Johnson v. Officer Ponticello

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedOctober 24, 2024
Docket6:24-cv-05076
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Officer Ponticello (Johnson v. Officer Ponticello) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Officer Ponticello, (D.S.C. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION

Robert W. Johnson, ) C/A No. 6:24-cv-05076-RMG-KFM ) Plaintiff, ) REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ) vs. ) ) Officer Ponticello, ) ) Defendant. ) ) This is a civil action filed by a pro se non-prisoner plaintiff. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. The plaintiff’s complaint was entered on the docket on September 18, 2024 (doc. 1). Upon review of the complaint, the undersigned recommends that it be summarily dismissed. ALLEGATIONS This is a civil action filed by the plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se (doc. 1). The plaintiff alleges that the defendant has violated his rights by “discriminations, civil rights violations and due process violations” (id. at 3). The plaintiff contends that on September 2, 2024, after Mr. Reid trespassed on the plaintiff’s property, the defendant failed to arrest Mr. Reid or enter a restraining order against Mr. Reid when requested by the plaintiff (id. at 4). The plaintiff’s injuries include mental and physical anguish (id. at 5). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id.). APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff’s pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them.” Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). There are two types of federal jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. Federal question jurisdiction arises when the case arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction, 2 on the other hand, is conferred upon the Court when a suit is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, liberally construed, the plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (doc. 1 at 3). Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Venue Venue in § 1983 actions is established by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that a civil action can be brought in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Therefore, under Section 1391, this action may be heard in a venue where the defendant resides (Syracuse, New York), or in the venue where the issue substantially arose (Syracuse, New York) – both of which appear to be located in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The court may, “in the interest 3 of justice,” transfer a case “to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Under the plain language of § 1406(a), dismissal – and not transfer – is the default disposition of a case filed in an improper venue. When evaluating the propriety of a transfer, rather than a dismissal, within the context of § 1404, the “interest of justice” has been interpreted to include such factors as “the pendency of a related action, the court’s familiarity with the applicable law, docket conditions, access to premises that might have to be viewed, the possibility of unfair trial, the ability to join other parties and the possibility of harassment.” Bd.

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Related

Lehigh Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Kelly
160 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1895)
Burnett v. New York Central Railroad
380 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1965)
Baker v. McCollan
443 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Albright v. Oliver
510 U.S. 266 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
United States v. Joseph Jesse Espinoza
641 F.2d 153 (Fourth Circuit, 1981)
United States v. Edward Lester Schronce, Jr.
727 F.2d 91 (Fourth Circuit, 1984)
Rehberg v. Paulk
132 S. Ct. 1497 (Supreme Court, 2012)
In Re Bulldog Trucking, Incorporated
147 F.3d 347 (Fourth Circuit, 1998)
Feurtado v. McNair
227 F. App'x 303 (Fourth Circuit, 2007)
Harley v. United States
349 F. Supp. 2d 980 (M.D. North Carolina, 2004)
Ballard v. Carlson
882 F.2d 93 (Fourth Circuit, 1989)
Linda R. S. v. Richard D.
410 U.S. 614 (Supreme Court, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
Johnson v. Officer Ponticello, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-officer-ponticello-scd-2024.