1 TIMOTHY L. REED, CA Bar No. 258034 timothy.reed@ogletree.com 2 MARC A. KOONIN, CA Bar No. 166210 marc.koonin@ogletree.com 3 KHADIJAH KENYATTÉ, CA Bar No. 337236 khadijah.kenyatte@ogletree.com 4 OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. One Embarcadero Center, Suite 900 5 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: 415-442-4810 6 Facsimile: 415-442-4870 7 Attorneys for Defendant LYFT, INC. 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 JORDAN MATTHEW PAULEY, Case No. 4:25-cv-10252-HSG 13 Plaintiff, JOINT STIPULATION TO REMAND 14 CASE TO STATE COURT, AND AMEND vs. COMPLAINT FOLLOWING REMAND; 15 AND ORDER (as modified) LYFT, INC., 16 Action Filed: October 27, 2025 Defendant. Trial Date: None Set 17 Judge: Hon. Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 JOINT STIPULATION 2 Plaintiff Jordan Matthew Pauley (“Plaintiff”) and defendant Lyft, Inc. (“Defendant”) 3 (collectively, the “Parties”), by and through their respective counsel, hereby agree and stipulate as 4 follows: 5 WHEREAS, on October 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Alameda County Superior 6 Court styled Jordan Matthew Pauley v. Lyft, Inc., Case No. 25CV150665 (the “Complaint”) alleging 7 that Defendant violated certain laws, including certain federal laws relating to the use of criminal 8 background checks and that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff as a job applicant; 9 WHEREAS, Plaintiff served the Summons and Complaint on Defendant, through its 10 California agent for service of process, on October 29, 2025; 11 WHEREAS, on November 26, 2025, Defendant removed the action to this Court on the basis 12 of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1331 and 1441; 13 WHEREAS, on December 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint to 14 remove claims alleged under federal law and asking the Court to remand this Action to the Alameda 15 County Superior Court, along with a proposed First Amended Complaint; and 16 WHEREAS, the Parties agree that, once the Complaint is amended to dismiss all federal 17 claims, there will no longer be any basis for federal jurisdiction in this Action. 18 THEREFORE, THE PARTIES AGREE AND STIPULATE AS FOLLOWS: 19 1. This action shall be remanded to Alameda County Superior Court, with each side to 20 bear its own attorney’s fees and costs. 21 2. Upon remand to state court, Plaintiff will file the First Amended Complaint attached 22 hereto as Exhibit A. 23 24 25 26 27 1 DATED: December 15, 2025 OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. 2 3 4 By: /s/ Timothy L. Reed TIMOTHY L. REED 5 MARC A. KOONIN KHADIJAH KENYATTÉ 6 Attorneys for Defendant 7 LYFT, INC. 8 DATED: December 15, 2025 9 10 11 By: /s/ Jordan Matthew Pauley JORDAN MATTHEW PAULEY 12 Plaintiff in Pro Per 13 14 SIGNATURE ATTESTATION 15 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 5-1(i)(3), I attest that concurrence in the filing of this 16 document has been obtained from the other signatories. 17 18 DATED: December 15, 2025 By: /s/ Timothy L. Reed OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK 19 & STEWART, P.C. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 ORDER 2 This Court, having read and considered the stipulation between plaintiff Jordan Matthew 3 || Pauley (“Plaintiff”) and defendant Lyft, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) regarding remand to state court and 4 || the filing of an amended complaint by Plaintiff, and based on good cause appearing therefrom, the 5 || Court HEREBY ORDERS: 6 1. This action is remanded to Alameda County Superior Court, with each side to bear its 7 || own attorney’s fees and costs. The Clerk is directed to close the case. 8 2. Upon remand to state court, Plaintiff will file the First Amended Complaint attached 9 || hereto as Exhibit A. 10 1] IT ISSO ORDERED. 12 13]! Dated: 12/15/2025 Matnuperd g bd) □ 14 Hon. Ha od S. Gilliam, Jr. United States District Court Judge 15 16 94346482.v1-OGLETREE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Case No. 4:25-cv-10252- HSG
E A XHIBIT 1 HAYWARD, CA 94540 P: (510) 813-7054 2 E: JM.PAUL731@GMAIL.COM 3 4 SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 5 FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 6 JORDAN MATTHEW PAULEY, Case No. 25CV150665 7 Plaintiff, Unlimited Jurisdiction 8 vs. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 9 INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY 10 LYFT, INC.; AND DOES 1-10, INCLUSIVE, RELIEF, DAMAGES, AND PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF (1) CALIFORNIA Defendant(s). 11 LABOR CODE § 432.7, (2) CALIFORNIA INVESTIGATIVE CONSUMER 12 REPORTING AGENCIES ACT (ICRAA), (3) 13 CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (UCL), (4) INVASION OF PRIVACY, 14 AND (5) GROSS NEGLIGENCE 15 (DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL) 16 Action Filed: October 27th, 2025 17 Amended: December 1st, 2025 18 PLAINTIFF Jordan Matthew Pauley alleges as follows: 19 THE PARTIES TO THIS ACTION 20 1. PLAINTIFF Jordan Matthew Pauley (“PLAINTIFF”) is, and at all relevant times 21 herein, was a resident of Hayward, California. Until approximately March 2024, PLAINTIFF 22 23 was actively engaged in the rideshare profession, having successfully completed more than 5,600 24 passenger trips and/or deliveries since 2019, maintaining an exceptional driver rating of 4.98 out 25 of 5 on the Uber Driver platform. 