Per curiam.
The issue here is whether a tract of land owned by a foundation is exempt from ad valorem taxation as property dedicated to and used exclusively for purely public charity.
For prior appearance of this litigation see Griffin v. Wormsloe Foundation, Inc., 226 Ga. 749 (177 SE2d 481), transferring the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and 123 Ga. App. 765 (182 SE2d 319), holding that an affidavit of illegality is not an available remedy to contest an exemption from taxes. All of the documentary evidence from the first trial was by consent ordered to be made a part of the record in this case since the issues are the same.
The action now on appeal arose when the appellee Wormsloe Foundation, Inc. filed a complaint in equity in the Superior Court of Chatham County praying for temporary and permanent injunction to prohibit the defendants, J. A. Johnson, as Tax Commissioner of Chatham County, C. M. Peagler, as Chief Tax Assessor, and Carl A. Griffin, as Sheriff, from further assessing, levying or otherwise attempting to collect State and county ad valorem taxes against two parcels of land in Chatham County known as Lots A and B of Wormsloe Plantation, and requesting cancellation of certain tax executions against those parcels.
The complaint alleged in pertinent part as follows: that the appellee Foundation is a purely public charitable organization under the laws of Georgia; that Parcels A and B, together with the adjacent marshlands, have been used exclusively and continuously since 1962 for the benefit of educational and charitable institutions; that they have never been used for any other purpose since that time; and that they are therefore exempt from taxation under the provisions of Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV of the Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. §2-5404), and also under Code Ann. §92-201.
The complaint further alleged that certain assessments were made for the year 1965 and each year subsequent [724]*724thereto through 1968, the date the property was levied upon by the appellants; that the Foundation has protested such assessments on the ground that the property in question was used exclusively for charitable purposes and was exempt from ad valorem taxes under the Constitution and statutes of Georgia; that for the above reasons said taxes are excessive and illegal; and that the Foundation has exhausted its administrative remedies and has no adequate remedy at law.
The appellants filed an answer denying the essential allegations of the complaint.
Upon the action coming on for hearing on the prayer for temporary injunction, the trial court denied the appellants’ oral motion to dismiss the complaint and granted the appellee’s prayer for temporary injunction.
Subsequently the appellee Foundation filed a motion for summary judgment upon the ground that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, as appeared from the pleadings and from certain affidavits and other documents to be referred to hereinafter, all of which were attached and made a part of the motion.
In opposition to this motion the appellants submitted an affidavit, a deposition and certain documents.
Upon consideration of this motion the trial court entered an order granting the summary judgment. In doing so it made the following findings of fact: that the Foundation is a purely public charitable organization under the laws of Georgia; that the property alleged to be tax exempt comprises a large part of Wormsloe Plantation and has been used exclusively since 1962 for purely public charitable purposes; and that this property constitutes an historical site, containing a fort erected as a defense against the Spaniards, and other historical features.
The trial court made two conclusions of law, to wit: (1) that the Foundation is a purely public charity within the meaning of the laws of Georgia; and (2) that the property it alleged to be tax exempt had been "dedicated to, and used [725]*725exclusively since 1962 for purely public, charitable purposes within the meaning of the laws of Georgia. [Cits.]”
Pursuant to the foregoing the appellants were permanently enjoined from assessing, levying or otherwise attempting to collect ad valorem taxes on the property involved and the tax executions for the years 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968 were ordered canceled.
The appellants appealed from this order, contending that the court erred in (1) overruling its oral motion to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds that it fails to allege a dedication of the property to public and charitable purposes and also that it fails to state a claim for equitable relief from taxation; and (2) in granting the Foundation’s motion for summary judgment.
The motion to dismiss was properly denied.
The complaint alleged in essence that the property in question has been used exclusively and continuously since 1962 for the benefit of charitable institutions; that it is exempt from taxation by virtue of stated constitutional and statutory provisions; that the property has been levied upon for taxes; that said levy is illegal; and that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.
The allegations of the complaint are sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss in view of the Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. §81A-108 (a)). No longer must a cause of action be alleged. The allegations are not to be construed most strongly against the pleader. The complaint gave notice of the nature of the claim. See in this connection, Gill v. Myrick, 228 Ga. 253 (1) (185 SE2d 72).
We come now to the substantial question, whether the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment upon the ground that the property was exempt as purely public charity.
To begin with, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV (Code Ann. §2-5404) of the Georgia Constitution provides in material part as follows:
"The General Assembly may, by law, exempt from taxation ... all institutions of purely public charity . . . this [726]*726exemption shall not apply to real estate or buildings other than those used for the operation of such institution and which is rented, leased or otherwise used for the primary purpose of securing an income thereon; and also provided that such donations of property shall not be predicated upon an agreement, contract or otherwise that the donors shall receive or retain any part of the net or gross income of the property.”
