UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
JOSEPH COOPER,
Petitioner, Case No. 1:25-cv-1438
v. Honorable Maarten Vermaat
MATT LEIRSTEIN,
Respondent. ____________________________/
OPINION Petitioner Joseph Cooper is a detainee at the Emmet County Correctional Facility in Petoskey, Michigan. Petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that his detention violates his constitutional rights. (Petition, ECF No. 1.)1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 3.) Section 636(c) provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Rule 4 of the
1 Petitioner has filed two similar petitions for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court regarding the same Emmet County Circuit Court criminal charges. See Cooper v. Leirstein, No. 1:25-cv-940 (W.D. Mich.); Cooper v. Leirstein, No. 1:25-cv-970 (W.D. Mich.). Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.2 The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the petition. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Service of the petition on the respondent is of particular significance in defining a putative respondent’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority,
by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority- asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Rule 4, by requiring courts to review and even resolve the petition before service, creates
a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the petitioner. Because Respondent has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that Respondent is not presently a party whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review of the petition. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
2 The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be applied to petitions filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).3 Petitioner’s consent is sufficient to permit the undersigned to conduct the Rule 4 review. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, it plainly appears from the face of the petition that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he has failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Accordingly, the Court will summarily dismiss the petition without prejudice. Discussion I. Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis The filing fee for a habeas corpus action is $5.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Petitioner is currently detained at the Emmet County Correctional Facility pending state criminal charges in the Emmet County Circuit Court. It reasonably appears that paying the cost of this filing fee would impose an undue financial hardship. Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the Court will grant Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
3 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). II. Duplicative Submissions This is Petitioner’s third petition raising the same issues. The Court has twice informed Petitioner of the steps he must take to exhaust his state court remedies before presenting a habeas petition under § 2241 to this Court. Although Petitioner suggests he has done many things in his attempt to exhaust his claims in the state court, the documents he attaches to his petitions and
supplement (ECF Nos. 1, 5), and the publicly available dockets of the trial court and the Michigan appellate courts indicate that he is not following the procedures necessary to exhaust his state court remedies. For all the reasons stated in this Court’s opinions and judgments in Cooper v. Leirstein, No.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
JOSEPH COOPER,
Petitioner, Case No. 1:25-cv-1438
v. Honorable Maarten Vermaat
MATT LEIRSTEIN,
Respondent. ____________________________/
OPINION Petitioner Joseph Cooper is a detainee at the Emmet County Correctional Facility in Petoskey, Michigan. Petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that his detention violates his constitutional rights. (Petition, ECF No. 1.)1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 3.) Section 636(c) provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Rule 4 of the
1 Petitioner has filed two similar petitions for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court regarding the same Emmet County Circuit Court criminal charges. See Cooper v. Leirstein, No. 1:25-cv-940 (W.D. Mich.); Cooper v. Leirstein, No. 1:25-cv-970 (W.D. Mich.). Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.2 The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the petition. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Service of the petition on the respondent is of particular significance in defining a putative respondent’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority,
by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority- asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Rule 4, by requiring courts to review and even resolve the petition before service, creates
a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the petitioner. Because Respondent has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that Respondent is not presently a party whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review of the petition. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
2 The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be applied to petitions filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).3 Petitioner’s consent is sufficient to permit the undersigned to conduct the Rule 4 review. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, it plainly appears from the face of the petition that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he has failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Accordingly, the Court will summarily dismiss the petition without prejudice. Discussion I. Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis The filing fee for a habeas corpus action is $5.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Petitioner is currently detained at the Emmet County Correctional Facility pending state criminal charges in the Emmet County Circuit Court. It reasonably appears that paying the cost of this filing fee would impose an undue financial hardship. Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the Court will grant Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
3 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). II. Duplicative Submissions This is Petitioner’s third petition raising the same issues. The Court has twice informed Petitioner of the steps he must take to exhaust his state court remedies before presenting a habeas petition under § 2241 to this Court. Although Petitioner suggests he has done many things in his attempt to exhaust his claims in the state court, the documents he attaches to his petitions and
supplement (ECF Nos. 1, 5), and the publicly available dockets of the trial court and the Michigan appellate courts indicate that he is not following the procedures necessary to exhaust his state court remedies. For all the reasons stated in this Court’s opinions and judgments in Cooper v. Leirstein, No. 1:25-cv-940 (W.D. Mich.) and Cooper v. Leirstein, No. 1:25-cv-970 (W.D. Mich.), Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Until he does, this Court is compelled to dismiss his duplicative habeas petitions. III. Certificate of Appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a “substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Sixth Circuit has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v.
Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s application is properly dismissed for lack of exhaustion. Under Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), when a habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only “when the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and [2] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Both showings must be made to warrant the grant of a certificate. Id. The Court concludes that reasonable jurists could not find it debatable whether Petitioner’s application should be dismissed for lack of exhaustion. Therefore, a certificate of appealability will be denied. Moreover, for that same reason, the Court also concludes that any issue Petitioner
might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Conclusion The Court will enter an order and judgment granting Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissing the petition without prejudice for lack of exhaustion, and denying a certificate of appealability.
Dated: January 12, 2026 /s/Maarten Vermaat Maarten Vermaat United States Magistrate Judge