26 2. Providing rideshare and delivery services as both a “Delivery Network Company 27 28 1 the Protect App-Based Drivers and Services Act, CA Bus. & Prof. Code § 74631, has constituted 2 a substantial and integral part of PLAINTIFF’s overall financial livelihood and long-term 3 professional strategy. Notwithstanding, in addition to app-based driving, PLAINTIFF has long 4 pursued regular employment opportunities with both government entities and major technology 5 companies like LYFT. PLAINTIFF is currently a 40+ year old African-American person, and a 6 7 professional Data Analyst by trade. 8 3. At all times relevant herein, PLAINTIFF was an “applicant” – meaning an applicant 9 for employment as defined under CA Labor Code § 4302, who applied for regular employment 10 with LYFT in December of 2023. 11 4. PLAINTIFF is also a 100% disabled United States ARMY veteran, having served 12 13 honorably in the 82nd Airborne Division during the Global War on Terror. PLAINTIFF’s race, 14 age, and veteran status place him squarely within classes protected by the California Fair 15 Employment and Housing Act34, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645, and the Age 16 Discrimination in Employment Act of 19676. 17 5. At all times relevant herein, PLAINTIFF was also a recipient of relief under CA 18 19 Penal Code § 1203.47, resulting in the expungement of all prior convictions and thereby placing 20 him within the protections afforded by the California Fair Chance Act89, CA Labor Code § 21 432.710, and other contextually relevant statutes. 22 23 24 25 1 https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/business-and-professions-code/bpc-sect-7463/ 2 https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/labor-code/lab-sect-430 26 3 https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/government-code/gov-sect-12900/ 4 https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/government-code/gov-sect-12952/ 27 5 https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964 6 https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/age-discrimination-employment-act-1967 28 7 https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/penal-code/pen-sect-1203-4/ 8 https://calcivilrights.ca.gov/fair-chance-act/
9 https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/california/2-CCR-11017.1 1 was and is a Delaware corporation registered with the California Secretary of State. LYFT 2 operates a transportation and delivery network platform through which it contracts drivers to 3 provide rideshare and delivery services to consumers. In addition to its network operations, 4 LYFT employs thousands of individuals across its corporate departments, including but not 5 limited to accounting and finance, data analytics and business intelligence, data science, human 6 7 resources, legal, operations, and software engineering. 8 7. LYFT qualifies as both a “Transportation Network Company” and “Delivery 9 Network Company”—collectively, a “Network Company”—as those terms are defined under the 10 Protect App-Based Drivers and Services Act, Bus. & Prof. Code § 7463. In addition to its 11 network operations, LYFT’s extensive corporate structure and workforce also render it an 12 13 “employer” within the meaning of California Labor Code provisions, Government Code § 14 12926(d)1112, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)13, and Section 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 15 1964/42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)14, and other analogous state and federal employment statutes. 16 8. Lyft’s principal place of business is located at 185 Berry St Suite 400, San 17 Francisco, CA 94107. 18 19 JURISDICTION 20 9. The Superior Court of the State of California has original jurisdiction over this action 21 pursuant to (1) the California Constitution, Article VI, Section 1015 – as this case involves causes 22 of action arising under California law, and (2) because DEFENDANT conducts business in and 23 across the State of California. 24 25
27 11 https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/government-code/gov-sect-12926/ 28 12 https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/government-code/gov-sect-12940/ 13 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29/630
14 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000e 1 10. Venue is proper in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda, 2 under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 395.516, as the liability at issue arose in this county. 3 4 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 5 a. Background 6 i. General 7 11. On or around December 18th, 2023, PLAINTIFF submitted a Data Analyst 8 employment application through LYFT’s careers portal. LYFT issued an acknowledgment 9 10 stating that it receives a high volume of applications and would only follow up if there were an 11 immediate fit for the role. 12 12. At that time, LYFT’s careers page expressly represented that: 13 “Lyft is an equal opportunity employer committed to an inclusive workplace that fosters 14 belonging. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without 15 16 regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, 17 disability status, protected veteran status, age, genetic information, or any other basis 18 prohibited by law. We also consider qualified applicants with criminal histories 19 consistent with applicable federal, state, and local law.” 20 This public representation formed part of the factual and legal context in which PLAINTIFF’s 21 22 application was submitted and later evaluated. 23 13. Separately, on or around March 8th, 2024, PLAINTIFF applied to drive on the LYFT 24 platform. LYFT engaged non-party Checkr, Inc. ("CHECKR") to furnish a background report for 25 the driver application. As part of the process, PLAINTIFF consented to the procurement of this 26 27