Pursuant to the aforesaid authority, the General Assembly has also provided that "all institutions of purely public charity” are exempt from taxation. Code Ann. § 92-201.
However, to qualify for ad valorem tax exemption as an "institution of purely public charity” the property itself must be dedicated to a purely public charitable use. Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council, BSA, 185 Ga. 810 (196 SE 762, 116 ALR 373); United Hospitals Service Assn. v. Fulton County, 216 Ga. 30 (114 SE2d 524).
Wormsloe Foundation, Inc. claims certain of its property qualifies as such by implication.
"Dedications of lands for charitable and religious purposes, and for public highways, are valid without any grantee to hold the fee, and the principle upon which they are sustained, sustains dedications of streets, squares and commons . . .
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Per curiam.
The issue here is whether a tract of land owned by a foundation is exempt from ad valorem taxation as property dedicated to and used exclusively for purely public charity.
For prior appearance of this litigation see Griffin v. Wormsloe Foundation, Inc., 226 Ga. 749 (177 SE2d 481), transferring the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and 123 Ga. App. 765 (182 SE2d 319), holding that an affidavit of illegality is not an available remedy to contest an exemption from taxes. All of the documentary evidence from the first trial was by consent ordered to be made a part of the record in this case since the issues are the same.
The action now on appeal arose when the appellee Wormsloe Foundation, Inc. filed a complaint in equity in the Superior Court of Chatham County praying for temporary and permanent injunction to prohibit the defendants, J. A. Johnson, as Tax Commissioner of Chatham County, C. M. Peagler, as Chief Tax Assessor, and Carl A. Griffin, as Sheriff, from further assessing, levying or otherwise attempting to collect State and county ad valorem taxes against two parcels of land in Chatham County known as Lots A and B of Wormsloe Plantation, and requesting cancellation of certain tax executions against those parcels.
The complaint alleged in pertinent part as follows: that the appellee Foundation is a purely public charitable organization under the laws of Georgia; that Parcels A and B, together with the adjacent marshlands, have been used exclusively and continuously since 1962 for the benefit of educational and charitable institutions; that they have never been used for any other purpose since that time; and that they are therefore exempt from taxation under the provisions of Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV of the Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. §2-5404), and also under Code Ann. §92-201.
The complaint further alleged that certain assessments were made for the year 1965 and each year subsequent [724]*724thereto through 1968, the date the property was levied upon by the appellants; that the Foundation has protested such assessments on the ground that the property in question was used exclusively for charitable purposes and was exempt from ad valorem taxes under the Constitution and statutes of Georgia; that for the above reasons said taxes are excessive and illegal; and that the Foundation has exhausted its administrative remedies and has no adequate remedy at law.
The appellants filed an answer denying the essential allegations of the complaint.
Upon the action coming on for hearing on the prayer for temporary injunction, the trial court denied the appellants’ oral motion to dismiss the complaint and granted the appellee’s prayer for temporary injunction.
Subsequently the appellee Foundation filed a motion for summary judgment upon the ground that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, as appeared from the pleadings and from certain affidavits and other documents to be referred to hereinafter, all of which were attached and made a part of the motion.
In opposition to this motion the appellants submitted an affidavit, a deposition and certain documents.
Upon consideration of this motion the trial court entered an order granting the summary judgment. In doing so it made the following findings of fact: that the Foundation is a purely public charitable organization under the laws of Georgia; that the property alleged to be tax exempt comprises a large part of Wormsloe Plantation and has been used exclusively since 1962 for purely public charitable purposes; and that this property constitutes an historical site, containing a fort erected as a defense against the Spaniards, and other historical features.
The trial court made two conclusions of law, to wit: (1) that the Foundation is a purely public charity within the meaning of the laws of Georgia; and (2) that the property it alleged to be tax exempt had been "dedicated to, and used [725]*725exclusively since 1962 for purely public, charitable purposes within the meaning of the laws of Georgia. [Cits.]”
Pursuant to the foregoing the appellants were permanently enjoined from assessing, levying or otherwise attempting to collect ad valorem taxes on the property involved and the tax executions for the years 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968 were ordered canceled.
The appellants appealed from this order, contending that the court erred in (1) overruling its oral motion to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds that it fails to allege a dedication of the property to public and charitable purposes and also that it fails to state a claim for equitable relief from taxation; and (2) in granting the Foundation’s motion for summary judgment.
The motion to dismiss was properly denied.
