Johnson v. Marchiano

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 20, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-07267
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Marchiano (Johnson v. Marchiano) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Marchiano, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IBRAHIM X. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, -against- 24-CV-7267 (LTS) NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIALS AND ORDER TO AMEND HEARINGS; MARIA MARCHIANO; EDWARD EDWARDS; MARCIA GRANT; YESSENIA RAMOS CRUZ, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Ibrahim X. Johnson, who is proceeding pro se, alleges that his employer, the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (“OATH”) discriminated against him because of his age and gender. The Court construes the complaint as asserting race and sex discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), and race, sex, and age discrimination claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws (“HRL”). He names as Defendants OATH and four individuals, Maria Marchiano, Edward Edwards, Marcia Grant, and Yessenia Ramos Cruz. By order dated November 20, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the amended complaint.1 On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a charge with the New York State Human Rights Division and the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) “because I had a grievance against . . . OATH.” (ECF 1, at 5.) Plaintiff states that he “formally accused OATH of violating federal and state laws that prohibit Age and Gender discrimination.” (Id.) “On August 30th, 2024, NYC OATH terminated my employment under the pretext that they ‘no longer needed my services.’” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “OATH’s custom of terminating employees after they file discrimination complaints violates the 1st Amendment rights of the grieving employees.” (Id.)

1 The Court quotes from the amended complaint. All spelling, grammar, and capitalization are as in the original, unless otherwise noted. In addition to OATH, Plaintiff names as defendants three OATH employees: (1) Maria Marchiano, Chief Clerk of an OATH location at 66 John Street; (2) Edward Edwards, an OATH Hearing Support Manager at the same John Street location; and (3) Marcia Grant, the Chief of Human Resources, also at the OATH John Street location. Plaintiff also names as a defendant Yessenia Ramos Cruz, a Branch Manager at an unidentified entity, located in the Bronx. Plaintiff

does not plead any facts regarding these four individuals. Plaintiff seeks to be reinstated at OATH and to recover money damages. DISCUSSION A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal

conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. The complaint does not comply with Rule 8 because it does not state facts suggesting that Plaintiff is entitled to relief from the Defendants. Plaintiff asserts that OATH discriminated against him because of his age and gender, but he does not allege any facts in support of this assertion. Moreover, although he claims that OATH retaliated against him after he filed a claim of discrimination, he does not state any facts describing why he believes that his filing a charge with the DHR and the EEOC caused OATH to fire him. Finally, Plaintiff does not state any facts describing how the three OATH employees were involved personally in his firing or how the fourth individual, Cruz, participated in any discriminatory conduct related to Plaintiff’s employment. Accordingly,the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to state facts in support of his claimsunder Title VII, the ADEA, and the New York State and New York

City HRLs. Title VII Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ...to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, or who has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under the statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

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Bluebook (online)
Johnson v. Marchiano, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-marchiano-nysd-2025.