonment” and Negligence. 2 II. OPINION 3 A. Legal Standard 4 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 5 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 6 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted 7 only if “the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or 8 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 9 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 10 Cir. 2008). The court assumes all factual allegations are true 11 and “construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the 12 nonmoving party.” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 13 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Everest & Jennings, Inc. 14 v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226 (9th Cir. 1994)). 15 That said, if the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give 16 rise to an entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. 17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 18 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement 19 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations.” 21 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations 22 omitted). However, this rule demands more than unadorned 23 accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at 24 least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, 25 conclusory or “formulaic recitations of elements” do not alone 26 suffice. Id. (citations and internal quotations removed). “A 27 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 28 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 1 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 2 B. Analysis 3 The Court first addresses Defendant’s motion as to 4 Plaintiff’s Monell claims, then turns to the claims Plaintiff 5 agrees to voluntarily dismiss and Plaintiff’s state law 6 negligence claim. The Court also addresses the issue of whether 7 Defendant’s motion should be granted with leave to amend. 8 1. Counts Five and Six – Monell Claims 9 Municipalities may be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. 10 § 1983 when “action pursuant to an official municipal policy of 11 some nature caused a constitutional tort,” Monell v. Dep’t of 12 Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), meaning a “policy, 13 practice, or custom of the entity, or . . . an order by a 14 policy-making officer,” causes a constitutional deprivation. 15 Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (2012) (quoting 16 Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) 17 and citing Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 (9th 18 Cir. 2002)) (internal quotations and citations removed). 19 However, “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a 20 respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 21 Monell liability may be established under section 1983 in 22 one of three ways:

23 First, the plaintiff may prove that a city employee committed the alleged constitutional violation 24 pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes 25 the “standard operating procedure” of the local governmental entity.’ Second, the plaintiff may 26 establish that the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with ‘final 27 policy-making authority’ and that the challenged action itself thus constituted an act of official 28 governmental policy. Whether a particular official 1 has final policy-making authority is a question of state law. Third, the plaintiff may prove that an 2 official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action 3 and the basis for it. 4 Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (1992) (quoting Jett 5 v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) and 6 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986)) 7 (other internal citations omitted). Plaintiff must also 8 demonstrate causation – that “one of the[se] three circumstances 9 . . . was (1) the cause in fact and (2) the proximate cause of 10 the constitutional deprivation.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 11 918 (9th Cir. 1996). 12 The Supreme Court has made clear that “[p]roof of a single 13 incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to 14 impose liability under Monell,” without additional proof “it was 15 caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, [] 16 attribute[able] to a municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma 17 v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985). And, “where the policy 18 relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more 19 proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case 20 to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the 21 municipality, and the causal connection between the ‘policy’ and 22 the constitutional deprivation.” Id.; see also Trevino, 99 F.3d 23 at 918 (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on 24 isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon 25 practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that 26 the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out 27 policy.”). 28 Defendant moves to dismiss Count Five, arguing Plaintiff 1 relies on a single incident, without more, to establish a Monell 2 claim, fails to identify an unconstitutional policy, custom, or 3 practice that caused Plaintiff harm, and that Plaintiff’s 4 complaint contains only vague, conclusory, and speculative 5 allegations about general policies, which are wholly 6 insufficient to state a Monell claim. See Mot. at 4-7. 7 Plaintiff argues his pleading is adequate, especially since it 8 was made “without the benefit of any discovery being 9 propounded,” because it puts Defendant “on notice of the claims 10 against it.” Opp’n at 6-11. 11 Plaintiff analogizes the instant action to a number of 12 cases, arguing they support a finding Plaintiff’s complaint 13 passes 12(b)(6) muster. Opp’n at 6-11. Although only one of 14 the cases deals with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is clear that 15 the allegations or evidence in each of those cases includes 16 specific facts about unlawful policies, practices, or customs 17 unique to the municipality or circumstances of the case, unlike 18 Plaintiff’s complaint here; and, in at least one of those cases, 19 a court still found that those allegations, which were more 20 robust and detailed than Plaintiff’s here, could not survive a 21 motion to dismiss. For example, in Mitchell v. County of Contra 22 Costa, the amended complaint “add[ed] allegations about 15 23 lawsuits against Contra Costa, its employees, or cities in which 24 it provides police services dating from 2004 to 2021[,] . . . 25 [n]early all involv[ing] allegations of excessive force and [] 26 ‘manufactured charges’ or false or misleading police reports.” 27 600 F.Supp.3d 1018, 1029-30 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2022). The 28 Mitchell court emphasized that “[s]everal of th[os]e incidents 1 involve[d] allegations similar to those made by [the plaintiff], 2 such as the use of excessive force against complaint citizens 3 . . . .” Id. The court found this added information was 4 sufficient to deny a motion to dismiss under a theory of 5 liability based on a policy, custom, or practice, but was not 6 enough to support the plaintiff’s claims under failure to train 7 or ratification theories, because “the amended complaint 8 remain[ed] conclusory and unsupported by any facts,” lacking 9 specifics about training, knowledge, or approval of the acting 10 officers’ actions. Id. at 1029-33. 