The complaint alleged in essence that the property in question has been used exclusively and continuously since 1962 for the benefit of charitable institutions; that it is exempt from taxation by virtue of stated constitutional and statutory provisions; that the property has been levied upon for taxes; that said levy is illegal; and that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.
The allegations of the complaint are sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss in view of the Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. §81A-108 (a)). No longer must a cause of action be alleged. The allegations are not to be construed most strongly against the pleader. The complaint gave notice of the nature of the claim. See in this connection, Gill v. Myrick, 228 Ga. 253 (1) (185 SE2d 72).
We come now to the substantial question, whether the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment upon the ground that the property was exempt as purely public charity.
To begin with, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV (Code Ann. §2-5404) of the Georgia Constitution provides in material part as follows:
"The General Assembly may, by law, exempt from taxation ... all institutions of purely public charity . . . this [726]*726exemption shall not apply to real estate or buildings other than those used for the operation of such institution and which is rented, leased or otherwise used for the primary purpose of securing an income thereon; and also provided that such donations of property shall not be predicated upon an agreement, contract or otherwise that the donors shall receive or retain any part of the net or gross income of the property.”
Pursuant to the aforesaid authority, the General Assembly has also provided that "all institutions of purely public charity” are exempt from taxation. Code Ann. § 92-201.
However, to qualify for ad valorem tax exemption as an "institution of purely public charity” the property itself must be dedicated to a purely public charitable use. Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council, BSA, 185 Ga. 810 (196 SE 762, 116 ALR 373); United Hospitals Service Assn. v. Fulton County, 216 Ga. 30 (114 SE2d 524).
Wormsloe Foundation, Inc. claims certain of its property qualifies as such by implication.
"Dedications of lands for charitable and religious purposes, and for public highways, are valid without any grantee to hold the fee, and the principle upon which they are sustained, sustains dedications of streets, squares and commons . . . When lands are dedicated and are enjoyed as such, and rights are required [acquired?] by individuals in reference to such dedication, the law considers it in the nature of an estoppel in pais, which precludes the original owner from revoking it.” Mayor &c. of Macon v. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239, 244.
" Whether express or implied, an intention on the part of the owner to dedicate his property to the public use must be shown . . . When an implied dedication is claimed, the facts relied on must be such as to clearly indicate a purpose on the part of the owner to abandon his personal dominion over the property and to devote it to a definite public use.’ Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 707 (30 SE2d 627) . . . 'The mere use of one’s property by a small portion of the public, even for an extended period of time, will not amount to a dedication of the property to a public use, un[727]*727less it appears clearly that there was an intention to dedicate . . . ’ (Healey v. City of Atlanta, 125 Ga. 736, 738 (54 SE 749)), and that this dedication was accepted by the public by public use. Chatham Motorcycle Club v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770 (1) [107 SE2d 806].” Nelson v. Girard, 215 Ga. 518 (2) (11 SE2d 60).
We are unable to find an implied dedication to a public charitable use from the evidence pertinent to this issue which shows: the property involved consists of 750 acres, the Dean of the Department of Biology of Armstrong State College operated 300 traps for wildlife studies on the property from 1964-1967 and 60 traps since then, that he is also currently conducting bird population studies, and the classes of the School of Environmental Design of the University of Georgia consisting of as many as 60 students visit the property as often as three times a year and sometimes stay as long as three days.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that anyone desiring to enter the property must obtain the permission of the plaintiff and make an appointment. In our view this completely refutes any finding of an implied dedication.
Also, the crucial language to be interpreted in this constitutional and statutory exemption is "used for the operation of such institution.”
This record discloses that Wormsloe Foundation, Inc. is not using the subject property itself for the operation of activities carried on by Wormsloe Foundation, Inc. Wormsloe Foundation, Inc. is merely making the property available to the University System of Georgia and to Emory University. And the activities of those institutions carried on on the property are rather minimal.
We interpret this crucial constitutional and statutory language to mean that the charitable institution itself must be carrying on an operation on its real estate for the benefit of the public or for some other legitimate charitable purpose. Merely making real estate available to other public or charitable institutions for their use is not sufficient to qualify for the tax exemption.
[728]*728It is rather plain that a charitable institution can not be allowed to qualify its real estate for tax exemption, especially such a vast acreage as is involved in this case, by such a thin legal thread as has been shown in this motion for summary judgment.
It cannot be successfully maintained that the pleadings, depositions and other documents "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c).
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that claims for exemption from taxation should generally be construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayers. See Fulton County Federal Savings &c. Assn. v. Simmons, 210 Ga. 621 (82 SE2d 16).
We therefore hold that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment upon the ground that the property here was used exclusively for purely public charity and was thus exempt from ad valorem taxation.
Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part.
All the Justices concur, except Grice, J., who dissents from Division 2.