28 1 expunged/sealed criminal history. Upon notice of these findings from LYFT, PLAINTIFF 2 promptly disputed the report with CHECKR – to which CHECKR, in turn, sent notice to LYFT 3 of the dispute. LYFT then placed PLAINTIFF's driver application on hold pending CHECKR’s 4 reinvestigation. 5 14. During the reinvestigation period of the driver issue, and notwithstanding LYFT’s 6 7 prior representation regarding PLAINTIFF’s Data Analyst application – that it “would only be 8 reaching out to candidates who are an immediate fit for the role,” LYFT unexpectedly issued a 9 tailored rejection notice regarding the Data Analyst employment application. This rejection letter 10 made no reference to any background-check results or adjudicative criteria. However, the very 11 next day, LYFT issued a separate notice rejecting PLAINTIFF’s driver application based 12 13 explicitly on the expunged information contained in the CHECKR background report. 14 15. Based on information and belief, and the temporal proximity of adverse actions 15 described herein, PLAINTIFF alleges that LYFT unlawfully accessed, cross-referenced, and 16 used the same expunged criminal history—originally transmitted by CHECKR solely for 17 purposes of the driver screening process—to inform and effectuate its decision to reject 18 19 PLAINTIFF’s Data Analyst application. Such cross-use of protected background information, 20 obtained for a distinct and limited purpose without PLAINTIFF’s authorization, constitutes a 21 willful violation of CA Labor Code § 432.7 and other applicable consumer-protection and anti- 22 discrimination laws. 23 16. PLAINTIFF further alleges that LYFT’s decision to unlawfully cross-reference his 24 25 background-check information, to rely upon that protected data in making an adverse 26 employment decision regarding his Data Analyst application, and to conceal such conduct by 27 issuing a customized rejection notice, was authorized, directed, or subsequently ratified by one or 28 more managing agents of the company. The individuals involved—including senior personnel 1 discretionary authority over employment policy and applicant evaluation procedures, thereby 2 rendering their actions and ratifications those of LYFT itself for purposes of liability and 3 punitive damages. 4 17. The rejection email regarding PLAINTIFF’s Data Analyst application was sent by 5 Senior Talent Acquisition Partner/Technical Recruiter Alina Cebotarenco (Person Most 6 7 Knowledgeable17; “FW 1”), who, upon information and belief, acted within the course and scope 8 of her employment with LYFT. As a senior recruiter responsible for managing corporate-level 9 technical hiring, Ms. Cebotarenco possessed discretion and authority over candidate evaluation, 10 communication of hiring decisions, and implementation of LYFT’s recruitment policies. Her 11 issuance of the customized rejection notice therefore constitutes corporate conduct attributable to 12 13 LYFT, and her actions and knowledge are relevant to determining the company’s authorization, 14 participation in, or ratification of the unlawful cross-referencing described herein. 15 18. Based on information and belief, LYFT’s driver-operations division is departmentally 16 firewalled from its Corporate and Technical Recruiting teams, each maintaining separate 17 reporting structures, data systems, and decision-making protocols. The temporal proximity of the 18 19 events described herein—particularly LYFT’s sudden and renewed interest in PLAINTIFF’s 20 Data Analyst application, occurring only after the driver-side background-check issue arose— 21 suggest that FW 1 was prompted interdepartmentally to act. Such coordination, if proven, would 22 demonstrate the likely involvement of multiple managing agents or supervisory personnel 23 operating across divisions, collectively ratifying or executing the decision to reject PLAINTIFF’s 24 25 Data Analyst application on the basis of expunged criminal-history information. This 26 27
28 1 level response, rather than an isolated error. 2 ii. Related Cases 3 4 19. On March 18th, 2025, this Court compelled arbitration in Pauley v. Checkr Group, 5 Inc., et al. (Alameda Sup. Ct. No. 24CV089648), which included LYFT among the defendants. 6 The LYFT portion of those proceedings are presently pending before the American Arbitration 7 Association (“AAA”). That arbitration case concerns claims arising from LYFT’s rejection of 8 PLAINTIFF’s app-based driver application based on reasons statutorily barred. 9 10 20. The present civil action by PLAINTIFF concerns his separate application for 11 employment with LYFT as a corporate Data Analyst, and the Company’s subsequent rejection of 12 that application. These claims are both factually and contractually independent from the driver- 13 related matters currently pending in arbitration against LYFT. The employment application here 14 was not subject to the arbitration agreement governing the earlier driver disputes, nor are the 15 16 legal theories (employment discrimination, unauthorized use of expunged records, retaliatory 17 conduct) or damages (lost W-2 employment opportunity and associated career trajectory) tied to 18 the deactivation of a driver account. Accordingly, the employment-application claims are 19 properly before this Court and are not “inextricably bound up” with those currently in 20 arbitration. (See Goldman v. KPMG LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 214 [“The sine qua non 21 22 for allowing a nonsignatory to enforce an arbitration clause based on equitable estoppel is that 23 the claims the plaintiff asserts against the nonsignatory are dependent on or inextricably bound 24 up with the contractual obligations of the agreement containing the arbitration clause”].)18 25 26 27 28