11 The Court agrees with Defendant: “The Fifth Cause of Action 12 for Monell liability based on policy, practice or custom fails 13 to state a claim because it 1) lacks sufficient factual 14 allegations about the challenged policy or custom, 2) does not 15 explain how the policy or custom is deficient, 3) does not 16 explain how the policy or custom caused the plaintiff harm, and 17 4) does not indicate how the policy or custom amounted to 18 deliberate indifference, i.e., show how the deficiency involved 19 was obvious and the constitutional injury likely to occur.” 20 Mot. at 7; see Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F.Supp.2d 1155, 21 1163 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (citing Young v. City of Visalia, 22 687 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1148–50 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); see also 23 Jackson v. County of San Diego, 2009 WL 3211402, *3 (S.D. Cal. 24 Sept. 29, 2009); cf. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 25 682 (9th Cir.2001)). This claim primarily includes only 26 boilerplate allegations which, arguably, could be substituted 27 into any Monell case attempting to assert an unlawful policy, 28 practice, or custom theory of liability. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 1 77 i. and ii., 78 (alleging Defendant “maintained, inter alia, 2 the following unconstitutional customs, practices, and policies: 3 [u]sing excessive and objectively unreasonable force . . . ; 4 [p]roviding inadequate training regarding the use of force . . . 5 ; [and having] deficient policies and fail[ing] to train its 6 Deputies/Officers with respect to unreasonable seizures of 7 persons . . . .”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, 8 Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action 9 is granted. 10 Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action is deficient for the same 11 reasons – it includes boilerplate language, without any factual 12 allegations specific to Defendant regarding “(1) an inadequate 13 training program, (2) deliberate indifference on the part of the 14 County in adequately training its law enforcement officers, and 15 (3) whether the inadequate training ‘actually caused’ a 16 deprivation of [the plaintiff]’s constitutional rights.” Meritt 17 v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989). 18 Although Plaintiff argues, “[t]he very fact that the incident 19 occurred [and that the officers are still employed with the 20 County shows] that the training program was inadequate or 21 insufficient,” this is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent 22 requiring additional information or allegations to sustain a 23 Monell claim. See Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (“Proof 24 of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not 25 sufficient to impose liability under Monell,” without additional 26 proof “it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal 27 policy, [] attribute[able] to a municipal policymaker.”); 28 Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918 (“Liability for improper custom may not 1 be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be 2 founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and 3 consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of 4 carrying out policy.”); accord Meritt, 875 F.2d at 770 (“Mere 5 proof of a single incident of errant behavior is a clearly 6 insufficient basis for imposing liability on the County.”); see 7 also Mot. at 7-8, Reply at 3-4, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 8 Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is granted as to Count Six. 9 2. Counts Seven and Eight 10 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of 11 Action, arguing Plaintiff failed to plead facts supporting the 12 necessary elements of a ratification Monell claim. Mot. at 9- 13 10. As to Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action, Defendant argues 14 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to 15 sustain a false imprisonment claim, especially since the 16 complaint acknowledges officers arrested Plaintiff based on an 17 active arrest warrant. Id. at 10. Plaintiff does not oppose 18 Defendant’s motion as to these two counts and voluntarily 19 dismisses them. Opp’n at 15. Given Defendant’s meritorious 20 arguments that these claims are not adequately pled, and 21 Plaintiff’s concession, Defendant’s motion is granted, without 22 leave to amend, as to Counts Seven and Eight. 23 3. Count Ten – Negligence 24 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of 25 Action to the extent it is based on direct tort liability for 26 negligence, including as alleged in paragraph 140.i., vii., and 27 viii of the complaint. See Mot. at 10-11. Plaintiff responds 28 by citing California Government Code section 815, et seq., which 1 Plaintiff avers supports a theory of vicarious liability. Opp’n 2 at 15-17 (“Plaintiff alleges that . . . Defendant[ is] 3 vicariously liable for the nonfeasance and malfeasance of the 4 individual Defendants . . . .”). Defendant is correct, that in 5 California, “no statute imposes direct liability on public 6 entities,” and “vicarious liability [] is limited to cases 7 involving gross negligence or bad faith [].” Eastburn v. 8 Regional Fire Protection Authority, 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1178 (2003) 9 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815, 815.2, 815.6, and 820) (other 10 internal citations omitted). In Eastburn, the California 11 Supreme Court clarified that Government Code section 820 (the 12 section Plaintiff includes in the heading of Count Ten) 13 “provides only that public employees are liable for injuries 14 from their acts or omissions in the scope of their employment to 15 the same extent as private persons, unless otherwise provided by 16 statute…. [N]o similar provision makes public agencies liable 17 for their own negligent conduct or omission to the same extent 18 as a private person or entity.” 31 Cal.4th at 1179-80. 19 Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to any 20 theories or claims of direct liability for negligence in Count 21 Ten. 22 4. Leave to Amend 23 In granting a motion to dismiss, the Court must also decide 24 whether to grant leave to amend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Leave 25 to amend should be given freely where there is no “undue delay, 26 bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . 27 undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of 28 the amendment, [or] futility of amendment . . . .” Foman v. NOIR EIEIO INI II RO EIEIO IIIS ED

1 Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, 2 Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Dismissal without 3 leave to amend is proper only if “‘the complaint could not be 4 saved by any amendment.’” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest 5S | Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re 6 Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005)). As to 7 Counts Five and Six, Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is 8 granted, as it appears to be unopposed. See Opp’n and Reply. As 9 noted above, leave to amend Counts Seven and Eight is denied by 10 virtue of futility of amendment. Plaintiff may proceed on Count 11 Ten but not as to any theory of direct liability. 12 IIl. ORDER 13 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 14 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. If Plaintiff elects to attempt to 15 amend Counts Five and Six, he shall file his amended complaint 16 | within twenty days of the date of this Order. Defendant County of 17 Sacramento shall file its response to the amended complaint 18 within twenty days thereafter. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: February 13, 2026 21 HN A. MENDEZ. 22 Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28 11