Johnson v. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION

836 F. Supp. 14, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15504, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 651, 1993 WL 464565
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedNovember 2, 1993
DocketCiv. A. 92-1136
StatusPublished
Cited by80 cases

This text of 836 F. Supp. 14 (Johnson v. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, 836 F. Supp. 14, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15504, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 651, 1993 WL 464565 (D.D.C. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SPORKIN, District Judge.

In this action, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., the plaintiff, Willie L. Johnson, alleges that his former employer, Digital Equipment Corporation (“Digital”) fired him from his sales position because of his race. Mr. Johnson is a black male. He was hired by Digital as a Senior Sales Representative in 1986 to sell Digital computer systems. Johnson was initially hired to work on the “large systems sales team” but was soon moved to a sales team which catered to the National Air and Space Administration (“NASA”). After two years on the NASA account, Johnson was given a number of less established “developmental accounts”. Digital terminated Mr. Johnson’s employment on September 10,1991. The Court has before it Digital’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike Evidence.

In his complaint and opposition to Digital’s motion for summary judgment, Mr. Johnson states that he was a capable salesman who performed well until taken off the NASA account. Mr. Johnson alleges that Digital gave white sales representatives accounts with greater promise and thus provided white employees with more opportunities to meet their sales goals while he was relegated to non-performing “developmental” accounts. Thus, Mr. Johnson alleges that he was treat *15 ed differently from similarly situated white employees and that Digital’s proffered reason for terminating his employment — poor sales performance — was but a pretext for racial discrimination. Digital maintains that Mr. Johnson was hired as a salesman and despite numerous attempts to improve his sales skills through corrective action plans and other problem solving programs used by Digital to assist poorly performing employees, his sales skills remained inadequate to meet Digital’s requirements. Digital insists that Mr. Johnson’s performance on the NASA account was inadequate and that he was removed at the request of the customer. Digital also asserts that after he was taken off the NASA account, Mr. Johnson was given a number of developmental sales accounts where he had ample opportunity to succeed based on his sales ability. But despite having one of the lowest sales budgets of any sales representative Mr. Johnson failed to even come close to achieving his projected budget.

Because Mr. Johnson has brought forward no competent evidence to support his claim that Digital’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for firing him was pretextual, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment.

Summary Judgment Standards

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(c). Mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading are not enough to prevent the issuance of summary judgment. The adverse party’s opposition must be supported by affidavits or other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(e).

The governing standards for the issuance of summary judgment were set by the Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In Celotex, the Court explicitly recognized that a full-blown trial is a drain on resources to be avoided if and when the non-moving party’s position cannot be substantiated through affidavit or other competent means:

Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action,” Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 1.
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.

Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. (citation omitted).

The plaintiff as the non-moving party is “required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find” in its favor. Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam) (citing Celotex, supra). For this case to go to trial, Mr. Johnson must provide evidence of his prima facie case which would be admissible at trial. Furthermore, if Digital provides adequate evidence that Johnson was terminated because of poor performance, Johnson must then bring forward evidence of the pretextual nature of the legitimate non-discriminatory purpose posited by defendant Digital. Evidence of discrimination that is “merely colorable”, or “not significantly probative” cannot prevent the issuance of summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Evidence Put Forward by Plaintiff Johnson

In a Title VII complaint the prima facie case is established when the plaintiff demonstrates that 1) He is a member of a protected class, 2) that he was terminated from his position, and 3) that he was replaced by a member of a non-protected class of equal or *16 lesser qualifications or that non-members of the protected class were treated more favorably. If the plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating these things, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the termination. Once the defendant has substantiated the legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide evidence that the legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision was merely a pretext — a mask — for illegal race-based discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Mr. Johnson claims that he was fired on the basis of his race. His allegations can be encapsulated in the four following statements:

1) Willie Johnson was an excellent salesman who performed well until he was replaced on a key account (the NASA account) by a white woman.

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836 F. Supp. 14, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15504, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 651, 1993 WL 464565, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-digital-equipment-corporation-dcd-1993.