18 1 discovery overlap is anticipated. 2 21. Further, under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.419, “if the issue which is the controversy 3 subject to arbitration is severable, the stay may be with respect to that issue only.” Even if the 4 employment-application and driver-deactivation issues had originally been plead together, they 5 would have been plainly severable and not subject to a stay within the meaning of the statute. 6 7 22. PLAINTIFF also notes that during prior correspondence, LYFT suggested that the 8 arbitration agreement applicable to the driver matter also extends to employment-application 9 claims. While PLAINTIFF acknowledges DEFENDANT’s right to defend its interests, this 10 representation appears to foreshadow a potential attempt to compel arbitration in bad faith where 11 no such agreement exists. PLAINTIFF includes this information solely to provide procedural 12 13 context and to reinforce that the instant claims are separate and properly before this Court. 14 23. Finally, the other related action, Pauley v. Toyota Motor Credit Corporation et. al. 15 (Alameda Sup. Ct. No. 24CV091339), which was compelled to arbitration in late-spring 2025, 16 was subsequently resolved by mutual agreement. 17 18 iii. Fact Witnesses 19 A. FW Number One 20 24. Referencing ¶17 of this pleading and based on publicly available information20, FW 21 22 1 publicly represents herself as a Senior Talent Partner who “builds holistic talent experiences.” 23 Descriptions of her prior professional work experience, in her own words, are as follows: 24 “… Developed global strategies to improve our pipelines and attract high-quality 25 diverse candidates. Led initiatives to improve candidate experience and created 26 27 28
19 https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/code-of-civil-procedure/ccp-sect-1281-4/ 1 teams...... Provided thoughtful candidate experience from application through 2 onboarding. I collaborated with the People team on developing the onboarding 3 process and interview-skills training, while also creating comprehensive resource 4 toolkits for hiring managers, interviewers, and candidates. Owned the full-cycle tech, 5 product and business recruitment process, partnering closely with hiring managers to 6 7 build strategies for sourcing, evaluating, and securing top talent...... Led the 8 recruitment process — from sourcing talent, interviewing candidates, making job 9 offers and negotiating compensation to onboarding. To keep the team’s skills up to 10 date, I mapped out a skills matrix and oversaw training programs to promote 11 professional growth and development…” 12 13 FW 1 also appears to be a Romanian national residing in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Based on 14 information and belief, LYFT placed her in a role bearing substantial responsibility for U.S. 15 hiring and compliance decisions, including those governed by the employment and consumer 16 laws. This appointment raises questions regarding LYFT’s diligence in assigning managerial 17 agency to non-citizen personnel who may not be readily familiar with U.S. Federal and state 18 19 regulatory regimes. 20 25. Consistent with the principle articulated in White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 21 563, 58421 — that punitive liability may attach where “the employer had advance knowledge of 22 the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights 23 or safety of others” — PLAINTIFF alleges that LYFT’s selection and retention of FW 1, and its 24 25 delegation of compliance-sensitive responsibilities to her despite the foregoing circumstances, 26 27
28 1 applicants such as PLAINTIFF. 2 B. FW Number Two 3 4 26.As first described in ¶13 and ¶14 of this pleading, during the pendency of 5 PLAINTIFF’s app-based driver application review, LYFT placed the application on hold after 6 receiving an erroneous background report from CHECKR. During this period, LYFT 7 communicated with PLAINTIFF by email, instructing him to “sit tight” pending completion of 8 its internal review. PLAINTIFF then engaged in protected activity by disputing the CHECKR 9 10 report, to which CHECKR sent LYFT a notice in reference. 11 27.Following the CHECKR reinvestigation—which improperly reaffirmed the 12 inaccurate and expunged criminal-history information—LYFT issued a final disposition email 13 formally rejecting PLAINTIFF’s driver application. This correspondence appeared to close the 14 procedural “loop” in LYFT’s standard adjudication workflow: (1) background report received, 15 16 (2) applicant placed on hold, (3) final disposition issued. 