Jones-Bey v. Sirius-El

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 28, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-06371
StatusUnknown

This text of Jones-Bey v. Sirius-El (Jones-Bey v. Sirius-El) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones-Bey v. Sirius-El, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SISTER E JONES-BEY; LYRICS PLAYHOUSE MOORISH SUDBURY INSTITUTE, Plaintiffs, -against- 23-CV-6371 (LTS) YUSEF SIRIUS-EL; ROBERT JONES-BEY, ORDER OF DISMISSAL doing business as MOORISH SCIENCE TEMPLE OF AMERICA INC; D. CLARK-EL; WALTER CLENDENIN-BEY; ROBERT JONES-BEY, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Sister E. Jones-Bey, who is appearing pro se, invokes the court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated her rights. Named as Defendants are Yusef Sirius-El, Grand Sheik Moorish Science Temple of America Subordinate Temple 34; Assistant Grand Sheik Walter Clendenin-Bey; D. Clark-El, Grand Governor of the State of New York Moorish Science Temple of America, Inc.; and Robert Jones-Bey, Grand Sheik and Moderator of the Moorish Science Temple of America, Inc. By order dated July 26, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead her claims in an amended complaint demonstrating that the Court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of her state law claims. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings her claims using a general complaint form. She checks the box to invoke the court’s federal question jurisdiction, and in response to the question asking her to list the specific federal statutes, treaties, or constitutional provisions at issue in this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “have behaved and conducted business in ways that violate” the First Amendment; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513, 12131, 12133, and 1831; and 28 U.S.C. § 1651. (ECF 1, at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to her claims occurred in Bronx County and

Kings County, New York, between October 2020 and the present. Plaintiff alleges, The named State and National Officials of The Moorish Science Temple of America Inc. have violated my constitutional rights, and use extortion and blackmail in order to prevent me from being able to progress[] in the organization. On three different occasions I requested that Yusef Sirius-El give me a letter verifying my membership with Moorish Science Temple of America Subordinate Temple #34. My intellectual property has been used without donation or acknowledgment that it was created by me and Yusef Sirius-El has used others to find out th[i]ngs about my business in order to boycott and blacklist us and then later implement my ideas as if he was the creator. I requested that my dues be refunded back dating to June 2020 or disclose what they are used for as there are no faith based service for Moorish Americans in NYC. I have written several complaints requesting resolution to no avail. It is my belief that the defendants has been using these tactics for years to remain in power. (Id. at 5.)1 Plaintiff alleges that she has experienced emotional distress and does not know “how much financial damage has been done but ive lost three years of financial compensation for my services due to [Sirius-El’s] unwillingness to truly resolve his indiscretions as a leader and the other defendants allow his behavior.” (Id.)

1 The Court quotes the complaint verbatim. All grammar, punctuation, and spelling are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. As relief, Plaintiff requests money damages, and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651,2 that “an order of Protection be issued for myself my offspring and my business clients students and associates against the defendants.” (Id.) Plaintiff attaches to the complaint an “Affidavit of Support of Discrimination Claim” in

which she alleges the following. Sirius-El has violated the “basic Human Rights” of Plaintiff, her “offspring and many of [her] associates” by prohibiting them from attending “Mandatory Public Meetings,” which Plaintiff alleges is a “direct violation” of the laws that govern “our organization.” (ECF 1-1, at 1.) Plaintiff alleges Sirius-El has discriminated against her based on her familial status, sexual orientation, and disability, and she accuses him of using “slander & libellious statements” made by others to defame her and “prevent [her] from progressing in the organization.” (Id.

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Jones-Bey v. Sirius-El, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-bey-v-sirius-el-nysd-2023.