Johnson v. Frederick

467 F. Supp. 956, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13658
CourtDistrict Court, D. North Dakota
DecidedMarch 20, 1979
DocketCiv. A78-2071
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 467 F. Supp. 956 (Johnson v. Frederick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. North Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Frederick, 467 F. Supp. 956, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13658 (D.N.D. 1979).

Opinion

ORDER

BENSON, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff in the above-entitled action is an Indian who is presently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution, Oxford, Wisconsin, under sentence imposed by this court. He was convicted of the offense of second degree murder of his wife, which offense was committed within the exterior boundaries of the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation in North Dakota.

*958 Plaintiff brought this action pro se, alleging defendants have violated his constitutional rights by denying him visits and correspondence with his children. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Jurisdiction is asserted in the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1361, 2201 and 2202; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

Defendant Richard Frederick is the tribal judge on the Turtle Mountain Reservation who placed plaintiff’s children in a foster home. Defendants Betty Sue Wilkie and Patricia Allery are, or were at the times alleged in the complaint, social workers employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs on the Turtle Mountain Reservation. Defendants Martin and Carolyn Gourneau are the appointed foster parents of plaintiff’s children.

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint.

Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add two additional jurisdictional bases, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1391. Since the court does not have jurisdiction under either of these statutes, the motion is denied.

In the absence of an allegation to the contrary, plaintiff, as a prisoner, remains a citizen of North Dakota for purposes of federal jurisdiction. See White v. Fawcett Publications, 324 F.Supp. 403 (W.D.Mo.1971). It appears from the record that all of the defendants except Betty Sue Wilkie are citizens of North Dakota. Therefore, complete diversity of citizenship is lacking and the court has no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

The court also notes that 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the venue statute, does not confer jurisdiction.

II. Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Frederick, Gourneau and Gourneau.

The above-named defendants have moved for dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff has enumerated eleven causes of action in his complaint, each alleging deprivation of a right secured to him by the Constitution and violation of the parallel provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1302. 1

Plaintiff has no cause of action against the moving defendants based directly on the constitutional provisions he cites. The powers of the Turtle Mountain *959 tribal government are constrained only by the provisions of the ICRA, and not by the parallel provisions of the Constitution. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1675, 56 L.Ed.2d 106, 113-114 (1978).

Plaintiff also has no remedy in this court under the ICRA. The United States Supreme Court held in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, that the exclusive remedy in the federal courts for enforcement of the provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 1302 is a habeas corpus action brought pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303. 2 All other enforcement actions must be brought in the tribal courts. The Supreme Court recognized the respect that is to be accorded the tribal courts:

Tribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA, and § 1302 has the substantial and intended effect of changing the substantive law which these forums are to apply. Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians. 3

436 U.S. at 65, 98 S.Ct. at 1680-1681, 56 L.Ed.2d at 119-120.

The fact that plaintiff’s complaint is in part against the tribal judge who placed plaintiff’s children in a foster home on the reservation and supervises their care does not change the result. Congress has not provided a remedy in the federal courts for this type of action, so plaintiff’s civil rights grievance under the ICRA may be presented only to the tribal court.

None of the other statutes cited in plaintiff’s complaint will serve as a basis for relief either. Since there is no state action involved, plaintiff has no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The federal question and civil rights jurisdictional statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 respectively, provide plaintiff no basis for relief from the moving defendants since he has no cause of action under the Constitution, the Indian Civil Rights Act or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court has no diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, since plaintiff and the moving defendants are all citizens of North Dakota. Since none of the moving defendants are federal officers, no mandamus action will lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The remaining statute cited by plaintiff, the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
467 F. Supp. 956, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13658, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-frederick-ndd-1979.