17 28.On or around June 7th, 2024, CHECKR completed a subsequent reinvestigation and 18 furnished an updated, corrected background report fully clearing PLAINTIFF of the prior 19 inaccuracies. Despite receipt of this corrected report, LYFT sent only a second “sit tight” 20 message and failed to issue any corresponding final-disposition or reinstatement notice. This 21 22 apparent deviation (hence, manual override) from LYFT’s own documented process effectively 23 left PLAINTIFF’s driver application status unresolved. It also obscured the fact that the prior 24 adverse decision had been predicated on inaccurate and expunged information. 25 29.Based on information and belief, the individual responsible for this deviation (“FW 26 2”), who assumptively sits within LYFT’s Driver Operations or Compliance division, exercised 27 28 managerial agency in making the decision. FW 2 possessed authority to determine or withhold 1 loop—specifically, the apparent decision to omit a closing disposition following receipt of the 2 corrected report—constituted an intentional act designed to conceal LYFT’s prior unlawful use 3 of expunged records, and to mitigate potential corporate liability. 4 30. Furthermore, FW 2—or a parallel person most knowledgeable—may hold 5 information directly linking the driver-side conduct described herein with the employment-side 6 7 conduct at issue in this action. 8 iv. California Civil Rights Department Investigation 9 10 31. PLAINTIFF has completed intake with the California Civil Rights Department 11 (“CRD”) regarding all civil rights claims. CRD’s investigation is now pending. 12 13 b. California Labor Code § 432.7 Violation 14 32. PLAINTIFF realleges that he was an “applicant” within its meaning under CA Labor 15 Code, seeking to be a LYFT “employee” within its meaning under the “ABC test”222324. 16 33. PLAINTIFF further realleges that LYFT, an “employer” within its meaning under CA 17 Labor Code § 432.7, utilized expunged convictions as a factor in determining his fitness for 18 19 regular employment with the company as a Data Analyst. 20 34. By requesting, obtaining, considering, and/or using expunged/dismissed criminal 21 history information to reject PLAINTIFF’s Data Analyst application, LYFT violated CA Labor 22 Code § 432.7. Furthermore, none of § 432.7’s statutory exceptions apply. 23 35. Based on information and belief, LYFT sourced the expunged criminal records—or 24 25 26
28 22 https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/abc_test
23 https://www.labor.ca.gov/ab5-statute/ 1 PLAINTIFF never authorized a background check in conjunction with his Data Analyst 2 application. Such conduct would be per se unlawful across statutes, if proven. In the course of 3 rejecting PLAINTIFF’s employment application, PLAINTIFF further alleges that DEFENDANT 4 concealed its reliance on the unlawfully considered expunged information. Given the temporal 5 proximity between PLAINTIFF’s protected background-dispute activity with CHECKR, and 6 7 LYFT’s subsequent rejection of his driver application – explicitly referencing the same expunged 8 records, DEFENDANT’s actions regarding the employment application appear both retaliatory 9 and intentional within its meaning under CA Labor Code § 432.7(c). 10 36. As a direct and proximate result of LYFT’s violations, PLAINTIFF suffered 11 economic harm, including the lost employment opportunity, lost wages and benefits, loss of 12 13 career advancement, as well as non-economic harm including humiliation, emotional distress, 14 and loss of dignity. 15 37. PLAINTIFF seeks injunctive and declaratory relief requiring LYFT to: (a) cease use 16 of prohibited criminal history information; (b) correct and purge any records reflecting unlawful 17 consideration of such information; (c) implement compliant policies, training, and auditing; and 18 19 (d) provide notice of corrective action. 20 38. PLAINTIFF also seeks treble actual damages together with costs of suit. PLAINTIFF 21 further seeks pre- and post-judgment interest as permitted by law, and such other and further 22 relief as the Court deems just and proper. 23 24 c. California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act Violations (“ICRAA”) 25 39. At all times relevant herein, LYFT was a “person” using "investigative consumer 26 reports" for "employment purposes" within their respective meanings under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 27 28 1786.2(a), (c), and (f). LYFT obtained, reviewed, and used investigative consumer report 1 1786.2(b), whose personal and employment history information was collected, evaluated, and 2 used by LYFT in connection with an employment decision. Accordingly, LYFT was obligated to 3 comply with all disclosure, authorization, and notice requirements set forth under the ICRAA 4 prior to taking any adverse employment action based in whole or in part on such report. 5 40. LYFT willfully violated the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act by (a) 6 7 procuring or causing a report to be made without a permissible purpose, (b) failing to certify to 8 CHECKR that they have made the applicable disclosures to the consumer as required by the 9 subdivision and that they will comply with subdivision b, (c) failing to provide a copy of the 10 report to the subject of the investigation, (d) failing to provide the consumer a means by which 11 the consumer may indicate on a written form, by means of a box to check, that the consumer 12 13 wishes to receive a copy of any report that is prepared, and (e) acting willfully and in conscious 14 disregard of PLAINTIFF’s statutory rights. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1786.16(a)(2)(A and C(4 and 5), 15 1786.16(b)(1), § 1786.50. 16 41. PLAINTIFF properly pleads these ICRAA claims before this Court, as the claims 17 asserted are not duplicative of the FCRA claims pled herein. Cal. Civ. Code § 1786.52. 18 19 42. As a direct and proximate result of LYFT’s violations of the ICRAA, PLAINTIFF 20 suffered loss of an employment opportunity, lost wages and benefits, emotional distress, 21 reputational harm, and deprivation of his statutory right to receive accurate, timely, and lawful 22 disclosures and notices prior to adverse action. 23 43. PLAINTIFF seeks all available remedies under Cal. Civ. Code § 1786.50 et seq., 24 25 including actual damages, punitive damages, together with the costs of suit, injunctive and 26 declaratory relief prohibiting LYFT from continuing such unlawful practices, and any other 27 relief the Court deems just and proper. 28 1 44. PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 2 though fully set forth herein. 3 45. PLAINTIFF alleges that here, LYFT has engaged in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent 4 business acts or practices within the meaning of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Bus. & 5 Prof. Code §17200 et seq. 6 7 46. LYFT’s conduct was “unlawful” because it violated, inter alia, Cal. Labor Code 8 §432.7, multiple provisions of the ICRAA, together with related regulations and public policy 9 protecting applicants from discriminatory or improper criminal-history use. Each statutory 10 violation is a predicate “unlawful” act under the UCL. 11 47. LYFT’s conduct is “unfair” because, among other things, it (a) coordinated or cross- 12 13 used driver-program criminal-history information to dispose of PLAINTIFF’s W-2 application; 14 (b) failed to provide mandatory disclosures/authorizations or a meaningful opportunity to dispute 15 before adverse action; (c) deployed product and process designs that obscure applicants’ rights 16 and tilt the playing field (e.g. impermissible click-wrap agreements); and (d) engaged in grossly 17 negligent hiring practices that foreseeably undermined their regulatory and compliance 18 19 responsibilities. The harm to applicants (including PLAINTIFF) is substantial, not outweighed 20 by countervailing benefits, and could have been avoided by feasible, compliant practices. 21 48. LYFT’s acts and omissions were “fraudulent” in that they were likely to deceive 22 reasonable applicants, including by suggesting compliant handling of background information 23 while omitting material facts about how such information would actually be used to deny 24 25 employment in contravention of several regulatory and compliance regimes. 26 49. As a result of the foregoing, PLAINTIFF suffered economic injury “as a result of” 27 28 1 postage/communications, document procurement), and loss of money and opportunity flowing 2 from the denial of employment and the corrective efforts required to contest LYFT’s practices. 3 50. Under Bus. & Prof. Code §17203, PLAINTIFF seeks injunctive relief prohibiting 4 LYFT from using expunged records in employment decisions; requiring compliant ICRAA 5 disclosures/authorizations and pre/post-adverse action procedures. PLAINTIFF also seeks pre- 6 7 and post-judgment interest, together with costs of suit. Nothing herein seeks non-restitutionary 8 damages under the UCL. 9 10 e. Invasion of Privacy 11 51. PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 12 though fully set forth herein. 13 52. LYFT intentionally intruded into PLAINTIFF’s legally protected privacy by 14 obtaining and using an investigative consumer report containing expunged criminal information 15 16 without authorization. PLAINTIFF had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding this 17 information, and LYFT’s intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Therefore, 18 LYFT’s actions constituted an unlawful intrusion upon PLAINTIFF’s seclusion and a serious 19 violation of his right to privacy under Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution. 20 53. As a direct and proximate result of LYFT’s invasion of privacy, PLAINTIFF suffered 21 22 loss of an employment opportunity, lost wages and benefits, emotional distress, reputational 23 harm, humiliation, discrimination, and anxiety. 24 54. PLAINTIFF seeks all available remedies arising from LYFT’s invasion of his 25 privacy, including actual and compensatory damages, general damages for emotional distress, 26 humiliation, and mental anguish, punitive and exemplary damages to deter and punish willful 27 28 misconduct, injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent further violations, costs of suit, pre- and 1 55. LYFT owed PLAINTIFF a duty to exercise reasonable care in collecting, using, 2 storing, and relying upon criminal-history information; to comply with Labor Code § 432.7, the 3 FEHA, FCA, the ICRAA, UCL, and common law; to refrain from using expunged/sealed 4 records; to segregate driver-screening data from regular employment hiring decisions; to obtain 5 any required written authorizations for employment-purpose reports; and to provide required pre- 6 7 and post-adverse action notices; to refrain from unlawful discrimination against protect classes. 8 56. LYFT breached those duties by acting in a manner constituting an extreme departure 9 from ordinary care, including: (a) using expunged and sealed criminal history information to 10 decide PLAINTIFF’s Data Analyst application; (b) cross-using driver-screening data for an 11 unrelated employment purpose without proper authorization or required notices; (c) ignoring or 12 13 unreasonably delaying reinvestigation and dispute responses; (d) failing to implement or enforce 14 reasonable procedures, training, and supervision to prevent such misuse; (e) issuing a tailored 15 rejection contrary to its own stated process; (f) discriminating against PLAINTIFF based on 16 inaccurate or unlawful information; and (g) recklessly hiring and entrusting international 17 personnel who were foreseeably unfamiliar with United States federal and state regulatory 18 19 requirements, etc. 20 57. As a direct and proximate result of LYFT’s gross negligence, PLAINTIFF suffered 21 harm including loss of employment opportunity and earnings, emotional distress, and other 22 consequential damages in an amount to be proven at hearing. 23 58. PLAINTIFF seeks all recoverable special and general damages, punitive damages, 24 25 together with the costs of suit, and any other relief the Court deems just and proper. 26 g. Punitive Damages 27 28 59. PLAINTIFF is informed and believes, and thereon realleges, that the misconduct 1 Code § 3294. One or more managing agents of LYFT (e.g. FW 1, FW 2 …. FW n, and 2 potentially others) possessed advanced knowledge of, ratified, or personally participated in the 3 wrongful conduct. 4 60. PLAINTIFF further alleges that discovery is likely to reveal additional “me-too” 5 evidence—other applicants and drivers subjected to similar unlawful background-check practices 6 7 and discrimination—supporting a pattern of willful disregard for statutory rights. 8 61. Also, given this Court’s prior agreement with PLAINTIFF—ruling a recent 9 version of LYFT’s web-based clickthrough wrap sign-up agreement impermissible— 10 PLAINTIFF alleges that the design of that agreement was fraudulent and malicious, deliberately 11 structured to obscure substantive protections afforded under state and federal law. The 12 13 architecture and user-interface flow of the wrap were not accidental but reflect intentional 14 concealment and manipulation, potentially evidenced in LYFT’s internal UX research notes, 15 design briefs, and contemporaneous communications among the legal, compliance, and product 16 teams responsible for implementing the sign-up process. Such conduct demonstrates LYFT’s 17 pattern of deceptive contracting practices designed to suppress employee and consumer 18 19 awareness of their rights and to evade judicial scrutiny through procedural misdirection. 20 62. Under Civil Code § 3295(c)25 and the standards articulated in Jabro v. Superior 21 Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 75426 and Guardado v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 22 9127, there exists a substantial probability that PLAINTIFF will prevail on his claim for punitive 23 24 25 26 27 28 25 https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/civil-code/civ-sect-3295/ 26 https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/4th/95/754.html
27 https://www.resolvingdiscoverydisputes.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/95/2012/06/Guardado- 1 to seek leave for financial-condition discovery at the appropriate stage of litigation. 2 63. Notwithstanding, PLAINTIFF seeks an award of punitive damages to punish and 3 deter DEFENDANT and others from engaging in similar unlawful conduct in the future. 4 5 h. Class Action 6 64. This action involves questions of common and general interest within the 7 meaning of CCP § 38228. The unlawful and fraudulent practices alleged herein—including 8 LYFT’s procurement, handling, and use of consumer and investigative reports, its concealment 9 10 of substantive applicant protections, its use of procedurally unconscionable electronic 11 agreements, violations of civil rights, discrimination, and other unfair business practices—have 12 affected, and continue to affect, a large and identifiable group of individuals who applied for 13 employment and/or performed work through LYFT’s platforms in California. 14 65. The parties aggrieved by such conduct are sufficiently numerous that joinder of 15 16 all affected persons would be impracticable. Common issues predominate regarding LYFT’s 17 standardized background-check procedures, recruitment and onboarding systems, form 18 contractual terms, and uniform employment and consumer-screening policies. Plaintiff’s claims 19 are typical of the class, and Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent their interests. 20 66. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that class treatment may be appropriate pursuant to 21 22 CCP § 382 and expressly reserves the right to seek class certification at the appropriate stage of 23 these proceedings, following discovery sufficient to define the class and any subclasses and to 24 establish the requisite elements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 25 representation. 26 27
28 1 1st Cause of Action – Violation of Cal. Labor Code § 432.7 2 67.PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 3 though fully set forth herein. 4 68.DEFENDANT intentionally violated Cal. Labor Code § 432.7 by unlawfully 5 procuring and utilizing PLAINTIFF’s dismissed and expunged criminal records as a factor in 6 7 determining any condition of employment. 8 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief as set forth below. 9 10 2nd Cause of Action – ICRAA/CIV § 1786.16(a)(2)(A) – Procuring a Report Without 11 Permissible Purpose 12 69.PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 13 though fully set forth herein. 14 70.DEFENDANT willfully violated the ICRAA by procuring or causing a report to 15 16 be made without a permissible purpose. 17 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief as set forth below. 18 19 3rd Cause of Action – ICRAA/CIV § 1786.16(a)(C)(4) – Failure to Certify with CRA 20 71.PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 21 though fully set forth herein. 22 72.DEFENDANT willfully violated the ICRAA by failing to certify to CHECKR 23 that they have made the applicable disclosures to the consumer as required by the subdivision 24 25 and that they will comply with subdivision b. 26 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief as set forth below. 27 28 1 Report 2 73.PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 3 though fully set forth herein. 4 74.DEFENDANT willfully violated the ICRAA by failing to provide a copy of the 5 report to the subject of the investigation. 6 7 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief as set forth below. 8 5th Cause of Action – ICRAA/CIV § 1786.16(b)(1) – Failing to Provide Consumer a Means 9 10 to Request a Copy of the Report 11 75.PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 12 though fully set forth herein. 13 76.DEFENDANT willfully violated the ICRAA by failing to provide the consumer a 14 means by which the consumer may indicate on a written form, by means of a box to check, that 15 16 the consumer wishes to receive a copy of any report that is prepared. 17 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief as set forth below. 18 19 6th Cause of Action – UCL/ Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. – Unfair Business Practice 20 77.PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 21 though fully set forth herein. 22 78.DEFENDANT violated the Unfair Competition Law by engaging in unfair 23 business practices. LYFT’s conduct also constitutes “unlawful” and “fraudulent” business 24 25 practices within the meaning of § 17200, as it violated multiple statutes and misled applicants 26 regarding their legal rights and the true nature of LYFT’s hiring processes. 27 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief as set forth below. 28 1 79.PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 2 though fully set forth herein. 3 80.DEFENDANT intentionally intruded into PLAINTIFF’s private affairs by 4 obtaining and using his expunged and confidential criminal history information without 5 authorization. PLAINTIFF had a reasonable expectation of privacy in such information, and 6 7 LYFT’s intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 8 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief as set forth below. 9 10 8th Cause of Action – Invasion of Privacy – Cal. Constitutional Right to Privacy (Art. I, § 1) 11 81.PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 12 though fully set forth herein. 13 82.DEFENDANT’s unauthorized procurement, retention, and use of PLAINTIFF’s 14 expunged and sealed criminal history constituted a serious invasion of PLAINTIFF’s legally 15 16 protected privacy interests under Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution. PLAINTIFF 17 had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information, and LYFT’s conduct was not 18 justified by any legitimate business necessity. 19 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief as set forth below. 20 21 9th Cause of Action – Gross Negligence 22 83.PLAINTIFF realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as 23 though fully set forth herein. 24 25 84.DEFENDANT owed PLAINTIFF a duty to exercise reasonable care in the 26 procurement, use, and handling of consumer and investigative reports, in the protection of 27 PLAINTIFF’s civil rights and statutory privacy interests, and in the training, supervision, and 28 hiring of personnel responsible for compliance with federal and state employment laws. DEFENDANT breached those duties through extreme and reckless departures from ordinary 1 || care and is therefore liable. WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief as set forth below. 3 4 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 5 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for the following relief: 6 1. Actual damages (Special damages and General damages). 2. Punitive damages/Exemplary damages. 9 3. Treble Damages. 10 4. The maximum statutory fines. 11 5. Costs and Attorney’s fees (where and if applicable). 6. Injunctive and declaratory relief. 7. Pre and post judgment interest to the extent permitted by law.
15 8. For such other and further relief as the court may deem Just and proper. 16 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PLAINTIFF hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable, pursuant to Article 1, 19 ||Section 16 of the California Constitution and Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 631. 20 21 — PLA , Jordan Mbtthew Pauley, Pré P 3 Date: 12/1/2025 24 25 26 27 28
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF. DAMAGES. AND PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION: